AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE



GLENN P. HASTEDT

TWELFTH EDITION

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GLENN P. HASTEDT
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To Matthew David

Brief Contents

Preface xiv

1 Defining American Foreign Policy Problems 1

2 The Global Context 27

3 The American National Style 51

4 Learning from the Past 75

5 Society 103

6 Congress 133

7 Presidency 162

8 Bureaucracy 189

9 Policy-Making Models 218

10 Diplomacy 244

11 Economic Instruments 271

12 Military Instruments: Big Wars 302

13 Military Instruments: Small Wars 328

14 Alternative Futures 353

Glossary G-1

Notes N-1

Credits C-1

Index I-1

Contents

Preface xiv

1 Defining American Foreign Policy Problems 1

■ DATELINE: ISIS 1

Thinking about Foreign Policy Problems 3

Choices 4
- What Do Americans Want in Foreign Policy? 4
- The National Interest 5

Costs 6

Building Consensus 7

Selecting a Policy Instrument 8
- Hard Power and Soft Power 9
- Unilateral or Multilateral Action 9

■ HISTORICAL LESSON: The America First Committee, 1940 10

Presidential Foreign Policy Doctrines 12

■ BOX 1.1: Selected Presidential Foreign Policy Doctrines 12
- The Truman Doctrine 14
- The Nixon Doctrine 15
- The Carter Doctrine 16
- The Reagan Doctrine 16
- The Bush Doctrine 18
- In Search of the Trump Doctrine 18

Assessing Foreign Policy Results 21
- Intellectual Coherence 22
- The Dominance of Domestic Politics 22
- Consistency of Application 23

■ OVER THE HORIZON: The Future of Grand Strategy 24

Critical Thinking Questions | Key Terms | Further Reading 25

2 The Global Context 27

■ DATELINE: The South China Sea 27

■ HISTORICAL LESSON: The First Asian Pivot: Commodore Perry's Opening of Japan 29

Thinking about the World 31
Realism 31
Neoliberalism 32
Constructivism 32
International System: Structural Constants 32
Decentralization 33
Self-Help System 33
A Stratified System 34
International System: Evolutionary Trends 35
Diffusion of Power 35
Issue Proliferation 36
Actor Proliferation 37
Regional Diversity 38
Dominant Features Today 39
Terrorism 39
■ BOX 2.1: Snapshot of Global Terrorism 40
Globalization 42
American Hegemony 44
■ BOX 2.2: Military Power Republic of China, 2019 45
America and the World: Attitudes and Perceptions 47
■ OVER THE HORIZON: 2035 48
Critical Thinking Questions | Key Terms | Further Reading 49

3 The American National Style 51
■ DATELINE: The Mexican Border 51
The Importance of Ideas 54
Isolationism versus Internationalism 56
Historical Sources of the American National Style 57
Patterns 59
Unilateralism 59
Moral Pragmatism 61
Legalism 63
Consequences of the American National Style 64
■ HISTORICAL LESSON: The Bracero Program 65
Voices from the Past 69
■ OVER THE HORIZON: A Millennial Foreign Policy? 72
Critical Thinking Questions | Key Terms | Further Reading 73

4 Learning from the Past 75

- DATELINE: Venezuela 75

How Do Policy Makers Learn from the Past? 78

Events From Which Policy Makers Learn 79

Types of Calculations Made 80

Lessons Learned 81

- HISTORICAL LESSON: U.S.-Cuban Relations 82
- CASE STUDIES 84
  - The Vietnam War 84
  - The Iraq War 92
- OVER THE HORIZON: The Challenge to R2P 100

Critical Thinking Questions | Key Terms | Further Reading 101

5 Society 103

- DATELINE: NSA Electronic Surveillance 103
- HISTORICAL LESSON: The Pentagon Papers 105

Public Awareness of Foreign Policy Issues 106

Public Opinion 107
- Trends and Content 107
- Public Opinion and the Use of Force 109
- Impact of Public Opinion 112

Elections 113
- Voting and Foreign Policy 113
- Impact of Elections 114

Interest Groups 116
- Types of Interest Groups 116
- Impact of Interest Groups 123

Political Protest 123

The Media and American Foreign Policy 124
- Newspapers and Television 125
- The New Media and American Foreign Policy 125
- Shaping the Public's View 126

States and Cities: The New Foreign Policy Battleground 128

Policy Makers' Responses 128

- OVER THE HORIZON: An Intelligence-Industrial Complex? 129

Critical Thinking Questions | Key Terms | Further Reading 131

6 Congress 133

- DATELINE: Yemen Resolution 133

Constitutional Powers 136
- Treaty-Making Power 136
- Appointment Powers 139
- War Powers 139

- HISTORICAL LESSON: War Powers Act 140
- BOX 6.1: Excerpt: House Resolution Authorizing the Use of Military Force against Iraq, October 2, 2002 143

Commerce Powers 145

Congressional Structure and Foreign Policy 146

Blunt Foreign Policy Tools 146

- BOX 6.2: Investigating Russia's Involvement in the 2016 Presidential Election 149

The Absence of a Single Voice 152
Policy Entrepreneurship 152
Staff Aides 153

Influence of Party and Region 154

Outsourcing Foreign Policy 155

Congress and the President: The Changing Relationship 156

- OVER THE HORIZON: A New War Powers Act? 159

Critical Thinking Questions | Key Terms | Further Reading 160

7 Presidency 162

- DATELINE: Trump's First 100 Days 162
- HISTORICAL LESSON: John F. Kennedy's First 100 Days 164

Weak President or Strong President 166

The President and the Foreign Affairs Constitution 166
- Executive Agreements 167
- Signing Statements 168
- Executive Orders, Spending, and Administrative Powers 168
- Informal Ambassadors 170
- Undeclared Wars 170

When Does the President Matter? 171
- Presidential Personality 172
- Presidential Managerial Style 175

The National Security Council 177

Other White House Voices 182
The Vice President 182
The U.S. Trade Representative 183
The White House Chief of Staff 183
The First Lady 185
■ OVER THE HORIZON: Improving Presidential Transitions 186
Critical Thinking Questions | Key Terms | Further Reading 187

8 Bureaucracy 189
■ DATELINE: Fixing the State Department 189
Presidents and the Bureaucracy 192
The State Department 192
Structure and Growth of the State Department 192
The State Department's Value System 194
Impact of the State Department on Foreign Policy 196
The Defense Department 196
Structure and Growth of the Department of Defense 197
■ HISTORICAL LESSON: Integrating the Military 198
The Value System of the Department of Defense 202
Impact of the Defense Department on Foreign Policy 204
The CIA and the Intelligence Community 205
Structure and Growth of the CIA and the Intelligence Community 205
The Intelligence Community's Value System 208
Impact of the CIA and the Intelligence Community on Foreign Policy 210
The Domestic Bureaucracies 211
Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture 211
Homeland Security 213
Policy Makers' Response to Bureaucracy 214
■ OVER THE HORIZON: U.S. Space Command 214
Critical Thinking Questions | Key Terms | Further Reading 216

9 Policy-Making Models 218
■ DATELINE: Iran Crises 218
■ BOX 9.1: Chronology of Events Leading up to the Downing of a U.S. Drone by Iran 219
Foreign Policy Decisions and Models 222

The Rational Actor Model 223
The Bureaucratic Politics Model 224
The Small-Group Decision-Making Model 225
Elite Theory and Pluralism 229
■ HISTORICAL LESSON: The War to End All Wars 231
Integrating Models 233
The Cuban Missile Crisis 234
The Crisis: An Overview 234
Applying the Rational Actor Model to the Crisis 237
Applying the Bureaucratic Politics Model to the Crisis 238
Applying the Small-Group Decision-Making Model to the Crisis 240
Models: A Critique 241
■ OVER THE HORIZON: Individual-Centered Models 241
Critical Thinking Questions | Key Terms | Further Reading 242

10 Diplomacy 244
■ DATELINE: Paris Agreement 244
Diplomacy: Choices and Dilemmas 246
The Diplomatic Tool Kit 246
Bilateralism versus Multilateralism 247
Process versus Product 247
Incentives versus Sanctions 248
Trump's Approach to Diplomacy 249
Allies, Friends, Adversaries 250
Shuttle Diplomacy 251
Summit Diplomacy 252
East-West Superpower Summits 253
Economic Summits 253
The Trump-Putin Summit 254
Conference Diplomacy 255
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) 255
■ HISTORICAL LESSON: The Kyoto Protocol and Copenhagen Accord 257
Environmental Conferences 259
Human Rights Conferences 259

UN Diplomacy 260
Public Diplomacy and Digital Diplomacy 261
The Political Use of Force 263
Coercive Diplomacy 263
Nuclear Diplomacy 264
Arms Transfers 265
■ OVER THE HORIZON: A Climate Coalition of the Willing 268
Critical Thinking Questions | Key Terms | Further Reading 269

11 Economic Instruments 271
■ DATELINE: New NAFTA 271
Economic Statecraft 273
Inventory of Options 274
Strategic Outlooks 275
Free Trade 275
Strategic Trade 276
Monetary Strategies 277
Trump's Trade Strategy 278
Varieties of Trade Agreements 278
Bilateral Trade Agreements 278
Regional Trade Agreements 279
Global Trade Agreements 281
Economic Sanctions 282
Using Sanctions 282
Sanctions in Action: Iran, Cuba, Russia 283
The China Trade War 287
Foreign Aid 288
Types of Foreign Aid 290
Cold War Foreign Aid 292
Post–Cold War Foreign Aid 292
■ HISTORICAL LESSON: NAFTA 293
Post–9/11 Foreign Aid 295
Contemporary Foreign Aid 298
■ OVER THE HORIZON: How Trade Wars End 299
Critical Thinking Questions | Key Terms | Further Reading 300

12 Military Instruments: Big Wars 302

■ DATELINE: North Korean Denuclearization 302

Cold War Nuclear Thinking 305
The U.S. Cold War Strategic Arsenal 305
U.S. Cold War Nuclear Strategy 306

■ HISTORICAL LESSON: The Baruch Plan 308

Post–Cold War Nuclear Thinking 310
The U.S. Post–Cold War Strategic Nuclear Arsenal 310
U.S. Post–Cold War Nuclear Strategy: Content 311

Bridging the Nuclear-Conventional Divide 312
Deterrence 312
Preemption 314

Using Large-Scale Conventional Military Force 315

Reducing the Danger of War: Arms Control and Disarmament 317
The Cold War Record 318
The Post–Cold War Record 320

Defense 323
The Strategic Defense Initiative 323
National Missile Defense Systems 324

■ OVER THE HORIZON: The Fate of New START 325

Critical Thinking Questions | Key Terms | Further Reading 326

13 Military Instruments: Small Wars 328

■ DATELINE: Cyber Warfare 328

Pivoting Out of Small Wars: Afghanistan 330

Separating Big Wars from Small Wars 332

Types of Small Wars 333
Hybrid Warfare 333
Counterinsurgency 334
Counterterrorism 336

Small Wars by Other Means 337
Cold War Covert Action 337
Post–Cold War Covert Action 340

■ HISTORICAL LESSON: Into Afghanistan 340
The Covert War against Osama bin Laden 343
Cyber Warfare 343

Small Wars for Peace 344
Humanitarian/Peacekeeping Operations 344
Stability Operations 345
Conventional, Cyber, and WMD Arms Control 346
Chemical and Biological Weapons 346
Recovering Loose WMD Material 347
Cyberspace 347
Conventional Weapons 348
Counterproliferation 349
■ OVER THE HORIZON: Drone Wars 350
Critical Thinking Questions | Key Terms | Further Reading 351

14 Alternative Futures 353
■ DATELINE: Africa 353
Foreign Policy Visions 355
The United States as an Ordinary State 356
Reformed America 357
Pragmatic America 358
American Crusader 359
America the Balancer 360
Disengaged America 362
■ HISTORICAL LESSON: The Path to Mogadishu 362
■ OVER THE HORIZON: The U.S.–China Relationship 365
Critical Thinking Questions | Key Terms | Further Reading 367

Glossary G-1
Notes N-1
Credits C-1
Index I-1

Preface

This twelfth edition of *American Foreign Policy* comes at a time when Donald Trump's presidency is breaking way from many of the traditional foundation points in American foreign policy in terms of how foreign policy is made and its content. The results have pleased some and angered others but almost uniformly raised political tensions at home and abroad

Like its predecessors, this twelfth edition of *American Foreign Policy* does not try to present students with an answer on how best to move American foreign policy forward. Rather, it is designed to help students cultivate the critical thinking skills they need to develop their own answers and participate in current and future debates about the conduct and content of U.S. foreign policy. We do this by raising four key sets of questions over the course of the book: (1) What do we mean by foreign policy and what is the national interest? (2) How did we get here and how do we learn from the past? (3) How is foreign policy made? (4) What next?

The twelfth edition updates information presented in the eleventh introduces students to key facets of Trump's foreign policy style and the content of his decisions. It adds to the previous edition more extensive discussions of China trade policy, the conflict with Iran, relations with Russia, U.S. involvement in Africa, and arms control talks with North Korea as well as providing a foundation for understanding the Congressional move to impeachment. The Further Reading sections at the end of each chapter have been updated and include a greater number of journal articles for students to examine on their own.

The chapters in this edition of *American Foreign Policy* contain all of the essential critical thinking materials found in previous editions. The introductory "Dateline" section introduces students to the material being covered by providing them with a short contemporary case study. The "Historical Lessons" section provides a historical context for students to understand current U.S. foreign policy issues and is linked to the "Dateline" section. The "Over the Horizon" section concludes each chapter with a speculative view to the future to spur student thinking about how American foreign policy might evolve in the coming years. Each of these critical thinking sections has been updated and in some cases revised to better capture the current U.S. foreign policy agenda. In many chapters new material appears in these sections to reflect the evolving nature of American foreign policy. Topics include:

- The America First Committee, 1940
- The future of grand strategy
- U.S.-Cuban relations
- Venezuela

- Trump's first 100 days
- The New NAFTA
- North Korean denuclearization
- The Iran Drone Crisis
- The Fate of New START
- Fixing the State Department

Special thanks to the reviewers for the twelfth edition: Edin Mujkic (University of Colorado Colorado Springs) and Rita Peters (Harvard University Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies).

Defining American Foreign Policy Problems 1



Dateline: ISIS

Foreign policy problems rarely surface as coherent, neatly packaged challenges providing policy makers with clear guidance on what conditions produced them or the proper response. Nor do they remain constant over time. Instead, they evolve and mutate, sometimes in unexpected ways. Such has been the challenge facing the United States in responding to ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), also known as Daesh or ISIL (the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant).

In campaigning for the presidency, Donald Trump embraced a policy of strong military action against ISIS, declaring that he would "bomb the hell" out of the Iraqi oil fields it controlled and send twenty thousand

to thirty thousand troops to Syria. Neither of these policies was implemented. Nonetheless, the net effect of the military campaigns against ISIS his administration inherited seriously reduced ISIS control over territory in Syria and Iraq. In December 2018, Trump declared victory over ISIS in Syria and announced plans to withdraw U.S. forces from that nation. Secretary of Defense James Mattis promptly resigned in opposition to this decision. Trump soon changed direction again, stating in early 2019 that the U.S. would keep forces in Iraq to "watch Iran," a mission different from preventing the resurgence of ISIS in Iraq.

For Trump, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Syria fulfilled his American First campaign promise of avoiding long-term military commitments abroad in the absence of direct threats to U.S. security interests. U.S. allies and many members of Congress saw it as a dangerous move that would strengthen the influence of Russia and Iran in Syria (through their support of Syrian President Bashir Assad); provoke Turkey into attacking U.S. supported, anti-ISIS Syrian Kurdish forces along its border; and lead to the further destabilization of Syria (due to the continued presence of ISIS fighters in Syria and Iraq). Less than one year later, after European allies declined his request to send troops to Syria to replace departing U.S. forces, Trump announced that some four hundred troops would remain in Syria. In March 2019 it was announced that the Pentagon planned to leave one thousand troops there.

ISIS emerged from the ashes of the Bush administration's successful military operations against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Iraq. Initially it was viewed as a "low boil" insurgency that might last a decade. Early in 2014, President Obama referred to the successor groups to al-Qaeda—of which ISIS was one—as being equivalent to a junior varsity team. Later that year, the intelligence community reached the conclusion that this characterization of ISIS's capabilities and intentions was incorrect. Key to this changed assessment was ISIS's expansion into Syria, where an ongoing and brutal civil war provided it with a safe haven to grow and expand its influence and allow it to seek to take territory in Iraq and Syria. As predicted, in June 2014, ISIS declared its intent to create an *Islamic caliphate* (an Islamic state led by a religious supreme leader who is also its political leader). By the end of 2014, ISIS had captured dams, oil fields, and air bases, and had established a de facto capital in Raqqa, in northeastern Syria. The intelligence community estimated that ISIS had 20,000–31,500 fighters, two-thirds of whom were based in Syria. As 2014 progressed, it also became increasingly clear that the administration's policy of relying on regional allies and Syrian rebels to defeat ISIS needed to change. However, it was not clear in what direction it needed to move. As Obama noted in August 2014, "We don't have a strategy yet." No off-the-shelf, canned solution existed for responding to ISIS. Obama's administration was torn between aversion to another ground war and the need to take military action. A series of difficult and

interconnected choices had to be made under uncertainty and with incomplete information.

ISIS remains a problem for Trump. As the January 2019 intelligence community's *World Threat Assessment* report stated, "ISIS still commands thousands of fighters in Iraq and Syria, and it maintains eight branches, more than a dozen networks, and thousands of dispersed supporters around the world. . . . ISIS very likely will continue to pursue external attacks from Iraq and Syria against regional and Western adversaries, including the United States."[1] The Defense Department echoed this assessment. These judgments were unchanged by Trump's decision to use U.S. forces to deny ISIS access to Syrian oil fields and the death of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghadi in an October military raid. In addition, the withdrawal of U.S. forces also raised fears of an increased Russian and Turkish military presence in Syria.[2]

This chapter examines six key tasks in constructing a foreign policy: (1) problems must be defined, (2) choices must be made, (3) costs must be assessed, (4) public support must be built, (5) a course of action must be designed, and (6) results must be assessed. Selected presidential foreign policy doctrines are reviewed later in the chapter to help place Trump's foreign policy in a larger context.

Thinking about Foreign Policy Problems

In thinking about foreign policy problems, presidents discover three political truths very quickly. First, most foreign policy problems contain a bundle of distinct policy problems or issues that intersect in complicated ways. This makes deciding how to approach a problem difficult because of uncertainty over the nature of the problem or how attacking one aspect will affect its other dimensions. In 2004, then national security advisor Condoleezza Rice told the 9/11 Commission the following about the Bush administration's anti-terrorism policy: "You didn't have an approach against al-Qaeda because you didn't have an approach against Afghanistan. And you didn't have an approach against Afghanistan because you didn't have an approach against Pakistan. And until we could get that right, we didn't have a policy."[3]

Second, foreign policy problems are seldom ever "solved." George Shultz, President Ronald Reagan's Secretary of State, noted that policy making does not involve confronting "one damn thing after another . . . it involves confronting the same damn thing over and over."[4] This is due in part to the difficulty of fashioning policies that accurately capture the problem's complexity. However, the necessity of dealing with the same problem over and over again may also occur because it has no solution. Problems without solutions are often characterized as wicked problems. Terrorism is seen by many as a wicked problem because no permanent solution exists.

Terrorism can be deterred, targets can be protected, and the terrorist threat can be managed, but the potential for terrorism always exists.

Third, it is important to realize that the history and origin of foreign policy problems differ. In terms of political history, some foreign policy problems are inherited from previous administrations, but others are the result of a president's own policy. The key dilemma faced by U.S. presidents is whether to endorse the policy line of their predecessor or move in a new direction. President Obama inherited an American on-the-ground military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan from President Bush that he was determined to end. President Trump inherited a similar military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with proxy wars in Syria and Yemen. Important political calculations depend on whether a foreign policy was inherited or of one's own making: Only inherited policy problems can be blamed on one's predecessor. President Trump has frequently done so, citing the "mess" he inherited from President Obama. As Trump's presidency progresses, this argument becomes more difficult to make, and responsibility falls more directly on his administration for policy outcomes in trade (with China, and a new NAFTA agreement), arms control (North Korea and Iran), regional military crises (Iran and Yemen), and immigration (the Mexican wall).

Choices

Foreign policy is about choices: what goals to pursue, what threats to protect against, what costs to bear, and who should bear those costs. Choices always exist. When asked if the president ever had a last card to play in foreign policy before having to walk away and accept defeat, President George W. Bush replied, "There is always another card." However, those choices might not always be great ones. In reflecting on the four military options presented to him on Afghanistan, Obama noted that two were basically alike and two were unclear.[5] Trump has expressed similar frustration with the military options given to him in dealing with Venezuela, North Korea, and Iran.

Just as there are always options once a conflict is under way, so too there are always choices about which problems to place on the foreign policy agenda. Two different lines of thinking have been used to make foreign policy choices: asking what Americans want, and asking what the United States should do. Answers to the first are generally found in public opinion polls. Answers to the second are typically sought by referring to the concept of the national interest.

What Do Americans Want in Foreign Policy?

Determining what the American public wants is not always easy. In one sense it has remained relatively stable, but it also shows signs of change. In response to a November 2018 public opinion poll that asked which

foreign policy goals were very important, 71 percent said protecting the jobs of American workers;[6] 81 percent had identified this goal as important in 2013, 79 percent in 2010, and 78 percent in 1978. In 2018 this priority came in second to protecting the United States from terrorist attacks (72 percent). It was also the second-ranked goal in 2014, when 83 percent identified protecting the United States from terrorism. In addition to protecting American jobs and protecting the United States from terrorism, in 2018 over 50 percent of the American public valued preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction (66 percent), improving relations with allies (58 percent), and reducing the spread of infectious diseases (56 percent). Several policy issues that ranked highly in 2013, such as reducing dependence on imported energy (61 percent) and combatting international drug trafficking (57 percent), dropped out of the top 25 foreign policy priorities in 2018. Change is also evident at the other end of the public opinion spectrum. In 2018 only 17 percent identified promoting human rights as a priority. Compare this to 2013, when 33 percent prioritized it; to 2008 when 31 percent did; and to 1978, when 39 percent voiced support for human rights as a high priority in U.S. foreign policy.[7]

The National Interest

For those who pose the question of selecting goals in terms of the demands of foreign policy rather than the wishes of the American people, the answer is found in defending and pursuing the **national interest**, the fundamental goals and objectives of a country's foreign policy. This term is unmatched in its emotional impact and ability to shape a foreign policy debate. It conveys a sense of urgency, imminent threat, and higher purpose. All other foreign policy objectives pale in comparison to those promoting the national interest. It is advanced with great certainty and talked about as if there could be no doubt about its meaning.

Students of world politics have struggled—with little success—to give concrete meaning to the term "national interest."[8] Various formulations are used to separate threats and problems into different categories. Some employ a pyramid with a few core national interest problems at its apex. Beneath it are larger numbers of long-range societal goals and goals that advance the interests of specific groups. Others using the same logic to divide foreign policy problems into three categories: *A-list threats* pose a direct and immediate challenge to U.S. survival. *B-list threats* involve challenges to immediate U.S. interests, but not to U.S. survival. *C-list threats* indirectly affect the U.S. national interest, but are not immediate or direct.

The implication of both frameworks is the same. Policy makers need to concentrate resources on addressing the most important foreign policy issues so they do not jeopardize the U.S. national interest. The ever-present danger is that not enough resources will be available to successfully deal with a core national interest problem or A-list threat should it appear.

Regardless of approach, the fundamental problem remains: deciding in which category to place a foreign policy problem. This is a judgment call that has led to two major lines of dissent in discussing the national interest. One argues that, since it is not possible to rank the importance of foreign policy goals in some abstract fashion, the national interest should be defined by a country's actions. If a country is willing to allocate significant resources to a problem, then solving that problem is in the national interest. A second voice, which calls for reexamination of the issues included in these ranking schemes, wants greater attention paid to **public goods**. These are goods—such as a clean environment—that are not owned by any one country. Because they belong to everyone in the international community, public goods tend to be devalued in discussions of the national interest.

Costs

Foreign policy comes with a price tag, regardless of the type of policy. **Declaratory policy** consists of proclamations that state the intent of the United States to pursue a line of action. It establishes and raises expectations about what the United States will do. **Action policy** is what the United States actually does. The perennial danger exists that declaratory and action policies will be out of sync, creating what some refer to as the "say-do" problem.[9] The most notable example during the Obama administration came with his bold statement about a "red line" warning to Syria over the use of chemical weapons. Five times he warned the Syrian government about the consequences, yet no action taken. As you shall see later in this chapter, a "say-do gap" has become commonplace in the Trump presidency, as Trump has frequently exhibited a significant gap between his declaratory and action policies.

The greater the gap between declaratory and action foreign policies and the more frequently this gap exists, the more difficult and costly it becomes to get other states to join in on foreign policy initiatives. Trump discovered this in trying to get Europe and other states to support his withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear agreement. The lack of fit between declaratory and action foreign policy in the areas of human rights and democracy promotion has repeatedly dogged presidents. These issues often have received a great deal of declaratory policy support but little action policy support. Beyond creating the say-do gap, many argue this this discrepancy also undermines American global leadership by denying presidents "the global bully pulpit" from which to build a global consensus for action.[10] This too is a criticism leveled at Trump's foreign policy.

At the most basic level, the price tag of action policy can be calculated readily in human and monetary terms. An estimated 2,346 American soldiers died in Operation Enduring Freedom (2001– 2014) in Afghanistan.

Some 4,424 lost their lives in Operation Iraq Freedom (2003– 2010). Over 31,000 civilians have lost their lives in Afghanistan, and between 183,000 and 205,000 have perished in Iraq. A 2018 study placed the direct military accosts of Iraq and Afghanistan at $1.8 trillion; the total cost of these wars plus Syria exceeded $6 trillion in 2019.

Two additional dimensions of the cost problem also must be taken into account when examining action policy: opportunity cost and blowback. **Opportunity cost** means that resources devoted to one foreign policy problem cannot be used to address other foreign policy or domestic problems. Resources are limited, but the foreign and domestic policy goals that policy makers may decide to pursue have no natural limits. The difference between the resources (power) available and the list of goals being pursued is often referred to as the **Lippmann Gap** in honor of columnist Walter Lippmann, who in 1947 observed that a recurring problem in American foreign policy was an imbalance between American power and the goals it sought.[11] When this imbalance occurred, he found American foreign policy to be mired in domestic conflict and to be ineffective abroad. Most notably, there was inadequate preparation for conflicts, and peace agreements were too hastily constructed.

The second additional dimension of the cost problem is that policies have unintended consequences. **Blowback,** the term commonly used to capture the essence of this phenomenon,[12] was first used by the CIA to characterize problems that came about as a result of covert action programs. An example can be found in the war on terrorism. After defeating Iraq, the United States instituted a policy of de-Ba'athification, removal of the Ba'ath party's influence. Under Order #2, Iraq's military was dissolved. All soldiers were dismissed but allowed to keep their weapons. With no possibility of employment, many joined ISIS and came to hold important military leadership positions. Diplomacy can also produce blowback. After Trump succeeded in getting Mexico to take action to stop asylum seekers from entering the United States in order to avoid new tariffs, fears were expressed that other states might begin to use the same type of brinksmanship negotiation tactics against the United States.

Building Consensus

In order to succeed, a foreign policy must be supported by the American public. American policy makers have long recognized this reality. Dean Acheson, who served as secretary of state from 1949 to 1953, once commented that 80 percent of the job of conducting foreign policy was managing the domestic ability to make policy.[13] The term long used to convey this sense of support was **bipartisanship**. It referred to the ability of both Democrats and Republicans to unite behind a course of action. Unity at home is seen as sending a message to adversaries that they cannot "wait

out" a president in hopes of getting a better deal with their successor, or try to appeal to Congress to undercut their foreign policy. Recent presidents have found bipartisanship in increasingly short supply, raising the following question: is bipartisanship normal or natural? This question has received renewed attention with Trump's presidency. His populist political style and agenda (which will be discussed in Chapter 5) is rooted in the existence of division and conflict rather than national unity within society.

Because it is such a powerful symbol, the national interest is a key instrument that presidents and others have used to build public support for their foreign policies. While it may not dictate a specific course of action, invoking the national interest places opponents on the defensive and serves as a point of consensus for the public to unite behind the president.[14]

At the same time, invoking the national interest in making foreign policy can trap policy makers. Having justified a course of action as being in the national interest, it is politically difficult to do an about-face and declare that this is no longer the case. Typically, in these cases, policy makers insist that their policy is correct, but alter the definition of the national interest used as justification. The Iraq War is a case in point. In 2003, President George W. Bush stated that the purpose of the Iraq War was "to disarm Iraq, free its people and defense [*sic*] the world from grave danger [of weapons of mass destruction]." In 2005, he characterized the Iraq War as an effort to quarantine terrorist groups that might otherwise attack the United States. In 2007, he compared America's enemies to communists.[15] Most recently, Trump has shown the ability escape being trapped by a definition of the national interest by freely and rapidly changing the direction of the U.S. national interest in his alternating characterizations of North Korea and China as friends and foes.

Using the concept of the national interest as a means of building public support may also blind presidents to other foreign policy problems. By the end of Bush's presidency, the excessive focus on Iraq began to trouble Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice; others feared that, by making Iraq the "end-all, be-all test" of American strength, U.S. standing and interests in other parts of the world were being harmed.[16]

Selecting a Policy Instrument

Policy makers must decide not only which goals to pursue, but also how to pursue them. A prime consideration in selecting a policy instrument is the context in which it will operate. Power cannot be used with equal effectiveness everywhere. Economic strategies that worked well when the United States was a hegemonic economic power may prove less useful in a period of economic decline or parity. Similarly, covert action policies successful in one country may fail in another. Beyond these issues, which will be addressed in later chapters, two other fundamental choices must

be made: between hard power and soft power, and between unilateral and multilateral action.

Hard Power and Soft Power

At a most general level, policy makers have two forms of power around which to build their foreign policies. The first, **hard power**, is coercive power that is the traditional means by which states protect and advance their national interests. While most often employed against an enemy, hard power can also be used against a reluctant ally. It is designed to force or compel another state to act in a prescribed fashion. Hard power tries to limit the range of choices open to another state so that the state will act in accordance with U.S. wishes. Hard power is most often associated with the military but, as Trump's foreign policy demonstrates, economic power can also be used to compel.

Soft power, the power to influence and persuade, is rooted in the power of attraction. It seeks to convince states to willingly identify with the United States and support the U.S. position. Domination is replaced by cooperation. Examples include using the military for disaster and humanitarian relief efforts and strengthening democratic institutions and civil society in states making the transition to democracy. In each of these cases, the United States can draw on the reservoir of goodwill that is created in carrying out its foreign policy.

Observers of U.S. foreign policy are divided as to whether the use of hard power or soft power is preferable. Hard power supporters note that soft power is difficult to use. Many of the associated resources, such as the appeal of American values and American democracy, are beyond the control of policy makers and are not easily mobilized. Soft power supporters note that while hard military power can defeat an enemy, it cannot produce peace. Robert Gates, who served in both the George W. Bush and Obama administrations, cautioned that "we cannot kill our way to victory."[17]

Unilateral or Multilateral Action

A second important choice in selecting a policy instrument is whether to act alone (unilaterally) or as part of a group of states (multilaterally). *Unilateral action* offers the advantage of maximum control over the use of the policy instrument and the maximum benefit of its use. Offsetting this advantage, states acting unilaterally will also bear the greatest burden of failure. In addition, they may not possess the necessary hard and soft power resources to act alone.

Multilateral action—through formal alliances, international organizations, or informal coalitions—also presents states with potential problem. One is the *free rider problem*, in which other states do not contribute their fair share to the joint undertaking, placing a greater burden on the more

powerful states. A second potential problem is the *patron's dilemma*. Here, the more powerful state becomes entrapped in the foreign policy initiatives of less powerful states because they need their cooperation. If it supports the initiative, the more powerful state may be dragged into expensive and unwinnable conflicts; if it abandons the ally, its reputation and trustworthiness may come into question, making it harder to act multilaterally in the future.

From the very beginning of his bid for the presidency, the core theme of Donald Trump's foreign policy has been "America First." This is not the first time this expression has been employed by those opposed to what they perceive as a dangerous and overly internationalist U.S. foreign policy in need of correction. Most notably, the phrase played a highly visible role in American politics under the banner of the short-lived America First Committee, which was organized in an effort to keep the United States out of World War II (see the Historical Lesson).

Historical Lesson

The America First Committee, 1940

The roots of the America First Committee can be traced back to informal discussions by students at Yale University in the spring of 1940. Officially established in September 1940, General Robert Wood, head of the board of Sears Roebuck and Company, served as its national chairman. Also on the committee were a former Commander of the American Legion; Chester Bowles, future diplomat; and American aviator Charles Lindbergh. Prominent advisors to the board included William Benton, vice president of the University of Chicago and future Republican Senator from Connecticut; Phillip La Follette, a former governor of Wisconsin; Democratic Senator Burton Wheeler of Montana; and Republican Congressman Karl Mundt of South Dakota. Its total national membership was estimated to be between 800,000 and 850,000, with the great majority located in the Midwest and Northeast.

Five core principles guided the America First Committee's approach to foreign policy:

- Our first duty is to keep America out of foreign wars. Our entry would only destroy democracy, not save it.
- Not by acts of war abroad but by preserving and extending democracy at home can we aid democracy and freedom in other lands.
- In 1917 we sent our American ships into the war zone and this led us to war. In 1941 we must keep our naval convoys and merchant vessels on this side of the Atlantic.
- We must build a defense, for our own shores, so strong that no foreign power or combination of powers can invade our country by sea, air, or land.
- Humanitarian aid is the duty of a strong, free country at peace. We should feed and clothe the suffering and needy people of England and the occupied countries and

> so keep alive their hope for the return of better days.

These principles led the America First Committee to oppose Franklin Roosevelt's Lend-Lease proposal and a proposed revision of the Neutrality Act so that American merchant ships could enter war zones. Convinced that Nazi Germany could not defeat Great Britain but that Great Britain could not win without full U.S. military support, the America First Committee recommended exploration of the possibility of a negotiated peace. In June 1941, the Committee called for a national advisory referendum on war and peace as part of its campaign to influence Congress and the president. There was disagreement within the America First Committee on several points. Initially it banned pacifists from joining, but soon abandoned this policy; the America First Committee would later cooperate informally with pacifist groups. Disagreement also existed about whether building U.S. defenses extended to a defense of the Western Hemisphere.

In addition to distributing material through the mail, the America First Committee actively used the media to promote its noninterventionist foreign policy views though newspaper advertising, pamphlets, radio addresses, motion pictures, press releases, and use of cartoon services. The Committee also lobbied Congress and the president. It provided congressmen with policy bulletins and helped them write speeches. Most importantly, it urged sympathizers to demonstrate their support for its cause by writing to the President and Congress, indicating that "your pen is you last weapon against war." While they failed to change the overall direction of U.S. foreign policy, these efforts were not without impact. Accounts describing Franklin Roosevelt's foreign policy note the impact of the America First Committee on his decision-making.

Critics rallied opposition by highlighting the extent to which Committee views were consistent with and supported the efforts of communist, pro-fascist, and anti-Semitic groups. Charges of anti-Semitism were especially damaging, given the Committee's association with such prominent anti-Semitic individuals as Henry Ford, who briefly served on the national committee; followers of member Father Charles Coughlin, who had begun attacking Jews in 1938; and Charles Lindbergh, who at a September 1941 rally stated that the three most important groups pushing the United States to war were the British, the Roosevelt Administration, and Jews.

The America First Committee passed from the scene with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Four days later, it voted to dissolve, urging members to "give their full support to the war effort of this country until the conflict with Japan is brought to a successful conclusion."

Applying the Lesson

1. How similar is the America First Committee's foreign policy to Donald Trump's America First foreign policy?
2. Would the America First Committee's foreign policy agenda have much popular support today?
3. Identify any current organizations or policy makers today that hold the same foreign policy beliefs as the America First Committee.

Presidential Foreign Policy Doctrines

Grand strategy is the lynchpin uniting goals and tactics in a government-wide approach that brings together all elements of power. The earliest grand strategy in American diplomatic history was put forward in President George Washington's Farewell Address. His call for avoiding entanglement in foreign alliances provided the conceptual foundation for a policy of isolationism that, in various forms, was embraced by many of his successors. Other examples of notable early American foreign policy grand strategies include the *Monroe Doctrine*, which called for a policy of activism and creation of a U.S. sphere of influence in Latin America in return for involvement in European affairs; *Manifest Destiny,* which was a policy of continental expansion; and the *Open Door* a strategy for establishing an American presence in Asia. Box 1.1 highlights five post–World War II presidential foreign policy doctrines that have been particularly important for signaling shifts in the agenda of U.S. foreign policy. After discussing them in more detail shortly, the chapter then turns to the challenge of evaluating foreign policy.

Box 1.1

Selected Presidential Foreign Policy Doctrines

The Truman Doctrine

The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my appearance. . . . The United States has received from the Greek government an urgent appeal for financial and economic assistance. . . . The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists. . . . The United States must supply that assistance.

. . . There is no other country to which democratic Greece can turn. . . . The future of Turkey as an independent and economically sound state is clearly no less important to freedom-loving peoples of the world . . . [its] integrity is essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East. . . . I am fully aware of the broad implications involved if the United States extends assistance to Greece and Turkey.

. . . One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. . . . I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures. . . . If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation.

Source: Address before a joint session of Congress, March 17, 1947

The Nixon Doctrine

A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its

friends. Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam without question would promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have yet to abandon their goals of world conquest. . . . I laid down in Guam three principles as guidelines for future American foreign policy toward Asia. First, the United States will keep its treaty commitments. Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider essential to our security. Third, . . . we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. We shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense. . . . The defense of freedom is everybody's business, not just America's business.

Source: President Nixon's address to the nation, November 3, 1969

The Carter Doctrine

The 1980s have been born in turmoil, strife, and change. This is a time of challenge to our interest and our values and it's a time that tests our wisdom and our skills.

. . . I am determined that the United States will remain the strongest of all nations, but our power will never be used to initiate a threat to the security of any nation or to the rights of any human being. We seek to be and to remain secure—a nation at peace in a stable world. But to be secure we must face the world as it is. . . . The region which is now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of great strategic importance. . . . Let our position be absolutely clear: an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

Source: State of the Union address, January 23, 1980

The Reagan Doctrine

We must stand by all our democratic allies. And we must not break faith with those who are risking their lives—on every continent from Afghanistan to Nicaragua—to defy Soviet-supported aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth.

. . . The U.S. must rebuild the credibility of our commitment to resist Soviet encroachment on U.S. interests and those of its allies and friends, and to support effectively those Third World states that are willing to resist Soviet pressures or oppose Soviet initiatives hostile to the United States, or are special targets of Soviet policy.

Source: Reagan Doctrine, U.S. Department of State

The Bush Doctrine

Today, at the start of a new century, we are again engaged in a war unlike any our nation has fought before. . . . The enemies we face are different in many ways from the enemy we faced in the Cold War. In the Cold War, we deterred Soviet aggression through a policy of mutually assured destruction. . . . The terrorists have no borders to protect, or capital to defend. They cannot be deterred—but they will be defeated.

. . . In this new war we have to set a clear doctrine. . . . America will not wait to be attacked again. We will confront threats before they fully materialize. We will stay on the offense against the terrorists, fighting them abroad so that we do not have to face them at home. . . . The security of our nation depends on the advance of liberty in other nations. . . . So we are pursuing a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East. I believe the desire for liberty is universal, and by standing with democratic reformers across a troubled region we will extend freedom to millions who have not known it—and lay the foundation of peace for generations to come.

Source: Commencement address at the United States Military Academy at West Point, May 27, 2006

The Truman Doctrine

The Truman Doctrine in box 1.1 is excepted from a speech that President Harry S Truman made to a special joint session of Congress, in which he asked for $400 million for economic assistance to Greece and Turkey to help them resist Soviet-inspired aggression. In making his request, he asserted that "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures."

Greece was involved in a civil war that pitted a pro-British government against leftist rebels led by the communist-controlled National Liberation Front. Turkey was involved in an ongoing dispute with the Soviet Union over control of the Dardanelles and Bosporus, straits linking Soviet ports along the Black Sea with the Mediterranean Sea. From the Soviet point of view, access to the Mediterranean was crucial to its ability to act as a Great Power, but it was also a security threat. During World War II, Turkey had permitted German naval forces to enter the Black Sea via the straits. Stalin now insisted on international control over the straits, a demand that Turkey interpreted as a threat to its national sovereignty.

Truman's speech is widely seen as the equivalent to a U.S. declaration of Cold War against the Soviet Union. It firmly rejected the pre–World War II U.S. foreign policy of isolationism and provided a rationale for U.S. activism in world affairs. Truman divided the world into two opposite and competing ways of life, "one based on freedom, another on coercion," and called on Americans to help free people remain free. The Truman Doctrine, as the content of this speech came to be known, also identified a universal enemy with its references to aggression by "totalitarian regimes," a phrase applied almost exclusively to the Soviet Union and its allies.

Although the Truman Doctrine did not specify a set of actions to be taken, its implementation quickly centered on two concepts: containment and deterrence. Central to both was a status quo orientation to the events in the world. U.S. foreign policy would not actively seek to roll back the

Iron Curtain, but focus on stopping the further expansion of the Soviet Union and its sphere of influence.

Containment became identified with three sets of policies. The first was encircling the Soviet Union and its allies with a ring of alliances and bilateral security agreements. The most significant alliances were the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in the Middle East, and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Important bilateral agreements were signed with Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea. Second, covert military action was directed at key countries that were being threatened by communist takeovers or had just fallen victim to them, such as Iran, Guatemala, Cuba, and Indonesia. Third and finally, foreign aid was used to ensure the loyalty and support of key governments and to promote economic prosperity as a way to dampen the appeal of communism.

The Nixon Doctrine

The Nixon Doctrine, presented in an address to the nation in November of 1969 (see box 1.1), was part of an attempt to formulate a policy that would allow the United States to remain the dominant power in the international system after Vietnam, but not require it to send troops abroad to contain the spread of communism. The United States would help free countries defend themselves by providing both military and economic assistance, but those countries must provide for their own military defense. In short, there would be no more Vietnams.

Nixon also pursued two other initiatives as part of this strategy. The most narrowly constructed was *Vietnamization*, which sought to turn over responsibility for defending South Vietnam to the South Vietnamese. In an effort to buy sufficient time for Vietnamization to work, Nixon ordered the invasion of Cambodia and Laos to eliminate communist sanctuaries. That strategy failed. In spring 1972, North Vietnamese forces attacked across the 17th Parallel into the South, forcing Nixon to "re-Americanize" the war. The second, more broadly conceived policy initiative was **détente**, which sought to engage the Soviet Union and China in a dialogue that would transform their relationship with the United States from competition and open distrust to limited cooperation and muted conflict. The most significant accomplishments of détente were the opening to China and the signing of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) arms control agreements with the Soviet Union.

A major consequence of the Nixon Doctrine was a massive increase in the level of arms transfers to regional powers allied with the U.S. Indonesia, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, and South Korea became prime recipients of this aid. A particularly troubling situation developed in the Middle East, where the rising price of oil permitted these states to acquire highly sophisticated weapons.

The Carter Doctrine

The Carter Doctrine is the name given to the policy announced by President Jimmy Carter in a 1980 State of the Union address (see box 1.1) in response to the Soviet Union's December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. In his speech, Carter stated that the United States would treat an "attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region as an assault on the vital interests of the United States and such force will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."

The Carter Doctrine represented an about-face for Carter's foreign policy toward the Soviet Union. Carter had campaigned on a platform that rejected power politics and promised to replace it with an emphasis on human rights and morality. Shortly after being elected, in 1977 he quickly moved to negotiate a new Panama Canal Treaty that would transfer sovereignty over the canal to Panama. The following year, in September 1978, Carter arranged for a summit conference at the presidential retreat at Camp David between Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, at which both leaders agreed to a "just, comprehensive and durable settlement for the Middle East conflict." This agenda deemphasized the importance of the Soviet Union to U.S. foreign policy, but arms negotiations with the Soviets continued. Only after two-and-a-half years of difficult negotiations was a SALT II agreement reached in 1979. That agreement, already controversial, was never voted on by the Senate because Carter withdrew it from consideration following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

A 1973 coup d'état had deposed the king of Afghanistan. An ensuing power struggle resulted in the pro-Soviet wing of the Marxist People's Democratic Party taking power. In 1979, the People's Democratic Party was overthrown by a rival Maoist group. In December 1979, faced with a chaotic situation in Afghanistan and the possible triumph of opposition Islamic forces, the Soviet Union sent an invasion force of over fifty thousand soldiers into Afghanistan and placed an exiled pro-Soviet Communist Party leader in power.

The Soviet action caught the Carter administration off-guard and called into question the wisdom of Carter's foreign policy agenda of building peace. As part of his response, Carter requested an increase in annual defense spending and expanded the American naval and air presence in the Persian Gulf. Debate over the wisdom of this response was soon overshadowed by the Carter administration's inability to resolve the Iranian hostage crisis and secure the release of the Americans taken hostage in the American Embassy.

The Reagan Doctrine

Unlike Nixon and Carter, for most of his presidency, Reagan saw the Soviet Union as a state to be challenged, not an opportunity for cooperation. Early in his administration, he referred to the Soviet Union as an

"evil empire," charging that "the only morality they recognize is what will further their cause; meaning they reserve unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat." A prerequisite for dealing effectively with such a state was a major buildup of American military strength and a toughened stance on arms control. Reagan called for a $16 billion increase in defense spending over five years, the deployment of the MX missile system, the renewed production of poison gas, the development of the neutron bomb, and the beginning of a long-term research plan—the Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars")—to build a missile defense system. On arms control, his administration went public with a series of accusations of Soviet arms control cheating.

In his 1985 State of the Union speech, Reagan asserted, "We must not break faith with those who are risking their lives—on every continent from Afghanistan to Nicaragua—to defy Soviet aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth. Support of freedom fighters is self-defense." By speaking in this manner, Reagan signaled an important shift in his foreign policy from that of his predecessors. The United States would now do more than contain the spread of communism; it would work actively to remove communists and their allies from power. In fact, the Reagan administration was already doing so.

Reagan considered El Salvador a textbook case of communist aggression. He attributed a large part of the problem to Russian and Cuban military support for leftist rebel forces that was being funneled through Nicaragua. In a move to cut off the supply of weapons, Reagan signed a presidential finding in March 1981 authorizing the CIA to organize and fund moderate opponents of the Nicaraguan Sandinista government. These forces became known as the Contras.

The administration's unwavering support for the Contras became one of the most controversial features of its foreign policy. Reagan characterized the Contras as the "moral equivalent of the founding fathers," but human rights groups complained at length about their brutality. In 1984, Congress cut off funding for the Contras. In an effort to circumvent this ban, the Reagan administration undertook a failed secret initiative that became known as the Iran–Contra Affair. The initiative proposed that American weapons intended for Israel would be sold to Iran, and Israel would receive new weapons. In return, Iran would help secure the release of American hostages in Lebanon. Money from the weapons sales would be used to fund the Contras.

By 1985, the Reagan administration was also deeply involved in Afghanistan. The primary Afghan group opposing the Soviet Union's invasion, the Mujahedin, proved to be a formidable fighting force that tied down Soviet forces. By 1987, the administration had provided the Mujahedin with $630 million. This aid was not without its long-term costs. A large amount of U.S. arms flowed into the hands of Afghan groups that combined forces with the Taliban-led government after the Soviet Union left, and were later used against U.S.-supported interests.

Near the end of his administration, Ronald Reagan did an about-face in his foreign policy. He and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev became regular partners at summit conferences, meeting five times during Reagan's last term. It was their second summit at Reykjavik, Iceland, that provoked the most controversy. The Reagan administration was caught off guard by Gorbachev's proposal that both sides eliminate all offensive strategic nuclear weapons. Reagan initially accepted the proposal, but backed off later because of his personal attachment to the Star Wars program.

The Bush Doctrine

Although the Bush Doctrine first appeared as a unified statement in the September 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, its key themes were already visible by that time.[18] Speaking to a joint session of Congress following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, President George W. Bush stated that the United States "would make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them" and that "we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists." In the June 2002 speech to the graduating class at West Point excerpted in box 1.1, Bush stated, "Our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives." He also asserted, "the gravest danger to freedom lies in the crossroads of radicalism and technology." To these observations, the *National Security Strategy* added that "We cannot let our enemies strike first," that the United States will use its power to encourage free and open societies, and that it will never allow its military supremacy to be challenged.

The Bush Doctrine provided the intellectual framework for launching the Global War on Terrorism, the invasion of Afghanistan to remove the Taliban from power, and the invasion of Iraq. Achieving those objectives provided problematic. Central to the administration's argument for the Iraqi invasion was its possession of weapons of mass destruction, a claim that later proved to be false. The Taliban and Iraq's Saddam Hussein were removed from power with relative ease, but capturing Osama bin Laden and establishing democracy in Iraq proved to be a far greater challenge. It was only near the end of the Bush administration, as it moved its goals away from spreading democracy, that a sense of stability returned to the region.

In Search of the Trump Doctrine

Not every president has a foreign policy doctrine with their name attached. For some, foreign policy either is not a high priority or largely follows in

the footsteps of previous presidents. Others find grand strategies hard to change.[19] An ongoing debate today is whether or not a Trump Doctrine exists.[20] Some argue that the concept of a foreign policy doctrine implies consistency of purpose and goals, and that Trump's foreign policy is marked by wild swings from one position to another. Declaratory policy aside, others question how much of a break with Obama's foreign policy it really represents. Like Obama, Trump has embraced foreign policies of restraint and has been hesitant to commit U.S. forces to overseas combat missions.

As already discussed, during his presidential campaign Trump asserted that his foreign policy would be built around an "America First" strategy. It was also a key component of his inaugural address:

> For many decades, we've enriched foreign industry at the expense of American industry; subsidized the armies of other countries while allowing for the very sad depletion of our military; we've defended other nation's borders while refusing to defend our own; and spent trillions of dollars overseas while America's infrastructure has fallen into disrepair and decay.
>
> We've made other countries rich while the wealth, strength, and confidence of our country has disappeared over the horizon. . . . But that is the past. And now we are looking only to the future. . . . From this day forward, a new vision will govern our land. From this moment on, it's going to be America First.

While America First was a highly effective campaign slogan, its value as a guide to foreign policy proved problematic due to disagreements over its definition. Is it isolationist or internationalist? If the latter, what type of internationalism does it embrace? A more conceptual foundation for the Trump Doctrine, principled realism, was soon put forward to address such concerns.[21] According to the administration's 2017 National Security Strategy document, *principled realism* is a foreign policy strategy that is "guided by outcomes, not ideology." "Guided by our values and disciplined by our interests," it is based on accepting the international system as it is and not on what we might want it to be. In concrete terms, this means accepting that the world is made up of sovereign independent states guided by narrowly defined national interests, and that power is the ultimate determinant of success and failure. As Trump noted in a 2018 speech before the UN General Assembly, "We reject the ideology of globalism. And we embrace the doctrine of patriotism."

While a much stronger conceptual base, nesting the Trump administration's foreign policy in principled realism left unresolved many questions as to the makeup of a Trump foreign policy Doctrine. Consequently, many observers have focused more closely on Trump's personal worldview and his approach to conducting foreign policy in order to uncover the ideas underlying a Trump Doctrine that can also account for its frequent and rapid changes in focus.

Six factors stand out as particularly influential:

1. Trump's clearest focus is on unraveling or reversing polices inherited from previous administrations, especially those of the Obama administration. The Trump Doctrine is far less clear or consistent regarding the nature of the concrete policies it hopes to put in their place.
2. Trump sees the world as an arena of zero-sum competition, or winners and losers. A global community does not exist, and allies do not have special importance in making foreign policy. As Trump told a campaign rally in 2018, "I'm the president of the United States — I'm not the president of the globe." America's allies have been the target of especially sharp criticism from Trump. From his perspective, all too often allies have taken advantage of U.S. willingness to bear the burden for organizing and maintaining the global community by not paying their fair share. He is committed to changing that, asserting that "America is in the game and American is going to win."
3. In navigating this competitive world Trump embraces a bilateral transactionalist approach to foreign policy, whether in trade, defense spending, arms control, or foreign aid. The objective is to a make a deal that increases U.S. power and standing in the world, not to transform the world. Creating a scorecard of wins and losses is more easily accomplished and tracked over time if negotiations are carried out on a bilateral basis rather than in multinational negotiations among many countries or within international organizations. This perspective also provides a rationale for negotiating with adversaries. What matters are wins and losses, not the identity of the other state.
4. Trump's focus on short-term outcomes is insensitive to the second- and third-order consequences of a decision. A case in point is his decision to recognize Israel's authority over the Golan Heights. Critics have objected on two points. First, while Trump characterized the Golan Heights as being of "critical and strategic importance to Israel," recognition was unnecessary, given Syria's weakness and the firm control Israel had over the territory. Second, since the Golan Heights retains great symbolic value to both Arabs and Israelis, there was concern that Trump's decision would undermine his efforts to bring peace to the region by bringing Syria and Iran closer together. Moreover, other states that occupy contested territory, such as Russia, might be encouraged to further solidify their control.
5. For Trump, the key bottom line measure of winning and losing is found in increasing U.S. economic power and standing. This came through quite clearly in his response to calls from Congress and others to reexamine U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia in light of its connection to the assassination of Saudi dissident Jamal Khashoggi. Trump rejected doing so by arguing that "the world is a dangerous place" and the United States must protect itself; that "maybe the Crown

Prince had knowledge of this tragic event—maybe he and maybe he didn't"; and that taking action against Saudi Arabia might threaten a recent agreement which "will create hundreds of thousands of jobs, tremendous economic development, and much additional wealth for the United States."

6. Trump treats foreign policy in instinctive and personalized terms, focusing on personal relationships rather than bureaucratic interactions: "My whole life has been deals. I've done great at it." He met with Russian President Vladimir Putin without note takers. His impulsive agreement to talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un after an exchange of highly inflammatory public statements between the two leaders; his confidence in negotiating an agreement with little preparatory work, calling Kim Jong-un "my friend"; and the fact that he pushed his chief negotiator to the sidelines after the February 2019 talks failed and dismissed the warnings of national security officials that North Korea would not abandon its nuclear weapons program are all examples of his personalistic style. As a result, many leaders have abandoned standard foreign protocols in dealing with the United States and have taken to going directly to Trump. When national security advisor John Bolton clashed with Turkey's president Recep Erdogan over U.S. plans to remove troops from Syria, Erdogan called Trump directly.

Assessing Foreign Policy Results

Judging the consequences of a foreign policy is a complicated task. Success and failure are often treated as absolute categories, yet this is seldom the case. Far more typical are situations in which success and failure are both present in varying degrees. A state rarely has a single goal when it undertakes a course of action, and the reality of multiple goals further complicates the calculations of costs and benefits. Estimates of success and failure also depend on time frame. Economic sanctions work slowly, but it does not mean that they are any less effective than fast actions. Such slow solutions might even be preferable, because they minimize the risk of miscalculation that occurs during crisis situations.

Political considerations also cloud any evaluation of the effectiveness of a policy instrument. In 2003, Libya announced that it was giving up its pursuit of nuclear weapons. The George W. Bush administration quickly hailed the announcement as evidence of success of its tough post–9/11 military stance, including the doctrine of preemption. Others countered that the success really should be attributed to years of behind-the-scenes diplomacy and economic sanctions.[22]

Most fundamentally, U.S. foreign policies can be judged in terms of three standards: (1) intellectual coherence, (2) the extent to which they are motivated by domestic politics rather than foreign events, and (3) consistency

of application to foreign policy problems. Each of these reference points has been found to be a problem to some extent in the five foreign policy doctrines examined earlier. The following sections include selective examples from these doctrines to illustrate the challenge of evaluating foreign policy.

Intellectual Coherence

Does the foreign policy build on a sound and consistent set of ideas? Does it contain contradictory assumptions and lines of action? The Truman Doctrine and the policy of containment were grounded in two very different views of the Soviet Union, both of which could not be correct. One view, championed by George Kennan, saw Soviet expansion largely as defensive and reactionary, with Soviet leaders more concerned with staying in power than with spreading communism. The authors of National Security Council document #68 (NSC-68) rejected this perspective. They saw Soviet hostility to the United States as unrelenting and based on Marxist–Leninist ideological principles. Nixon's policy of détente was rooted in National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger's belief that the most stable international system was one in which all major powers viewed the international system as legitimate, which the Soviet Union and China could not do as long as they were the target of American containment efforts.[23] Carter's foreign policy was characterized by sympathetic observers as "the hell of good intentions" for its immature and mistaken belief that it could push U.S.–Soviet relations to the sidelines while addressing human rights problems.[24] The Bush Doctrine sparked a debate over the purposes of American power that pitted realist conservatives against neo-conservatives.[25] Both groups were in agreement on the importance of military power; however, conservative realists called for restraint in its use while neoconservatives advanced an ambitious agenda that included spreading democracy.

Political scientist Aaron Ettinger attributes much of the inconsistency so evident in Trump's foreign policy to the attempt in the 2017 National Security Strategy to combine his nationalistic America First agenda and post WW II internationalism into a single foreign policy doctrine. Thomas Wright of the Brookings Institution argues that assertions of the internal inconsistencies of Trump's foreign policy are overstated. Wright contends that Trump has a very consistent and cohesive world view which can best be characterized as a nineteenth-century foreign policy built around isolationist and protectionist principles.[26]

The Dominance of Domestic Politics

As a popular slogan goes, "domestic politics stops at the water's edge." Foreign policy is about interacting with the world and should not be influenced by domestic politics. This is easier said than done, however. Truman resisted adopting the changes suggested in NSC-68 because of their

budgetary implications, especially the need to fight communism everywhere in the world. Only after the outbreak of the Korean War and the changed domestic climate at home did he embrace a more expansive—and expensive—definition of containment. Nixon's embrace of détente and the shifting of defense responsibilities to threatened allies were likewise heavily influenced by the unwillingness of the American public to pay for the Vietnam War. Reagan represents an interesting case. He pursued aggressive foreign policies and advocated large-scale military spending, yet did not call on the American public to make sacrifices. As one observer put it, the great appeal of Reagan's foreign policy was that it demanded so little from the public while promising to deliver so much.[27] When costs were encountered, such as the attacks on the marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983 that killed 241 marines, Reagan quickly terminated the policy.

The influence of domestic politics on Trump's foreign policy comes through in several ways. First, as numerous commentators have noted, Trump approaches declaratory foreign policy statements as if he is still campaigning. This was particularly evident in the language he has used to criticize other countries for policies that hurt the United States and to advance his own political standing. Second, Trump repeatedly emphasizes foreign policy issues that are of great importance to his base, such as immigration and fair trade. Third, and hardly unique to Trump, domestic politics surfaces as a factor in key foreign policy decisions. As the June 2019 Iran crisis unfolded, Fox newscaster Tucker Carlson urged Trump not to respond with force because it would cost him reelection.

Consistency of Application

Critics have charged that no administration has fully succeeded in using its doctrine as an organizing device to guide all foreign policy decisions. In some cases this is understandable or necessary, because circumstances change. However, in other cases it can undermine the ability of presidents to achieve their foreign policy goals. Carter succumbed to offering arms sales to states with poor human rights records. Reagan did little to aid Eastern European states seeking to break away from the Soviet Union, entered into negotiations with supporters of terrorism as part of the Iran–Contra affair, and entered into arms control talks with the Soviet Union near the end of his presidency. Bush engaged in a preemptive war with one member of the "axis of evil" (Iraq), but found it necessary to enter into negotiations with another member (North Korea) that had obtained nuclear weapons, and struggled to obtain support from the international community to block the efforts of the third (Iran) to procure nuclear weapons.

Along with his personalistic approach to foreign policy, one of the most oft-cited factors contributing to the inconstancies in Trump's foreign policy is frequent turnover in key foreign policy advisors. After the early departure of national security advisor Michael Flynn and chief strategist

Steve Bannon, both of whom held foreign policy views close to those of Trump, many of those in key positions (Defense Secretary James Mattis, national security advisor H. R. McMaster, and Chief of Staff John Kelly, often referred to collectively as "the Generals") held conservative and internationalist perspectives on foreign policy. Because of this, it has been said that Trump was dragged into carrying out a largely conventional foreign policy in spite of his America First declaratory foreign policy. When "the Generals" departed, Trump replaced them with advisors more attuned to his foreign policy views, most notably John Bolton as national security advisor, freeing himself to pursue his preferred foreign policy goals.

Over the Horizon: The Future of Grand Strategy

As the Trump administration and its predecessors discovered, constructing an effective grand strategy is not an easy task.[28] In 2005, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice stated that the U.S. strategy in Iraq was "clear, hold, and build." General George Casey, then the commanding general in Iraq, commented that this was little more than a bumper sticker.[29] It was not a strategy. President Obama once summarized his outlook on foreign policy as "don't do stupid sh**."

Grand strategies are commonly envisioned as being written in stone and unchangeable. Reality is different. Foreign policy doctrines are not immune from change. As noted earlier in the chapter, not every president has a foreign policy doctrine with their name attached. Commentators saw two different Obama Doctrines. The first was optimistic in its outlook, promising to "reset" America's relations with the world. His foreign policy would be activist in orientation but stress cooperation and problem solving rather than domination. This Obama Doctrine proved to be short-lived, giving way to a more cautious and pragmatic doctrine that sought to draw a distinction between lesser and compelling threats to U.S. national security. One commentator suggested that the essence of the second Obama Doctrine was "a willingness to be the world's police chief but not its policeman."[30]

A deeper question about U.S. grand strategy also exists: Does the US. need a grand strategy? Advocates assert that major powers cannot and should not make foreign policy decisions "on the fly," and that achieving foreign policy goals and effectively managing state power requires a plan. In the words of Dean Acheson, Truman's secretary of state, policy makers need to escape a focus on the "thundering present" and instead think about the big picture and ask big questions. No matter how great they are, changes in the structure of the international system and the dynamics of world politics do not eliminate the need for grand strategy. In fact, they only increase that need by providing policy makers with a long-term focus and prioritizing goals.

Others question the need to try and construct a grand strategy.[31] Supporters of this perspective argue that it is more appropriate to proceed on a case-by-case basis, in which pragmatism, rather than broad principles, rule. They stress that constructing an effective foreign policy is better seen as a test of political will than a blueprint for action.

In place of grand strategy, some call for adopting an *emergent strategy*. In contrast to the top-down constructs made by senior officials and then implemented by the bureaucracy of grand strategy, the logic of emergent strategy is bottom-up. It emphasizes learning at all levels of the foreign policy decision-making process rather than constructing a blueprint for action. As such, an emergent strategy results not only in changes in tactics but also in changes in goals. Political scientist Daniel Drezner raises an even deeper concern; given the fractured nature of American domestic politics, he wonders whether any viable grand strategy can be created that will last more than one election cycle.[32]

Critical Thinking Questions

1. Identify ten foreign policy problems facing the United States today. Divide them into A-, B-, and C-list problems. On what basis did you make your decisions?
2. What type of foreign policy problems can best be addressed by hard power? By soft power?
3. Select a foreign policy problem. What standards should be used to evaluate U.S. efforts to address it?

Key Terms

action policy, 6
bipartisanship, 7
blowback, 7
declaratory policy, 6
détente, 15
grand strategy, 12
hard power, 9
Lippmann Gap, 7
national interest, 5
opportunity cost, 7
public goods, 6
soft power, 9

Further Reading

Richard Betts, "Is Strategy an Illusion?" *International Security* 25 (2000), 5–50.
A frequently heard recommendation for improving American foreign policy is development of a more coherent grand strategy. This important essay raises the question of whether it can be done.

Ted Galen Carpenter, "The Case for Moral Realism," *The National Interest* 140 (November 2015), 51–58.

The starting point of this article is that not all interests are created equal. The author divides them into four categories: vital, conditional, peripheral, and barely relevant. The article then discusses the challenge of making moral compromises in foreign policy making.

Daniel Drezner, "This Time is Different," *Foreign Affairs* 98 (May 2019), 10–17.

The author raises the question of whether any viable grand strategy can survive the degree of political polarization existing today.

Paul Kennedy, ed., *Grand Strategies in War and Peace* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991).

The essays in this volume present historical and comparative perspectives on the challenges of developing grand strategy.

Paul Macdonald, "America First? Explaining Continuity and Change in Trump's Foreign Policy," *Political Science Quarterly* 133 (September 2018), 401–34.

This article reviews the debate over how different Trump's foreign policy is from that of his predecessors by examining his first-year foreign policy across nineteen issues. He finds continuity and change.

Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 1994).

This volume introduces readers to the concept of soft power and discusses its ability to advance foreign policy and further the national interest.

Bruno Tertrais, "Drawing Red Lines Right," *Washington Quarterly* 37 (Fall 2014), 7–24.

Noting that red lines have a mixed record of success, the author of this article examines the circumstances under which they will fail and makes recommendations for how to improve the chances of success.

The Global Context 2



Dateline: The South China Sea

By definition, foreign policy is outward-looking and seeks to promote the national interest. Disagreement exists over how best to anticipate threats and recognize opportunities found beyond state borders. Do we look at the structure of the international system, changing relations between countries, or specific events? Each of these focal points presents itself as the United States formulates a foreign policy to respond to Chinese actions in the South China Sea.[1]

Some 648,000 square nautical miles, the South China Sea is one of the world's largest semi-enclosed seas. Five countries (six if Taiwan is counted) with a combined population of about 270 million are found along its borders: China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, and Malaysia. All claim

sovereignty over some or all of it. China argues that these islands have been Chinese territory "since antiquity." At issue is control not only over the waters and the airspace above it, but also over some four hundred to six hundred rocks, reefs, atolls, and islands. The two largest groupings of land in the South China Sea are the Spratly and Paracel Islands. Both have been the focal point of military-political conflicts involving competing claims made by China, Vietnam, and the Philippines. The United States has taken no official position on these conflicting territorial claims, other than rejecting China's claim to sovereignty over virtually all of it.

Three geostrategic factors come together to frame the South China Sea foreign policy problem facing the United States. First, the South China Sea is a critical passageway for global commercial shipping and naval operations linking the Middle East and Africa to Asia. The amount of oil passing through its waters is six times larger than that going through the Suez Canal. Second, evidence points to the presence of potentially significant natural energy reserves beneath the South China Sea that the Chinese media refer to as "the second Persian Gulf." Third, the South China Sea is of great strategic importance to China. It is often spoken of in terms comparable to the United States' traditional view of the Caribbean Sea. To a considerable degree it was in recognition of China's growing economic and military power, along with the key role that the South China Sea played in China's foreign policy thinking, that President Obama called for a "pivot" to Asia when he became president.

Tensions between the United States and China have grown noticeably over the past decade. As China's military and economic power have increased, the U.S. has placed greater emphasis on Asia in its foreign policy. In November 2013, after China unilaterally claimed the right to police a contested portion of the airspace over the South China Sea, the United States sent two B-52 bombers into that zone without asking permission. In May 2014, without notice, China unilaterally placed a $1 billion deep water oil drilling rig on the shore of an island claimed by both China and Vietnam. The move was described in the press as a possible "game changer" because expansion of the Chinese navy would be required to protect its investment. Three months later, China rejected a U.S. call for a freeze on "provocative acts" in the South China Sea, stating that "as a responsible great power, China is ready to maintain restraint but for unreasonable provocative activities, China is bound to make a clear and firm reaction."[2]

Matters escalated considerably in 2015, when China began to build a "Great Wall of Sand" in the South China Sea; this effort was defined by China as a "lawful and justified" land reclamation project within its own borders. The project involves the construction of coral reefs and rocks within the Spratly Islands, along with harbors, piers, helipads, and possibly an airstrip. State Department officials characterized it as an unprecedented attempt to "militarize outposts on disputed land features." By early 2016, China had moved forward, placing surface-to-air missiles with a range of 125 miles on a disputed island. In a counter move, the United States

announced that it was on track to reposition 60 percent of the navy to the Pacific by 2020. Later that year, the U.S. Navy sent a destroyer near a contested island. The government claimed that it was the first of what they defined as freedom of navigation patrols, intended to challenge China's "excessive maritime claims" and demonstrate the U.S. commitment to free maritime passage through the South China Sea. China countered by carrying on military exercises in disputed waters. 2016 also saw the International Court of Justice reject China's claims of historical rights to most of the South China Sea, a ruling that China has not accepted.

During the 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump openly criticized Obama for not responding forcefully enough to China's expansionist South China Sea policies. However, it was only after nuclear talks with North Korea faltered, due to what he saw as China's reluctance to bring pressure on North Korea, that Trump began to increase the U.S. presence in the South China Sea through B-52 bomber and surveillance flyovers and increased use of freedom of navigation patrols. The military effectiveness of these actions is unclear. In 2018 Admiral Philip Davidson, head of the US. Indo-Pacific Command, told Congress that "China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States." Others note that the stepped-up U.S. naval presence also increases the risk of accidents, which could escalate into conflicts. For example, in 2018 a Chinese destroyer came within 45 yards of the USS Decatur, a guided missile destroyer.

This chapter lays the foundation for developing a deeper understanding of the foreign policy problems facing the United States today by presenting three broad international political perspectives used to study world politics and then identifying key structural features in world politics. Attention then turns to the contemporary international system, examining three important issues (terrorism, globalization, and American hegemony) and comparing American and non-American views of the world today.

President Obama's "Asian Pivot" was not the first time that the United States had come to recognize the potential importance of Asia to its military and economic security. A first Asian Pivot occurred more than a century ago when Commodore Matthew Perry led four ships into Tokyo Bay on July 8, 1853 (see the Historical Lesson).

Historical Lesson

The First Asian Pivot: Commodore Perry's Opening of Japan

For some two centuries, Japan had managed to severely limit the access by foreigners to its territory. Japanese leaders had expelled missionaries, whom they had come to consider as overly zealous, and foreign traders, whom they saw as taking advantage of their people, in 1639. By the mid-1800s this policy was becoming harder to maintain. In the 1830s, U.S. naval

vessels stationed in China had already made several voyages to Japan in an effort to establish relations.

By the time Commodore Perry set sail to Japan, a combination of factors had made the opening of Japan a high-priority foreign policy issue. The annexation of California now provided the United States with Pacific Ocean ports, raising the possibility of expanding U.S. trade with China. Japan's geographic location and rumors of its large coal reserves made access to Japanese ports an important part of any move to increase the U.S. economic presence in Asia. American missionaries also lobbied for access to Japan, convinced that Protestantism would be accepted by the Japanese, who had earlier rejected Catholicism. Stories of Japanese mistreatment of shipwrecked American sailors gave rise to even more calls for opening Japan.

Perry presented Japanese leaders with a letter from President Millard Fillmore outlining U.S. objectives. Before leaving, he informed them that he would return the following year. After his return, the Treaty of Kanagawa was signed on March 5, 1854; it was subsequently ratified unanimously by the Senate. The Treaty provided the United States with two coaling stations and protection for shipwrecked sailors, but did not include commercial concessions or the guarantee of trading rights. In 1858, a follow-on treaty gave the United States two additional coaling stations and trading rights, and established the principle of *extraterritoriality* (American citizens arrested in Japan would be tried by U.S. courts). Because this provision was common to treaties between Western powers and Asian states at the time, such agreements came to be known as unequal treaties.

Within a decade, Japan turned these agreements to their fullest advantage, using them to spur reforms to its feudal political and economic systems. The resulting Meiji Restoration transformed Japan into an industrial and military power, as testified to by its victories in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904. The latter gave Japan control over Taiwan and much of Manchuria, as well as a dominant position in Korea. Theodore Roosevelt won the Nobel Peace Prize for helping bring about an end to the Russo-Japanese war.

Over the next several decades, Japan's growing power also set the stage for a series of military and diplomatic interactions with the United States that would steadily deepen America's involvement in Asian regional politics. One of the first points of dispute was the U.S. annexation of Hawaii in 1898. The Taft-Katsura Agreement of 1905 was designed to prevent future disputes over areas of influence. In return for recognizing American control over the Philippines, the United States recognized Japan's dominant role in Korea. This agreement was followed in short order by an American show of military strength and another agreement. In 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt sent the entire American battle fleet of sixteen ships on an around-the-world tour, and Japan was one of its most important ports of call. At the time, the United States had the world's second largest navy and Japan's was the fifth largest. The next year both countries signed the Root-Takahira Agreement, promising to respect the political-military status quo in the Pacific,

support the Open Door policy in China, and honor China's political independence and integrity. This agreement failed to hold; during World War I Japan sought to extend its dominance over China by issuing the 21 Points and seizing control of Germany's Asian colonial holdings.

Applying the Lesson

1. How do the foreign policy goals regarding Asia held by recent administrations compare with those that motivated Admiral Perry's opening of Asia?
2. What lessons does Admiral Perry's opening of Asia have for current U.S. foreign policy toward China and Japan?
3. How would realists, neoliberals, and constructivists evaluate U.S. foreign policy toward Japan as described here? How would this assessment compare to their views on President Trump's Asia policy?

Thinking about the World

Disagreement about the causes and consequences of foreign policy decisions are an enduring feature of the commentary on American foreign policy. For example, some argue that Russia's 2014 intervention into Ukraine was pushback provoked by Western military and economic expansion toward its borders. Others counter that full responsibility lies with Russia, and was a product of Russian domestic politics, most notably Putin's declining popularity.[3] A basic reason for disagreements over such an important foreign policy issue is different theoretical perspectives about the fundamental nature of world politics. Three perspectives are particularly important for understanding the larger debate over what American foreign policy should and can be: realism, neoliberalism, and constructivism.

Realism

The first theoretical perspective is **realism**.[4] For realists, world politics involves a constant struggle for power carried out under conditions that border on anarchy. There is little room for embracing universal principles or taking on moral crusades. The acknowledged founding voice of American realism was Hans Morgenthau, who captured the essence of realism in stating that leaders "think and act in terms of interests defined as power." For realists, peace—defined as the absence of war—is possible only when states follow their own narrowly defined national interests. Early realists stressed human nature as the central driving force in world politics, but later realists focused attention on the central role played by the structure of the international system. Once in place, the international system becomes a force that states cannot control; instead, it controls the states.

Neoliberalism

A second theoretical perspective is **neoliberalism**.[5] While conceding that the international system is anarchic in many respects, neoliberalism rejects the pessimistic realist conclusion that world politics is essentially a conflictual process from which there is no escape. Instead, neoliberalism sees world politics as an arena in which all participants (states and nonstate actors) can advance their own interests peacefully without threatening others. This becomes possible by creating conditions that allow the inherent rationality of individuals to come to the forefront. Among the primary factors that promote peaceful intercourse are democracy, respect for international laws, participation in international organizations, restraints on weapons, and free trade. Although many of his views are closer to traditional liberalism, President Woodrow Wilson, who championed the League of Nations after World War I, is the American statesperson most associated today with neoliberalism. Long dismissed by realists as idealistic, Wilsonianism began to reassert itself as a powerful voice in American foreign policy after the Vietnam War.

Constructivism

The third theoretical perspective relevant to American foreign policy is **constructivism**.[6] While realism and neoliberalism differ in their interpretations of the essential features of world politics, they both share the conviction that the nature of world politics is fixed and that objective rules for conducting foreign policy can be derived from it. Constructivists takes issue with this idea, asserting that international politics is not shaped by fixed underlying forces but by our perceptions. Ideas and cultural and historical experience give meaning to what we see. Free trade is not inherently a force for peace or a cause of war. How it is evaluated depends on personal and societal experiences with it.

Perceptions of the world change over time and as we interact with others. An entire generation of Americans has grown up after the end of the Cold War and sees American global dominance as natural. As a result, many in the United States have trouble understanding how revolutionary and unnatural such dominance can appear to others.[7] One year after it was announced, a commentator noted that, from China's perspective, Obama's Asian Pivot "was pulled right out of the old Cold War playbook. . . . Washington is trying to inflame new tensions by isolating it and emboldening the countries China has territorial disputes with."[8] The administration soon quietly dropped the phrase "Asian Pivot" and begin speaking about the U.S. "rebalancing" to Asia.

International System: Structural Constants

This section and the following two present a survey of those forces in the international system most often seen as driving state behavior: structural constants, evolutionary trends, and the dominant features of today's

international system. While realists, neoliberals, and constructivists would disagree on how to rank their relative importance, all would agree that an effective U.S. foreign policy requires thinking critically about each of them. Structural constants include decentralization, the self-help nature of the international system, and stratification.

Decentralization

The first enduring feature of the international system is *decentralization*. From the realist perspective, no central political institutions exist to make laws or see to their enforcement in the international arena. There is no common political culture to anchor an agreed-on set of norms governing the behavior of states. The result is a highly competitive international system with a constant expectation of violence and very little expectation that international law or appeals to moral principles will greatly influence the resolution of an issue.

Decentralization does not mean anarchy. For realists, *ordered anarchy* would be a more apt characterization. Enforceable laws and common values may be absent, but there are rules limiting permissible behavior and directions to follow in settling disputes, lending a measure of predictability and certainty to international transactions. Rules are less permanent than laws, are more general in nature, and tend to be normative statements rather than commands. They grow out of the basic principles of self-help and decentralization and are rooted in the distribution of power in the international system. As power distribution changes, so will the rules.

Neoliberals hold a different interpretation. In their view, rules are negotiated, voluntarily entered into, and obeyed by states trying to advance their national interests. Once established, rules often demonstrate a remarkably long lifespan that outlasts the specific problem they were designed to address or the identity and power of those who negotiated them into existence.

Constructivism takes exception to both realism and liberalism, arguing that "anarchy is what states make of it." To constructivists, anarchy lacks a fixed definition. States may see anarchy as requiring more power or requiring cooperation, depending on the values they hold and their past experiences.

Self-Help System

The second structural constant in the international system grows out of the first. According to realists the international system is a self-help system. A state must rely on itself to accomplish its foreign policy goals. To do otherwise runs the risk of manipulation or betrayal at the hands of another state. It is important to stress that Great Powers as well as smaller powers both need to avoid excessive dependence on others.

The self-help principle challenges policy makers to bring goals and power resources into balance. Pursuing more goals than the available resources allow or squandering resources on secondary objectives saps the vitality of the state and makes it unable to respond effectively to future challenges. Many argue that Vietnam is a classic example of the crippling consequences of an inability to balance goals and resources. American policy produced steady increases in the level of the U.S. commitment to the war, but it did not bring the United States any closer to victory. Instead, the reverse occurred: The longer the United States remained in Vietnam and the greater its commitment, the more elusive victory became.

Neoliberals reject the emphasis on self-help. From their perspective, the ability of states and individuals to recognize the costs and benefits of different strategies will allow them to pursue cooperative, mutually beneficial solutions to problems and avoid the use of force in settling disputes. Constructivism offers a cautionary perspective, suggesting that self-help can be interpreted as taking risks or acting cautiously to keep goals and resources in balance; it can mean acting alone or in cooperation with others. The perspective adopted reflects societal norms, values, and ideas; as those change, so will policy.

A Stratified System

The third structural constant in the international system is its stratified nature. The equality of states embedded in the concept of **sovereignty** is a legal myth. The principle of sovereignty dates back to the Treaty of Westphalia and the beginnings of the modern state system in 1648. It holds that no legal authority exists above the state, except that which the state voluntarily accepts. The reality of international politics is quite different; sovereignty is a matter of degree rather than an absolute. States are "born unequal."[9] The resources from which states draw their power are distributed unequally across the globe. As such, the ability of states to accomplish their foreign policy objectives (and their very choice of objectives) varies from state to state.

The principle of stratification leaves open the question of how unevenly power is distributed. The three most commonly discussed forms of stratification are **unipolar**, **bipolar**, and **multipolar**. In a unipolar system, one state possesses more power than any other. No other state or alliance of states can match it. In a bipolar system, two relatively equal states have more power than all others. Typically, permanent alliance systems form around the two states. A multipolar system is characterized by the presence of a core group of states that are relatively equal in power; floating coalitions—rather than permanent alliances—form as states join and leave to accomplish goals and protect their interests.

Neoliberals would argue that this picture is overdrawn. Rather than being organized around the global or regional distribution of power, the

international system should be seen as organized around issue areas, or regimes, each of which is organized around its own set of rules and norms. Here again, enlightened self-interest is expected to produce regimes based on accommodation rather than domination. As a perspective for studying foreign policy and international politics, constructivism urges caution in creating fixed power hierarchies and classifying states and is reluctant to provide firm guidance on which policy to adopt or how to define the global context in which states act. This is seen by its advocates as a major contribution to American foreign policy and by its detractors as a major limitation.

International System: Evolutionary Trends

Although the basic structure of the international system has endured over time, the system itself is not unchanging. Four post–World War II trends are especially notable for their ability to influence the conduct of U.S. foreign policy: diffusion of power, issue proliferation, actor proliferation, and regional diversity.

Diffusion of Power

Power, the ability to achieve objectives, is typically viewed as something we possess—a commodity to be acquired, stored, and manipulated. However, it must also be viewed as a relational concept. Ultimately, it is not how much power a state has, but how much power it has on a specific issue compared to those with whom it is dealing.

The postwar era has seen a steady diffusion of power. The causes for this are many. After examining the decline of empires throughout history, Robert Gilpin asserts that a cycle of hegemonic decline can be identified.[10] As the cycle progresses, the burdens of imperial leadership, increased emphasis on the consumption of goods and services, and the international diffusion of technology conspire to sap the strength of the imperial state and bring about its decline.

Foreign policy success and failures can contribute to the diffusion of power. The effect of foreign policy failures is relatively easy to anticipate. In the wake of defeat, the search for scapegoats, disillusionment with the task undertaken, and a desire to avoid similar situations can be followed. The Vietnam War is held by many to have been responsible for destroying the postwar domestic consensus on the purpose of American power. For example, economic sanctions directed against Fidel Castro in Cuba in the 1960s failed to bring down his regime and only made him more dependent on Soviet support.

American foreign policy successes have also hastened the decline of U.S. dominance. The reconstructions of the Japanese and Western European economies rank as two truly remarkable achievements. In a

sense, U.S. foreign policy has been almost *too* successful. These economies are now major economic rivals of the U.S. economy and often outperform it. However, the Japanese case also illustrates that there is nothing inevitable about the process of power diffusion. In the 1960s, observers spoke of the Japanese economic miracle and the threat it presented to U.S. economic power. In the 1990s, reference was instead being made to Japan's lost decade and the many economic problems it faced.

Issue Proliferation

The second area of evolutionary change in the international arena is issue proliferation. Not long ago, there was a relatively clear-cut foreign affairs issue hierarchy. At the top were a relatively small number of high-politics problems involving questions of national security, territorial integrity, and political independence. At the bottom were the numerically more prevalent low-politics issues of commerce, energy, environment, and so on. Although largely intuitive, the line between high and low politics was well established and the positions occupied by issues in this hierarchy were relatively fixed, allowing policy makers to become familiar with the issues before them and the options open to them. Today, this is no longer the case.

The high-politics category has become crowded. Natural resource scarcity moved from a low-politics to a high-politics foreign policy problem after the 1973 OPEC oil embargo. In 2014, the Defense Department's Quadrennial Defense Review and other studies pointed to the growing national security threat posed by global climate change. Issues may also change position in the hierarchy for political reasons. Human rights, which was a major concern for the United States when Jimmy Carter was president, returned to a low-politics position when Reagan took office. Its importance has continued to fluctuate over time, most recently returning to a low-politics position under Trump.

Accompanying the high-low politics division is a long-standing distinction between foreign and domestic policy, which has become increasingly difficult to maintain. How, for example, do we classify attempts to fight international drug cartels? On one level this is a foreign policy problem. The United States is actively engaged with helping the Mexican government combat the drug cartels operating out of that country. These organizations realize more than $20 billion in profits from U.S. sales alone. Yet this is also a matter of domestic policy, as some states have legalized the recreational use of marijuana.

A term increasingly being used to characterize these and other issues with significant domestic and international dimensions is **intermestic** (*inter* from "international" and *mestic* from "domestic").[11] Other examples of emerging intermestic policy areas include food safety and the regulation of passenger airplanes. Traditionally, food safety has been treated as a domestic policy matter. This is no longer realistic, as food production has become

globalized. Between 2000 and 2006, the value of U.S. food imports doubled, to $2.2 trillion; yet, traditionally, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) inspects less than 1 percent of the imported food products under its jurisdiction. Airline safety became front page news in 2019 when two Boeing 737 Max 8 planes on international flights crashed within months of each other. International airline safety regulations are largely left in the hands of national regulators such as the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). As a U.S. plane, the FAA had certified the safety of the Boeing 737 Max 8. The United States was virtually the last country to ground the plane after the crashes. Following the tragedies, serious doubts have arisen about its safety and FAA inspection policy.

Actor Proliferation

The third evolutionary feature of the international system is actor proliferation. On the one hand, actor proliferation has taken the form of an expansion in the number of states. Today, there are 190 countries, compared to fifty-eight states in 1930. The United States has diplomatic relations with all but three (four if Taiwan is counted). This expansion in the number of states has brought with it a corresponding expansion in the number of views that can be found on any given problem. Eighty-four states attended the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958. In contrast, 185 countries attended the 2015 Paris Climate Summit conference; adding the European Union and others brought the total number of participants to 196. The vast number of states and the diversity of views expressed in these global meetings now present great obstacles to achieving an agreement.

Although the growth in the number of new states has slowed, continued growth is taking place in a second area: nonstate actors. While states have never been the only actors in world politics, it is only comparatively recently that nonstate actors have appeared in sufficient numbers and possessed control over enough resources to be significant actors in world politics. Three categories of nonstate actors may be identified: intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), such as the United Nations, NATO, and the Organization of American States; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as General Motors, the International Red Cross, the Catholic Church, and the Palestine Liberation Organization; and subnational actors, such as the U.S. Defense Department, New York City, and Texas.

Statistically, the growth in the number of nonstate actors has been explosive. On the eve of World War I, there were only 49 IGOs and 170 NGOs. By 1951 the numbers had grown to 123 IGOs and 832 NGOs. The 2015/2016 edition of the *Yearbook of International Organizations* identified 273 conventional IGOs and 3,189 conventional NGOs. Overall, the *Yearbook* lists almost 70,000 international organizations: 7,757 IGOs and 60,272 NGOs.[12]

Actor proliferation has altered the context in which American foreign policy decisions are made in three ways. First, it has changed the language used in thinking about foreign policy problems. The state-centric language of the Cold War now competes for the attention of policy makers with the imagery of interdependence and globalization. Second, nonstate actors often serve as potential instruments of foreign policy. By not being identified as part of a state, their actions may be better received by other actors. Third, nonstate actors often limit the options open to policy makers. Their ability to resist and frustrate state initiatives can necessitate consideration of courses of action that states otherwise would likely reject, including inaction. Two recent examples include the lack of a credible pro-Western rebel group in Syria to support and the inability to take quick action in Nigeria against the Boko Haram Islamic militant group.

Regional Diversity

As a superpower, the United States is concerned not only with the structure and operation of the international system as a whole, but also with the operation of its subsystems, three of which are especially important. Each presents different management problems and thus require different solutions.[13] While the language used to describe them comes out of the Cold War era, the differences they highlight remain relevant to the way international politics is conducted and the foreign problems that are considered important.

The first subsystem, the Western system, is made up of the advanced industrial states of the United States, Canada, Western Europe, and Japan. The principal problem in the Western system is managing interdependence. At issue is the distribution of costs and benefits. U.S. leadership and initiative in the realm of national security policy, once so eagerly sought by its allies, is now often resisted. Even before Trump became president, many in the United States had begun to question the costs of leadership and sought to have its allies pick up a larger share of the defense burden. A similar situation holds for underwriting a free trade system or accepting economic discrimination in the name of alliance unity.

The second subsystem is the North-South system. Instead of expectations of sharing and mutual gain, the South views matters from a perspective rooted in the inequalities and exploitation of colonialism. When NATO and U.S. forces intervened in Libya and removed Muammar Qaddafi from power in the name of Responsibility to Protect, many in the South saw this humanitarian doctrine as nothing but a cover for another instance of Western imperialism. In contrast to solutions to the problems of interdependence, which lie in the fine-tuning of existing international organizations and practices, solutions to the problems of dependence and domination require constructing a new system that the South is willing to accept as legitimate and in which it is treated as an equal.

The third subsystem of concern to the United States is the remnants of the Cold War East-West system. Its fundamental management problem is reintegration. The Cold War divided the East and West into two largely self-contained, competing military and economic parts. In the 1970s, détente brought about a limited reintegration of the East and West through arms control and trade agreements. The opportunity for full-scale integration of these states into the international system came with the demise of communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union, which has to some extent been realized. Russia became a member of the Group of Eight (G8), and both China and Russia joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). Still, the task of reintegration is incomplete, as evidenced by Russia's military intervention into Ukraine to reclaim the Crimea, China's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea and its aggressive overseas economic policies, and ongoing concerns about the status of human rights in both countries.

Dominant Features Today

In many ways, the contemporary international system lacks a defining identity. For some, it is the post–9/11 era. Others argue that not much has changed in world politics since 9/11.[14] Still others see the current international system as being marked by the resurgence of Great Power politics with the rise of Russia and China. Regardless of how it is defined, it is clear that the structure of the international system has become more complex. It has become a three-dimensional chessboard, with different problems and dynamics on each board. There is a traditional hard-power-driven security chessboard, a soft-power-driven economic chessboard, and a third chessboard dominated by the activities of nonstate actors, where power is diffuse and hard to define. Not only does each chessboard to the United States, but disagreement exists over how to rank them in importance. Here, one challenge on each chessboard is identified: terrorism, globalization, and American hegemony.[15]

Terrorism

Terrorism dominates the third chessboard. Box 2.1 presents a snapshot of the scope of the terrorism problem as it existed in 2017, a point in time when many were speaking of the end of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Syria, also referred to as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Using the term in its most value-free and politically neutral sense, **terrorism** is violence for the purpose of political intimidation.[16] Terrorism is not a new phenomenon nor is it the exclusive tool of any political ideology or political agenda. It does not specify an organizational form. Governments as well as nonstate actors may engage in terrorism.

Box 2.1

Snapshot of Global Terrorism

Terrorism Trends

Over 99 percent of all deaths from terrorism have occurred in countries involved in a violent conflict or with high level of political terror.

Every region of the world recorded a higher impact of terrorism in 2017 than in 2002.

Right-wing terrorism is on the rise. The majority of the attacks were carried out by lone wolves. Seventeen of the sixty-six deaths were between 2013 and 2017, and 66 of the 113 attacks occurred in 2017.

Number of times since 2000 that a country has been ranked among the top ten countries affected by terrorism:

1. Afghanistan 16
2. India 16
3. Pakistan 16
4. Iraq 15
5. Somalia 11

The five most frequent types of terrorist attacks, 2002–2017:

1. Bombing/explosion
2. Armed assault
3. Hostage taking
4. Assassination
5. Facility/Infrastructure attacks

Emerging Hot Spots of Terrorism:

1. The Sahel and Maghreb
2. Southeast Asia
3. Nigeria

Terrorism in 2017

The total number of deaths from terrorism fell for the third consecutive year after peaking in 2014.

Sixty-seven countries experienced at least one death from terrorism in 2017. This is the second highest number since 2002.

The economic impact of terrorism in 2017 was $52 billion, 42 percent lower than in 2016.

Almost 20 percent of attempted terrorist attacks in 2017 failed.

Top 5 countries with regard to death by terrorism, 2017:

1. Afghanistan
2. Iraq
3. Nigeria
4. Somalia
5. Syria

Five largest increases in deaths from terrorism, 2016–2017:

1. Somalia
2. Egypt
3. Central African Republic
4. Myanmar
5. Mali

Four deadliest terrorist groups in 2017:

1. Islamic state of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
2. Al-Shabaab
3. Taliban
4. Boko Haram

Source: Institute for Economics and Peace, *Global Terrorism Index, 2018*

Today's brand of terrorism, which dates from 1979, is the fourth wave of terrorism that has arisen since the 1880s.[17] The preceding three waves each lasted a generation. If this pattern holds, the current wave of terrorism will not lose its energy until around 2025. The first, anarchist wave of terrorism began in Russia and was set in motion by the political and economic reform efforts of the czars. The second, anticolonial wave of

terrorism began in the 1920s and ended in the 1960s. The third, New Left wave of terrorism was set in motion by the Vietnam War. It was made up of Marxist groups such as the Weather Underground and separatist groups that sought self-determination for minority groups that felt trapped inside larger states, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The defining features of the current wave of terrorism are twofold. The first is its religious base. Islamic extremism is at its core. Its initial energy was drawn from three events in 1979: the start of a new Muslim century, the ouster of the shah in Iran, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The United States is the special target of this religious wave of terrorism. Iranian leaders have long referred to the United States as the "Great Satan," and the common goal shared by Islamic terrorist groups has been to drive the United States out of the Middle East. Before 9/11, this wave had produced a steady flow of terrorist attacks on U.S. facilities. Marine barracks were attacked in Lebanon in 1983, the World Trade Center was first bombed in 1993, American embassies were attacked in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and the USS *Cole* was attacked in 2000. The second defining attribute is the specter of mass casualties. Earlier waves of terror focused on assassinating key individuals or the symbolic killing of relatively small numbers of individuals, but today we also see terrorist attacks resulting in large numbers of deaths.

As recently as 2015, U.S. officials struggled with the question of whether al-Qaeda or ISIS posed the greatest terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland. The FBI, the Justice Department, and the Department of Homeland Security rated ISIS as the higher threat, while the Defense Department, the National Counterterrorism Center, and intelligence agencies tended to place al-Qaeda ahead of it. At the heart of this debate were two questions: Which would be most able to strike U.S. targets? Which could cause the greatest damage? As one member of Congress put it before the 2015 Paris attacks, "ISIS is all about the quantity of attacks, Al Qaeda . . . is about the quality of the attack."[18]

The ISIS caliphate ended in Syria in 2019, but that was not necessarily the end of ISIS, as proclaimed by President Trump, or the end of terrorism as a key feature of the contemporary international system. General Joseph Votel, head of the U.S. military central command, observed that "what we are seeing now is not the surrender of ISIS as an organization but . . . a calculated decision to preserve the safety of their families and preservation of their capabilities. The ISIS population being evacuated . . . largely remains unrepentant, unbroken, and radicalized."[19] Observers estimate that ISIS has a war chest of between $50 million and $300 million hidden away.

Looking at terrorism more broadly, what stands out is that terrorist groups are highly adaptive organizations. Early terrorist groups such as the Irish Republican Army and the Palestine Liberation Organization were organized into small groups of individuals who had little contact with one another in order to protect their identities. Al-Qaeda embraced

an organizational structure based on concentric circles. At its core was a central leadership group, surrounded by a ring of al-Qaeda affiliates in different countries. The outer ring contained al-Qaeda locals or lone wolves. ISIS operated as a pseudo-state, controlling oil-producing operations in Iraq and Syria, engaging in extortion, collecting taxes, and selling goods such as abandoned U.S. weapons and antiques on the black market. [20] Even before its defeat, ISIS began to decentralize its decision-making structure. It delegated power to mid-level military commanders in Iraq and Syria, sought out foreign affiliates, and actively recruited and trained disenchanted individuals and criminals to return to their home countries and engage in terrorist attacks. Of special concern to the United States has been the ability of ISIS and al-Qaeda to establish affiliates in North and Central Africa. In one notable encounter with ISIS in October 2018, fighters thought to be affiliated with ISIS ambushed U.S. troops in Niger, killing four and wounding two soldiers.

The question of how terrorist groups end is also important in determining the significance of terrorism in the present and future international system.[21] Numerous possible endings include the capture or killing of leaders, the loss of popular support, the achievement of goals, the transition to legitimate political organizations, and transformation into criminal organizations.

Globalization

Globalization dominates the second chessboard. A central problem in formulating a foreign policy based on globalization is that it is a vaguely defined term often used interchangeably with internationalization, Westernization, and Americanization. Most commentators define **globalization** as an economic process centered on the speed of interactions among economies and the intense and all-encompassing nature of those interactions. Economies do not simply trade with one another; they are transformed by their interactions. Globalization's supporters claim that this transformation will lead to economic benefits and prosperity.

Globalization, however, is much more than just an economic process. It is a dynamic mix of economic, political, social, and cultural forces that has the potential to bring about both positive and negative changes within and among states. Globalization may unleash the forces of democracy, but it may just as easily unleash a fundamentalist and defensive cultural backlash by those who feel threatened. Similarly, globalization accelerates the diffusion of technology and knowledge among people, which may help solve global health and environmental problems, but it also allows terrorist groups to communicate with one another, travel more efficiently, and gain access to weapons of mass destruction.

Globalization did not arrive on the scene suddenly. It emerged bit by bit over time. Although some commentators trace its foundations back to

the eighteenth century, most identify its beginnings with the post–World War II era and the establishment of the Bretton Woods monetary system and its core institutions: the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Together, these institutions laid the foundation for an international economic system that facilitated and encouraged an ever-expanding and accelerating cross-border flow of money, commodities, ideas, and people. This foundation set in motion a chain reaction, producing what Thomas Friedman refers to as the "flattening of the world."[22]

The dominant perspective held that globalization was an irreversible process. It was a reality and not a choice.[23] The problem facing the United States was not whether but how to participate in a globalized economy. In addition, as with all underlying structural aspects of the international system, globalization places limits on state behavior—rewarding states that embrace "correct" foreign and domestic policies and punishing those that adopt inappropriate ones.

Events over the past decade have called this view into question.[24] References to the emergence of identity politics and the triumph of nationalism over globalization point to a weakening of globalization, if not a retreat from it.[25] From this perspective, as globalization grew stronger it created a divide between groups at upper and lower socio-economic levels. Where the rich saw globalization as beneficial, others saw the accompanying job losses as threatening. The jobs that were once a key part of their identity were lost to foreign competition, and they came to feel that the political elites were not responding to their fears and needs. The result was a rise in populist sentiment and the reemergence of right-wing and authoritarian governments. Note that doubts about the future of globalization preceded the emergence of these trends. Writing in 2005, Niall Ferguson raised the possibility that at some point globalization may collapse and we may enter into a postglobalist era.[26] He saw economic and political parallels between the current period of globalization and the one that existed prior to the outbreak of World War I and the Great Depression of the 1930s.

It is also possible that globalization will not end but enter a new phase. Ian Bremmer raises the possibility that globalization will come to be dominated by state capitalism,[27] in which governments rather than private businesses are the driving force behind investment decisions. The goal here is to increase state power, not maximize profit. Prominent forms of state capitalism include government-owned or -controlled natural resource companies; national champions or firms that receive special tax incentives and other benefits from the state; and state-controlled sovereign wealth funds that invest in key firms and industries. Bremmer warns that state capitalist firms are inherently inefficient due to the role that politics plays in their operation, and that their investment decisions could harm global economic growth.

American Hegemony

American **hegemony** is the principal issue on the first chessboard, the traditional hard-power security-dominated chessboard. The term **hegemony**, which implies control, dominance, or preeminence, was used to describe the United States' position after the end of the Cold War, when for all practical purposes it was the last superpower left standing on the chessboard. Part of the difficulty in making judgments about the present condition of this first chessboard lies in the terms commonly used to describe hegemonic power.

Some observers refer to the United States as an empire. Not surprisingly, this characterization is controversial.[28] In its most neutral sense, an *empire* is a state with "a wide and supreme domain." The political, economic, and military reach of the United States fits that criterion. However, the term also carries very negative connotations of a state that imposes its will on others and rules through force and domination. Military occupation and the arbitrary use of military power typify an empire's foreign policies, charges that have frequently been leveled at American foreign policy. Critics of the empire label assert that the reach of American foreign policy, which is imperial in the sense that it is global, is being confused with the political ambition to control vast expanses of territory beyond U.S. borders, which does not exist.

A quite different view holds that America's unchallenged dominance allows it to act as the functional equivalent of a world government. It provides services needed for the effective functioning of the international system, such as military security, stewardship of the global economy, and emergency humanitarian aid. If the United States did not carry out these and other crucial tasks, the international system might cease to function effectively, because no other state possesses the resources to do so, and a true world government would not likely come into existence. So American hegemony can be seen as beneficial rather than exploitive. As one supporter of this position noted, it is in the interests of both America and the world that American primacy last as long as possible.[29]

Between these contrasting views of American hegemony lies a third perspective that stresses the limits placed on U.S. hegemony by global politics. One variant of this perspective sees the United States has having sat atop a Unipolar Concert for most of the post–Cold War era.[30] The United States did not dominate global politics singlehandedly; it did so with the acquiescence of the next two major powers in the international system (China and Russia). Both chose *not* to try and balance the United States because they benefitted greatly from the international system as it operated under U.S. leadership. Each of these three perspectives finds itself challenged by two questions: (1) How accurate a description is it today? and (2) How much longer will it hold true?

For those who adopt the American empire perspective, the historical reality is that empires come with expiration dates; they do not last

forever. In addition, today's empires tend to have much shorter life spans than ancient and early modern ones. The average Roman Empire lasted 829 years. The British Empire lasted 336 years. Twentieth-century empires on average lasted only 57 years.[31] Even prior to Trump's "America first" foreign policy agenda, the United States' status as an empire was easily questioned due to the rise in Chinese economic and military power. Robert Kaplan asserts that we may have already entered the postimperial moment, in which world disorder and competition for power and space will grow. [32]

For those who adopt the United-States-as-global-government perspective, the principal challenges facing the United States involve its ability to structure the "rules of the game" by which international politics is played.[33] These challenges take two forms, both tied to the rising number and influence of authoritarian governments and their rejection of the liberal democratic values at the heart of the global system created by the United States. The first challenge is altering the policies of existing international organizations such as the United Nations to bring them more in line with U.S. values. The second is to create parallel international organizations to advance U.S. interests, like China did by establishing the Asian Development Bank and modeling its structure and functions on those of the World Bank.

For those who stress the continuing importance of power politics to U.S. dominance, the key longevity issue is the extent to which credible challengers to U.S. power exist or will surface. Some see the United States as being a remarkably secure country. There are many foreign policy problems, but individually and collectively they do not constitute security threats.[34] Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth argue that such challenges will not materialize soon.[35] While China's rise in power today is very real, they note that the distance that China must travel from great power to superpower is far bigger than successful challengers have faced in the past. Others take a more pessimistic view, arguing that power balancing by Russia and China is already under way to the point that the unipolar concert has unraveled, bringing with it a series of regional challenges to U.S. influence.[36] See box 2.2 for the May 2019 report by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to Congress on the military power of the Republic of China.

Box 2.2

Military Power Republic of China, 2019

Building a More Capable People's Liberation Army

In support of the goal to establish a powerful and prosperous China, China's leaders are committed to developing military power commensurate with that of a great power. Chinese military strategy documents highlight the requirement for a People's Liberation Army (PLA) able to fight and win wars, deter potential adversaries, and secure Chinese national interests

overseas, including a growing emphasis on the importance of the maritime and information domains, offensive air operations, long-distance mobility operations, and space and cyber operations.

In 2018, the PLA published a new *Outline of Training and Evaluation* that emphasized realistic and joint training across all warfare domains and included missions and tasks aimed at "strong military opponents." Training focused on war preparedness and improving the PLA's capability to win wars through realistic combat training, featuring multi-service exercises, long-distance maneuvers and mobility operations, and the increasing use of professional "blue force" opponents. The CCP also continued vigorous efforts to root out corruption in the armed forces.

The PLA also continues to implement the most comprehensive restructure in its history to become a force capable of conducting complex joint operations. The PLA strives to be capable of fighting and winning "informatized local wars"—regional conflicts defined by real-time, data-networked command and control (C2) and precision strike. PLA modernization includes command and force structure reforms to improve operational flexibility and readiness for future deployments. As China's global footprint and international interests have grown, its military modernization progress has become more focused on investments and infrastructure to support a range of missions beyond China's periphery, including power projection, sea lane security, counterpiracy, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and noncombatant evacuation operations.

China's military modernization also targets capabilities with the potential to degrade core U.S. operational and technological advantages. China uses a variety of methods to acquire foreign military and dual-use technologies, including targeted foreign direct investment, cyber theft, and exploitation of private Chinese nationals' access to these technologies, as well as harnessing its intelligence services, computer intrusions, and other illicit approaches. In 2018, Chinese efforts to acquire sensitive, dual-use or military-grade equipment from the United States included dynamic random access memory, aviation technologies, and anti-submarine warfare technologies.

Reorganizing for Operations along China's Periphery

China continues to implement reforms associated with the establishment of its five theater commands, each of which is responsible for developing command strategies and joint operational plans and capabilities relevant for specific threats, as well as responding to crises and safeguarding territorial sovereignty and stability. Taiwan persistently remains the PLA's main "strategic direction," one of the geographic areas the leadership identifies as having strategic importance. Other strategic directions include the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and China's borders with India and North Korea.

Source: "Executive Summary," Military Power of the Republic of China, 2019, Annual Report to Congress, Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 2019.

America and the World: Attitudes and Perceptions

As constructivists remind us, the global setting of American foreign policy involves more than just a series of contemporary problems and underlying structural features. It also consists of attitudes and perceptions about the world. As evidenced by responses to global public opinion polls conducted in the United States and other countries it is increasingly obvious that Americans and non-Americans do not always see the world the same way.[37] In 2014, 70 percent of Americans polled said that the United States takes into account the interests of other countries in making foreign policy decisions. Little agreement on this point existed abroad. At one extreme, only 13 percent of Pakistanis indicated that the United States considers their country's interest a great deal or a fair amount. At the other extreme, 85 percent of Filipinos felt that the United States considers their country's interests.

Global public opinion polls also show differences in how Americans and citizens of other countries view policy problems. A 2018 survey showed that 59 percent of Americans identified climate change as the top international threat.[38] Compare this to the global mean across twenty-three countries: 67 percent. The global mean for identifying cyberattacks as the top threat was 61 percent; in contrast, 74 percent of Americans identified it as the top threat.

Widely different views also exist on the exercise of American power. Of the individuals surveyed in these twenty-three countries in 2018, 45 percent viewed U.S. power and influence as a top threat, up from 25 percent in 2013. The polling data showed a strong connection between negative feelings about President Trump and concern regarding U.S. power and influence. In seventeen countries, citizens who had little or no confidence in Trump were most likely to see U.S. power as threatening. Thirty-six percent of global respondents identified Russian power and influence as a top threat, and 35 percent identified Chinese power and influence as a top threat. In 2013, a majority of people in twenty-three of thirty-nine countries felt that China had already replaced the United States as the dominant economic power or would soon do so.

Another politically significant indicator of differences in global outlook is reflected by the periodic anti-American protests that erupt around the world. In seeking to understand the motivations and logic of such anti-American demonstrations, observers have made distinctions among four different types of anti-Americanism:[39]

1. Liberal anti-Americanism. Commonly found in other advanced industrial societies, at its core is the charge that the United States repeatedly fails to live up to its own ideals in conducting its foreign policy.
2. Social anti-Americanism. Here, the complaint concerns the United States' attempt to impose its version of democracy and its definition of rights on others while being insensitive to local societal values and norms.

3. Sovereign anti-Americanism. This version focuses on the threats the United States presents to the sovereignty and cultural and political identity of another country. A nationalistic backlash can occur regardless of whether the country is powerful or weak.
4. Radical anti-Americanism. This version defines American values as evil and subscribes to the notion that only by destroying them can the world be made safe.

The world is not solidly anti-American. Pro-American views tend to be most pronounced among those aged 60 and older, a factor many attribute to American foreign policy initiatives during the Cold War. Another group with solidly pro-American sentiments is made up of young people identified as *aspirational* (upwardly mobile or would like to be).[40]

Over the Horizon: 2035

What, then, might the future hold? Periodically, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) addresses this question. Its peeks into the future are not meant to be taken as predications or forecasts but as attempts to help policy makers focus on trends and aspects of the international system that have the potential to shape U.S. foreign policy—for better or worse.

According to the NIC's *Global Trends 2035* report, which was produced in 2017, the coming years will test U.S. resilience and require it, as well as all other states, to adapt to the changing landscape of international politics.[41] There will be a heightened risk of interstate conflict and an expanding terrorist threat as states, groups, and individuals will increase their ability to do harm. The net result will be creation of greater amounts of global disorder, raising questions about the rules, institutions, and distribution of power in the international system. In particular, the NIC expects U.S. competition with China and Russia to increase as these states seek to change the rules governing the international order and increase their influence over neighboring regions.

Meeting the challenge of increased global disorder and rising tensions will be difficult for three reasons. First, global technological, economic, environmental, and political trends will increase the number and complexity of issues that require global cooperation. Second, this expanded set of issues will lead to increased blurring of the line between peace and war. This will make it harder for states to employ traditional tools of foreign policy such as deterrence, economic coercion, and covert operations, but engagement in cyber operations and disinformation campaigns will become easier. Third, citizens have become increasingly fragmented and divided in their views of issues, making it difficult to facilitate global cooperation and unity based on democratic concepts that formerly united them. The bottom line is that traditional wars may become less frequent; they will be replaced by more remote stand-off military operations, which are more costly and less likely to produce decisive results.

Looking further into the future, the NIC is somewhat less pessimistic. Much hinges on government responses to economic changes and alterations in public attitudes; emerging patterns of cooperation and competition from the arena of international politics; and the types of short-term and long-term deals that countries are willing to make in addressing global issues. The central puzzle that states must solve is how to blend international, national, and community resources in a way that yields sustainability, security, prosperity, and hope.

Critical Thinking Questions

1. Which of the three theoretical perspectives (realism, neoliberalism, and constructivism) is best suited for guiding thinking about U.S. foreign policy today, and why?
2. Which of the possible global futures is most likely? How should the United States prepare for it?
3. Which features of the international system are most influential in determining the success or failure of U.S. foreign policies, and why?

Key Terms

bipolar, 34
constructivism, 32
globalization, 42
hegemony, 44
intermestic, 36
multipolar, 34
neoliberalism, 32
realism, 31
sovereignty, 34
terrorism, 39
unipolar, 34

Further Reading

Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, "The Rise and Fall of Great Powers in the Twenty-First Century," *International Security* 40 (Winter 2015), 7–53.

This article examines the rise of China as a challenger to U.S. unipolarity. It concludes that while China's rise in power is real, the United States will likely long remain the only superpower.

Chester Crocker, "The Strategic Dilemma of a World Adrift," *Survival* 57 (February 2015), 7–30.

The author argues that the international system is in a rudderless transition. It is partially repolarized, creating a toxic mix of normative issues and power dynamics. With no one in charge of global order, the key question is how a player gains and uses strategic leverage.

John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations and Provocations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

Authored by a leading diplomatic historian, this volume looks back to the end of the Cold War for insight into both why it ended and what that means for the future of American foreign policy.

Ted Hopf, *Reconstructing the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).

This volume uses a social constructivist theoretical perspective to examine the Cold War period with an eye toward explaining the many abrupt changes in policy during its early years.

Anthony Richards, "Conceptualizing Terrorism," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 37 (March 2014), 18–29.

This article presents a solid overview of the concept of terrorism, which it defines as a method of political violence. It then examines the implications of this definition for the debate over how to think about terrorism in world politics.

Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Relations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

Written by one of the founding scholars of the constructivist school of international relations theorizing, this book introduces readers to this approach and illustrates its utility through an examination of key concepts in the study of international relations and foreign policy.

Thomas Wright, *All Measures Short of War* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017).

According to the author, great power competition is back and the liberal order is in jeopardy. Reviewing Russia and Chinese challenges along with regional threats, he calls for a foreign policy of responsible competition.

The American National Style 3



Dateline: The Mexican Border

In responding to foreign policy challenges, the United States is influenced as much by ideas as by events. In the case of border security, the idea that technological or engineering solutions to political problems exist has been especially influential. During his presidential campaign, Donald Trump embraced such a solution in calling for a wall to be built along the border as a means to reduce illegal immigration and drug smuggling from Mexico. Once in office, his proposal brought forward a firestorm of controversy, leading to the longest U.S. government shutdown in history, thirty-five days (December 22, 2018–January 25, 2019). Controversy returned later in 2019 when it was announced that the Pentagon was transferring $3.6 billion from military construction projects in twenty-three

states, nineteen countries, and three U.S. territories to pay for the wall, including upgrading the Incirlik Air Base in Turkey. Only about 60 miles of replacement barriers were built in the first 2½ years of Trump's presidency and much of what was being constructed were see-through fences and vehicle barriers. The first construction of a brand-new wall in Texas began in October 2019.

A closer look reveals that, for over a decade, the United States has been seeking a technological solution to the border problem. The U.S.–Mexico border is 1,969 miles long. It is the world's most frequently crossed international border. In 1994 President Bill Clinton authorized Operation Gatekeeper to "to restore integrity and safety to the nation's busiest border" by stopping illegal immigration. Prior to this point, only about some 80 miles of barriers and fencing existed along the U.S.-Mexican border in Texas and California. Operation Gatekeeper, targeting the San Diego border sector, involved doubling the Border Patrol's force, building more fences and walls, and implementing high-tech land and air surveillance along the border.

In 2006 President George W. Bush signed the Secure Fence Act, stating that, "This bill will help protect the American people. This bill will make our borders more secure." This legislation called for creating a double-reinforced fence along 700 miles of the border. When Barack Obama took office in 2009 more than 580 miles of fence was in place, although only a small portion was double-layered. By 2012, the total length of fencing, consisting of some 300 miles of vehicle barriers and 353 miles of pedestrian barriers, had increased to 649 miles.

Constructing the border fence as it currently exists was controversial, with many of the same concerns leveled at Trump's Great Wall proposal. The first is cost. Trump proposed that Mexico pay for the wall. The 14-mile San Diego fence was to cost a total of $14 million, but just the first 11 miles ended up costing $42 million. The initial costs of pedestrian fencing averaged $3.9 million per mile, and those of vehicle fencing ranged from $200,000 to $1.8 million per mile. In Bush's plan, the projected cost of upkeep of the fencing system was $66.5 billion over the next twenty years. According to the Department of Homeland Security, in FY 2010 the fence was breached over four thousand times; with an average repair cost of $1,800 per breach, the total for just one year came to $7.2 million.

Second, there is the question of its effectiveness. As the fence was constructed and passageways into the United States blocked, illegal crossing did not so much end as move on to other points. The Tucson enforcement zone was once the most active point of entrance; it is now the Rio Grande Valley. In a six-month span covering late 2013 and early 2014, more than ninety-seven thousand illegal migrants were arrested in the Rio Grande Valley, a 69 percent increase from the previous year. Just as technology in the form of fencing has been used to stop border crossings, it has also been used to overcome it. Over a two-week period,

three smuggling tunnels were found, along with over 40 tons of marijuana. The tunnels were equipped with lighting, ventilation, and—in one case—a railcar system.

A great deal of data on illegal border crossings fuels the arguments of both defenders and opponents of the border fence system. According to statistics from U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), over 396,000 undocumented people were caught entering the United States illegally in 2018, compared to 1.6 million people in 2000. Year-to-year variation was common until 2010, when a steady decline began that continued until recently. Defenders of the border fence system cite the drop as evidence of success. Opponents point to economic recession, which reduced the number of U.S. jobs available to border crossers and the percentage of Mexicans aged 15–29. From October 2017 to January 2018, the CPB apprehended 109,000 people who had crossed the border illegally. This number jumped to more than 200,000 between October 2018 and January 2019. A primary actor in the surge was the rise in extreme poverty and gang violence in home countries, which caused families rather than independent young workers to move to the United States in large protective groups.

A third point of controversy has been the manner in which the fence was constructed. More than thirty legal waivers were used to bypass existing laws and regulations. The project received exemptions from acts including the Endangered Species Act, the Clean Water Act, and the National Historic Preservation Act. Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the Homeland Security Department, justified the legal waivers, stating, "Criminal activity does not stop for endless debate or protracted litigation." States and communities along the border registered objections to the fence because of its negative impact on the economic health of their areas.

Fencing is not the only technological solution the United States has embraced in its efforts to secure its border with Mexico. The same drone aircraft used to hunt out terrorists in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq are now being employed (without their missile packages). In 2017 the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol flew a total of 635 missions.

The Mexican border is not the only border the U.S. has sought to close off using technology. In 1980, Cuban Premier Fidel Castro unexpectedly announced that anyone wishing to leave Cuba for the United States would be permitted to do so. Almost instantly Cuban-Americans in Miami organized an operation that came to be known as the Mariel boatlift. President Reagan ordered the Coast Guard to stop refugees from reaching the United States by boat after an estimated 125,000 Cubans arrived in Florida on boats of varying sizes and seaworthiness. In 1991– 1992, some 40,000 Haitians tried to reach the United States by boat. Poverty and political oppression were the primary forces that produced this mass exodus. President George H. W. Bush ordered that their boats be intercepted before reaching the United States and returned to Haiti. In his 1992 presidential campaign, Bill Clinton promised to change this policy. As inauguration day approached,

fears grew of another mass exodus from Haiti. Shortly after taking office, Clinton revoked his pledge and kept in place the 1981 Reagan order.

Embracing engineering solutions as a means to deal with political problems is only one of the ways in which ideas shape the content and conduct of U.S. foreign policy. To get a fuller picture, this chapter examines the concept of an American **national style** as it relates to foreign policy, with special attention to the style's sources and consequences. Later, the chapter looks at how past approaches influence the contemporary U.S. debate over foreign policy.

The Importance of Ideas

Policy makers come and go, but ideas and ways of thinking endure. George W. Bush's major foreign policy innovation, moving from **containment** and **deterrence** to **preemption**, strikes many as a radical departure from the past, but others see in it the long reach of American history.[1] The same holds true for **neoconservatism**, the set of foreign policy ideas that formed the conceptual foundation for the Bush Doctrine (see chapter 1), with its emphasis on preemption, unilateral action, and support for democratization. To many, the Bush Doctrine is neither "neo" nor "conservative." Its core ideas of moralism, idealism, exceptionalism, militarism, and global ambition have deep intellectual roots in the American foreign policy tradition.[2] Barack Obama's foreign policy received a great deal of criticism for embracing the idea of "leading from behind." It was rejected by many as ill-conceived, un-American, and bound to fail. Regardless of the merits of these critiques, few pointed out the similarities between leading from behind and the post-Vietnam Nixon Doctrine (see chapter 1), which called for providing weapons to regional allies so that American troops would not have to be used to contain the spread of communism.[3] Today, many see similarities in Obama and Trump's foreign policies, which share a reluctance to commit military force to situations that have the potential for getting out of control.

The importance of ideas as a force in foreign policy decision-making stems from both their immediate and long-term effects.[4] In the short run, shared ideas help policy makers and citizens cope with the inherent uncertainty involved in selecting among competing policy lines. In the long run, ideas can become institutionalized as organizations and laws are designed around them. As they become anchors for future reform debates, ideas continue to exert an influence on policy long after they may have lost their vitality and after those who espoused them have passed from the scene.

The result of this interplay of policies and ideas is a layered pattern in which policies reflecting different sets of ideas and pulling in different directions are combined, with little overall coherence. This pattern is very much evident in American trade policy. Conventional explanations of American trade policies focus on the political leverage of societal interest

groups or the demands of the international system.[5] Others argue that only by looking at ideas can America's movement from a protectionist cycle (which began in the early nineteenth century and culminated in the highly protective tariffs of the 1930s) to a free-trade cycle with elements of both free trade and fair trade to Trump's embrace of fair trade be explained.

The national security policy arena provides an even clearer picture of the influence on American foreign policy of shared ideas and ways of acting. The logic of containment became embodied in a wide range of U.S. foreign policy initiatives including military alliances, foreign aid programs, and covert action. Even the Nixon administration's much heralded shift to a policy of *détente* at the end of the Vietnam War (see chapter 1) could be comfortably fitted into the larger strategy of containment. Détente was designed to protect U.S. influence as much as possible in an era of lessened power abroad and increasingly isolationist feeling at home. Confrontation and crisis management were now too expensive to be the primary means for stopping Soviet expansion. Détente sought to accomplish this end by creating a framework of limited cooperation within the context of an international order that recognized the legitimacy of both U.S. and Soviet core security goals.[6]

More fundamentally, the importance of ideas lies in how they shape policymakers' and citizens' views of the role of the United States in the world. One theme that dominates this world view is a sense of *exceptionalism*, the belief that the American political system, values, and historical experiences are unique and models for others to follow. By one count, the phrase "American exceptionalism" appeared 4,172 times in national U.S. publications from 2010 to 2012.[7] Accompanying exceptionalism is the perceived need (right) to a leadership role in world affairs, either by example or through transforming the international system.[8]

Not everyone embraces the ideas of exceptionalism and leadership equally. In 1998, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated that "if we use force, it is because we are America. We are the indispensable nation. We stand tall. We see farther into the future." Compare this with President Donald Trump's America First foreign policy, which emphasizes the centrality of sovereignty and nationalism. Others disagree quite strongly with this reading of America's role in the world.[9] For some, the United States has been antirevolutionary, seeking to prevent social change and stop Third World revolutionary movements that might threaten its dominant position in world affairs. This view is often expressed in the writings of revisionist historians, who find U.S. foreign policy to be imperial in nature and rooted in the expansionist needs of capitalism. Others see U.S. foreign policy as racist, as evidenced by its immigration policy, which historically discriminated against the Chinese and other non–Western Europeans; hesitated to support international human rights conventions; and wavered in its attitude about the suitability of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines for either statehood or independence.

Isolationism versus Internationalism

U.S. foreign policy is frequently discussed in terms of a tension between two opposing general foreign policy orientations: **isolationism** and **internationalism**. From the isolationist perspective, American national interests are best served by "quitting the world" or, at a minimum, maintaining a healthy sense of detachment from events elsewhere. Isolationism draws its inspiration from Washington's Farewell Address, in which he urged Americans to "steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world" and asserted that "Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or very remote relations."[10] Among the major foreign policy decisions rooted in the principles of isolationism are the Monroe Doctrine, the refusal to join the League of Nations, the neutrality legislation of the 1930s, and, more loosely, the fear of future Vietnams.

According to the internationalist perspective, protecting and promoting American national interests requires an activist foreign policy. Internationalists hold that the United States cannot escape the world, that events abroad inevitably affect U.S. interests, and that any policy based on the denial of their relevance is self-defeating. Such widely divergent undertakings as membership in the United Nations and NATO, the Marshall Plan, the Helsinki Human Rights Agreement, and involvement in Korea and Vietnam can be traced to the internationalist perspective on world affairs.

The oscillation between isolationism and internationalism has not been haphazard. An underlying logic appears to guide movement from one to the other. Five earlier periods of U.S. foreign policy of twenty to thirty years' duration have been identified, each of which has an introvert (isolationist) and extrovert (internationalist) phase.[11] According to this line of analysis, the United States has left the last phase of an internationalist phase; the isolationist phase began in 2014. Evidence of this shift is readily found in public opinion polls, which indicate that, while the American public remains internationalist, it has become less supportive of the use of military force abroad; in addition, majorities now see both the Afghanistan and Iraq wars as mistakes.

TABLE 3.1

Period	Introvert (years)	Extrovert (years)
1	1776–1798	1798–1824
2	1824–1844	1844–1871
3	1871–1891	1891–1918
4	1918–1940	1940–1967
5	1967–1987	1987–2014
6	2014–2034?	

In each of these periods, U.S. policy makers had to confront a major foreign policy problem. In period one, it was independence; in period two, issues involving manifest destiny were dominant; and in period three, it was the process of becoming an industrial power. The crisis of world democracy dominated period four, and in the fifth period the need to create a stable world order was the main challenge facing U.S. foreign policy. In each period, the dominant cycle (introversion or extroversion) imposes limits on the types of solutions that can be considered by policy makers and predisposes the public to accept certain courses of action. The cyclical movement between isolationism and internationalism is seen as spiral in nature; each movement toward internationalism has been deeper than the one before it, and each reversal to isolationism has been less complete than the preceding one.

Disagreement exists over the mechanism that triggers a shift from one phase to the next. One possibility is that shifts in foreign policy orientations may be tied to the business cycle.[12] Some have found that U.S. foreign policy takes on a belligerent tone during periods of economic recovery. The more stable the economy, the more moderate is U.S. foreign policy. In a similar vein, it has been argued that the periodic outward thrust of U.S. foreign policy is a product of domestic frustrations and disappointments.[13] Foreign policy successes are sought as a sign that the American dream is still valid and capable of producing victories.

Whatever the specific trigger, the movement from isolationism to internationalism and back again is made possible because both general foreign policy orientations are both very much a part of the American national style. It is not that one represents the American approach to world affairs and the other its denial. They are two different ways in which the fundamental building blocks that create the patterns of American foreign policy come together.[14] Both are united in the conviction that the institutions and ideals brought forward by the American experience need protection. The approaches differ on how best to provide for their continued growth and development.

Before proceeding to examine the shared roots of internationalism and isolationism, it should be noted that some argue that internationalism is better defined as *interventionism*: a tendency to intervene in the affairs of other states to a degree far beyond any reasonable definition of U.S. national interest. According to this view, there is no competing theme of isolationism, just opposition to specific cases of intervention on pragmatic or tactical grounds.

Historical Sources of the American National Style

The term *national style* is used to capture the way in which the ideas and experiences from the past shape current policy making. The sources of the American national style are found in many places.[15] Two different

approaches are used most often. One focuses on the legacy of the overall historical experience of the United States. The second examines the foreign policy ideas of key figures.

Few nations can look back on as favorable a set of conditions in which to grow and develop as the United States. Its vast size provided an abundance of natural resources on which to build a prosperous economy. Just as important for the development of the American national style is the fact that this economic growth took place without any master plan. Individual self-reliance, flexibility, and improvisation were the cardinal virtues in developing America. Guided by these principles, the United States has become a "how-to-do-it" society, with energies that are largely directed to the problem at hand and with long-range concerns that receive scant attention.[16]

U.S. economic growth also occurred in an era of unparalleled global harmony. With the exception of the Crimean War, from the Congress of Vienna in 1815 until the outbreak of World War I in 1914, the Great Powers of Europe were largely at peace with one another. The defense of America's continental borders never required the creation of a large standing army or navy. Peace and security seemed to come naturally, and were widely accepted as the normal condition of world affairs. The links between American security and developments abroad went unnoticed. Democracy, rather than the strength of the British navy or the European balance of power, was seen as the source of American security.

This faith in the power of democracy reflects the extent to which American political thought is rooted in the eighteenth-century view of human nature. Most important to the development of the ideas that have guided U.S. policy makers is the work of John Locke, who argued that people are rational beings capable of determining their own best interests. The best government was considered to be the one that governed least. To Locke, the historical record indicated that the exercise of power led inevitably to its abuse and corrupted the natural harmony existing among individuals. Conflicts between individuals could be settled without the application of concentrated state power. The wastefulness and destructiveness of war disqualified it as a means of conflict resolution. Negotiation, reason, and discussion should be sufficient to overcome misperceptions and reconcile conflicting interests.

In contrast to war, trade is seen as promoting the peaceful settlement of disputes. The dynamics of the marketplace bind individuals together in mutually profitable exchanges. This is not the case when governments dominate society and control activity for their own advantage. Because commerce creates a vested interest in peace, logic points to limiting government powers. The American historical experience seemed to offer vivid proof of the correctness of the liberal outlook on human affairs.

Much attention, of late, has also been given to the influence of religion on American foreign policy.[17] Four components of this religious framework are especially important. First is the idea of America as God's "chosen

nation." Second is the idea that America has a special mission or calling to transform the world. Third, in carrying out this mission, the United States is engaging in a struggle against evil. Finally, it is an apocalyptic outlook on world affairs. Change will come about not through gradual or subtle changes, but through a cataclysmic transformation in which evil is encountered and then decisively and permanently defeated.

Not all religions necessarily view world politics or America's role in the world in the same way.[18] Within Protestantism, three different schools of thought speak to the conduct of American foreign policy: fundamentalism, evangelicalism, and liberal Christianity.[19] Liberal Christianity, which provided the worldview for such key members of the founding generation of "Cold Warriors" as Secretaries of State Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles, is now in decline. It has been replaced by fundamentalism and evangelicalism as the politically dominant Protestant forces. Each provides a different lens through which to view America's place in the world. Fundamentalists are deeply pessimistic about the possibility of bringing about a new world order, and see a deep divide separating believers and nonbelievers. Defensive and self-confident, they hold an apocalyptic view of the future and are not particularly interested in cooperating with those with whom they disagree. Evangelicals also divide the world into believers and nonbelievers, but are far more optimistic than fundamentalists in their view about the potential for progress and cooperation among different people.

Patterns

Three patterns of thought and action growing from these past experiences provide the building blocks from which the American national style emerges: unilateralism, moral pragmatism, and legalism.

Unilateralism

The first pattern is **unilateralism**, a predisposition to act alone in addressing foreign policy problems.[20] Unilateralism does not dictate a specific course of action. Isolationism, neutrality, activism, and interventionism are all consistent with its basic orientation to world affairs. The unilateralist thrust of U.S. foreign policy represents a rejection of the balance-of-power approach associated with the European diplomatic tradition. It reflects the American sense of exceptionalism and is often perceived by others to be an insensitive and egoistic nationalism.

The best-known statement of the unilateralist position is the Monroe Doctrine. With the end of the Napoleonic Wars, concern arose that Spain might attempt to reestablish its control over the newly independent Latin American republics. Great Britain approached the United States about the possibility of a joint declaration to prevent this from happening. The

United States rejected the British proposal, only to turn around and make a unilateral declaration to the same end: The United States would not tolerate European intervention in the Western Hemisphere, and in return, it pledged not to interfere in European affairs. In 1904, the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine was put forward. Spurred into action by the inability of the Dominican Republic to pay its foreign lenders, President Theodore Roosevelt sent in U.S. forces. The Roosevelt Corollary established the United States as the self-proclaimed policeman of the Western Hemisphere. It would play that role many times. The years 1904–1934 saw the United States send eight expeditionary forces to Latin America, conduct five military occupations ranging in duration from a few months to nineteen years, and take over customs collections duties twice. The legacy of the Monroe Doctrine continued into the post–World War II era. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)-sponsored overthrows of the Arbenz government in Guatemala and the Allende government in Chile, U.S. behavior in the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban missile crisis, the 1965 invasion of the Dominican Republic, the 1983 invasion of Grenada, and the 1989 invasion of Panama testify to the continued influence of unilateralism on U.S. behavior in the Western Hemisphere.

The nature of American participation in World War I and the subsequent U.S. refusal to join the League of Nations also reflect the unilateralist impulse. Official World War I documents identify the victors as the Allied and Associated Powers. The only Associated Power of note was the United States. For U.S. policy makers, this was more than a mere symbolic separation from its European allies. Woodrow Wilson engaged in personal negotiations with Germany over ending the war without consulting the allies about the terms of a possible truce. The United States was also the only major victorious power not to join the League of Nations. This abstention is often attributed to isolationism, but it can also be seen as a triumph of unilateralism.[21] Membership would have committed the United States to a collective security system that could have obliged it to undertake multilateral military action in the name of stopping international aggression.

The impact of unilateralist thinking also comes through clearly in the neutrality legislation of the 1930s. These acts placed an embargo on the sale of arms to warring states. Because arms sales were seen as the most likely method of U.S. entry into a war, they had to be prohibited regardless of the consequences of the embargo on events elsewhere. The post–World War II shift from isolationism to internationalism did not bring about an abandonment of unilateralism; it only covered it with a multilateral façade. Control over NATO's nuclear forces remains firmly in the hands of the United States. The presence of the UN flag in Korea and references to SEATO treaty commitments in Vietnam could scarcely conceal the totally U.S. nature of these two wars. In the United Nations, the United States' veto power protects its vital interests from the intrusion of other powers, and the system of weighted voting used in international financial

organizations guarantees the United States a preponderant voice in their deliberations.

The American penchant for unilateralism was never far beneath the surface in its dealings with allies during the later years of the Cold War. Nowhere was this more evident than at the Reykjavik summit meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. James Schlesinger observed at the time that in proposing to eliminate all ballistic missiles within ten years, "the administration suddenly jettisoned 25 years of deterrence doctrine . . . without warning, consultation with Congress or its allies."[22]

The global war against terrorism did not change this unilateralist impulse; if anything, it reinforced it. In his January 2002 State of the Union address, President George W. Bush gave notice to the world that he was prepared to act unilaterally against terrorism. "Some governments will be timid in the face of terror. . . . If they do not act, America will." Unilateralism is central to Trump's America First approach to foreign policy and his disdain for working through alliances and international organizations.

Moral Pragmatism

The second pattern in American foreign policy is **moral pragmatism**.[23] The American sense of morality involves two elements. The first is that state behavior can be judged by moral standards. The second is that American morality provides the universal standard for making those judgments. By definition, American actions are taken to be morally correct and justifiable. Flawed policy initiatives are routinely attributed to leadership deficiencies or breakdowns in organizational behavior, not to the American values that guided the action. In the aftermath of World War I, the Nye Committee investigated charges that the United States had been led into war by banking interests, and the McCarthy investigations explored alleged communist penetration of the State Department following the "loss of China" in the 1950s. This dimension of moral pragmatism reappears in Trump's foreign policy, in his characterizations of the foreign policies of past administrations as "the worst deal ever."

In judging state behavior by moral standards, the United States typically places responsibility for foreign policy problems on the evil nature of the opponent rather than on the underlying dynamics of world politics or its own actions. George Kennan, the author of the containment doctrine, put it this way: "There seems to be a curious American tendency to search, at all times, for a single external evil, to which all can be attributed."

In line with Kennan's observation, Paul Pillar, a CIA officer who once served as National Intelligence Officer for the Middle East, has gone so far as to argue that the United States needs a villain in making foreign policy, and that it found one in Iran.[24] The end result is that the United States has become preoccupied with Iran to a far greater extent than is warranted by

the threat. Pillar argues that, by casting an adversary as a villain, several harmful byproducts for U.S. foreign policy follow, all of which have surfaced in negotiations to limit Iran's quest for nuclear weapons: (1) denial that any reasonable basis for the adversary's action exists; (2) underestimation of how much support the government may have among its people; and (3) underestimation of the adversary's willingness to compromise.

American pragmatism takes the form of an *engineering approach* to foreign policy problem solving.[25] The preferred method for uncovering the solution is to break the problem into smaller ones—the same way an engineer may take a blueprint and break a large task down into smaller ones. An organizational or mechanical solution is then devised for each of the subproblems. In using the engineering approach, it is not unusual to lose sight of the political context of the larger problem being addressed. When this happens, the result can be the substitution of means for ends, improvisation, or reliance on canned formulas to solve the problem.

U.S. involvement is typically put in terms of "setting things right." It is assumed that a right answer does exist, and that it is the American answer. In addition, the answer is seen as permanent. Foreign policy crises arise when states see the problem in different terms. To some, this has been especially evident in U.S.–Soviet arms control talks. The American approach to strategic thinking treated nuclear war as a "mathematical exercise." [26] Operating on the basis of a very different historical experience, the Soviets viewed war in quite different terms, marked by a great deal of uncertainty without a concrete solution.

The neutrality principle and related legislation of the 1930s provides an example of moral pragmatism at work. As first put forward, the legislation was easy to implement but paid little attention to the political realities of the day. Weapons were not to be sold to either side. Yet refusing to sell weapons to either participant guaranteed victory to the stronger side and invited its aggression. Neutrality legislation was repeatedly amended in an effort to close the gap between technique and political reality. In 1937, the president was given the authority to distinguish between civil strife and war. In 1939, legislation permitted the cash-and-carry purchase of weapons by belligerents, allowing the United States to sell weapons to Great Britain but making a mockery of the neutrality principle.

The potential dangers of rooting U.S. foreign policy on a foundation of moral pragmatism came through quite clearly in the Iran–Contra fiasco. Convinced of the moral correctness of the goal of freeing American hostages in Lebanon, the Reagan administration proceeded to sell arms to Iran, then diverted monies gained through these sales to the U.S.-backed Contras fighting the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. The reliance on engineering solutions and formulas to solve problems also reached excess here, as witnessed by National Security Council (NSC) staffer Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North's equation for achieving the release of the American hostages, part of which read: 1 707 w/300 TOWs (Tube-launched

Optically tracked Wire-guided missiles) = 1 AMCIT (American citizen). More recently, this tendency to solve foreign policy problems by designing blueprints and implementing them is evident in the American propensity to equate building democracy with holding elections and writing a constitution.

A frequent complaint leveled at U.S. Cold War foreign policy was that the anti-communist impulse was used to sanction almost any course of action, no matter how immoral, if it brought about the greater goal of stopping communism.[27] In the view of many, this attitude has carried over to the global war on terrorism and exists today in Trump's willingness to invoke seldom-used declarations of emergency as the basis for his actions, to use tariffs as his primary foreign policy bargaining tool, and to engage in brinkmanship in negotiating agreements that leave weaker states little choice but to acquiesce.

Legalism

The third pattern in U.S. foreign policy, **legalism,** grows out of the rejection of the balance of power as a means for preserving national security and the liberal view that people are rational beings who abhor war and favor the peaceful settlement of disputes.[28] A central task of U.S. foreign policy, therefore, is to create a global system of institutions and rules that allow states to settle their disputes without recourse to war. The primary institutional embodiments of the legalist perspective are the League of Nations and the United Nations. Also relevant are the host of post–World War II international economic organizations that the United States joined (i.e., the World Bank and International Monetary Fund). Just as commerce between individuals binds them together, international trade is assumed to bind states together and reduce the likelihood of war.

The rule-making thrust to legalism is found in the repeated use of the **pledge system** as an instrument of foreign policy.[29] In creating a pledge system, the United States puts forward a statement of principle and then asks other states to adhere to it, either by signing a treaty or by pledging their support for the principle. Noticeably absent is any meaningful enforcement mechanism. The Open Door Notes exemplify this strategy for world affairs problem solving. In the Notes, issued between 1899 and 1900, the United States unilaterally proclaimed its opposition to spheres of influence in China and asked other powers to do likewise, but it did not specify any sanctions against a state that reneged on its pledge. The Washington Naval Disarmament Conference of 1922 and the 1928 Kellogg–Briand Pact are also examples of use of the pledge system. The Washington Naval Disarmament Conference sought to prevent war by establishing a fixed power ratio for certain categories of warships, but failed to include inspection or enforcement provisions. Its restraining qualities were soon overtaken by a naval arms race in areas

left uncovered by the agreement and by a general heightening of international tensions. The Kellogg–Briand Pact sought to outlaw war as an instrument of foreign policy. Yet, true to its unilateralist impulse, the United States stated that signing the pact would not prevent it from enforcing the Monroe Doctrine or obligate it to participate in sanctions against other states. Agreements reached during the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I and SALT II) followed the tradition of the pledge system. They specified in broad terms the permissible nuclear inventories of the Soviet Union and the United States, without creating any enforcement provisions.

Variations of the pledge system have become a prominent feature of U.S. contemporary bilateral and multilateral trade policy. Confronted with an intransigent Japan in 1993, U.S. negotiators settled for a "framework" agreement that specified how future agreements would seek to resolve issues of trade imbalances and barriers to trade without detailing any particulars. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), signed in 2010 between the U.S. and Russia, contained no enforcement procedures. Neither did the 2015 Paris Climate agreement. Countries were expected to set their own reduction standards, and international shaming was to serve as the enforcement mechanism.

Legalism has also placed a heavy burden on U.S. foreign policy. In rejecting power politics as an approach for providing for U.S. national security, policy makers have denied themselves the use of the "reasons-of-state" argument as a justification for their actions. Instead, they have sought to clothe their actions in terms of legal principles. Post–World War II examples include fighting the Korean War under the UN flag, seeking the approval of the Organization of American States for a blockade during the Cuban missile crisis, and citing a request by the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States as part of the justification for going into Grenada. This pattern has continued in the post–Cold War era. Obama obtained UN support for his air attacks on Libya, George H. W. Bush moved forward with his military campaign against Iraq after getting UN support, and Clinton did the same for his use of force in Haiti. On the surface it might appear that Trump's foreign policy has abandoned legalism; instead, he has drawn upon it to support his unilateralist impulse repeatedly, arguing that the U.S. is justified in leaving NATO, trade agreements, and other cooperative ventures because other states have not met their responsibilities and have exploited the United States.

Consequences of the American National Style

As suggested earlier, these three patterns (unilateralism, moral pragmatism, and legalism) come together to support both isolationism and internationalism. They also produce four consequences for the overall conduct

of U.S. foreign policy. The first is a tendency to "win the war and lose the peace." As Robert Osgood wrote in 1957:

> The United States has demonstrated an impressive ability to defeat the enemy. Yet . . . it has been unable to deter war; it has been unprepared to fight war; it has failed to gain the objectives it fought for; and its settlements have not brought satisfactory peace.[30]

For many, his observation still rings true today.

The inability to "win the peace" stems from the American tendency to see war and peace as polar opposites. War is a social aberration, and peace is the normal state of affairs. Strategies and tactics appropriate for one arena have no place in the other. The two categories must be kept separate to prevent the calculations of war from corrupting the principles of peace. In times of peace, accomplishment of foreign policy objectives rely on reason, discussion, and trade. In times of war, power is the appropriate tool. The absence of a conceptual link between war and peace means that war cannot serve as an instrument of statecraft and that war plans will be drawn up in a political vacuum. The objective of war is to defeat the enemy as swiftly as possible. Only when that is accomplished can we return to the concerns of peace.

One example of the consequences of the American national style is the Bracero Program (see the Historical Lesson).

Historical Lesson

The Bracero Program

World War II led to a significant demand for additional workers in the United States, most notably in agriculture and the railroad industry. Between 1942 and 1964, this demand was filled by Mexican workers, "braceros," who crossed into the United States as part of a guest worker program negotiated between the two countries officially known as the Mexican Contract Labor Program. The wartime years produced the smallest migrant flow of any of these years, with 49,000–82,000 Mexican workers crossing the border. From 1947 to 1954, the average annual migration was 116,000–141,000 per year. In the last ten years of the Bracero Program, there were an average of 333,000 migrant worker contracts.

This was not the first attempt to regulate the entry of Mexican labor across the border. In 1909, President William Howard Taft signed an executive agreement with Mexico, permitting thousands of Mexican contract workers to harvest sugar beets in Colorado and Nebraska. When the United States entered World War I, restrictions were eased, and the number of Mexican workers increased to 73,000. The Mexican government

viewed this situation with some alarm. The Mexican Constitution of 1917 contained a provision that sought to safeguard the rights of emigrant workers, and it attempted to discourage workers from going to the United States unless they already had contracts that provided such protections. These efforts were largely ineffective. In 1929, with the Great Depression under way in the United States and large numbers of Mexicans returning home due to lack of jobs, the Mexican government sought but failed to obtain a bilateral agreement with the United States that would allow it to jointly manage the flow of workers across the border.

At the outset of the Bracero Program, Mexico possessed significant bargaining strength that allowed it to insert provisions protecting migrant rights. These included insisting that the braceros be paid the prevailing wage and prohibiting Mexicans from being rejected at "white" restaurants and other facilities in the American South. Mexico blacklisted Texas because of its discrimination policies and would not allow braceros to go there.

Gradually, however, Mexico's leverage began to weaken. One important reason was the growing phenomenon of illegal, or "wetback," immigration into areas such as Texas, where demand for migrant labor was great. In 1943, Congress passed Public Law 45, which gave legal status to the agreement reached with Mexico in 1942. One of its key provisions was that the United States could unilaterally declare an "open border" if need be. This power was used in May 1943 to grant one-year entrance permits. Texas farmers rushed into Mexico and began recruiting migrants, and the process undermined the orderly bilateral recruitment of workers. Lax border control enforcement in the early 1950s further contributed to the flow of illegal migrant workers.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the United States sought to deal with the problem of illegal migrant labor by transforming it into legal labor through mass deportations and mass legalizations. The scope of the problem was immense. In New Mexico, braceros made up 70 percent of the seasonal labor force. From 1947 to 1949, the President's Commission on Migratory Labor estimated that 142,000 deportable Mexicans in the United States were legalized as braceros. In 1950, slightly more than 19,800 new bracero contracts were awarded, but an estimated 96,200 illegal Mexicans were working in the United States. From 1955 to 1959, just 18 percent of all seasonal farm laborers were braceros.

The legacy of the Bracero Program is found in many areas. Getting seasonal and regionally concentrated agricultural jobs, rather than establishing permanent residence, became the norm for Mexicans coming to the United States. Part of the Mexican government's response to the end of the Bracero Program was the creation of jobs along the U.S. border for returning migrants, which became the Border Industrialization or Maquiladora Program. This program has not worked as expected, since firms have preferred to hire young Mexican women rather than returning braceros.

Within the United States, the end of the Bracero Program has not ended the debate over how to address the problem of illegal Mexican workers

in the United States or how to provide sanctioned labor to employers. The Reagan administration proposed a pilot program that gave 50,000 Mexicans temporary work permits each year. The George W. Bush administration floated the idea of a massive amnesty program for illegal Mexican migrants in the months prior to the 9/11 attacks. When the administration dropped these plans, Mexico called for establishment of a new guest worker program.

Applying the Lesson

1. What elements of the American national style can be found in the idea of a fence to control immigration and the Bracero Program?
2. Rate the importance of foreign policy and domestic policy considerations in these two policies.
3. Should we think about immigration primarily as an economic problem or as a national security problem?

The closing stages of World War II illustrate the problem inherent in the war–peace dichotomy. Should U.S. forces have pushed as far as possible eastward for the political purpose of denying the Red Army control over as much territory as possible, or should they have stopped as soon as the purely military objectives of the offensive were realized and not risked the lives of U.S. soldiers on nonmilitary goals? The Cold War East–West boundary in Europe reflected the choice of the latter course of action.

The George W. Bush administration was not immune from this artificial separation of war and peace. A sharp distinction between the two was evident in planning for the Iraq War. According to the original war plan, U.S. troops would be withdrawn within six months of the invasion; planning for the postwar transition to democracy was virtually absent. The presence of a sharp war–peace distinction and another consequence, impatience (to be discussed shortly), are evident in Obama's accelerated efforts to leave Afghanistan as the victor after bin Laden's death and the quick exit of American forces from Libya after Muammar Gaddafi was removed from power.

A second consequence of the American national style is the existence of a double standard in judging the behavior of states. Convinced of its righteousness and the universality of its values, and predisposed to act unilaterally, the United States has often engaged in actions that it condemns when they are taken by other states. The United States can be trusted to test and develop nuclear weapons, but other states, especially Third World states, cannot. Soviet interventions in Afghanistan and Czechoslovakia are condemned as imperialism, while U.S. interventions in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama are held to be morally defensible. The United States urges its allies not to sell weapons to terrorists or those who support them, while it is selling weapons to Iran in the hopes of securing

the release of U.S. hostages in Lebanon. The reverse condition also holds. Activities considered by most states to be a normal part of world affairs have been viewed as highly controversial by the United States. The clandestine collection of information and covert attempts to influence developments in other states, both long-standing instruments of foreign policy, are cases in point. The notion that different rules might apply to the United States than to other states surfaced after revelations of widespread abuse by American interrogators at Abu Ghraib prison. President Bush dismissed as "absurd" an Amnesty International report charging the administration with having created a gulag at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility.

The third consequence of the American national style is ambivalence toward diplomacy. In the abstract, diplomacy is valued as part of the process by which states peacefully resolve their disputes. Along with international law and international organizations, diplomacy occupies a central place in liberal thinking about the proper forums for conducting foreign relations. The product of diplomacy is viewed with great skepticism, however. If the U.S. position is morally correct, how can it compromise (an activity vital to the success of diplomacy) without rejecting its own sense of mission and its principles? As political scientist John Spanier notes, under these conditions compromise is indistinguishable from appeasement.[31] Regardless of whether the other party to the negotiations was a twentieth-century communist state or an eighteenth- or nineteenth-century European state, the fruits of diplomacy have been looked on with suspicion. Such feelings of mistrust and doubt are evident today across the political spectrum. They can be seen in Trump's rejection of Obama's nuclear agreement with Iran and fears about what Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin may have discussed in their private meetings.

The fourth consequence of the American national style is impatience. Optimistic at the start of an undertaking and convinced of the correctness of its position in both a moral and a technical sense, Americans tend to want quick results, and become impatient when positive results are not soon forthcoming. A common reaction is to turn away in frustration. The next time a similar situation presents itself and U.S. action is needed, none may be taken. Calls for "no more Vietnams" reflect this sense of frustration, as did the demand to get U.S. Marines out of Lebanon following the terrorist attacks on the U.S. compound during the Reagan administration. Impatience was evident in the expectation that the United States could oversee the election of an interim Iraqi government, the writing and ratification of a constitution, and the election of a permanent government in just twelve months. As one columnist noted, the problem is that Iraq does not operate on Washington's clock.[32]

The desire for quick and visible results is seen by many as creating a bias toward the use of the military as an instrument of foreign policy. Neither diplomacy nor economic power offers quick results; both are slow working and work best when used out of the public eye. Using the military

as an instrument of foreign policy can create a vicious circle, however. The demand for quick results leads to a reliance on military power, but the rigid distinction between war and peace makes it difficult to use that power effectively. Use of military power may be marked by a double standard or, as Osgood observed, failure to meet political objectives. If the latter occurs, then diplomacy may utilized. Yet here again, the results are likely to be slow in coming, and may be viewed with skepticism. Frustration will set in and dominate U.S. foreign policy until a consensus supports new foreign policy initiatives.

Recall that the American national style does not produce a single type of foreign policy, nor are its various elements always present to the same degree. It can accommodate a variety of foreign policies, ranging from internationalism to isolationism.

Voices from the Past

Because not everyone sees the world the same way or learns the same lessons from the past, many find the most important source of information about the American national style to be the foreign policy ideas developed by earlier generations of policy makers.

One of these is President John Adams. According to Adams, American foreign policy should be based on the principle that the United States is "the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all" but "the champion and vindicator only of her own."[33] Adams was putting forward an argument for nonintervention into the affairs of others and advocating a foreign policy that was to be based on the "power of example." To go further, he warned, would involve the United States in "wars of interest and intrigue, of individual avarice, envy, and ambition."

Conservative internationalists point to the writings of Theodore Roosevelt.[34] He would replace liberal internationalism's conception of humanitarian intervention as a philanthropic exercise with one rooted in a sense of nationalistic patriotism. Before the Spanish–American War, Roosevelt wrote, "the useful member of a community is the man who first and foremost attends to his own rights and duties . . . the useful member of the brotherhood of nations is that nation which is most thoroughly saturated with the national ideal."

Walter Mead identifies four other figures from the past as particularly influential in setting the goals and policies that continue to shape American foreign policy: Woodrow Wilson, Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, and Andrew Jackson. For virtually the entire post–World War II era, U.S. foreign policy was organized around a combination of Wilsonian and Hamiltonian principles with occasional periods—such as after Vietnam—when Jeffersonian ideas gained prominence. Today, we are witnessing a rise in the influence of Jacksonianism on U.S. foreign policy, as evidenced by the manner in which Trump's foreign policy is carried out and the goals that it pursues.

Wilson's core foreign policy ideas are found in his Fourteen Points, which he presented in a speech to Congress in 1918. They constituted an outline for constructing a new world order, one which would be marked by "open" era of international politics, "a general association of nations," and "political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike." Looking beyond the Fourteen Points, **Wilsonianism** rested on four elements. The first was promotion of democracy, the second was encouragement of free trade, and the third was weapons control. Together, these three elements would place restraints on the exercise of government power and provide space for the development of individual liberty. The fourth element, the League of Nations, would provide an alternative to balance-of-power politics in ensuring national security.[35]

Early evaluations of Wilson's foreign policy held it to be naively idealistic and fundamentally flawed. This is no longer the case. His foreign policy principles are now embraced by many as those of a vindicated visionary, one who possessed a "higher realism" in his handling of foreign affairs.[36] After the 9/11 terrorist attack, George W. Bush, who had promised a moderate foreign policy, began to sound very much like Wilson. In his 2002 State of the Union address Bush stated, "America will lead by defending liberty and justice because they are right and true and unchanging for people everywhere. . . . We have no intention of imposing our culture. But America will always stand firm for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity."

The renewed interest in Wilsonianism has not met with universal approval. Some opponents assert that the term lacks clear meaning, to the point that virtually all recent presidents could be termed Wilsonians.[37] For example, the Reagan Doctrine (see chapter 1) could be seen as the ultimate embodiment of the Wilsonian legacy given its commitment to expand democracy. David Fromkin poses another problem with Wilsonianism as a model for contemporary American foreign policy.[38] He concludes that one of its core assumptions is the importance of a strong presidency. Wilson saw the president's control of foreign policy as "very absolute." He believed that the Senate had no choice but to ratify any treaty submitted to it by the president, regardless of any doubts about its wisdom or the secrecy with which it may have been negotiated. Wilson also advocated the Espionage Act of 1917. Edward Snowden (NSA leaks), Daniel Ellsberg (Pentagon Papers), and Julius and Ethel Rosenberg (stealing atomic secrets for the Soviet Union) are among those charged with violating this Act.

Alexander Hamilton advanced a concept of foreign policy that centered on economic considerations. The first task of U.S. foreign policy was promoting the health of the American economy at home and abroad. To that end, Hamilton emphasized the importance of a strong alliance between big business and government. This positioned the United States to engage in the global economy on favorable terms. He advocated a policy of freedom of the seas, and an open-door policy ensuring the free flow of money

across borders. In the Hamiltonian perspective on foreign policy, excessive amounts of military power and wars were threats to economic stability and growth. Military power must be used for the appropriate purposes and with care. After World War II, this required an American foreign policy that worked with other states to promote and protect an open international economic order. More recently, Hamiltonians were not opposed to the post–9/11 American military offensive against terrorism, because those attacks and their aftershocks threatened the health of American and global economic stability and growth.

Thomas Jefferson's approach to foreign policy is seen by many as the foundation for isolationism. At its core is the belief that the primary mission of U.S. foreign policy is to protect and perfect democracy at home. From the Jeffersonian perspective, excess foreign involvements, whether for building democracy or economic development, represent a danger to American democracy because they foster the creation of a strong government. A strong government weakens the system of checks and balances, promotes secrecy, and threatens individual liberties, especially when it involves the use of military force. From the Jeffersonian perspective, what is needed is a constitutional foreign policy. To that end Jeffersonians support the War Powers Act, which attempts to limit the president's use of force; oppose fast track legislation that limits Congressional power to amend international agreements; and oppose National Security Agency (NSA) domestic spying programs implemented after the 9/11 attacks. Senator Ron Paul has advanced a libertarian foreign policy agenda that is Jeffersonian in outlook, expressing concern about the corrupting effects of global involvement on American democracy.[39] This has been particularly notable in his opposition to the NSA domestic surveillance program.

The lead figure in the fourth foreign policy world view impacting the American national style is Andrew Jackson.[40] His writings and actions provide a foundation for those who stress the populist principles of courage, honor, and self-reliance in the conduct of American foreign policy. Rooted in the American frontier experience, Jacksonians draw a clear and firm distinction between members of their community and outsiders. The purpose of government is to protect and promote the interests of community members against outsiders who, by definition, threaten it. These outsiders, who hold different economic and cultural values, are found both beyond America's borders and within the government.[41] Jacksonians value simple and direct solutions to problems, fearing that complex solutions inevitably come to serve the interests of these outsiders rather than the people. Pessimists at heart, Jacksonians see the community as being threatened constantly by outsiders. For that reason, they champion a foreign policy of constant vigilance backed by overwhelming might that may be employed with few, if any, constraints. For Jacksonians, the objective of war is victory, not a negotiated solution or the achievement of limited objectives. Jacksonians are slow to focus on foreign policy issues, which

works against achievement of victory in war or other foreign policy initiatives. Domestic issues take precedent. Additionally, once a foreign policy commitment has been made, Jacksonians find it difficult to change their position.

Jacksonianism never disappeared completely from the political scene. The Tea Party movement is often seen as evidence of its most recent revival, although its foreign policy agenda also contains strains of other voices from the past.[42] Donald Trump's election in 2016 is seen as the culmination of this revival.

Over the Horizon: A Millennial Foreign Policy?

The American national style should not be viewed as being frozen in place. Change is possible but not inevitable, and its direction is unpredictable. In the eyes of some observers, change might come as a result of the increased presence of women, blacks, and Hispanics in the policy-making process.[43] Their histories read quite differently from those presented in the standardized accounts of the American past, and they may bring to the policy process a very different style of acting and thinking about solutions to foreign policy problems.

A key question looking over the horizon for the U.S. national style is: Can it change in a way to adapt to future foreign policy challenges, or will traditional ways of defining problems and solutions continue? For example, will engineering solutions such as building a wall continue to dominate thinking about protecting U.S. borders, or will other approaches be used? Will border policies be rooted in a nationalist or globalist perspective?

At a minimum, two different scenarios present themselves. The first is a continuation of the important role that Jacksonian thinking currently plays regarding border policy. This is consistent with the view that Trump's election is best seen as a reflection of an underlying sense of frustration with the American political scene, and not simply a matter of personality and political style. As such, Trump's Jacksonian political agenda can be expected to outlive his presidency and influence future foreign policy making.

The second scenario involves change. A potential source of change in the American national style is the emergence into political power of a new generation: Millennials.[44] Born between 1980 and 1997, they make up almost one quarter of the adult U.S. population. They reached adulthood after the Cold War ended, so they have few memories of a pre–9/11 world with its terrorist attacks and Middle East wars. In addition, they are far more likely than older generations to see the United States as having provoked 9/11 through its foreign policy actions.

Research shows that Millennials differ from older Americans in their foreign policy outlooks in three critical ways: (1) they see the world as significantly less threatening and are less worried about national security;

(2) they are more supportive of international cooperation; and (3) while compared to older generations they are more hesitant to support use of military force in specific cases, they do not reject using force out of hand. They are more supportive of multilateral military efforts than unilateral action.

These contrasting generational positions are very evident in Millennial views on border crossing. A February 2017 PEW poll showed that 78 percent of those aged 18–29 opposed building a wall, as did 65 percent of those aged 30–49. Support for the wall in older age groups dipped below 50 percent. A January 2019 PEW poll found that 73 percent of those aged 18–29 and 63 percent of those aged 30–39 opposed expanding the wall, compared with 51 percent of those in the 50–64 age group and 48 percent of those over 65.

Critical Thinking Questions

1. Could the United States become isolationist again? Why or why not?
2. What is the most important element in the American national style for understanding U.S. foreign policy, and why?
3. How difficult would it be for the American national style in U.S. foreign policy to change? Explain your answer.

Key Terms

containment, 54
deterrence, 54
internationalism, 56
isolationism, 56
legalism, 63
moral pragmatism, 61
national style, 54
neoconservatism, 54
pledge system, 63
preemption, 54
unilateralism, 59
Wilsonianism, 70

Further Reading

Andrew Bacevich, *The New American Militarism: How Americans are seduced by War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).

The author traces the history of militarism in American political thought and argues that, after Vietnam, both the American political left and right have embraced militarism as a means of advancing their political agendas.

Judith Goldstein, *Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).

This book shows how new ideas shape foreign policy decisions long after they have been introduced by becoming embedded in political institutions.

John G. Ikenberry, et al. *The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the 21st Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).

This volume presents a collection of essays on the meaning of Wilsonianism and its impact on contemporary American foreign policy. Special attention is given to the Iraq War and the Bush administration.

Robert Kaplan, "Clash of Exceptionalisms," *Foreign Affairs* 97 (March 2018), 139–48.

This essay argues that Trump's America First exceptionalism is not a break from the past, calling it "American exceptionalism 3.0." The author argues that the United States will need a new exceptionalism after Trump to guide its grand strategy.

Gabriel Kolko, *The Roots of American Foreign Policy* (Boston: Beacon, 1969).

This classic volume presents a "revisionist" interpretation of American foreign policy, which draws heavily on the influence of special interests and capitalism as its driving force.

Russell Mead, "The Jacksonian Revolt," *Foreign Affairs* 96 (March 2017), 2–7.

The author asserts that Trump's American populism is rooted in the thought and culture of Andrew Jackson. He states that Jacksonian populism is only intermittently concerned with foreign policy and examines its implications for U.S. foreign policy.

Henry Nau, *Conservative Internationalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013).

Traditional foreign policy debates often stress the tension between liberal internationalism and nationalism. This book examines another perspective, conservative internationalism, and traces its development from Jefferson to Reagan.

David Unger, "A Better Internationalism," *World Policy Journal*, 29 (2012), 101–10.

Liberal internationalism is pictured as having become a code language for U.S. pressure against other governments and having been reduced to a tool for crisis management. In its place the author asserts that there needs to be a policy of constructive internationalism.

Learning from the Past 4



Dateline: Venezuela

On February 18, 2019, speaking in Miami to an audience that included many Americans of Venezuelan descent, President Donald Trump warned the Venezuelan military that they had only a few days to abandon to government of Nicolas Maduro and support opposition leader Juan Guaido. If they failed to do so, Trump warned that they would find "no safe harbor, no easy exit, and no way out . . . you will lose everything."

The focal point of the political standoff between Maduro and Guaido was the arrival of tons of food and medical supplies for Venezuelans who had been suffering through a deep and ongoing humanitarian crisis for years. The United States promised $20 million in humanitarian aid. One cargo

plane dispatched from Florida contained enough food to feed 2,000 people for one month. It also brought wheelchairs, crutches, and personal hygiene kits. Another stockpile of aid contained enough food to feed 3,500 people for ten days. These supplies sat on the Venezuelan border, their entry blocked by the military. Maduro had rejected them as part of a Washington-orchestrated coup, asserting that Venezuelans were not beggars. Trump's deadline came and went. The military remained overwhelmingly loyal to Maduro, and only minimal amounts of aid entered Venezuela.

For much of the post–Cold War era Venezuela had been a stable democratic state with a prosperous economy, due to its vast oil reserves and economic ties to the United States. At its height, Venezuela was one of the world's twenty richest countries, with a per capita gross national product higher than that of Israel, Spain, and Greece, and only 15 percent below that of Great Britain. By the time of the 2019 crisis, some three million Venezuelans had fled their country. Oil production had fallen to its lowest level in some thirty years. Hyperinflation rose to the level of one million per cent per year. Corruption was rampant. Over half the populations reported losing about 24 pounds due to hunger, and a malaria epidemic gripped the country due to a collapse of the healthcare system.[1]

Maduro is the handpicked successor to Hugo Chavez. An ardent socialist who saw Cuba as the revolutionary model to follow in Venezuela, Chavez led an unsuccessful military coup in 1992. He was elected president in 1998 and held that position until his death in 2013. Maduro narrowly won the presidency in 2013. He was reelected in 2019 in a highly contested race against Guaido. Trump was the first foreign leader to recognize Guaido as Venezuela's interim president. Some fifty countries, including many in Latin America, did likewise. Russia and China supported Maduro. Mexico remained neutral. Following Trump's announcement, Maduro broke diplomatic relations with the United States.

While economic relations between the United States and Venezuela remained strong during the Chavez era, their political relations had deteriorated sharply. Chavez was an outspoken opponent of George W. Bush's invasion of Iraq. Chavez also made overstated claims that the United States was behind a failed 2002 coup attempt against him; that it planned to invade Venezuela; and that he was the target of U.S.-supported assassination efforts. In a 2005 Organization of American States resolution, the Bush administration referred to Chavez as a "negative force" in Latin America and sought to isolate him from neighboring states; the resolution failed.

Relations did not improve during the Obama administration, which criticized his outreach to Iran and support for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, a Marxist revolutionary group. In 2014, Congress passed the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act, which authorized economic sanctions against Venezuelan officials who had mistreated anti-government protestors. In 2015, Obama signed an executive order defining Venezuela as a national security threat; he ordered

additional economic sanctions but left U.S. economic, trade, and oil relations untouched. By then Chavez had declared that "there was never a government more terrorist than the U.S. . . . The Yankee Empire will fall."

Virtually from the outset of his presidency, Trump viewed Venezuela as an ideological adversary. In August 2017, with no warning, he asked top aides if the United States could intervene in Venezuela on the grounds that its deteriorating political and economic situation was a threat to the region. The next day he publicly stated that "We have many options for Venezuela including a possible military option, if necessary." In the fall of 2018, he praised those leaving Venezuela as "great, great people" and said that Venezuela was in the "twilight hour" of socialism. Trump also embraced sanctions designed to deny Venezuela revenue from the sale of oil (something Obama had not done).

As the 2019 crisis developed, veiled references to military action short of sending in U.S. troops were put forward by members of the Trump administration. With the failure of its bid to remove Maduro from power by creating a border crisis, the Trump administration returned to economic power to achieve its goals. Two days after the border crisis passed, Vice President Mike Pence met with Guaido and announced new sanctions directed at Venezuelan state governors who supported Maduro, as well as an additional $55 million in aid to the Venezuelan opposition. In early March, another round of economic sanctions was announced. These were directed at financial institutions jointly owned by Russia and Venezuela, which provided Venezuela with more than $17 billion to get around U.S. sanctions. Also in March, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the United States was withdrawing all remaining diplomatic personnel, stating that they were "a constraint on U.S. Policy." His statement was widely read as holding out the possibility of military intervention.

As the crisis passed, the likelihood of military action faded. It was reported that Trump was upset that U.S. pressure had failed to remove Maduro, and had become disinterested in Venezuela. That did not, however, put an end to the conflict; the United States and Russia engaged in a spirited exchange of comments over whether Russian troops had left Venezuela because the Venezuelan government did not compensate Russia for its presence. Controversy also arose over the government's sincerity in entering talks with opposition leaders over holding new elections with many feeling that Maduro was only stalling for time. And trying to end Venezuela's economic isolation.

In making foreign policy decisions, policymakers must cast their attention in multiple directions. They need to understand the world as it exists, where it is going, and from whence it came. History suggests that remarkably little learning from the past takes place.[2] In making threats of military intervention to remove Maduro, the Trump administration showed little sensitivity to how they revived images of American imperialism in the region. Policy makers often get the present wrong.[3] In this case, Trump

misread the likelihood of the military turning on Maduro, disregarding doubts by members of his administration. The future is often viewed through viewpoints rooted in excessive fears or excessive confidence. No plans were announced regarding how aid would reach Venezuelans or how economic recovery, peace, and stability would be created after Maduro was forced out.

This chapter looks at the challenges of learning from the past through a close examination of U.S. involvement in Vietnam and Iraq. It also takes up the question of what lessons might be learned from the U.S. experience in Afghanistan.

How Do Policy Makers Learn from the Past?

Policy makers learn by matching the known with the unknown.[4] This is not a passive act. They do not sit back and simply accept data as a given, but actively interact with it.[5] In deciding how to respond to the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, Bill Clinton and his advisors drew upon **analogies** with at least four different events from the past, each of which suggested a different definition of the problem and the response: Vietnam, the Holocaust, Munich, and the outbreak of World War I.[6]

In addition to selecting reference points for evaluating information, policy makers must make judgments about whether a piece of information is important (a **signal**) or unimportant (**noise**). Discriminating between the two is no easy task. Identifying a piece of data as a signal does not tell the policy maker what to do; it only sets in motion the process of learning. Information received in the Philippines before the attack on Pearl Harbor did not tell policy makers that they were the next target, or identify the steps to take to defend themselves. In the period immediately before Pearl Harbor, fifty-six separate signals, ranging in duration from one day to one month, pointed toward the Japanese attack, but there was also a good deal of evidence to support all of the wrong interpretations. Surprise occurred not because of a lack of signals, but because there was too much noise.[7]

Policy makers discriminate between signals and noise by making a series of assumptions about what motivates the behavior of others or what constitutes the underlying dynamics of a problem. Consider the intercepted Japanese directive to its U.S. embassy and consulates to burn their codes. In retrospect, this is a clear indication that hostilities were imminent. However, during the first week of December 1941, the United States ordered all of its consulates in the Far East to burn their codes, and no one took this to be the equivalent of a U.S. declaration of war against Japan.

The assumptions that policy makers bring to bear on foreign policy problems are influenced by both long-term experiences and immediate concerns. Long-term experience provides policy makers with a database against which to evaluate an ongoing pattern of behavior. For Franklin

Roosevelt and other U.S. policy makers, personal experiences and their reading of history led to a conclusion that the presence of the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor was a deterrent to a Japanese attack. They failed to appreciate that it also made a fine target. For their part, Japanese leaders drew on their 1904 war-opening attack in the Russo-Japanese War as the model for how to deal with a more powerful enemy.

Once they are in place, perceptual systems are not readily changed. They easily become obsolete and inaccurate. The principle involved here is **cognitive consistency**.[8] Individuals try to keep their beliefs and values consistent by ignoring some information, actively seeking out other data, and reinterpreting still other information to support the individuals' perception of reality. As a result, instead of being a continuous and rationally structured process, learning is sporadic and constrained. Policy makers do not move steadily from a simplistic understanding of an event to a more complex one as their experience and familiarity with it build. New information and new problems are fitted into already well-established perceptual systems. So learning rarely produces dramatic changes in priorities or commitments, and changes in behavior tend to be incremental.

A well-documented case of this process at work is John Foster Dulles's perception of the Soviet Union.[9] Dulles was Eisenhower's secretary of state and had a **closed belief system**. He saw the Soviet Union as a hostile state and interpreted any data that might indicate a lessening of hostility in such a way that it reinforced his original perceptions. In his view, cooperative Soviet gestures were not a sign of goodwill but the product of Soviet failures, and represented only a lull before the Soviet Union would engage in another round of hostilities.

Events from Which Policy Makers Learn

The sporadic and constrained nature of the learning process means that not all aspects of the past are equally likely to serve as the source of lessons. Two categories of events are especially important lesson sources. The first is the dramatic and highly visible event. Policy makers turn to these events with the conviction that, because they are so dramatic and visible, they must contain more important information than commonplace happenings. The scars they leave in defeat and the praises sung in victory can become deeply entrenched in the collective memory of society. Events of this magnitude are often referred to as **generational events**, because an entire generation draws on them for lessons. War is the ultimate generational event. A policy maker need not have been involved in the 1938 negotiations at Munich to invoke the analogy and point to the dangers of appeasement.

The corollary to paying a great deal of attention to highly dramatic events is to all but ignore the nonevent. Nothing is learned from the crisis that *almost* happened. Warnings about the weakness of the shah of Iran

were heard as early as 1961, when members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee warned the incoming Kennedy administration that no number of weapons could save him. Mass unrest and corruption, they argued, doomed him to defeat. Senator Hubert Humphrey declared: "This crowd they are dead. They just don't know it. . . . It is just a matter of time."[10] The more often a warning is given and no attack occurs, the easier it is for policy makers to dismiss the next one. The November 27, 1941, warning to Pearl Harbor that a Japanese attack was possible was not the first one the United States received. An alarming dispatch had been received in October, but no attack had followed.

The second type of highly influential event is one that the policy maker experienced firsthand, especially those that took place early in the policy maker's career. The lessons drawn from events experienced firsthand tend to be overgeneralized, to the neglect of lessons that might otherwise be drawn from the careful analysis of the experiences of others.[11] U.S. thinking about the post–World War II role of the atomic bomb provides an example of the pull of personally experienced events on policy making.[12] The initial decisions were made by the men who had defeated Germany and Japan. In formulating ideas about the applications of the bomb, they drew heavily on those experiences. From 1945 to 1950, the Soviet targets identified for destruction by the atomic bomb duplicated the U.S. World War II policy of targeting commercial and industrial centers. They did not view the atomic bomb as a new weapon requiring development of a new strategy. It would be left to politicians to put forward the first strategy tailored to the political and technological realities of the postwar era.

Firsthand experiences that occur early in a policy maker's career are especially important because perceptual systems are resistant to change. Individuals are most open to competing images of reality when they confront a situation for the first time. Once a label or category is selected, it establishes the basis for future comparisons. These early firsthand experiences are not necessarily related to foreign policy problems. They may be ways of thinking about problems that proved successful in the past, positions taken on issues that produced desired outcomes, or strategies used in winning political office.[13] Early firsthand experiences are also of special significance because of the conditions under which policy makers must try to learn from the past. Henry Kissinger spoke to these problems in his memoirs when he stated that "policy makers live off the intellectual capital they have brought with them into office; they have no time to build more capital."[14]

Types of Calculations Made

When an event is recognized as a possible source of lessons, policy makers frequently engage in two types of calculations. First, they pay attention to *what* happened, but seldom to *why*. The Iron Curtain descended across Europe; Vietnam fell; and hostages were taken following an attack on the

American embassy in Iran. Focusing on what happened rather than on why it took place creates a type of tunnel vision that obscures the differences between the present situation and earlier ones. What can be concluded from the fact that the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, and the 1981 noninvasion of Poland each required three months of preparation time by the Soviet Union? Perhaps not very much.[15] Policy makers could not assume that the Soviets would need three months to prepare for the next invasion. None of these was an extremely urgent case demanding rapid mobilization or precluded an invasion starting at a higher stage of readiness.

Second, in examining what happened, policy makers tend to dichotomize the outcomes into successes and failures. They tend to forget that most policy initiatives are designed to achieve multiple objectives, that success and failure are rarely ever complete, and that neither is permanent. Problems are not so much solved as redefined and transformed into new challenges and opportunities.

When a policy is defined as a success, policy makers are especially prone to ignore three considerations in applying it as a lesson: (1) its costs, (2) the possibility that another option would have worked better or produced the same result at lesser cost, and (3) the role of accident, luck, and chance in affecting the outcome of events. When an event is defined as a failure, a different set of biases tends to grip policy makers' thinking. There is (1) the presumption that an alternative course of action would have worked better and that policy makers should have known this; and (2) an unwillingness to admit that success may have been unattainable or that surprise is inevitable.[16] The congressional investigation into Pearl Harbor takes up thirty-nine volumes, and the success of the Japanese attack continues to bring forward a never-ending series of books asserting that U.S. policy makers knew of the attack and permitted it to happen.

Lessons Learned

Three lessons are most often learned by policy makers from their studies of history. First, *expect to see more of the same*. The shah of Iran was expected to continue in power in 1979 simply because he had ruled for so long. Iran without the shah seemed inconceivable. The grain shortage of 1973 caught U.S. policy makers by surprise because for them "the grain problem" was always too much grain. It did not occur to policy makers that the combination of large-scale Soviet purchases of grain plus global drought would send the price of grain skyrocketing.

Second, *expect continuity in the behavior of others.* In part this occurs because policy makers are insensitive to the costs of inaction perceived by another state. The United States made this mistake at Pearl Harbor. U.S. estimates of Japanese behavior were based on the cost of attacking the United States. Insufficient attention was given to the costs that the

Japanese would experience if they did nothing and allowed the status quo to continue. For similar reasons, the hostile acts or words of allies surprise policy makers more than the hostility of an enemy.

Third, *avoid policies that fail and repeat policies that bring success.* However, two conditions work against the continued success of a policy. First, successful policies get overused, and are applied to problems and situations for which they were not intended. Second, a successful policy often changes the situation in ways that will frustrate its future use. In the 1960s, military aid to the shah may indeed have been responsible for averting the coup predicted by members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; however, because it also changed the situation, by the late 1970s continued military aid became part of the shah's problem instead of the solution.

These three frequently learned lessons cast a long shadow over U.S. foreign policy making in the lead-up to the Iraq War. First, policy makers expected to see more of the same; According to the dominant view, nuclear proliferation was a "strategic chain reaction," with Iraq under Saddam Hussein being the most recent addition to this chain.[17] Second, it was assumed that Saddam Hussein was evil and could not be trusted to change his policies or—at a minimum—contained as a security threat. Moreover, Saddam Hussein was engaged in an ongoing game of deception and obstruction with UN weapons inspectors. Why would he do this unless he was trying to hide something? When no weapons of mass destruction were found, an unexamined possibility emerged as the best explanation.[18] Saddam Hussein may have been acting out of a fear that if his bluff was exposed, his enemies within Iraq would be emboldened and his hold on power seriously weakened, or his bluff may have been directed at intimidating neighboring states such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. The George W. Bush administration was determined to avoid what it saw as the central mistake made by George H. W. Bush in the Persian Gulf War; the administration would remove Saddam Hussein from power.

U.S.-Cuban relations serves as another example of lessons learned (see the Historical Lesson).

Historical Lesson

U.S.-Cuban Relations

Laying 90 miles off Florida's south coast, Cuba has long played a prominent role in U.S. foreign policy. After he tried but failed to purchase it from Spain, President Thomas Jefferson commented "we must have both the Floridas and Cuba." In the years leading up to the Civil War, many southerners looked to annexing Cuba, where slavery was legal, as necessary to offset the growing number of free states. The Treaty of Paris, which officially ended the 1898 Spanish-American War, passed Spanish control over Cuba to the United States. The American military occupation of Cuba began in

1899 and continued for three and a half years before Cuba gained its independence in 1903. Under the terms of the 1901 Platt Amendment, which became part of the Cuban constitution, the United States had the right to intervene in Cuban affairs to maintain order and Cuban independence, and did so in 1906, 1912, and 1917.

Cuba has been a priority in U.S. foreign policy for both national security and economic reasons. U.S. fears that a foreign power might establish a military presence there were realized during the cold war, when the Soviet Union placed missiles in Cuba, leading to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. By the beginning of the twentieth century, some 95 percent of Cuban sugar was sold in American markets, and one-half of all U.S. exports to Central and South America went to Cuba. In the 1940s and 1950s, U.S. firms controlled 70 percent of all petroleum brought into Cuba and 42 percent of its sugar production. In the late 1950s, American foreign investment in Cuba was valued at almost $1 billion.

Since 1934 the dominant political figure in Cuba had been Colonel Fulgencio Batista y Zaldivar. By the late 1950s, Batista's rule was increasingly challenged. His leading opponent was communist leader Fidel Castro. As opposition became more widespread, the United States concluded that Battista was no longer capable of maintaining political stability in Cuba and began to distance itself from him through such symbolic acts as placing an arms embargo on Cuba and withdrawing its ambassador for consultations.

After Castro assumed power in 1959, Cuban relations with the United States deteriorated to such a degree that the U.S. broke diplomatic relations with Cuba in 1961. Castro moved quickly to nationalize U.S. businesses, imposing new labor standards and pricing policies. The United States responded by reducing the amount of Cuban sugar that could enter the United States. Castro then nationalized more U.S. property. The U.S. enacted a trade embargo, permitting only food and medicine to reach Cuba. Relations deteriorated further as Castro began to enter into close economic and diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

The culmination of this rising tension was the decision made in March, 1960 by the Eisenhower administration to support the entry of anti-Castro dissidents back into Cuba. Planning eventually shifted to organizing a full-scale invasion of Cuba, anticipated to result in a popular revolt and military desertions. John Kennedy implemented the plan one year later, in April 1961, with a force of 1,400 dissident Cubans. The Bay of Pigs invasion was a failure. No uprising took place, and 1,000 members of the invasion force were arrested and later exchanged for food and medicine.

The failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion led presidents to seek other ways of removing Castro from power. At least eight assassination plans were approved—but not necessarily implemented—between 1960 and 1965. In the spring of 1962, a series of political, military, psychological and intelligence operations designed to destabilize Castro's regime and set the stage for another military intervention were approved by Kennedy under the heading Operation Mongoose.

Operation Mongoose was suspended with the onset of the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962. Preventing an invasion had been given by the Soviet Union as the rationale for placing missiles in Cuba. As part of the agreement with the Soviet Union that led to the withdrawal of the missiles, the United States agreed not to invade Cuba.

After the Cuban missile crisis, the United States returned to economic sanctions as its primary instrument for placing pressure on Castro, who was now firmly in power. The most significant of these sanctions were bills that prohibited subsidiaries of U.S. firms from doing business with Cuba through other countries, and gave presidents the authority to withhold foreign aid and debt relief to countries providing assistance to Cuba. In 1996, the Helms-Burton Act was passed, authorizing lawsuits against foreign companies that purchased property once owned by Americans which had been nationalized by Castro. 2019 marked the 59th year of U.S. trade embargoes against Cuba.

Applying the Lesson

1. Was repeatedly intervening in Cuba in the U.S. national interest? Why or why not?
2. What other policy options existed to remove Castro for power?
3. Which lessons learned from Cuba might policy makers have applied to the Venezuelan case described at the beginning of the chapter?

Case Studies

The focus of this chapter now shifts to an examination of Vietnam and the Iraq War as case studies about how to learn from the past. Through the phrases *Vietnam syndrome* (see chapter 5) and **Iraq syndrome,** these conflicts have become primary reference points for thinking about the war in Afghanistan and the merits of intervention in Libya, Syria, and elsewhere. Vietnam provides a look at the range of lessons used by policy makers in making decisions about how to fight the war, and illustrates those that American elites have drawn from U.S. involvement. Lessons can also be drawn from how the Iraq War ended. Joshua Rovner's study led him to conclude that, contrary to popular perception, the United States did not win the war and lose the peace.[19] Instead, it won both the war and the peace that followed, but a combination of domestic politics, diplomatic and strategic considerations, and psychological factors combined to prevent U.S. leaders from recognizing that they had won.

The Vietnam War

America's involvement in Vietnam spanned six presidents. The cost of the war and its level of destruction were enormous: 55,000 Americans dead; a maximum American troop presence of 541,000 men; a total cost of $150 billion; untold numbers of Vietnamese dead and wounded; 7 million

tons of bombs dropped; and 20 million craters left behind. Despite these grim statistics, much confusion still exists. A public opinion poll, taken between March 21 and March 25, 1985, revealed that only three of five Americans knew that the United States supported South Vietnam. In a press conference on February 18, 1982, in response to a question about covert operations in Latin America, President Reagan stated:

> If I recall correctly, . . . North and South Vietnam had been, previous to colonization, two separate countries [and] provisions were made that these two countries could, by the vote of their people together, decide whether they wanted to be one country or not. . . . Ho Chi Minh refused to participate in such an election. . . . John F. Kennedy authorized the sending of a division of Marines. And that was the first move toward combat troops in Vietnam.[20]

North and South Vietnam did not exist as separate countries prior to French colonization in the 1880s; it was South Vietnam that rejected the elections; and Kennedy had sent Green Berets to Vietnam in 1961.

Table 4.1 presents a chronology of major events in the history of the U.S. presence in Vietnam.

Vietnam Chronology The first president to have to deal with Vietnam was Truman. Initially, his views on Indochina resembled those held during World War II by Roosevelt, who was sympathetic to Ho Chi Minh's efforts to establish independence for the region and unsympathetic to French attempts to reestablish their prewar position of colonial domination. In 1947, Truman resisted French requests for U.S. aid; he also urged France to end the war against Ho Chi Minh, who, while being one of the founders of the French communist party, had proven himself a valuable ally and nationalist in defeating Japan.

Truman's views were soon to undergo a stark and rapid transformation. By 1952 the United States was providing France with $30 million in aid to defeat Ho Chi Minh, and in 1953, when Truman's presidency ended, the United States was paying one-third of the French war cost. Ho Chi Minh was also redefined from a nationalist threat to a communist threat to U.S. security interests. Nothing had changed in Indochina to warrant this new evaluation of the situation. Dramatic events, however, were taking place elsewhere as Cold War competition took root. France was reluctant to participate in a European Defense System, something the United States saw as vital if Europe was to contain communist expansionist pressures. In a virtual quid pro quo, the United States agreed to underwrite the French war effort in Indochina, and France announced its intent to participate in plans for the defense of Europe.

The Eisenhower administration began by reaffirming Truman's financial commitment to France, and then enlarged it. By the end of 1953, U.S. aid rose to $500 million and covered approximately one-half of the cost of the French war effort. For Eisenhower and Secretary of State John

TABLE 4.1 Chronology of U.S. Involvement in Vietnam

September 1940	France gives Japan right of transit, control over local military facilities, and control over economic resources in return for right to keep nominal sovereignty.
March 1945	Gaullist French forces take over administration of Vietnam from pro-Vichy French troops.
September 1945	Ho Chi Minh declares Vietnam to be independent.
February 1950	United States recognizes French-backed Bao Dai government.
March 1954	French forces defeated at Dien Bien Phu.
April 1954	Geneva Peace Talks begin; end in July.
September 1954	SEATO created.
July 1956	No elections held in Vietnam.
October 1961	Taylor-Rostow mission sent to Vietnam; 15,000 advisers sent in as a result.
November 1963	Diem and Kennedy assassinated.
August 1964	Gulf of Tonkin incident.
February 1965	Pleiku barracks attacked; eight U.S. soldiers dead and sixty injured; Operation Rolling Thunder launched in retaliation.
May 1965	General Westmoreland requests 80,000 troops.
July 1965	President Johnson announces an additional 125,000 troops to be sent to Vietnam.
January 1968	Tet Offensive.
March 1968	Bombing halted; Johnson steps out of presidential race.
April 1970	Cambodia invaded.
March 1972	Major North Vietnamese offensive launched.
April 1972	B-52 bombings of Hanoi and Haiphong.
May 1972	North Vietnamese harbors mined.
December 1972	Peace talks collapse and then resume after heavy bombing.
January 1973	Peace agreement signed.
March 1975	North Vietnamese offensive begins.
April 1975	South Vietnam surrenders.

Foster Dulles, expenditures of this magnitude were necessary to prevent a Chinese intervention that they both felt was otherwise likely to occur. Unfortunately for the French, U.S. aid was not enough to secure victory, and Eisenhower was unwilling to go beyond financing a **proxy war**.

The end came for the French at Dien Bien Phu. With its forces under siege there, France informed the United States that unless it intervened, Indochina would fall to the communists. With no aid forthcoming, the process of withdrawal began. France's involvement in Indochina officially came

to an end with the signing of the 1954 Geneva Peace Accords. According to this agreement, a *provisional demarcation line* would be established at the 17th Parallel. Vietminh troops (troops loyal to Ho Chi Minh) would regroup north of it, and pro-French Vietnamese forces would regroup south of it. Elections to determine who would rule over the single country of Vietnam were scheduled for 1956. The Geneva Peace Accords provided the French with the necessary face-saving way out of Indochina. Ho Chi Minh's troops controlled three-quarters of Vietnam, and were poised to extend their area of control. All parties to the agreement expected Ho Chi Minh to win the 1956 election easily.

The United States did not sign the Geneva Accords, but pledged to "refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb" the settlement. However, only six weeks after its signing, the United States helped set up the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) as part of an effort to halt the spread of communism in the wake of the French defeat. A protocol extended coverage to Laos, Cambodia, and "the free people under the jurisdiction of Vietnam." The Vietminh saw the protocol as a violation of the Geneva Accords, because it treated the 17th Parallel as a political boundary, not a civil war truce line. Political developments below the 17th Parallel supported the Vietminh interpretation. In 1955 the United States backed Ngo Dinh Diem, who had declared himself president of the Republic of Vietnam. With U.S. support, he argued that, because South Vietnam had not signed the Geneva Accords, it did not have to abide by them and hold elections. The year 1956 came and went with no elections. By the time Eisenhower left office, U.S. military aid had reached one thousand U.S. military advisers stationed in South Vietnam.

The landmark decision on Vietnam during the Kennedy administration came in October 1961 with the Taylor-Rostow Report. Receiving contradictory information and advice on how to proceed, Kennedy sent General Maxwell Taylor and Walt Rostow to Vietnam on a fact-finding mission. They reported that South Vietnam could only be saved by the introduction of eight thousand U.S. combat troops. Kennedy rejected this conclusion, but he did send an additional fifteen thousand military advisers. Kennedy's handling of the Taylor-Rostow Report is significant for two reasons. First, the decision was typical of those he made on Vietnam. He never gave the advocates of escalation all they wanted, but neither did he ever say no. Some increase in the level of the American military commitment was always forthcoming. Second, in acting on the Taylor-Rostow Report, Kennedy helped shift the definition of the Vietnam conflict from a political problem to a military one. Until this point, Vietnam was seen by the Kennedy administration as a **guerrilla war** in which control of the population was key. Going forward, control of the battlefield would become the priority.

Under President Lyndon Johnson, U.S. involvement in the war escalated steadily. Pressures began building in January 1964, when the Joint

Chiefs of Staff (JCS) urged Johnson to put aside the United States' self-imposed restraints so that the war might be won more quickly. The JCS especially pushed for aerial bombing of North Vietnam. In August 1964, bombing began in retaliation for an incident in the Gulf of Tonkin, when two North Vietnamese patrol torpedo (PT) boats purportedly fired on the USS *C. Turner Joy* and the USS *Maddox* in neutral waters. President Johnson went to Congress for a resolution supporting his use of force against North Vietnam. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which passed by a unanimous vote in the House and an 88–2 vote in the Senate, gave the president the authority to "take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression." The incident itself is clouded in controversy. Later studies suggest that the incident was staged or that it never occurred. According to the authors of these studies, Johnson was merely looking for an excuse to begin bombing.[21] The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution became the functional equivalent of a declaration of war.

From that point forward, the war became increasingly Americanized. *Operation Rolling Thunder*, a sustained and massive bombing campaign, was launched against North Vietnam in retaliation for the February 1965 Vietcong attack on Pleiku. In June the military sought two hundred thousand ground forces and projected a need for six hundred thousand troops. By 1967, U.S. goals were also changing. A Pentagon Papers memorandum put forward the following priorities: 70 percent to avoid a humiliating defeat; 20 percent to keep South Vietnam from China; and 10 percent to permit the people of South Vietnam to enjoy a better, freer way of life.[22]

In January 1968, a final challenge was brought to the Johnson administration. The Tet Offensive was a countrywide assault by communist forces on South Vietnam that penetrated Saigon, all of the provincial capitals, and even the U.S. embassy compound. The U.S. response was massive, and expanded bombings of North Vietnam. In the end, the communist forces were defeated. As a final thrust to take control of South Vietnam the Tet Offensive had been premature, but it did demonstrate the bankruptcy of U.S. policy. Massive bombings and hundreds of thousands of U.S. combat troops had not brought the United States closer to victory. In March 1968, Johnson announced both a halt in the bombings against North Vietnam and that he was not a candidate for reelection.

Establishing détente was Richard Nixon's primary concern (see chapter 1); this policy could be threatened by any weakness or vacillation in U.S. policy on Vietnam. American commitments to Vietnam had to be met if the Soviet Union and China were to respect the United States in the post-Vietnam era. As you learned in chapter 1, the strategy selected for accomplishing this was called *Vietnamization*. Gradually, the United States would reduce its combat presence such that, by 1972, the South Vietnamese army would be able to hold its own when supported by U.S. economic aid and air and naval power.

The inherent weakness of Vietnamization was that it could succeed only if the North Vietnamese did not attack before the South Vietnamese army was ready. Nixon and Kissinger designed a two-pronged approach to lessen this possibility: (1) Cambodia was invaded with the hope of cleaning out North Vietnamese sanctuaries, and (2) the bombing of North Vietnam was increased. Nevertheless, the potential danger became a reality when, in the spring of 1972, North Vietnam attacked across the demilitarized zone (DMZ). At this point, Nixon was forced to re-Americanize the war in order to prevent the defeat of South Vietnam. Bombing of North Vietnam reached unprecedented levels, and North Vietnamese ports were mined.

The Paris Peace Talks were being carried out against the backdrop of this fighting. They had begun in earnest in 1969, but had made little progress. With the escalation of the war, Nixon also offered a new peace plan, which included a promise to withdraw all U.S. forces after an Indochina-wide cease-fire and exchange of prisoners of war. Progress was now forthcoming. Hanoi was finding itself increasingly isolated from the Soviet Union and China, both of which had become more interested in establishing a working relationship with the United States than in defeating it in Vietnam. It was now South Vietnam that began to object to the peace terms and stalled the negotiating process. In early December 1972, the "final talks" broke off without an agreement. On December 18, the United States ordered the all-out bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong to demonstrate U.S. resolve to both North and South Vietnamese leaders. On December 30 talks resumed, and the bombing ended. A peace treaty was signed on January 23, 1973.

Two years later, President Gerald Ford was in office when South Vietnam fell. What had begun as a normal military engagement ended in a rout. On March 12, 1975, the North Vietnamese attacked across the DMZ. On March 25, Hue fell. Five days later, Da Nang fell. The United States evacuated on April 29, and on April 30, South Vietnam surrendered unconditionally.

Lessons Used by Policy Makers In examining the lessons used by policy makers in their decision-making on Vietnam, the focus is on the Kennedy and Johnson administrations because it was during this period that the major escalations in the U.S. commitment took place. Two broad types of lessons of the past held by U.S. policy makers can be identified: political lessons, and strategic and tactical ones.

For elected and appointed policy makers, the political lessons of the past had the same bottom line: personal survival in the upper circles of decision-making in Washington required creating an image of toughness. The source of this lesson for elected officials was the "loss" of China to Mao Tse Tung and communism when the U.S. ally Chiang Kai Shek fled to Taiwan in 1949. The Republicans had successfully leveled this charge

against the Democrats. Kennedy applied the same strategy against Nixon in 1960, accusing the Eisenhower administration of losing Cuba. Politically, Kennedy saw Vietnam as his China. In addition, Johnson stated many times that he did not intend to be the first U.S. president to lose a war.

The national security managers also drew on the fall of China for lessons, and added decision-making in the Korean War. In each case, the implications were the same: A reputation for toughness was the most highly prized virtue to possess.[23] The bureaucratic casualties in the decision-making process on China were those who—even though they were correct—had become identified with the "soft" side of a policy debate. Though wrong, those who had been hawkish emerged relatively unscathed from McCarthyism. To a lesser extent, Korea produced a similar pattern. Dean Rusk, who had failed to predict the Chinese entry into Korea but was staunchly anti-communist, did not pay a price for being wrong. Instead, in 1961 he became Kennedy's secretary of state.

Standing out among the host of strategic and tactical lessons drawn on by Vietnam policy makers was the analogy to Munich and the danger of appeasement. Munich had become a symbol for a generation of policy makers.[24] Its impact was so great that even those with no personal contact with the European peace efforts of the late 1930s could draw on it for insight. For example, Lyndon Johnson viewed the central lesson of the twentieth century as that the appetite for aggression is never satisfied. It was Dean Rusk who drew most openly and repeatedly on the Munich analogy. Although he recognized that differences existed between the aggressions of Ho Chi Minh and Hitler, the basic point remained the same: "Aggression by any other name was still aggression and . . . must be checked."[25]

Very different lessons could be drawn from the French experience in Indochina, which was on the mind of every participant in the debate on the Taylor-Rostow Report.[26] Yet, it had a negligible effect on American thinking, falling far short of being a generational experience on the order of Munich. Only George Ball, who worked for France at the Geneva negotiations, drew actively on its lessons. To him, the war was unwinnable. Ball warned Kennedy that, if he sent the recommended fifteen thousand combat troops to Vietnam, the commitment would escalate to three hundred thousand men.

Ball became concerned with U.S. policy in Vietnam because he feared that it was diverting attention from Europe. His Europeanist orientation to world politics was not unique within the Kennedy-Johnson administrations. McGeorge Bundy was "totally a man of the Atlantic." He was also very much a product of the 1950s and the Cold War, so when he entered the debate on Vietnam, he was an advocate of the U.S. presence. Kennedy's first ambassador to Vietnam was also a Europeanist who was ignorant of Asia and Asian communism. The predominance of Europeanists illustrates the interaction of political lessons and strategic and tactical lessons of the past. A president concerned with making sure Vietnam did not become his China had limited options in making appointments, because a cloud of doubt continued to hang over the credentials of most Asian experts. Even

lacking knowledge about Asian affairs, a president could feel politically safe with Europeanists in key decision-making positions.

The lack of knowledge about Asia comes through in the strategic and tactical lessons that key policy makers drew from Asian events. Kennedy's favored set of lessons of the past was Magsaysay's struggle against the Huk guerrillas in the Philippines and the British experience in Malaysia. Both contests were very different from what was being contemplated in Vietnam. For example, according to the U.S. military, the Malaysian analogy was flawed in at least five respects:

1. Malaysian borders were far more controllable.
2. The racial characteristics of the Chinese insurgents in Malaysia made identification and segregation much simpler than the situation in Vietnam.
3. The relative plenty of food in South Vietnam compared to Malaysia made the denial of food to the guerrillas a far less usable weapon.
4. The British were in actual command of military operations in Malaysia.
5. It took the British twelve years to defeat an insurgency far less strong than the one in South Vietnam.[27]

The professional military also proved unable to draw on Asia for insights into how to fight in Vietnam. General Westmoreland was described as "a conventional man in an unconventional war." Vietcong challenges brought only a request for more and more men and more and more bombing. The approach of JCS chairman General Maxwell Taylor was not very different. While he spoke of the challenge of brushfire wars, he was not really talking in terms of fighting a guerrilla war. His solution was additional troops; political reforms were not mentioned. Taylor's analogy was not with Malaysia, but with Korea. He drew favorable comparisons of battlefield conditions and terrain, but overlooked the different nature of the two wars. Korea had been a conventional war, begun with a border crossing by uniformed troops that fought in large concentrations.[28] This was not Vietnam in 1964.

Lessons drawn by two other policy makers deserve mention. The first is Walt Rostow, who brought to Vietnam decision-making a firm set of beliefs about the necessity of winning the war and how to do it. In his eyes, communist intervention had taken place in South Vietnam, breaking the first rule of peaceful coexistence. The boundaries of the two camps were immutable, and any effort to alter them had to be resisted. His solution was air power. Rostow had selected bombing targets during World War II, and was convinced that massive bombing would bring North Vietnam to its knees.

The second policy maker is Lyndon Johnson, who drew heavily on his experience in Texas politics in formulating his Vietnam strategy. He had opposed the idea of a coup against Diem. That simply was not the way things were done in Texas: "Otto Passman and I, we have our differences, . . . but I don't plan his overthrow."[29] Beyond that, the United States had

given its word to Diem, and in Texas, you don't go back on your word. Johnson also felt that displays of toughness were prerequisites for dealing with the Vietnamese. Here, he drew on analogies to his dealings with Mexicans: "If you don't watch they'll walk right into your yard and take it over . . . but if you say to 'em right at the start, 'Hold on just a minute,' they'll know they are dealing with someone who'll stand up. And after that you can get along just fine."[30]

Lessons Learned Vietnam had a tremendous impact on public opinion and elite attitudes. It destroyed the postwar consensus on the ends and means of U.S. foreign policy and left in its place three competing belief systems: Cold War internationalism, post–Cold War internationalism, and neo-isolationism. The existence of these three competing outlooks would greatly complicate future U.S. foreign policy making.

The specific lessons of Vietnam can be identified by examining the results of a survey conducted by Ole Holsti and James Rosenau.[31] They identify seven groups holding different opinions about the sources, consequences, and lessons of Vietnam, covering the entire range from consistent critics to consistent supporters. Fully 30 percent of the sample falls at the two extremes, confirming the depth of the impact of Vietnam on American attitudes. Looking first at the sources of failure, Holsti and Rosenau were able to identify twenty-one reasons why the United States lost. The depth of disagreement is great. Not only are the sources of failure ranked differently by the various groups, no one explanation appears among all seven groups. Only three explanations are shared by six of these groups: the United States' lack of clear-cut goals, the presence of Soviet and Chinese aid, and North Vietnamese dedication.

A more coherent picture emerges when we review the consequences of Vietnam. Supporters cited international system-related concerns as the most important consequences, while critics cited Vietnam's domestic impact. Only one consequence was cited by all seven groups (but not with the same relative importance): the United States will limit its conception of its national interest. Yet the picture becomes cloudy again when turning to the lessons of Vietnam. Of the thirty-four lessons cited, not one appears among all seven groups. Only two appear among six of the groups: (1) executive-legislative cooperation is vital; and (2) Russia is expansionist.

The Iraq War

Before turning to the details of the Iraq War, it is important to understand the six linked phases of military activity described by military planners (see figure 4.1). In the Shape Phase (Phase 0), normal and routine military operations take place. In the Deter Phase (Phase I), military action seeks to deter the enemy by demonstrating resolve and capabilities for action. In the Seize Initiative Phase (Phase II), military force is used to execute




FIGURE 4.1 Phase Model of Military Activity

offensive operations. In the Dominate Phase (Phase III), military forces focus on breaking the enemy's will for organized resistance by engaging in a full deployment of force. The Stabilize Phase (Phase IV) is required when there is no functioning legitimate government or only a minimally functioning one. In Phase IV, military forces are required to perform limited local governance activities. Finally, in the Enable Civil Authority Phase (Phase V), the objective of the military is to support the civil authorities. Whereas great praise surrounded the initial military operation in Iraq, the lack of connections between the first three phases and Phase IV, as well as the conduct of Phase IV, became the subject of much criticism.[32]

Iraq War Chronology The prelude to the Iraq War found the United States engaged in diplomatic efforts at the UN Security Council to gain its approval for military action against Iraq. President George W. Bush addressed the UN General Assembly in September 2002, calling on it to move quickly to enforce the resolution demanding Iraq's disarmament, while making it clear that the United States was prepared to act on its own. With the prospects for an affirmative vote by the UN Security Council virtually nonexistent, on March 16 President Bush met with British Prime Minister Tony Blair and leaders from Spain and Portugal in the Azores to announce that the "moment of truth" had arrived for Saddam Hussein. The following day Bush issued an ultimatum requiring Saddam to leave Iraq within forty-eight hours, and on March 19 Bush ordered the invasion of Iraq. A **shock and awe** military campaign began, designed to overwhelm and demoralize Iraqi forces and allow coalition forces to move swiftly to Baghdad. On April 9 Baghdad came under the control of U.S. forces, and on May 1 President Bush declared an end to major combat operations. At this point, the administration began Phase IV. A chronology of major events in the Iraq War is presented in table 4.2.

By all accounts, the Bush administration entered Phase IV without a great deal of forethought, expecting it to be completed in about six months. Calls for additional forces were rejected as unnecessary, and postwar planning carried out in the State Department and the CIA received

TABLE 4.2 Chronology of Major Events in the Iraq War

January 2002	In his State of the Union address, President Bush identifies Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as an "axis of evil."
September 2002	Bush addresses the UN General Assembly and challenges it to confront "the grave and gathering danger" of Iraq or become irrelevant.
December 2002	Bush approves deployment of U.S. forces to the Persian Gulf.
February 2003	The United States, Spain, and Great Britain introduce a resolution in the Security Council authorizing the use of military force against Iraq. Russia, Germany, and France oppose it.
March 17, 2003	Bush gives Saddam Hussein a forty-eight-hour ultimatum to leave Iraq.
March 19, 2003	Operation Iraqi Freedom begins with a "decapitation" air strike against leadership targets in Baghdad.
March 21, 2003	Major fighting begins.
May 1, 2003	Bush declares an end to major combat operations.
December 2003	Saddam Hussein is captured.
April 2004	Photos are aired showing torture and mistreatment of prisoners by U.S. personnel at Abu Ghraib prison.
June 2004	United States transfers power to a new interim Iraqi government.
September 2004	U.S. casualties reach the 1,000 mark.
December 2004	United States announces its plans to expand its military presence in Iraq to 150,000 troops.
January 2005	Iraq holds its first multiparty election in fifty years.
May 2006	Nouri al-Malaki forms Iraq's first permanent democratically elected government.
December 2006	The Iraq Study Group Report (Baker-Hamilton Report) is released.
January 2007	President Bush announces a surge of U.S. forces into Iraq to stem the violence and create conditions for peace.
March 19, 2008	Fifth anniversary of the start of the Iraq War.
September 2008	The United States transfers responsibility for security in Anbar Province, the heart of the Sunni insurgency, to the Iraqi military and police.
November 2008	The Iraq cabinet approves a status of forces agreement that will govern the U.S. presence in Iraq through 2011.
January 2009	Iraq holds local elections that are free from violence.
August 2010	Last U.S. combat brigade leaves Iraq.
December 2011	President Obama declares the Iraq War to be over.

little attention in the Pentagon. On May 12, Paul Bremer arrived in Iraq as head of the new Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Bremer's first two orders proved to be highly controversial. CPA Order 1 attempted to "de-Baathify" Iraqi society. All full Baath Party members were dismissed

immediately from their government positions and banned from future government employment. CPA Order 2 dissolved the Iraqi army, along with Saddam Hussein's bodyguard and special paramilitary. The result of these two decisions was to drive many highly trained individuals into the opposition who had not necessarily been supporters of Saddam Hussein, and on whom the United States would have been able to rely to help stabilize the military and political situation.

Establishing political stability proved an elusive goal, as did creating a democratic government. Political milestones were realized, but a functioning government supported by all sectors of the Iraqi population was not created. On May 28, 2004, Iyad Allawi was selected as prime minister of the interim Iraqi government. One month later sovereignty was transferred, and Paul Bremer left Iraq. On October 13, 2005, a national referendum was held on Iraq's constitution, and in May 2006 Nouri al-Malaki formed Iraq's first permanent, democratically elected government. President Bush praised al-Malaki's government as having "strong leaders that represent all of the Iraqi people" and signaling a "decisive break with the past," but by the end of 2006, U.S. national security advisor Stephen Hadley was questioning its will and capacity to take the necessary military and political steps to bring sectarian violence under control. Al-Malaki's ability to do so was central to the success of Bush's surge plan, announced in January 2007, which sent additional U.S. forces to Iraq.

Bush's decision was controversial because it contradicted the central thrust of the Iraq Study Group's report.[33] The report recommended a phased exit of U.S. forces from Iraq, as well as talks with Syria and Iran. In June it was announced that the surge was complete, with 28,500 more U.S. forces in the country. This brought the total number of U.S. forces in Iraq to 165,000, the largest to date.

U.S. strategy in Iraq began to move in a new direction in 2007 when General David Petraeus took command of its military operation. Prior to assuming this post, he oversaw the writing of the Army's new counterinsurgency manual.[34] The first new manual on counterinsurgency (COIN) operations produced by the army in twenty years, it now became the basis of U.S. operations in Iraq. According to the manual, the central issue in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies is political power. The long-term success of COIN requires people to take charge of their own affairs and consent to the government's rule.

The combination of the surge, the change of strategy to COIN, and the "Anbar Awakening" produced by a Sunni tribal uprising altered the military landscape in Iraq. From 2004 until mid-2007, Iraq averaged more than fifteen hundred civilian deaths per month, and the U.S. military experienced almost one hundred dead and seven hundred wounded. By the end of 2007, U.S. fatalities fell to an average of twenty-three per month; from June 2008 to June 2011 this number decreased by just over one half.[35]

By 2013, two years after Obama declared the Iraq War over, a much different scenario was in place. A series of political protests accompanied

the insurgency-led violence in Iraq after the withdrawal of U.S. forces. A common focal point was failures of the Iraqi government to end corruption and provide public services. Significant protests in the name of democracy took place in Iraqi Kurdistan. Sunni Arabs protested what they saw to be their marginalization in Iraq's new economic and political order. The net result of this deteriorating situation was that most of the military gains prior to 2011 were gone. Led by al-Qaeda–linked insurgents, suicide attacks were once again common, and in 2013 some 7,800 civilians and 1,000 Iraq security troops died in attacks.

By 2014, references to an Iraq insurgency were increasingly replaced by those identifying the conflict as a civil war. Both politically and militarily, the tipping point came in 2014 with the announcement by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/ISIS) of the creation of a worldwide caliphate claiming religious, political, and military authority over all Muslims. In June 2014, ISIS took control of Fallujah and some 70 percent of Anbar Province. In response, Obama sent additional forces to Iraq. Later that year he announced a renewal of significant U.S. military operations in Iraq. It would be 2016 before Fallujah was retaken by Iraqi forces.

Analogies with Past Conflicts This section examines three lessons from the past (the Cold War and the Vietnam and Korean Wars) that American policy makers drew upon in making strategic decisions about the Iraq War.

The Cold War The George W. Bush administration cast the Global War against Terrorism as a long war with Iraq as its central front, inviting comparisons with the Cold War. One factor that stands out in many analyses of how the Cold War played out, especially in the Third World, is the challenge that nationalism presented to U.S. foreign policy as it sought to counter the influence of the Soviet Union and communism.[36] Both the Soviet Union and the United States were most effective when they cast their arguments in terms of local conditions and nationalist sentiment, and least effective when trying to couch a local conflict in global terms. The United States also encountered difficulties because it tended to ignore the differences among local enemy forces, grouping them all together under the heading of communists or communist sympathizers and allying with leadership forces often seen by local political forces as part of the problem. This same set of problems was a central challenge that the U.S. faced in Iraq.

A rather ominous reading of the past is presented by Andrew Bacevich.[37] He sees the Cold War and the Iraq War as firmly linked. In his view, they are World War III and part of World War IV, respectively. Periodically during the Cold War, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, in particular, had been major concerns of U.S. policy makers, but were almost always overshadowed by other conflicts. This changed just as the Cold War was ending, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian hostage crisis. Bacevich sees President Jimmy Carter as virtually declaring the

start of World War IV and Ronald Reagan as fully committing the United States to the region. The first phase of World War IV concluded in 1990. Iran and the Soviet presence in Afghanistan were the main U.S. enemies at this time. A second phase began with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and ran through the 1990s. World War IV entered its third phase with the terrorist attacks of 9/11.

The Vietnam War There are no shortage of comparisons between the Vietnam War and the Iraq War,[38] nor is there any shortage of controversy over such comparisons. President George W. Bush invoked the Vietnam comparison in 2007, stating that "one unmistakable legacy of Vietnam is that the price of America's withdrawal was paid by millions of innocent citizens." Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) countered, saying, "The president is drawing the wrong lessons from history."[39] Among the most often-noted differences are those involving the nature of the military conflict. In Vietnam, the United States entered into an ongoing national war of liberation which the enemy operated as a unified political-military force, engaging in both conventional military battles and insurgency operations. Violence rarely spread into major South Vietnamese cities. The United States also carried the war on the ground and in the air to North Vietnam and neighboring states that it accused of aiding the enemy. More recently, it has been suggested that the need to learn the political lessons of the Vietnam War still exists. Four lessons have been suggested by John Kerry, John McCain, and Bob Kerry: (1) do not confuse a war with the warriors; (2) be honest with Congress and the American people; (3) exercise humility in assuming knowledge about foreign cultures; and (4) with sufficient effort and will, seemingly unbridgeable differences can be reconciled.[40]

The Iraq War began with an American invasion. Conventional battles soon ended, and the conflict became almost entirely a combination of terrorist and insurgency attacks. Opposition forces operated not as a unified political-military front, but as militias, terrorist bands, and death squads under the leadership of a host of leaders. In the process, cities became the battleground and civilians the frequent targets as the various sides fought for dominance and to settle feuds both old and new. The United States did not expand the Iraq War beyond that country's borders, even though it asserted that Iran and Syria were harboring and supporting Iraqi insurgents.

Commentators see far more parallels of the political side of the Iraq War with the Vietnam War, although not all agree on what they are. Melvin Laird, who served as Secretary of Defense under Nixon during Vietnam, observed one point of similarity: Both wars were launched on the basis of faulty intelligence and "possibly outright deception."[41] By "possible deception," he was referring to the weapons-of-mass-destruction charge leveled against Saddam Hussein and the Gulf of Tonkin incident.

Similarities are also found in the decisions made by presidents early in the war and then as it became clear that victory no longer seemed attainable. For Kennedy and Bush, Vietnam and Iraq became testing grounds

for new strategic doctrines.[42] For Kennedy, it was an opportunity to move away from Eisenhower's doctrine of massive retaliation to one of graduated escalation. Massive retaliation, with its emphasis on the all-out use of nuclear weapons, left presidents with few options in dealing with regional threats like Vietnam. For Bush, Iraq provided a test case for preemption as the new American strategic doctrine as a replacement for deterrence, which was judged as too passive and unable to dissuade leaders of rogue states.

Nixon and Bush also used similar language in explaining an American exit strategy to the public. Nixon said, "As South Vietnamese forces become stronger, the rate of American withdrawal can become greater." Bush asserted, "As the Iraqi security forces stand up, coalition forces can stand down."[43] However, political differences are present. The depth of support for the Vietnam War was far wider and deeper than that for the Iraq War. In the early 1960s, few questioned the domino theory and the need for an American presence in Vietnam. No equivalent rationale for action existed at the outset of the Iraq War. Unlike the war in Afghanistan that preceded it, the link to the global spread of terrorism did not seem as evident to most.

The Korean War In June 2007, the Bush administration publicly raised the possibility of a long-term deployment of U.S. troops in Iraq after the end of the present mission. The historical analogy put forward is South Korea, where U.S. forces continued to be based for decades after the Korean conflict formally ended. The Korean model was presented by both Bush and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates as superior to the Vietnam model, in which U.S. forces left "lock, stock, and barrel." The analogy is attractive because of the economic prosperity and political stability that South Korea has experienced since the armistice was signed. However, critics quickly pointed out that, given the animosity toward American forces in Iraq, the continued presence of U.S. troops would likely be a lightning rod in domestic Iraqi politics and a target of military and terrorist attacks. Beirut in the 1980s, where U.S. Marines established a presence after fighting between Lebanon and Israel, was cited as a better analogy. At first the U.S. military forces were welcomed by all factions, but a suicide bomber driving a truck struck the Marine barracks in 1983, killing 241 soldiers.

Operations Decisions The United States faced two sets of operations decisions about how to fight the Iraq war: coinsurgency (COIN) and rebuilding Iraq.

Fighting COIN Operations The recognized differences between the political and military battlefields of Vietnam and Iraq noted earlier have led to a major debate over the military lessons of Vietnam for Iraq when it comes to fighting COIN operations. On one side are those who argue that the most relevant strategy in Vietnam was the abandoned "strategic hamlet"

program, in which the United States sought to pacify specific areas and then gradually expand control outward. In Iraq this has been referred to as the "oil spot" strategy.[44] At the other end of the spectrum are those who argue that the different political situations in Iraq and Vietnam negate the relevance of any Vietnam COIN strategy for Iraq. They argue that the issue in Iraq is not the people against a government so much as it is a security problem driven by mutual fear of all people about what will happen if the opposing group(s) seizes control. Winning the hearts and minds of the people does not address this problem, nor does promoting democracy. In fact, democratization may only further polarize the situation by increasing anxieties over what the new government will do.[45]

The search for lessons from the past that the United States can use in fighting insurgents in Iraq also yields a cautionary note. David Kilcullen argues that today's insurgents differ greatly from their predecessors in terms of policy, strategy, operational art, and tactics.[46] For example, given the global and instantaneous nature of communications today, the success of the insurgents may not ride on the legitimacy of the local government but on the ability to mobilize public support around the world for their cause. Kilcullen continues by saying that, whereas it was once believed that COIN operations were 25 percent military and 75 percent political, they may be 100 percent political today. He concludes by echoing the observation of Bernard Fall, a noted Vietnam-era COIN specialist: "If it works, it is obsolete."

Rebuilding Iraq The post–World War II American occupations of Germany and Japan were put forward by the George W. Bush administration as the starting points for thinking about rebuilding Iraq. Bush observed, "America has made and kept this kind of commitment before . . . after defeating enemies, we did not leave behind occupying armies, we left constitutions and parliaments."[47] A closer reading of the American experience in Germany and Japan would have provided reason for utilizing caution with regard to both process and outcome. Douglas Porch maintains that, for nearly a full decade, many of those involved in these **reconstruction** programs considered their efforts to be nearly a complete failure.[48] Rather than encounter a welcoming population, they found resentment and resistance. Actions taken to bring about reform were often counterproductive. General Lucius Clay, who was in charge of the American occupation zone in Europe, called de-Nazification his biggest mistake. It was in his mind a "hopelessly ambiguous procedure" that linked together small and big Nazis and engendered the hostility of the population at large because implementation often appeared arbitrary and hypocritical. Yet, the United States moved quickly to "de-Baathify" Iraq by dismissing party members from government positions and decommissioning the army.

It can be argued that the reasons for the ultimate success of the occupations of Germany and Japan had little to do with American foreign policy

or the presumed natural inclination of people liberated from tyranny for democracy. Rather, it had to do with factors such as enlightened domestic leadership, economic miracles fueled by the Marshall Plan in Europe, and the Korean War in Asia, along with the prior experience of democracy and entrepreneurship in these two states. The key American contribution was creating domestic and regional security, laying the ground rules for democratic reform, and then getting out of the way.

Germany and Japan were not the only efforts at reconstruction (or, more broadly, nation building) that might have been looked to for lessons. Fourteen other cases exist, including Cuba (1898–1902, 1906–1909, and 1917–1922), the Dominican Republic (1916–1924, 1965–1966), South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Afghanistan.[49] In only two cases, Panama (1989) and Grenada, was democracy in place after ten years. In seven cases, the United States established governments that almost totally depended on the United States for survival. In none of these cases did democracy emerge. One lesson drawn from these experiences is that the ideal form of transition involves a quick transfer of power to legitimately elected local leaders, but this presupposes a functioning electoral system and moderate local leaders who have genuine support among the populace.

The Iraq War and Iran, 2019 Standard discussions of the lessons of the Iraq War, such as those presented here, stress the legacy of the manner in which the United States entered the conflict and then became trapped as a result of poorly conceived strategies and a failure to understand the political and historical context in which it was operating. An alternative view argues that Iraq was winnable, that the problem (and lessons to be learned) are ones of execution. In particular, it is argued that Obama's decision to withdraw U.S. troops sealed defeat.[50] Supporters of both views are present within the Trump administration as it seeks to find a path forward in its dealings with Iran following the U.S. exit from the 2015 nuclear agreement and the onset of the conflict spiral discussed at the outset of this chapter. The conventional set of lessons suggests caution about the use of force and the ability to achieve a quick and lasting victory. The other lessons see the Iran conflict as a potential vindicator of that strategy.[51]

Over the Horizon: The Challenge to R2P

Learning from the past is not easy.[52] Past successes and failures are often obscured by the pressing foreign policy issues of the day. Not long after 9/11, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage gave voice to this political reality when he asserted, "History starts today."[53] Yet the pull of the past is never completely gone. As much as Obama wished to escape the Vietnam syndrome, he could not. When members of his administration brought up Vietnam, all Obama could say was "ghosts."[54]

As we look over the horizon, the 2019 Venezuelan crisis holds potentially important implications for the future of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). R2P holds that sovereignty is not just the right of a government to rule, but brings with it the responsibility for protecting and advancing the lives of its citizens. When a government is unable to do so, the international community has a responsibility to intervene, with force if necessary and as a last resort. R2P also obligates intervening countries to help rebuild the affected country.

R2P was not invoked in the 2019 Venezuelan crisis by Trump when he threatened to use military force. Proponents argue that R2P saves lives and is ethically required. It provided the justification for intervening into Libya in 2011 and has been a primary rationale advanced by those favoring intervention into Syria. [55] Citing Libya as an example, opponents argue that R2P serves as little more than a cover for countries to intervene to protect their own narrowly defined national interests.

Trump's silence on R2P is consistent with his rejection of international organizations and international law as constraints or stimuli of U.S. foreign policy. The question now becomes, will R2P reestablish itself as a guideline for interventions (for better or worse) or will it fall by the wayside?

Critical Thinking Questions

1. What is the most important lesson that can be learned from the U.S. experience in Vietnam, and why?
2. What lessons does Iraq hold for involvement in Afghanistan?
3. What are the dangers of looking to the past for lessons on how to deal with current foreign policy problems?

Key Terms

analogies, 78
closed belief system, 79
cognitive consistency, 79
generational events, 79
guerrilla war, 87
Iraq syndrome, 84
noise, 78
proxy war, 86
shock and awe, 93
signal, 78

Further Reading

Jon Finer, "The Last War—and the Next War," *Foreign Affairs* 98 (July 2019), 183–91.
This review essay of a U.S. Army official history of the Iraq War raises the question of whether we are learning the right or wrong lessons from Iraq.

David Fitzgerald, *Learning to Forget* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013).
This author focuses on the evolution of COIN doctrine, beginning with Vietnam and continuing through to Iraq, emphasizing the difficulty of learning from the past and how military leaders use history in formulating policy.
Robert Gallucci, *Neither Peace nor Honor: The Politics of American Military Policy in Vietnam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975).
The U.S. experience in Vietnam has produced many excellent volumes. This book is particularly noteworthy for its treatment of bureaucratic politics and the overall decision-making process.
Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).
This classic volume introduces readers to the many ways in which perceptions and misperceptions manifest themselves in foreign policy decisions.
Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Diem Bien Phu and the Vietnam Decision of 1965* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).
This book examines the process of analogical reasoning and shows how policy makers used three key analogies from the past to make a key decision in the Vietnam War.
Ernest May, *"Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978).
This foundational work on analogies and American foreign policy advances three arguments: policy makers are influenced by what they believe history teaches them; they tend to use history badly; and they are capable of using history better.
Dominic Tierney, "Intelligent Failure," *Foreign Affairs* 98 (January 2019), 41–8.
The author examines how U.S. officials think about past versus future losses, arguing that too often U.S. officials neglect the possibility of disaster.

Society 5



Dateline: NSA Electronic Surveillance

Observers are divided over the role that the public should play in making foreign policy. James Billington argues for an active and involved public: "International affairs cannot be a spectator sport. . . . Many must be involved; many more persuaded."[1] Walter Lippmann presents the opposite position: "The people have imposed a veto upon the judgment of the informed and responsible officials. . . . They have compelled the governments . . . to be too late with too little, or too long with too much."[2] This disagreement is very much in evidence in the controversy surrounding Edward Snowden's June 2013 leak of documents reporting the existence of a secret National Security Agency (NSA) domestic surveillance

program. Should the public be viewed as an independent check on government, making private communications off limits to secret government intelligence gathering programs, or are private communications fair game for monitoring, just like communications abroad?

Snowden was an NSA contractor. The documents he leaked revealed that the NSA had obtained a ruling from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) directing Verizon Business Network Services to provide it "on a daily basis" with all call logs "between the United States and abroad" or "wholly within the United States, including local telephone calls." The directive did not include the content of the communications but only *metadata*: the beginning and end points of a communication and its length.

The Obama administration initially declined comment but confirmed this directive the following day. Subsequent leaks revealed that the NSA had also been secretly monitoring the communications of key U.S. allies. Supporters of these programs quickly moved to defend them. President Obama proclaimed that "nobody is listening to your telephone calls." NSA officials asserted that it might "incidentally acquire" information about Americans and foreign residents, but it could not intentionally target any U.S. citizen. The program was defended as legitimate because it was authorized by law and known to Congress, and reportedly had helped thwart dozens of potential attacks. NSA defenders also attacked Snowden. Speaker of the House John Boehner called him a "traitor."

Critics challenged all of these assertions. They claimed that no evidence of the NSA programs' role in stopping terrorism had been produced. They noted that the FISC had approved 33,942 of 33,949 electronic warrant requests between 1979 and 2012, and that Congress had been lax in carrying out its oversight responsibilities. Most importantly, they argued that the NSA program was in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which bars unreasonable searches and seizures.

Supporters did not waver, but Obama felt compelled to act as revelations continued to mount, and in January 2014 he announced modifications in the program. After failing to pass reform legislation in 2014, in September 2015 Congress passed the USA Freedom Act. This compromise bill required the government to obtain targeted warrants to collect phone metadata from telecommunications companies.

In March 2019, it was revealed that, during Trump's first year in office, the NSA collected more than 500 million call records linked to forty targets (individuals, groups, or foreign powers). This number was more than triple the number of call records from 2016: 151 million calls and forty-two targets. In response, thirty-nine civil liberties groups lobbied the House Judiciary Committee to hold a new set of hearings on the domestic surveillance program. Later in March, a bipartisan group of Democrat and Republican House members introduced legislation to terminate the surveillance program. One of those, Ron Wyden (D-Ore.), argued that the

program "was born in secrecy, defended with lies and never stopped a single terrorist attack." Its fate is still uncertain although in August 2019 Trump requested that Congress reauthorize it. Reportedly, the NSA had halted the program in 2018 because of technicalities that resulted in unauthorized data collection and limited value in addressing the terrorist threat. In one instance, "over collection" led the NSA to purge millions of phone records.

Looked at over time, government-citizen relations are marked not only by questions of spying but also of withholding key pieces of information from the public One of the most important cases of this type is the Pentagon Papers (see the Historical Lesson).

Historical Lesson

The Pentagon Papers

The Pentagon Papers was a forty-seven-volume history of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam from World War II through 1967. Officially known as *United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967*, it was secretly commissioned by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in June 1967 and completed in 1969 just prior to Richard Nixon's inauguration. The Pentagon Papers contained three thousand pages of commentary and analysis and four thousand pages of documents, which included highly classified reports, memos, cables, and analyses. Only fifteen copies were printed.

The first installment of the "Pentagon Papers" appeared on the front page of the *New York Times* on June 13, 1971. Three days later, the Nixon administration obtained a federal court injunction to stop further installments from appearing. This did not bring an end to the Pentagon Papers, as the *Washington Post* and fifteen other papers began printing it. On June 30, the Supreme Court ruled 6–3 against the Nixon administration, paving the way for newspapers to print the Pentagon Papers in its entirety. The day before the ruling, Senator Mike Gravel (D-Ala.) had entered over four thousand pages of the Pentagon Papers into the official record of the Subcommittee on Public Buildings and Grounds to ensure that they would be made public. In making its ruling, the Supreme Court found that the Nixon administration had not made a case for prior restraint of free speech. The nine justices of the Supreme Court wrote nine different opinions in reaching this overall conclusion.

The Pentagon Papers created an immediate sensation. It revealed information that had not been covered in the press, such as U.S. bombings of Cambodia and Laos as well as military raids into North Vietnam designed to provoke a North Vietnamese response. Some argued that it represented a dangerous breach of national security, while others considered it a historical document that might cause embarrassment but was not a security threat. What was indisputable was that the information about military actions in Vietnam differed dramatically from that depicted in government policy statements. Most pointedly, it showed that

two presidents had lied, one about not fighting a wider war (Johnson) and the other about already having done so (Nixon).

The source of the leaked Pentagon Papers was Daniel Ellsberg. A RAND think tank military analyst during the Vietnam War. Because he had worked on the report for several months, he was able to obtain a copy and photocopy it. After failing to interest Nixon's national security advisor Henry Kissinger or Senators George McGovern and William Fulbright in the report, Ellsberg approached the *New York Times* in February 1971, giving them forty-three volumes. He held back the four remaining volumes contained what he felt was particularly sensitive information.

Ellsberg went into hiding after the *New York Times* began publishing the Pentagon Papers, but surrendered to police two days before the Supreme Court decision. He went on trial in 1973 for violating the 1917 Espionage Act and other statutes. The case was dismissed after it became known to the court that Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office had been targeted as part of the Watergate break-ins.

Applying the Lesson

1. Where is the dividing line between the public's right to know and the need for secrecy?
2. What motivations might McNamara have had in ordering the Vietnam study?
3. To what extent are the Pentagon Papers and the National Security Agency leaks similar? How do they differ?

This chapter examines the major avenues available to the public in exercising its voice on foreign policy matters: elections, public opinion, interest group activity, and political movements. It also takes a look at the role of the media in formulating public perceptions, the increasing involvement of states in foreign policy, and how policy makers view the public voice in making foreign policy. The chapter begins by evaluating awareness of the public on matters related to American foreign policy.

Public Awareness of Foreign Policy Issues

Not everyone is equally interested in or aware of foreign policy issues. A commonly used framework divides the American public into four groups, based on level of awareness and action. First, one large group is unaware of all but the most significant international events, and have, at best, vague and weak opinions. Second, another large group is aware of many major international events but is not deeply informed about them. The remainder of the American public, comprising about 25 percent, are generally knowledgeable about foreign policy issues and hold relatively firm convictions. Within this group, referred to as *opinion holders,* a smaller set of activists (1–2 percent) serve as opinion mobilizers for the other segments of the public.

It matters where the public gets its information. Opinion polling in the months following the invasion of Iraq found that many Americans were wrong about key facts, such as the existence of evidence linking Iraq and al-Qaeda (45–52 percent of Americans said it existed) and the discovery of weapons of mass destruction (about 25 percent believed this finding). Fox was the news source of choice for those with the most misperceptions, while NPR listeners held the fewest. Another study found that those who are not very attentive to foreign affairs tended to hold isolationist attitudes and got most of their news about international events from talk shows that emphasized soft news stories.[3]

Still, even though the public may not know the facts about a foreign policy issue, it tends to feel confident about what ought to be done. This holds true for both the substance and making of policy. A classic example with regard to the substance of American foreign policy comes from a 1988 poll, in which less than 50 percent of Americans could locate South Africa on a map. Nonetheless, 87 percent disapproved of its policy of apartheid.

Public Opinion

Public opinion provides a first avenue for the public to express its views on foreign policy. Every president since Richard Nixon has employed pollsters to learn just that.[4] Yet the public is not convinced that anyone is listening. A 2014 poll found that, from the American public's point of view, the gap between the views of the American public and the decisions taken by policy makers was considerable: 42 percent said it was very large and 45 percent said it was somewhat large. [5]

Interpreting public opinion polls is not always easy. The public's response can easily be swayed by the wording of a question. For example, before the Persian Gulf War, when asked if the United States should take all action necessary—including military force—to make sure Iraq withdrew from Kuwait, 65 percent said yes. However, only 28 percent said yes when asked if the U.S. should initiate a war to force Iraq out of Kuwait. Questions on trade policy show a similar sensitivity to wording; responses vary depending on whether the question is about exports or imports or about its impact on wages or economic growth.[6]

Trends and Content

Because of this sensitivity to wording, analyzing the responses to questions over time is better than looking at one-time polls as a way of uncovering what Americans think about foreign policy issues. Such analysis has captured several turning points in American public opinion about foreign affairs issues.

The pivotal event for the first shift was World War II. Public opinion polls before World War II suggested a strongly isolationist outlook. In

1939, 70 percent of opinion holders said that American entry into World War I was a mistake, and 94 percent felt that the United States should "do everything possible to stay out of foreign wars" rather than try to prevent one. The outbreak of fighting in Europe had little impact on U.S. attitudes.[7] This changed dramatically following the attack on Pearl Harbor. when internationalist sentiment came to dominate public perceptions about the proper U.S. role in the world. Between 1949 and 1969, 60–80 percent of the American public consistently favored active U.S. participation in world affairs.[8]

Before the Vietnam War, virtually all internationalists were in fundamental agreement on several key points: The United States had both the responsibility and the capability to create a just and stable world order, peace and security are indivisible, the Soviet Union was the primary threat to world order, and containment was the most effective way of meeting the Soviet challenge.[9] Foreign policy based on these beliefs could expect to receive the support of the American people. When disagreements arose, they tended to be about the process of making foreign policy rather than its substance.

Vietnam changed public attitudes.[10] It produced a steady and steep erosion of internationalist sentiment. In 1964, 65 percent of the public was defined as internationalist. This fell to 41 percent in 1974. That year also saw a dramatic increase in the number of isolationist responses, from 9 percent in 1972 to 21 percent.

Internationalism only reemerged as the majority perspective in 1980. No single pivotal event is associated with its rebirth. Instead, the American public gradually came to see the international system as threatening and out of control and developed a renewed willingness to use U.S. power and influence to protect national interests. Among the events that contributed to this shift were the 1979 Iranian coup, and the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The renewed embrace of internationalism was short-lived. The Pew Research Center characterized the public mood in the months preceding the 2016 election as one of isolationism with a very, very big stick.[11] Polls then showed that a majority of the American public (57 percent) favored letting other countries deal with their own problems and concentrating on problems in the United States; only 46 percent had held this view in 2010. In 2016, only 17 percent of Americans felt the next president should concentrate on foreign policy over domestic policy, in contrast to 60 percent in 2008. Yet 55 percent of the American public still favored policies that would allow the United States to maintain its status as the only world superpower. Only about one-third saw it acceptable for another country to rival the United States as a superpower. This outlook was reflected in a 12-point increase in the number of Americans favoring increased defense spending between 2013 and 2016. A significant factor feeding this change in outlook was a loss in confidence in America's world involvement. Almost

one-half polled in 2016 felt that the United States was less powerful than it was a decade ago.

The public's view on foreign policy appears to be shifting again toward internationalism, although polls differ on the depth of this attachment. According to a 2019 Pew Research Center Poll, 64 percent of Americans feel that global problems would be worse without U.S. involvement, a seven percent increase from 2016. A majority of Americans (54 percent) also favor taking into account the interests of its allies even if that requires making compromises with them.[12] A 2018 Chicago Council of Global Affairs survey found that 70 percent of Americans favored taking an active role in world affairs, up 7 percent from its 2017 results; except for the 2002 poll following the 9/11 attacks, this is the highest level since 1974. Ninety-one percent of respondents said it was more effective for the United States to work with other countries than act alone in achieving its foreign policy goals. Nearly three times as many Americans think it is more important for the United States to be admired than feared in order to achieve its foreign policy goals (73 percent versus 26 percent).[13]

It also appears that significant divisions exist. In the 2019 Pew poll, 49 percent of white Americans said it was important for the United States to be active in world affairs, compared to 39 percent of Hispanics and 29 percent of blacks. In contrast to only 29 percent of Republicans, a solid majority of Democrats (69 percent) said it was important to compromise with allies. Age also matters. In 2018, a Pew poll found that only 29 percent of younger Americans felt that limiting Russian power and influence should be a top foreign policy priority, compared to 54 percent of those aged 65 and older.[14]

Public Opinion and the Use of Force

A particularly important question for policy makers is the willingness of the public to support the use of military force. Here too, attention must be paid to wording and context. A 2012 poll regarding U.S. policy toward Syria showed that almost 75 percent of Americans opposed military action, but 62 percent supported the creation of no-fly zones.[15]

The conventional wisdom inherited from the Vietnam War era (see chapter 4) is that the public is unwilling to support the use of force if it results in casualties. Known as the **Vietnam syndrome**, the policy implication of this reading of the public led policy makers to either avoid the use of force altogether or use it only quickly and in an overwhelming fashion in highly controlled settings to ensure a short conflict with few American casualties.

The accumulated evidence on the use of force from the 1960s through the 1990s now points in a different direction, raising questions about the policy implications of the Vietnam syndrome. The public is not totally gun-shy. It will support the use of military force even when casualties occur,

depending on (1) the policy purpose behind its use, (2) the success or failure of the undertaking, and (3) the degree of leadership consensus.

Of particular interest to policy purpose is a study undertaken by Bruce Jentleson,[16] who found that the American public is most likely to approve military force when its purpose is to restrain the foreign policy actions of a hostile state; it is least likely to do so when the purpose is to bring about internal political change. A 2019 Chicago Council poll provides support for this view. When asked if the United States should use troops to overthrow a dictator, only 35 percent said yes, compared to 70 percent that supported their use to stop another country from obtaining nuclear weapons.

Public support for U.S. military involvement in the Middle East fits this pattern. During the Persian Gulf War, support was highest for Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm, which were designed primarily to curb Iraqi foreign policy adventurism by defending Saudi Arabia and liberating Kuwait. Public support dropped sharply when the question posed was the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Similarly, when asked about the Libyan military operation, 65 percent said they supported military action to protect civilians from Gaddafi, but only 48 percent supported the use of military force to remove him from power. Polling on Syria also supports this argument.[17] An online poll running from December 2015 to April 2016 showed that only 35 percent of Americans favored removing Assad from power. In contrast, as many as 66 percent favored using force against Assad if he had been found to use chemical weapons against Syrian opponents.[18]

Studies also suggest that the public is sensitive to the domestic costs of foreign policy activism. The more serious the domestic problems relative to the external challenge, the more powerful will be the public's isolationist impulse. So the weaker the economy, the less support a president is likely to find for an activist foreign policy. This logic helps explain support for the Iraq War, which was fought without a tax hike and cost less than 1 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). In comparison, the Vietnam War cost 9 percent of the GDP, and, at one point, the Korean War cost 14 percent of the GDP.[19]

A number of other factors also influence public opinion on the use of force. Foremost among them are race, gender, and party identification. When the Iraq War started, only 29 percent of blacks supported it. Hispanics were also far less likely than whites to support it; over 60 percent of all Hispanics disapproved of the Iraq War.[20] A similar pattern held in 2014, when a poll questioned Americans on their support for air strikes against Sunni insurgents in Iraq. Fifty-eight percent of whites voiced their support for air strikes, while only 50 percent of blacks and 43 percent of Hispanics did so.[21]

Gender differences were also evident (see table 5.1).[22] The 2014 poll cited earlier showed that 64 percent of men but only 44 percent of women supported air strikes against the Sunni insurgents. On average, regardless

TABLE 5.1 Gender-Based Differences on Use of Military Force

Policy Issues	Female (% in favor)	Male (% in favor)
Conflict		
War against Terror	70.5	80.0
Persian Gulf War	49.8	66.8
Somalia	52.6	61.4
Kosovo/Serbia	47.0	54.4
Type of Military Action		
Air/missile strikes/bombing	54.1	66.6
Send troops abroad	48.1	60.0
Policy Objectives		
Foreign policy restraint	54.9	68.1
Humanitarian intervention	63.4	68.1
Internal political change	43.8	53.2
Peacekeeping	43.4	49.6
Mention of Casualties		
War on Terror/no casualties mentioned	73.8	82.4
War on Terror/casualties mentioned	58.0	71.5
Haiti/no casualties mentioned	31.3	42.5
Haiti/casualties mentioned	26.0	37.7

Source: Adapted from Richard Eichenberg, "Gender Differences in Public Attitudes toward the Use of Force by the United States, 1990–2003," *International Security* 28 (2003), 110–41, tables 2–5.

of the purpose, women are less supportive of the use of military force. They are also more sensitive to humanitarian concerns and the loss of life. Having said this, women by and large are not pacifists. The differences between men and women on the use of force tend to occur at the margins and are a response to specific circumstances.

The use of force in Afghanistan and Syria highlights divisions along party lines. In 2013, 67 percent of Democrats believed that the war was not worth fighting, while only 54 percent of Republicans took this position. Only three years earlier, when Bush was president, a mere 27 percent of Republicans thought that the Afghan War was not worthwhile. On

Syria, 80 percent of Democrats supported Obama's decision to delay air strikes against Syria, while only 56 percent of Republicans did.

Impact of Public Opinion

How much influence does public opinion have on American foreign policy? This question can be answered in two ways: (1) the type of impact and (2) the conditions necessary for it to exert an influence. Public opinion can have three types of impact on American foreign policy. It can serve as a constraint on innovation, a source of innovation, and a resource to be drawn on by policy makers in implementing policy. To the extent that the public is subject to unstable moods about foreign policy issues—as was frequently believed in the early Cold War period and by some today in the war against terrorism—public opinion may act as a powerful constraint on U.S. foreign policy by defining the limits of what is politically feasible.

A case can also be made that the existence of too firm an outlook or too rigid a division of opinion is just as much a constraint. The deeply entrenched isolationist outlook of the American public during the 1930s made it extremely difficult for President Franklin Roosevelt to prepare the United States for World War II. A firm but divided opinion is cited by one major study as being responsible for the prolonged U.S. presence in Vietnam.[23] Faced by a "damned if they do and damned if they don't" dilemma, successive administrations are seen as having followed a strategy of perseverance until a public consensus developed for a strategy of either victory or withdrawal.[24]

Observers generally agree that public opinion rarely serves as a stimulus to policy innovation. One commentator argues that "no major foreign policy decision in the United States has been made in response to a spontaneous public demand."[25] However, public opinion today does appear to be capable of placing new items on the political agenda. What it tends to lack is the ability to overcome forces that push policy makers in the opposite direction. Such appears to be the case with regard to humanitarian interventions. In examining U.S. humanitarian interventions into Haiti, Bosnia, Somalia, and Kosovo, one study found that public support did increase congressional support, but political partisanship and ideology were strong enough to block congressional action.[26]

With regard to the conditions necessary for public opinion to exert an influence, work by public opinion pollsters suggests that it might be helpful to think about this influence in terms of **tipping points**.[27] Policies that have reached the tipping point share three characteristics: (1) a majority of the public is in support of or opposed to a particular policy, (2) they feel intensely about it, and (3) they believe that the government is responsible for addressing the problem. Public opinion on most foreign policy issues does not meet these requirements. Recent current issues that are at the tipping point or have crossed it are the Iraq War, ISIS terrorism, illegal immigration, and outsourcing jobs.

Elections

Almost invariably, the winning candidate in an election cites the results as a mandate for their policy program. Do elections really serve as a mechanism for translating the public voice into policy? The evidence suggests that claims of popular mandates are often overstated and based on a flawed reading of election returns.

A look back at the Lyndon Johnson–Barry Goldwater election of 1964 shows just how deceptive electoral outcomes can be. In 1964, Johnson won a landslide victory over Goldwater, who had campaigned on a platform of winning the war against communism in Vietnam "by any means necessary." The results were commonly interpreted as a mandate for continued restraint in the war effort. However, national surveys revealed that 63 percent of those who favored withdrawal and 52 percent of those who favored a stronger stand, such as invading North Vietnam, supported Johnson.[28]

Voting and Foreign Policy

For elections to confer a mandate on the winner, three demands are made of the voters: (1) they must be knowledgeable, (2) they must cast their ballots on the basis of issue preferences, and (3) they must be able to distinguish between parties and candidates. Evidence on the first point is not encouraging. The lack of widespread public understanding about foreign affairs issues never ceases to amaze commentators. Consider the following:

> 1964: Only 38 percent knew that Russia was not a member of NATO.
>
> 1966: Over 80 percent failed to properly identify the Vietcong.
>
> 1979: Only 23 percent knew which countries were involved in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.
>
> 1993: 43 percent could not identify the continent on which Somalia was located.
>
> 2003: 68 percent believed that Iraq played an important role in the terrorist attacks of 9/11.[29]

Do candidates win because of, or in spite of, their policy preferences? Historically, foreign policy has not been a good issue on which to conduct a campaign.[30] Party identification, candidate image, incumbency, or some other nonissue factors generally play important roles in deciding how the public votes. The "bump" a president gets from a foreign policy success may also be short-lived and is not easily transferred to other issues on the agenda. After Saddam Hussein was captured, George W. Bush's approval rating went up eight points. Three months later that bump was gone. Obama's rating immediately jumped nine points after Osama bin Laden was killed. It also soon returned to its prior level, and the jump had virtually no impact on his low approval rating on economic issues. The increased

polarization of American society may make obtaining lasting bumps ever more difficult. When asked about Trump's meeting with North Korean lead Jong Kim Un across the DMZ, 42 percent said it was a step toward peace, and 50 percent said it was a political act.

Charles Whalen, a former six-term congressman, sees the sporadic interest and low information level of constituents regarding foreign policy matters as a point of vulnerability for incumbents.[31] Challengers attempt to create policy differences with the incumbent and to cast the incumbent in a negative light. They find a powerful weapon in foreign affairs voting records. This dynamic also holds true at the presidential level, where foreign policy setbacks provide a strategic opening for the opposition party to put the president on the political defensive. Over the course of more than a century, the party out of power has sought to exploit setbacks in U.S.–China relations as evidence of incompetent or weak presidential leadership.[32] In the 1870s, Democrats called for a policy of curbing Chinese immigration into the United States; in the 1950s, Republicans blamed Truman for losing China; and in the 1990s, Democrats attacked George H. W. Bush for his response to China's handling of the Tiananmen Square protests.

The third prerequisite for elections to serve as a mandate is that voters must be able to distinguish between party and candidate positions. In U.S. elections this is rarely the case. When choice is present in a presidential campaign, it generally takes place in primaries, where candidates seek to separate themselves from their competitors by advancing boldly stated **positional issues** that lack detail but carve out valuable political turf.[33] During the general election, presidential candidates of both parties tend to stress **valence issues,** which find most people on the same side because of the need to form and hold together broad electoral coalitions.

In line with this reasoning, early in the 2015–2016 primary season Donald Trump called for building a wall along the U.S.–Mexico border and making Mexico pay for it, and advocating torture as a weapon to defeat terrorists; he also called upon South Korean and Japan to develop nuclear capabilities. As the Republican convention neared and his nomination appeared certain, Trump's tone changed. He now promised that "America is going to be strong again; America is going to be great again; it's going to be a friend again . . . we are going to finally have a coherent foreign policy, based on American interests and the shared interest of our allies . . . . we want to bring peace to the world."

Impact of Elections

What then is the impact of elections on U.S. foreign policy? For many observers, the greatest foreign policy impact of elections is not found in a single election but in the cycle of elections that defines a president's term in office.[34] The first year in office is generally characterized by policy

experimentation, false starts, and overly zealous goals, due to inexperience and the continued influence of overly simplistic foreign policy campaign rhetoric. During the second year, pragmatism becomes more evident because of the increased knowledge and skill of the administration and the realization that a foreign policy mishap may lead to the loss of House and Senate seats in the midterm elections. In the third year, foreign policy issues are evaluated largely in terms of their potential impact on the presidential reelection campaign. Potential successes are pursued vigorously, even if the price tag is high, while the administration tries to disengage from potential losses. The final year brings stalemate to the foreign policy process. "Foreign governments have long understood the difficulty of doing business with the U.S. in election years."[35]

The most propitious time for foreign policy undertakings is held to be the first year and a half of a second term. Here, there is an experienced president who has a foreign policy agenda and is operating under the halo effect of a reelection victory. By late in the second year of a president's second term, electoral considerations begin to overwhelm foreign policy again, as jockeying begins in both parties for their respective presidential nominations. At some point, the president comes to be regarded, both at home and abroad, as a "lame duck," limiting the ability to conduct foreign policy.

The influence of the election cycle competes with other factors, so its fit with any particular presidency is likely to be imperfect. However, indications of its presence may be seen many times. Take Obama's presidency. His first year in office was marked by frequent calls for resetting American foreign policy. His second year saw him adopt a pragmatic surge in troops to Afghanistan. Following the midterm elections, he moved to clear his foreign policy agenda by gaining high-stakes victories on the New Strategic Arms Reduction (New START) Treaty and ending the ban on gays in the military. In his third year, Obama announced the beginning of troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and moved on getting much-delayed trade legislation through Congress. In March 2012, Obama confided in Russian President Dmitry Medvedev that no agreement could come before the presidential election, indicating that after the election he would have "space."

Obama's second term did not fully follow the script outlined by the election cycle argument, however; partisan divisions between Republicans and Democrats and divisions within the Republican Party stalled efforts to pass immigration reform legislation.

Evidence for the election cycle argument can also be found in Trump's presidency. He started off intent on dismantling existing polices. In his second year, with a change in key advisors, his foreign policy became more pragmatic. In his third year, with another change in advisors, he sought to get contentious foreign policy issues off the electoral agenda by completing

multiple trade agreements, a nuclear agreement with North Korea, and by backing away from a conflict with Iran.

Interest Groups

The third avenue open to the public for expressing its outlook on foreign policy issues is interest group activity. A wide variety of groups actively try to influence U.S. foreign policy. Consider U.S. policy toward China.[36] A representative list of interest groups active in this policy area includes such diverse groups as the AFL-CIO, Amnesty International, the Christian Coalition of America, the Committee of 100 for Tibet, and the U.S.–China Business Council.

Groups wishing to influence U.S. foreign policy make their views known to them either directly or through interest brokers (lobbyists). Not surprisingly, former policy makers are among the most prominent interest brokers because of their access to policy makers and policy-making institutions. Among key recent White House foreign policy officials who established lobbying or strategic consulting firms after leaving office are former George W. Bush staff members Condoleezza Rice (Secretary of State and National Security Advisor), Stephen Hadley (onetime National Security Advisor), and Robert Gates (Secretary of Defense). Together they formed RiceHadleyGates LLC. Recent congressional leaders who entered the consulting field include former Senate majority leader Trent Lott and former House majority leader Richard Gephardt.

Types of Interest Groups

The most active foreign policy interest groups can be divided into four broad categories: business groups, ethnic groups, foreign lobbyists, and ideological public interest groups.

Business Groups The long-standing cliché at the heart of business lobbying is "what is good for General Motors is good for the United States." This view is endorsed both by those who feel threatened by foreign competition and seek protection (such as the auto, steel, and textile industries and farmers), and by those who depend on open access to foreign markets or natural resources. An example of the latter is lobbying during Obama's presidency by Exxon (then headed by Trump's first secretary of state Rex Tillerson) to obtain a Treasury Department waiver to sanctions that would prohibit Exxon from partnering with Russia on oil drilling projects in the Black Sea. Earlier it had received a waiver to search for oil in the Arctic; under that plan, Exxon and the Russian firm agreed to invest $3.2 billion.

The extent to which U.S. businesses depend on foreign trade and access to markets is captured in table 5.2, which lists the top ten states in terms of international trade as a share of their gross domestic product (GDP)

TABLE 5.2 International Trade as a Share of GDP: Top 10 (2017)

State	GDP (billions)	Exports + Imports (billions)	Trade Share of GDP
Michigan	$514.5	$200.1	38.9%
Louisiana	$243.3	$94.1	38.7%
Kentucky	$204.4	$78.0	38.1%
Tennessee	$344.7	$112.2	32.6%
South Carolina	$218.9	$69.7	31.9%
Texas	$1,692.0	$527.4	31.2%
Indiana	$359.5	$92.4	25.7%
Washington	$503.1	$127.0	25.3%
New Jersey	$589.3	$124.2	25.0%
Illinois	$818.2	$200.9	24.6%

Source: Mark Perry, How Important is International Trade to Each U.S. State's Economy? May 11, 2018. https://seekingalpha.com/article/4155383-important-international-trade. Data is from U.S. Census and Bureau of Economic Analysis

in 2017. The auto industry is most responsible for Michigan's high ranking; its top import partner is Mexico, and its top export partner is Canada. For Louisiana, crude oil is the most important foreign trade industry; its major partners are Russia, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and Iraq. Washington has a highly globalized economy due to its aerospace industries.

Nowhere is business foreign policy lobbying more controversial than when it is carried out by defense industries. Their activities bring forth images of what President Dwight Eisenhower referred to in his farewell address as the **military-industrial complex**.[37] At the core of this negative image is the assertion that a dominating political force consisting of professional soldiers, industrialists, and government officials exists within U.S. policy-making circles which acts in unison to determine policy on defense-related matters.[38] The resulting policies are based on an ideology of international conflict that requires high levels of military spending, a large defense establishment, and a belligerent, interventionist foreign policy. In the 1960s, the concept of a military-industrial complex became a major theme in the writings of those who opposed U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

Central to the effectiveness of the military-industrial complex are the linkages between its various elements. A 2012 study found that 70 percent of the retired three- and four-star generals took jobs with defense contractors or served as consultants to them. Perhaps the most important dimension of its operation is the extensive lobbying efforts of defense contractors directed at Congress and the White House. Collectively, Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon spent more than $50 million

on lobbying in 2017. In 2019, Lockheed Martin and the Pentagon reached agreement on a $34 billion deal for F-35 fighters, the largest contract ever signed. Especially important to these firms are their sales to Saudi Arabia, which came under attack in Congress following the assassination of Saudi dissident Jamal Khashoggi and the uncovering of links to the Saudi government. Raytheon's chief executive announced the firm's continuing support for Saudi Arabia, stating that, "we have supported the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in securing defense for more than 50 years . . . we are lock step behind them." The Aerospace Industries Association echoed Trump's call for standing with the Saudi government, asserting that it would continue "to support U.S. national security and foreign policy goals."

Ethnic Groups The most successful ethnic lobbies have relied on three ingredients to give them political clout: (1) the threat of switching allegiances at election time, either from one party to another or from one candidate to another in the same party; (2) a strong and effective lobbying apparatus; and (3) the ability to build a case around traditional American symbols and ideals.[39]

The Jewish American lobby possesses the most formidable combination of these elements. The centerpiece of the Jewish lobbying effort for Israel is the highly organized, efficient, and well-financed American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), which serves as an umbrella organization for pro-Israeli groups. It "promptly and unfailingly provides all members [of Congress] with data and documentation, supplemented, as circumstances dictate, with telephone calls and personal visits on those issues touching upon Israeli national interests."[40]

High levels of funding for pro-Israeli candidates are a key component of the lobbying strategy, as are pro-Israeli political action committees (PACs). A study by the Federal Election Commission found that, from 1998 to 2006, Jewish PACs made over $13 million in contributions to congressional candidates. The next highest level of contributions was by a Cuban American PAC ($1 million). Money alone does not explain the strength of Jewish American lobbying efforts. They have also been successful because their message resonates well with Americans: a country founded by settlers who were displaced from their homelands with a common sense of destiny and mission as a chosen people who are threatened by enemies.[41]

One of the challenges AIPAC faces is that the demographics of its support base are changing. Its primary supporters were once liberal Democrats; now they are conservative Republicans and, especially, evangelical Christians. African Americans were once staunch supporters of Israel but now increasingly align with Palestinian causes. AIPAC's core base has also aged. A 2008 poll showed that, while more than one-half of Jewish Americans older than age 65 felt that the Israel-Palestine relations were a major issue in the U.S. election, more than 66 percent of young non-Orthodox Jewish students did not feel this way. This change in support

base has contributed to the emergence of competing groups.[42] The most significant of these is J Street; formed in 2008, it defines itself as "the political home for pro-Israel, pro-peace Americans" and advocates a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It lobbied against AIPAC's position on such issues as Obama's nuclear agreement with Iran and imposition of economic sanctions on Iran, and disagreed with Trump's decision to recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital outside of formal peace negotiations.

AIPAC's many sources of strength do not guarantee success. Citizens for a Nuclear Free Iran, an AIPAC affiliate, worked with a $20 million advertising budget to stop Obama's nuclear deal with Iran, and ran ads in forty states. It was unable to mobilize sufficient votes in Congress to block the agreement. Decades earlier, in 1981, over AIPAC's objections Ronald Reagan had agreed to sell AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control Systems aircraft) to Saudi Arabia in what was then the largest arms sale in U.S. history.[43]

No Arab American lobbying force equal to AIPAC has yet emerged.[44] In 1972 a central organization called the National Association of Arab Americans (NAAA) was founded, and in the mid-1980s it had field coordinators in every congressional district and a membership of some one hundred thousand Arab American families. Also active in encouraging the participation of Arab Americans in the political process is the Arab American Institute, which was founded in 1985. From 1998 to 2006 Arab American PACs spent some $500,000 on congressional campaigns.

A major obstacle to creating an effective Arab American lobbying force is their ethnic diversity. Until 1948, most Arabs coming to the United States were Christians from Syria and Lebanon. Since 1978, most have been Muslims. As a result, no single political agenda exists for Arab Americans. Consensus exists only on the broad issues of pursuing a comprehensive peace plan in the Middle East and establishing better U.S. relations with the Arab world.

By the mid-1980s, African Americans had made great strides toward meeting two of the three prerequisites listed at the beginning of this section. First, as the Reverend Jesse Jackson's 1984 bid for the presidency made clear, blacks make up an important constituency within the Democratic Party, strengthening the threat of switching allegiances. Second, an organizational base, TransAfrica, now exists. The major focus of black lobbying in the mid-1980s was reorienting U.S. policy toward South Africa. Following the successful resolution of this issue, African Americans have had a more difficult time mobilizing on foreign policy issues.[45] Major areas of interest today include the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, South Africa, and Uganda.

Ethnic diversity is also a problem for Hispanic American lobbying on foreign policy.[46] Mexican immigration, which has been motivated largely by economic considerations, is concentrated in the Southwest and is largely Democratic. In 1980, Jimmy Carter got 72 percent of this vote. Cuban immigration is concentrated on the East Coast; it has been motivated

largely by foreign policy concerns, and is politically conservative and Republican. Ronald Reagan received 59 percent of Florida's Hispanic vote.

Two additional fissures within the Hispanic community make the establishment of an effective lobbying force difficult. One pits American-born Hispanics against immigrants.[47] The only real area of overlapping concern is immigration policy. American-born Hispanics give greatest weight to domestic issues such as education, crime, economic growth, and the environment. The second fissure is generational. This came through clearly in the differing reactions to President Obama's announcement that the United States and Cuba would move toward establishing normal diplomatic relations. By and large, longtime Cuban exiles in Florida denounced Obama as a traitor and liar, while younger Cuban Americans expressed the view that the time was right for a change in U.S.–Cuba relations. In reversing Obama's opening to Cuba, Trump was seen as appealing to this older generation of Cuban-American voters for electoral support. Some also argued this was a key element in his support for removing Socialist Nicolas Maduro from power in Venezuela; Trump had shown little interest in Venezuela, but was strongly pushed by Florida's Republican Senator Mark Rubio.

The most famous Hispanic lobby is the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF).[48] Established in 1981, CANF was vehemently opposed to Fidel Castro, intent on ending communist rule in Cuba, and had a long history of opposition to any change in American policy toward Cuba. Among the major legislation that it supported was the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act. Passed by Congress in an election year and endorsed by both presidential candidates in an effort to gain the support of the Cuban American community, the Act prohibited foreign affiliates of U.S. firms from doing business in Cuba.

CANF did a dramatic about-face in April 2009. Just days before President Obama announced that he was lifting long-standing restrictions on family and remittances to Cuba, CANF issued a white paper calling for a new direction in U.S.–Cuba relations based on people-to-people exchanges and promotion of Cuban civil society, and targeting bilateral and multilateral diplomacy.

Foreign Lobbyists Both foreign governments and groups within their societies engage in lobbying. While their most common concerns are foreign aid legislation and arms sales, foreign governments pursue a wide range of interests.[49] A point of controversy behind their lobbying efforts is the legal requirement that advocates of foreign organizations register as lobbyists and provide details of their fees and activities. Often, individuals recruited by foreign organizations argue that they are not lobbyists, but are legitimately acting as individuals to promote good foreign policy decisions. This was the position taken by Rudolph Giuliani, former New York City major and personal attorney to Donald Trump, who has not registered as a foreign agent even though Brazil, Colombia, and an Iranian dissident group, Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (MEK) are among his clients.

One of the most active foreign lobbyists is Saudi Arabia. In 2017, it had twenty-eight lobbying contracts. Only Japan had more, with forty-seven. In 2015, Saudi Arabia spent $7.7 billion on lobbying and consulting activities in the United States. This amount jumped to $27.6 billion in 2016, primarily because of a resolution in Congress to end U.S. support for Saudi bombing in Yemen (a topic taken up in the Dateline section at the beginning of chapter 6). In the weeks leading up to a vote on this resolution, Saudi Arabian lobbyists had 759 contacts with members of Congress, staffers, academics, and reporters to make their case. Another reason was the election of Donald Trump, who had attacked Saudi Arabia during the campaign. Shortly after his election, Saudi Arabia hired six additional lobbying firms. The day after Trump announced that he would visit, Saudi Arabia hired the Sonoran Policy Group as a "government affairs and commercial sector adviser" for $5.4 million. A few months later, Sonoran hired Stuart Jolly, the political director of a pro-Trump political-action committee, to be its president. Before Trump's trip, another consulting firm sent pro-Saudi material to hundreds of members of Congress. Still another firm distributed a sixty-page report justifying the Yemen bombing campaign. Three days after Khashoggi's death and rising demands in Congress for action against the country, Saudi Arabia again invested in lobbying firms, adding the McKeon Group founded by former Republican Chair of the House Armed Services Committee Robert McKeon for $450,000 with a $50,000 per month retainer. While in the House, McKeon received over $700,000 in campaign contributions from defense contractors such as Lockheed that sell aircraft to Saudi Arabia.

MEK provides an ongoing example of nonstate foreign lobbying. Founded by Iranian students who embraced Marxism, overthrow of the Shah, and establishment of an Islamic state, it was identified by the State Department as a terrorist organization. A series of MEK attacks in the early 1970s resulted in the deaths of several U.S. soldiers. The organization formally renounced terrorism in 2001. Among those speaking out on its behalf were former CIA directors Porter Goss and James Woolsey, former FBI director Louis Freeh, former House Speaker Newt Gingrich, and former Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Hugh Shelton. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton removed MEK from the terrorist list in 2012, but it continues to be at the center of controversy for its lobbying efforts. Shortly after she was confirmed as Trump's Secretary of Transportation, Elaine Chao acknowledged receiving $50,000 from MEK for a five-minute speech.

Another non-state foreign lobby are the Kurds, an ethic group found along the borders of Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Armenia, which hopes to create its own state out of this territory. The United States has relied on the Kurds heavily to promote its interests in the Middle East. The Kurds have targeted many of their efforts toward bureaucracy. One of their goals has been to obtain $18.4 billion from U.S. construction funds dedicated to the Kurdish region of Iraq. When the State Department opposed their efforts the

Kurdish lobbying effort switched its focus to the Commerce Department, which identified this region as the "gateway" for U.S. firms going to Iraq.

Ideological Public Interest Groups This category includes a wide variety of groups. At one extreme are highly institutionalized and well-funded organizations that are not normally thought of as interest groups. Part of the mission of these **think tanks** is the propagation and advancement of ideas about how to address public policy problems. The Brookings Institution is one of the most prominent foreign policy think tanks. It long advanced a liberal-democratic foreign policy agenda, but has become more moderate and centrist in orientation. Two of the most visible think tanks now occupy positions at the conservative end of the political spectrum: the Cato Institute, a libertarian organization that has advanced a restrictive—if not isolationist—foreign policy agenda; and the Heritage Foundation. In the view of many of its past supporters, the Heritage Foundation has moved away from its traditional orientation—as a source of conservative ideas about a foreign policy based on a strong military defense, limited involvement in humanitarian undertakings, and free market principles in international trade—to a more activist and combative orientation. Also playing prominent roles as producers of ideas are the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), New America, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

Think tanks make their mark on Washington in many ways. Their members serve as a source of expertise,as either outside experts or employees, on which administrations and congressional committees can draw. Perhaps most significantly, they serve as a focal point for bringing together like-minded individuals to address common concerns. For example, think tanks were prominent members of the "blue team," a loose alliance of members of Congress, staffers, conservative journalists, and lobbyists for Taiwan who worked to present China as a threat to the United States. More recently, the Heritage Foundation, AEI, and the Foreign Policy Institute joined forces in a "defend defense" initiative to protect the Pentagon's budget from major cutbacks.

Recently, think tanks have come under close scrutiny for receiving large sums of money from foreign governments without acknowledgment.[50] Since 2011, at least sixty-four foreign governments and their officials have contributed money to twenty-eight major U.S. research organizations. CSIS has disclosed a list of thirteen foreign government donors, including Germany and China. The Atlantic Council has acknowledged accepting funds from twenty-five countries since 2008.

Also included in this category are more traditional societal groups, the most prominent of which today may be the "religious right."[51] Pat Robertson's Christian Broadcasting Network gave $3–$7 billion to U.S.-backed anti-communist forces in Central America. In 2003, Robertson defended Liberian leader Charles Taylor against charges that he was a war criminal. Robertson later called for the assassination of Venezuelan

president Hugo Chavez. Evangelical groups also have become active in shaping U.S. foreign policy in Africa; U.S. policy on AIDS was heavily influenced by the beliefs of and lobbying by Focus on the Family.[52] As with other groups active in influencing foreign policy, divisions exist among evangelicals. For example, a 2017 poll showed that 76 percent of evangelicals aged 65 or above had a favorable view of Israel, compared to 58 percent in the 18–34 age group. Some 30 percent of those in this latter group were unsure, about twice as many as in the older age group.[53] The religious right does not hold a monopoly on interest group activity by religious organizations. During the prelude to the Iraq War, groups were active on both sides. Fundamentalist groups tended to support the war, but the Catholic Church, the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers), the World Council of Churches, the Muslim Peace Fellowship, and the Shalom Center all spoke out against it.

Impact of Interest Groups

Establishing an interest group's influence on a specific policy is difficult. More is required than just revealing the presence of group activity. A concrete link must be established between the group's actions and the actions taken by those who were influenced. Efforts to establish the validity of assertions about the influence of the military-industrial complex on U.S. foreign policy have produced mixed results. The influence of the military-industrial complex is greatest in the industrial arena and far less in the military one, where it faces strong competition from ideological, economic, and other nonmilitary influences.

Two additional factors must be considered in assessing the influence of interest group lobbying. First, to a considerable degree, success or failure may be due to factors beyond the control of interest groups, such as the existence of an economic problem or a change in the political climate. For example, a surge in populism within the United States fueled the election of Donald Trump, whose America First campaign promised to protect American businesses from unfair foreign competition. Second, interest group successes may have negative political side effects. Trump's tariffs on steel and aluminum were designed to protect those industries, but are likely to harm the auto industry and result in higher prices unless exceptions are granted, which would undermine the benefits of the tariffs. Moreover, China has retaliated by placing tariffs on soybeans and other products produced in the United States, hurting the U.S. farmers that were one of Trump's strongest support groups.

Political Protest

The public voice on foreign policy matters is not just expressed through officially sanctioned avenues. It can also be heard in a variety of forms that challenge policy makers to take notice of positions often at odds with

official policies. Protests range from the acts of single individuals, such as Cindy Sheehan challenging President George W. Bush's position on the Iraq War by camping outside his ranch in Crawford, Texas, to antiwar marches involving thousands, such as the one that occurred in Washington, DC, in 2010 on the seventh anniversary of the Iraq War.

Modern technology has added a new dimension to protest movements, the *virtual protest march.* In October 2003, when tens of thousands of protesters marched in Washington calling for an end to the occupation of Iraq, other protesters flooded congressional offices with e-mails stating their opposition to the war. A similar tactic was used to pressure Congress into investigating prewar intelligence claims made by the George W. Bush administration; more than four hundred thousand people from every state contacted members of Congress.

Political protests are valued for their ability to alter the political landscape by bypassing existing power centers and introducing new or marginalized voices into the political debate. The anti-globalization protests that began in Seattle in 1999 ensured that environmental, labor, and democracy issues could not be totally ignored. Pro-immigration protests have brought many Hispanics into the political process for the very first time.

The ability of political protests to have this impact may be especially important today. In large part this is because an *apathetic internationalism* is reshaping American politics, encouraging policy makers to ignore foreign policy problems and empowering *squeaky wheels*, those who make the loudest noise about foreign policy problems. More often than not, this condition favors those organized interests that can mobilize their supporters most effectively to pressure policy makers. However, when thousands of protesters repeatedly take to the streets, a new element is added to the equation.[54]

There is nothing automatic about the success of protest movements. Major foreign policies are not easily reversed, and it is often difficult to sustain the political momentum needed to change policies. Such was the situation facing the anti-globalization protestors at a 1999 meeting of the World Trade Organization in Seattle, and climate change protestors who marched in New York City in 2014. Protest movements can also give birth to counterprotests, which can be cited by policy makers as justification of their policies. Such was the case in September 2005, when Iraq War supporters marched in Washington, DC.

The Media and American Foreign Policy

To this point, the chapter has looked at how the public conveys its views to policy makers, but has not yet examined how the public obtains information about the world. In analyzing this issue, the sources of information on which the public relies are presented first, followed by an examination of how those sources can shape their thinking. Chapter 7 examines how presidents interact with the media to advance their agendas.

Newspapers and Television

For generations of Americans, newspapers were the primary—if not the only—means of keeping up with news. One of the early, most often cited examples of the influence of the media on U.S. foreign policy is the Spanish-American War. At the turn of the twentieth century, the Hearst and Pulitzer newspaper chains engaged in sensationalistic **yellow journalism** to increase circulation. Their coverage of the sinking of the USS *Maine* in Havana Harbor is routinely cited as contributing to the onset of the war by stirring up American public opinion. More recent scholarship cites the greater importance of more fundamental foreign policy issues dividing the United States and Spain, but the imagery of the press being able to lead the United States to war remains strong.

Over time, television also transformed the coverage of foreign policy issues. Network evening news broadcasts were only fifteen minutes long in 1962 and relied heavily on video of international events that were at least a day old. About the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis, Robert McNamara, President Kennedy's secretary of defense, observed, "I don't think that I turned on a television set during the whole two weeks of that crisis."[55] During the Cuban missile crisis, the Kennedy administration knew about the missiles in Cuba six days before the information was broadcast to the American people. Consider how differently the crisis might have played out had it occurred in the 1990s,[56] following transformation of television coverage of foreign policy issues by the arrival of CNN's 24–7 news coverage in 1980. CNN dramatically changed the political time clock for presidents to inform the public about their responses to events. Today, the bottom line is that presidents must develop a television policy to accompany their foreign policy. They have not always succeeded. During the Persian Gulf War, the George H. W. Bush administration was able to frame the policy issue on its own terms and to control media coverage.[57] Uncertain about how to proceed in Haiti, Bosnia, and Somalia, his administration and that of Bill Clinton were unable to present a coherent story with which the media could frame its pictures.[58]

The ability of the press to shape public opinion declined with the arrival of competing news sources and increased costs. By 1993, slightly more Americans reported watching network news regularly than reading the newspaper (60 percent versus 58 percent). By 2008, more people were going online three or more times per week (37 percent) then listening to radio news (34 percent) or reading the newspaper (34 percent). [59] The percentage of front-page foreign news stories in U.S. newspapers has also declined steadily. In 2007 it was at 14 percent, down from 27 percent in 1987 and 1977.

The New Media and American Foreign Policy

Today the Internet and the sharing of information, ideas, personal messages, videos, and other content via social media have become a major if

not the dominant source of foreign policy news and information. By 2003, 77 percent of Americans who used the Internet did so to get or share information on the Iraq War. One in five Internet users stated that it helped shape their thinking about the war.[60]

The new media helps shape public views on foreign policy in two ways. First, it serves as a source of raw information and images. One way it does this is through leaking secret documents. Nowhere was this more in evidence than in July 2010 when WikiLeaks released over ninety-one thousand secret documents about Afghanistan and other foreign policy matters on its website. Another way is reliance of traditional media outlets on the information it supplies. For example, the Syrian civil war is described as the most socially mediated conflict in history. Social media images were carefully managed by "gatekeepers." Violent images were designed to delegitimize the Assad regime to the outside world, encourage further extremism and polarization in the conflict, and demobilize others from intervening militarily for fear of becoming the next victims.[61]

Second, the Internet allows individuals to connect in a personal and direct manner with U.S. foreign policy. Foreign policy blogs abound. The White House arranged for President Obama's June 2009 speech in Cairo to be sent out in text-message format in four languages, translated into thirteen languages, and broadcast on Facebook. President Trump uses Tweets rather than news conferences or press briefings as the primary way to present his views to the public and connect with his political base.

Shaping the Public's View

It has become commonplace to speak of the media as driving foreign policy decisions through the **CNN effect**, the ability to place "breaking" news stories before the public all day, every day. Evidence suggests that a more complex relationship between the media and policy makers drives coverage of foreign events. The media does not so much discover foreign policy problems as it takes cues about what to report from the political debate in Washington. This practice is referred to as *indexing*. If there is no debate in Washington, then there is no debate in the media, and coverage of a topic may all but disappear. Journalists look first to the White House for cues on how to define a problem, creating what one White House official characterized as an echo chamber. "All of these newspapers used to have foreign correspondents. Now they don't. They call us to explain to them what's happening in Moscow and Cairo. . . . They literally know nothing."[62]

This is why Trump's Tweets are so important. First impressions are often difficult to challenge. With this frame of reference established, journalists then go to other lesser news sources—such as members of Congress, ex-government officials, and outside experts—for commentary and input. According to some, including former White House press secretary Scott McClellan,

this process, referred to as the *opinion cascade,* made the media a "complicit enabler" of the Bush administration's case for going to war with Iraq.

Two very different consequences of the manner in which the traditional media frames its foreign policy stories have been identified. The first is the **rally-around-the-flag effect**, in which the public moves to support the president in times of conflict and crisis. Initially, the American public was sharply divided on using military force against Iraq in 1991. Support for war hovered around the 50 percent mark until President George H. W. Bush's January 16, 1991, speech announcing the beginning of the bombing campaign. Support then shot up to 72 percent.

There is nothing in presidential speeches that automatically produces a significant boost in support for the administration's foreign policy. With the growth in numbers of cable outlets, the changing face of the American media makes it increasingly difficult for presidents to move large segments of the public to support their policies; with the growth of options, viewers in search of news increasingly go to those channels with views that they support. For example, in 2016 Fox News was the main source of campaign news for 40 percent of Trump supporters. The main source of news for 18 percent of Hillary Clinton supporters was CNN.

The second consequence of media framing of foreign policy stories is a **spiral of silence**. When individuals hold opinions that they do not hear reaffirmed in the voices of others, they exercise self-censorship as a way of protecting themselves from criticism. The opposite reaction takes place among those who receive positive reinforcement for their views; they become even more vocal and confident in their beliefs, leading the dissenters to exercise even more self-censorship. Many saw this spiral at work in public opinion on the Persian Gulf War. Networks all but ignored antiwar stories in the lead-up to the war. Of 2,855 minutes of network news coverage of the war during this period, only 29 minutes showed popular opposition to the ongoing American military buildup.

As evidence of Russian efforts to influence the 2016 presidential election reveals, the new media can also serve as a powerful tool to manipulate information covertly for political purposes.[63] Russian operators published more than 131 messages on Twitter, uploaded more than a thousand videos to YouTube, and reached 126 million users on Facebook. Russian efforts to influence public attitudes in the United States predates the 2016 election. One of its most important propaganda instruments was the state-backed news channel RT (Russia Today), which the U.S. intelligence community defined as Russia's "principal international propaganda outlet."

The Russian influence campaign was based on producing misinformation and sheltered social media sites of its own making as well as promoting misinformation from existing platforms run by Americans. In spreading its messages, Russian operatives relied on standard Facebook technologies that allowed them to send specific news stories, messages, and ads tailored to people who had unknowingly just visited a Russian site.

States and Cities: The New Foreign Policy Battleground

Because the foreign policy agenda has increasingly become one in which both domestic and foreign policy concerns are present simultaneously (*intermestic*; see chapter 2) the public voice on foreign policy is being directed away from a singular focus on Washington to include state capitals and major cities. The attention of many allies has also been directed away from Washington in what some diplomats refer to as the *donut strategy*: when you have a problem in the middle you work around the edges to build networks and encircle it. States and cities have responded by increasing their profiles abroad.[64] For example, Los Angeles now has a deputy mayor for international affairs.

One foreign policy area in which states and cities have become increasingly active is immigration policy. This predates the sanctuary city movement which now dominates the headlines. In the 1980s they reacted negatively to attempts by the Reagan administration to control immigration. In 1996 New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani sued the government over a federal law that limited local protections for undocumented immigrants. Angered by ongoing border violence and reacting to citizen demands that illegal immigration be curbed, in 2010 Arizona passed a state law that allowed police to arrest suspected illegal immigrants without a warrant. The sanctuary city movement began in response to Trump's promise to carry through on his campaign promise to deport illegal immigrants. Mayors across the U.S. asserted they would not cooperate with such a program with Chicago Mayor Rahm Emmanuel declaring that it will always be a sanctuary city. In March, 2019 eight states including California, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Illinois, had declared themselves to be sanctuary states. 178 cities and counties in twenty-seven states had also declared themselves to be sanctuaries. Included among them were Los Angeles, San Francisco, Denver, Chicago, New Orleans, and Philadelphia. In response to the sanctuary city movement the Trump administration threatened to revoke or withhold federal law enforcement funding from these jurisdictions. There followed a series of law suits as the Trump administration and sanctuary cities each tried to block action by the other. In 2019 Trump raised the possibility of transporting immigrants detained at the border to sanctuary cities. The administration officials termed the policy proposal a viable option to deal with overcrowding at the border. Comments made by others, including Trump, suggested that the policy was retaliation against these cities which largely vote Democratic.

Policy Makers' Responses

The prevailing view among policy makers holds that foreign policy is too important to be rooted in public perceptions of world affairs. Public attitudes should be formed and shaped rather than followed. Consider

comments made by two past Secretaries of Defense. At a press conference, Leon Panetta (under Obama) stated, "We cannot fight wars by polls." Dick Cheney (under George H. W. Bush) said, "I do not look upon the press as an asset. Frankly, I look on it as a problem to be managed."[65]

The tendency of policy makers to discount the positive contribution of the public voice to foreign policy making shows up when they look to uncover that voice. A State Department official observed, "If a given viewpoint different from our own does not have congressional expression, forget it."[66] A congressional staffer could not remember the last time he was asked to do a foreign policy poll. The inevitable result of this perspective is to greatly narrow the range of public attitudes that are taken into account in making policy. Additionally, policy makers often appear not to understand how the public thinks about foreign policy issues. In a 2004 poll, 76 percent of the public said that the United States should participate in the International Criminal Court. When asked about the issue before poll results were released, only 32 percent of government officials and 15 percent of congressional staffers anticipated that a majority of the public would hold this view.[67]

Policy makers may not be totally off base in their lack of attention to public opinion. One study suggests that, depending on the type of foreign policy problem, presidents can safely ignore what the public thinks. For a noncrisis issue, what matters to the public is that the president takes action; judgments of success and failure do not enter into public thinking because of the long time needed for such issues to be resolved. In a crisis, what matters is not the decision of whether to use force or intervene, but whether the effort failed or succeeded.[68]

Kori Schake challenges thoughts of dismissing the public's input into foreign policy as self-destructive hubris.[69] She argues that, instead, the foreign policy elite must become more responsive to the public by working with civil society groups and nongovernmental organizations to gain the sustained public support necessary for foreign policy to succeed.

Over the Horizon: An Intelligence-Industrial Complex?

Earlier it was noted that, in his farewell address, President Eisenhower warned about the need to guard against the influence of the military-industrial complex. The revelations by Snowden regarding the existence of a secret NSA domestic electronic data gathering program have many warning against a new threat to the public's ability to effectively express its voice on foreign policy matters: an *intelligence-industrial complex*. As with the military-industrial complex, critics see the intelligence-industrial complex as a potentially unaccountable political force rooted in the perception of significant national security threats to the United States. In contrast to the military-industrial complex, which gains influence through the production of

military power, the intelligence-industrial complex gains influence through the collection and production of information. As former NSA director Lt. Gen. Keith Alexander put it, the challenge is that "you need a haystack to find a needle." For the NSA and other intelligence agencies, building a haystack required the cooperation of commercial communication firms.[70] In the early postwar era of the twentieth century, Western Union and others provided government access to telegraph communications. Later the government turned to AT&T for help in tapping into underwater fiber cables. Then Microsoft provided the NSA with the capability to circumvent its own encryption program.

The foundations of the intelligence-industrial complex were laid through a combination of *jawboning* (arm twisting), stealth, legal protections, and monetary rewards. Legal protection came in the form of granting telecommunications firms immunity from prosecution for turning information over to the government. Jawboning took many forms, including appeals to patriotism and, when they failed, indirect pressure. As one Verizon executive noted, "At the end of the day, if the Justice Department shows up at your door, you have to comply." Monetary rewards are easy to find. An estimated 70 percent of the intelligence budget goes to private contractors. A computer systems contract awarded to Booz Allen Hamilton (BAH) by the Department of Homeland Security for $2 million was escalated to $124 million. Obama's Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, was a BAH executive. Mike McConnell, who served as President Bill Clinton's NSA director, left the government to work for BAH, returned to government service as George W. Bush's DNI, and has since returned to BAH.

Unlike imagery of a unified military-industrial complex, evidence exists that the intelligence-industrial complex may not be monolithic. Several former heads of the NSA, CIA, and Homeland Security supported Apple in its rejection of the FBI's request to unlock the mobile phone used by the attacker in the 2015 San Bernardino shootings. Many employed in these firms also voiced concern over their relationship with the intelligence community. To improve relations, in 2018 a task force consisting of the Center for a New American Century, former government employees, academics, and representatives from private industries was created to explore how the government can better make use of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies and interact with high technology firms.

The issue of whether or not the intelligence-industrial complex represents a threat to civil liberties finds Americans and Congress divided. A March 2016 CBS poll found that 50 percent supported the FBI's insistence that Apple unlock the mobile phone linked to the 2015 San Bernardino terrorist attack, and 43 percent supported Apple's refusal to comply. In 2019, a bipartisan group of lawmakers petitioned Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats to formulate a strategy to ensure that surveillance tools are not exported to

foreign countries with records of human rights abuses, which might use them against political dissidents, the press, and U.S. citizens.

Critical Thinking Questions

1. Which of the means of exercising the public voice discussed in this chapter (public opinion, elections, lobbying, and political protest) is most effective, and why?
2. Is the media best seen as a threat to the president's ability to conduct foreign policy or an important tool? Explain your answer.
3. Should policy makers listen to the public or use their professional judgment in making foreign policy decisions? Explain your answer.

Key Terms

CNN effect, 126
military-industrial complex, 117
positional issues, 114
rally-around-the-flag effect, 127
spiral of silence, 127
think tanks, 122
tipping point, 112
valence issues, 114
Vietnam syndrome, 109
yellow journalism, 125

Further Reading

Paul Baines and Nigel Jones, "Influence and Interference in Foreign Elections," *RUSI Journal* 163 (March 2018), 12–19.

The authors review the history of efforts by one country to influence elections in another, raising the issue of whether it is an acceptable norm in international relations or a violation.

Simon Curtis and Michele Acuto, "The Foreign Policy of Cities," *RUSI Journal* 16 (December 2018), 8–17.

This essay examines how cities around the world are flexing their economic and political resources to develop their own foreign policies, and examines how city-based foreign policy differs from traditional foreign policy.

Robert Entman, *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).

This book brings together the nature of public opinion, the manner in which the news media covers foreign policy, and the influence of the White House, formulating a model of how foreign policy problems come to be defined and framed.

Erika King, *Obama, the Media and Framing the U.S. Exit from Iraq and Afghanistan* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014).

This volume looks at the narratives presented by both the Bush and Obama administrations in exiting these two wars alongside mass media framing of these stories; it finds an interpretive disconnect between the political and media accounts.

William Lynn III, "End of the Military-Industrial Complex," *Foreign Affairs* 89 (September 2014), 97–108.

This article identifies four periods of the military-industrial complex, questions the ability of the Pentagon to adapt to globalization, and argues that the Pentagon should go abroad to partner with foreign firms.

Helen Milner and Dustin Tingley, *Sailing the Water's Edge* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016).

In examining how domestic politics has influenced foreign policy since World War II, this book finds that presidents have more control over some policy instruments than others. One result is the militarization of foreign policy.

Kori Schake, "Back to Basics" *Foreign Affairs* 98 (2019), (36–43).

This article argues that Trump's foreign policy is a wakeup call; while a strong critic of American foreign policy, Trump cannot produce positive change. True change requires elites to become more responsive to the public.

Congress 6



Dateline: Yemen Resolution

No shortage of views exists regarding the role that Congress plays in making foreign policy. It is frequently characterized as an obstacle course for presidential foreign policy initiatives to navigate. One dissenting view holds that Congress is not really an obstacle course for presidents.[1] They tend to get their way. A second dissent argues that, even if it is a hard obstacle course, congressional participation in foreign policy making is critical to raising public awareness about issues and providing additional information to policy makers.[2] Congressional efforts to prohibit U.S. involvement in the Yemen war provide a starting point for analyzing this debate.

In March 2015, Saudi Arabia, along with eight regional allies, began an air, ground, and naval military operation in Yemen designed to restore the government of Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi to power. Hadi had been forced to resign in January by an alliance led by the Iranian-supported Houthi and supporters of Ali Abdullah Saleh (president of Yemen before Hadi). Initially, the Obama administration supported the Saudi alliance's military effort. It also used drones against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which is active in Yemen. As the civilian death toll mounted and the humanitarian crisis deepened, Obama adopted a position that emphasized the need for a UN-facilitated cease fire and a negotiated settlement. In January 2017, it was estimated that some ten thousand civilians had died in the fighting; by June 2018, an estimated eight million of Yemen's twenty-eight million people were at the risk of starvation.

During his presidential campaign, Donald Trump stressed the need for a more aggressive anti-terrorism policy. Days after assuming office, Trump approved a military operation to gather intelligence on AQAP. The January 28, 2017, raid failed to achieve its objective and resulted in the death of one Navy SEAL, and fourteen to twenty-five civilians killed by U.S. aircraft supporting the ground attack. Since then, the Trump administration has called for greater humanitarian aid, increased its support for the Saudi military, and advanced the sale of guided munitions technologies that was halted by Obama.

In 2015, Congress had limited interest in the Yemen war. Its focus was on the Iranian nuclear agreement and ISIS in Syria. Congress' voice on Yemen came from a few members and was directed at the growing humanitarian crisis. In September, one member of Congress wrote a letter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff advocating a halt to U.S. support for the Saudi military operation until more civilian safeguards were provided. The following month ten members of Congress wrote to Obama, urging him to work with the Saudis to limit civilian casualties. The first steps toward placing legislative controls on U.S. participation in the Yemen conflict took place in September 2016, when a Senate resolution to block an arms deal was defeated by a 71–27 vote.

In 2017, Trump's increased support for the Saudi forces, plus a major new offensive, led to renewed congressional action. Letters were sent to Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and President Trump asking them to halt the conflict and provide humanitarian aid. Congress debated yet another resolution disapproving arm sales to Saudi Arabia. A concurrent resolution was introduced, calling for an end to support for Saudi Arabia's military intervention into Yemen, but House leaders effectively blocked a vote. Instead, a vote was taken on a nonbinding version expressing concern about the conflict without calling for an end to U.S. involvement. It passed by a vote of 366-30.

The congressional debates centered on two themes. From one perspective, the Yemen War was a conflict about regional domination that pitted Saudi Arabia against Iran. Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman

(MBS), the heir apparent to the throne, made this argument when he identified a "triangle of evil" (Iran, Turkey, and Islamist extremists) in the Middle East. He would later be identified by the U.S. intelligence community as a key player in the assassination of Saudi dissident and U.S. citizen Jamal Khashoggi. From a second perspective, supported by Kenneth Pollack, a former senior military analyst at the CIA and National Security Council, the Saudi concern was overstated. He described it as an obsession with Yemen and an inability to stop meddling in Yemen's internal affairs. In Pollack's view the Yemen War was driven by local and historical political forces energized by the 2011 Arab Spring.

2018 began with the introduction of a joint resolution to remove U.S. forces from conflicts that have not been authorized by Congress. The motion was tabled on a procedural vote just before MBS arrived in Washington for talks with Trump. At the same time, it was agreed that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee would hold hearings on U.S. policy in Yemen. This led to a requirement, inserted into the Defense Budget, for the president to certify that Saudi Arabia was taking appropriate actions to protect civilians. In signing the bill, Trump issued a statement rejecting that clause on the grounds that it violated his powers as commander in chief. The deadline came and went without any certification being made.

Following the death of Khashoggi in October 2018, Congress became more engaged in the Yemen War. A bipartisan resolution invoking the War Powers Act passed by a vote of 56 to 41. The bill then went to the House, where Speaker of the House Paul Ryan inserted language in a farm bill blocking its consideration.

Matters came to a head in 2019. In February, the now Democratically controlled House passed legislation by a vote of 248–177 that ended U.S. military support for Saudi Arabia. This was the first time in history that the War Powers Resolution was invoked successfully. It was stated that the U.S. military assistance to the Saudi-led coalition was an unauthorized military deployment in a hostility. Opponents argued that this was not the case, since U.S. troops were not directly involved in fighting. In March, the Senate passed a different version of the bill, with all forty-seven Democrats and seven Republicans voting to support it. On April 4, the House passed that bill by a vote of 247–175. On April 16, Trump exercised the second veto of his presidency, refusing to sign the resolution. Had he signed it, the United States would have had thirty days to end its military support for the Saudi coalition. This did not end Congressional attempts to end U.S. support for the Saudi bombing campaign; in September 2019, Congress inserted an amendment into the defense authorization bill for that purpose.

This chapter first looks at the constitutional basis of Congress's power to participate in foreign policy and the methods at its disposal to exercise its voice.[3] Next, the impact of Congress's operating structure and procedure on its participation in foreign policy making is examined. The chapter

concludes by analyzing Congress' relationship with the president in making foreign policy changes over time.

Constitutional Powers

The division of power found in the Constitution provides the foundation on which congressional participation in foreign policy rests. It comprises four powers: (1) the power of advice and consent in making treaties, (2) the power to confirm presidential appointments, (3) a set of war powers, and (4) the power to regulate commerce.

Treaty-Making Power

The Constitution states that the president, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, has the power to make treaties. The president's role in the treaty-making process generally has not been a source of serious controversy. The president nominates the negotiators, issues instructions to them, submits the treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent, and, if consent is given, decides whether to **ratify** the treaty and make it a law. Far more controversial have been the nature of Senatorial advice and consent, the topics to be covered by treaties, and the role of the House of Representatives in the treaty-making process.

Senatorial Advice and Consent The Senate has given its consent to over 1,500 treaties, and has rejected only 22. Fifteen of those rejections occurred between 1789 and 1920. Some, such as the Treaty of Versailles, were rejected twice. One of the most recently approved and controversial treaties was President Obama's New Strategic Arms Reduction (New START) Treaty in December 2010. It was passed by a vote of 71–26. In order to secure its passage and block crippling amendments, the administration agreed to spend an additional $84 billion over ten years to modernize the U.S. nuclear weapons program. The most recent treaty rejected by the Senate was the International Disability Treaty that was signed by President George W. Bush. It was defeated by a 61–38 vote in December 2012, five short of the 66 votes needed. Supporters argued that it was modeled on the Americans with Disabilities Act. Opponents argued that, by allowing international authorities to dictate the treatment of Americans with disabilities, it undermined U.S. sovereignty and the ability of American citizens to hold policy makers accountable for their actions.[4] A list of rejected treaties is presented in table 6.1.

Omitted from this count are treaties negotiated by presidents but never voted on by the Senate and those to which the Senate consented only after prolonged delays. A total of eighty-five treaties have been withdrawn from consideration. President Jimmy Carter's withdrawal of the Strategic Arms Limitation II (SALT II) Treaty from consideration after the Soviet invasion

TABLE 6.1 Rejected Treaties

Bilateral	Multilateral
Suspension of Slave Trade/Columbia, 1825	Treaty of Versailles, 1920
Property Rights/Switzerland, 1836	World Court, 1935
Annexation/Texas, 1844	Law of Sea Convention, 1960
Commercial Reciprocity/Germany, 1844	Montreal Aviation Protocol, 1983
Transit and Commercial Rights/Mexico, 1860	Comprehensive Test Ban, 1999
Cuban Claims Commission/Spain, 1860	Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2012
Arbitration of Claims/United Kingdom, 1869	
Commercial Reciprocity/Hawaii, 1870	
Annexation/Dominican Republic, 1870	
Interoceanic Canal/Nicaragua, 1885	
Fishing Rights/United Kingdom, 1888	
Extradition/United Kingdom, 1889	
Arbitration/United Kingdom, 1897	
Commercial Rights/Turkey, 1927	
St. Lawrence Seaway/Canada, 1934	

Source: http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Treaties.htm#4.

of Afghanistan is one example of a major Senate "nonrejection." Truman negotiated a treaty establishing an International Trade Organization that was to be part of the Bretton Woods system. However, because of certain Senate opposition, Truman never submitted the treaty for advice and consent, and the interim General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) became the formal international vehicle for lowering tariffs.

As of January 2019, forty-one treaties had been submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent on which it had not yet voted. A 1949 International Labor Organization Convention supporting labor's right to organize has still not come up for a vote. A 2013 arms trade treaty establishing international norms regulating the sale of weapons, including small handguns, was considered "dead on arrival" because over fifty senators had made their opposition known even before it was signed. It never came up for a vote, and Trump officially withdrew the United States from the treaty in 2019.

In addition to treaty ratifications and rejections, it is also important to look at Senatorial attempts to change treaties. A treaty needs 67 votes to pass, but Senate amendments to treaties only need a majority. Between 1947 and 2000, the Senate attached reservations to 162 of the 796 treaties that came before it.[5] In the heated debate over the Panama Canal Treaties, 145 amendments, 76 reservations, 18 understandings, and 3 declarations

were proposed. The Senate's attachment of amendments and reservations to treaties is far from random.[6] *High politics* treaties—those dealing with national security issues and questions of U.S. sovereignty—are far more likely to be saddled with reservations. Economic treaties are also likely to attract reservations.

The motivations behind introduction of treaty amendments are many. Some Senatorial changes are designed to improve a treaty; others are meant to kill it by introducing unacceptable provisions.[7] For example, the Senate approved the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty by a vote of 93 to 5 in 1988; it rejected more than a dozen killer amendments, including one that required removal of U.S. troops from Europe after withdrawal of U.S. missiles. Still others seek to protect domestic economic interests, reassert Senatorial powers, or make a policy statement. An example of the latter is the 1997 Chemical Warfare Convention, which directed the Secretary of Defense to increase U.S. military ability to operate in areas contaminated by chemical and biological weapons.

Finally, note that the president and the Senate may continue to clash over the provisions of a treaty long after Senatorial advice and consent has been given. A key issue here is the power to interpret treaty language that could potentially change the meaning of the treaty. A significant presidential-congressional clash over the language of the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty spanned three presidencies. The centerpiece of the dispute was whether a president could reinterpret the language of a treaty without congressional approval. President Reagan did so when he asserted that his administration could legally test elements of the proposed Strategic Defense Initiative shield. The controversy continued when the Clinton administration approached Russia about modifying the language of the treaty to permit the deployment of mobile defensive systems against intermediate missiles. Senate leaders responded that the administration should not try to put any change into effect without the approval of the Senate. The Clinton administration ultimately conceded this point, and recognized the Senate's right to review the revised treaty language. President George W. Bush formally withdrew the United States from the ABM Treaty in June 2002. Thirty-one members of Congress unsuccessfully brought legal action against his administration, asserting that the president lacked the constitutional power to do so.

The Role of the House Under the Constitution, the House is a spectator in the treaty making process. It has no formal role. This is changing, as the House has seized on its budgetary powers as the vehicle for making its voice heard. Treaties are not always self-executing. They typically require enabling legislation and the expenditure of funds before their provisions take effect. The Constitution gives the House control over the budget and, in the process, the ability to undo agreements between the Senate and the president.

A case in point is the Panama Canal Treaties. According to one observer, the House came quite close to destroying them by inserting language into the implementing legislation that disagreed with and contradicted parts of one of the treaties just approved by the Senate by identical 68–32 votes.[8]

The Carter administration's implementing legislation was assigned to four House committees. Primary jurisdiction was held by the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee; its chair opposed the treaty and proposed his own version of the implementing legislation, which gave Congress a continuing say in supervising the Panama Canal for many years to come. Eventually, the Carter administration found it necessary to abandon its own bill in favor of the committee bill. This angered Panamanian leaders, who cited almost thirty articles of the House bill that violated provisions of the negotiated treaty. Final congressional approval was given to the implementing legislation only four days before the treaty was scheduled to take effect.

Appointment Powers

As originally envisioned, the power to approve or reject presidential appointments was closely related to the power to give advice and consent to treaties. By exercising a voice about the persons negotiating a treaty, the Senate could influence its content. In practice, this linkage was never fully put into place, and it has long since unraveled. The Senate has failed to exercise its confirmation powers actively or systematically. Frequently, it has not hesitated to approve ambassadors appointed solely for political purposes and without any other apparent qualifications for the post. This practice is heavily criticized by Foreign Service professionals due to appointees' lack of expertise. However, it is defended by others, who argue that political appointees bring more political clout to the position of ambassador than careerists and can therefore be of value to the President. Typically, 30 percent of ambassadorial positions now go to political appointees or non-careerists. During the Reagan administration, this number reached a high of 38 percent. Under Clinton and Carter, it fell to 27 percent and, as of April 2019, it had risen to 49 percent in the Trump administration. Typically, many ambassadors are major campaign contributors. Obama's political ambassadorial appointments had given $13.6 million to Democratic campaigns.

War Powers

The war powers of the Constitution are split into three parts. Congress is given the power to declare war and the power to raise and maintain an army and a navy. Presidents are designated as commander in chief of the armed forces. In the abstract, these powers fit together very nicely. In

practice, their exact meaning is unclear. Alexander Hamilton saw them as a symbolic grant of power, with the actual power to decide military strategy and tactics held by professional soldiers. Many presidents have taken this grant of power quite literally. Franklin Roosevelt participated actively in formulating military strategy and tactics during World War II, and Lyndon Johnson took part in selecting bombing targets during Vietnam.

A further complicating factor is defining when a state of war exists. Is it any instance where U.S. troops are placed into combat, or must a war be declared into existence? In its Prize Cases decision of 1862, the Supreme Court ruled that the existence of a war was found in the prevailing conditions and not in a formal congressional declaration. U.S. practice has borne this out. Out of the over 125 "wars" that the United States has fought, Congress has declared only five: The War of 1812, the Spanish-American War, the Mexican War, World War I, and World War II.

The most visible means available to Congress in trying to limit the president's use of force is the 1973 **War Powers Resolution (see the Historical Lesson)**, which was passed over President Nixon's veto. It requires the president to:

1. "In every possible instance," consult with Congress before committing U.S. troops in "hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities" is likely.
2. Inform Congress within forty-eight hours after the introduction of troops if there has been no declaration of war.
3. Remove U.S. troops within sixty days (or ninety days in special circumstances) if Congress does not either declare war or adopt a concurrent resolution approving the action.

Congress also can terminate U.S. military involvement before the sixty-day limit by passing a concurrent resolution. Such a resolution does not require the president's signature and therefore cannot be vetoed.

Historical Lesson

War Powers Act

The 1973 War Powers Resolution is the starting point for most contemporary discussions about the proper relationship between Congress and the president. It was a highly controversial piece of legislation when passed and continues to be so today. The bill was passed over President Nixon's veto, and no president has yet recognized its constitutionality. Members of Congress and scholars have called for its repeal. Others have proposed amendments.

Crises in both foreign policy and domestic policy provided a highly charged backdrop for a multiyear political tug-of-war between Nixon, the House, and the Senate over the question of placing limits on the

president's ability to deploy troops into combat without prior consultation with Congress. The principal foreign policy crisis was the Vietnam War. In the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Congress provided President Lyndon Johnson with the authority to take "all necessary measures" to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression. The facts of the Gulf of Tonkin incident, in which U.S. naval vessels were attacked by North Vietnamese forces, remain contested even today. Johnson maintained that he did not need this congressional endorsement to carry out the U.S. war effort.

Nixon took the same position in continuing and expanding the war to include the 1970 invasion of Cambodia. On the domestic scene, increased opposition to the Vietnam War and controversies surrounding the 1972 presidential election campaign created an electrifying political atmosphere that spurred congressional efforts to control presidential war powers. One incident was the 1972 Watergate break-in at the Democratic Party Headquarters and subsequent efforts to cover it up. A second was the October 1973 Saturday Night Massacre, in which Nixon's attorney general and his deputy both refused to fire Archibald Cox, the special prosecutor appointed to investigate the Watergate affair. Both of them, along with Cox, resigned in protest.

The Senate acted first. In 1969 it passed a resolution proclaiming that U.S. forces could not be committed to combat "only from affirmative action taken by the executive and legislative branches . . . by means of a treaty, statue, or concurrent resolution." In 1970, the House approved legislation requiring presidents, after placing troops into combat, to report to Congress on the circumstances leading to this action and its military scope. A House Foreign Affairs subcommittee considered seventeen war powers bills and resolutions in putting forward the bill. No prior approval from Congress was required. The House passed the legation by a 288–39 vote. Congress adjourned without the Senate taking any action.

In 1971, the House again passed this legislation. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee took up the proposed House bill, but its approach to limiting presidential war-making power was quite different. The legislation sent forward by the Senate specified conditions under which a president could commit troops to combat without congressional approval, and set a time limit for how long such a deployment could last. The competing House and Senate bills eventually went to a conference committee, but only one meeting took place and Congress adjourned without reaching an agreement.

In 1972, both the House and Senate acted quickly to reintroduce their respective War Powers legislation. Significant points of disagreement remained, including limitations on the president's right to send troops into combat without prior consent and the president's timeline for reporting to Congress. The House had a 120-day reporting deadline, while the Senate's deadline was 30 days. In July, the competing versions of the bill again went to a conference committee. On October 4 it emerged from committee and was approved by both the House (238–123) and the Senate (75–20). As promised, President Nixon vetoed

the bill on October 24. There was no doubt that the Senate would vote to override Nixon's veto. The House vote was less certain. Presented as pitting congressional power against presidential power, the House voted to override Nixon's veto by 4 votes; 18 House members who had voted against the bill nevertheless voted to override Nixon's veto, while 15 who supported the bill supported Nixon's veto.

From the outset, the War Powers Resolution has been controversial. Senator Jacob Javits saw in it the basis for a new foreign policy compact between the president and Congress. Senator Thomas Eagleton, originally a supporter of the legislation with Javits, voted against it because he claimed that it gave the president powers he never had—the power to commit U.S. troops abroad without prior congressional approval.

Applying the Lesson

1. What does the War Powers Resolution case reveal about Congress's ability to influence the use of military force by the president?
2. Which is preferable: the War Powers Resolution or an Authorization of the Use of Military Force? Why?
3. What is the proper role of Congress in making decisions about the use of military force?

As of March 2019, presidents had submitted 168 reports to Congress.[9] In doing so, they have not recognized the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution. In reporting the Mayaguez rescue operation in 1975, President Gerald Ford stated that he was "taking note" of the War Powers Resolution, but asserted that he acted on the basis of his commander-in-chief powers. In 2011, President Obama used language frequently employed by past presidents when he did not seek congressional approval in establishing the no-fly zone in Libya. In his notification to Congress, he stated that "this is a limited . . . operation which does fall in the president's authority" and that he was informing Congress "consistent" with the War Powers Resolution.

One source of presidential hostility to the War Powers Resolution is the provision granting Congress the right to terminate hostilities after they have begun through the use of a **legislative veto**. It allows Congress to approve or disapprove executive branch actions after the fact, in a form short of legislation. In addition to the War Powers Resolution, Congress has inserted legislative vetoes into a wide range of foreign policy legislation, including arms sales and the export of nuclear fuel and facilities.[10] Presidents have maintained that only Congressional action approved by the president or passed by Congress over a presidential veto is legally binding. On January 23, 1983, in a landmark case, the Supreme Court agreed with the presidential interpretation in making its ruling in *U.S. v. Chadha*. The closest that the legislative veto came to being used was with the transfer

of nuclear material to India in 1980 and the sale of an AWACS and F-15 enhancement package to Saudi Arabia in 1981.

Another sore point with presidents is the sixty-day time limit imposed by the War Powers Resolution. Presidents have challenged the time limit on constitutional grounds and ignored it in practice. In 1999, for example, U.S. military operations in Kosovo passed the sixtieth day. Bill Clinton did not seek a thirty-day extension. Thirty-two members of Congress and others brought the case to court to try to block continued military action. The court ruled that they did not have legal standing and dismissed the case. A more recent controversy over the sixty-day limit came during the Obama administration; it argued that no report back to Congress was necessary since the operations being conducted in Libya did not qualify as "engaging in hostilities."

The War Powers Resolution is not the only legislative document that presidents have at their disposal related to the use of military force. Another is the **Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF**). By February 2018, AUMFs had been cited by presidents as the justification for forty-one military operations in nineteen countries, beginning with Operation Desert Storm against Iraq in 1991. An excerpt of the most recent AUMF authorization, made in 2002 during the Iraq War, appears in Box 6.1. Presidents do not see a universal need for AUMFs. When questioned about military deaths in Niger in 2017, the Trump administration's position was that an AUMF was not necessary since the presence of U.S. forces was permitted by separate legislation related to training and assistance missions. The most frequently invoked AUMF was issued after the 9/11 attacks. It gave presidents the authority to "use all necessary and appropriate force against anyone who committed or aided the attacks of September 11, 2001, or harbored such an organization or person in order to prevent a future attack." As passed, it is of unlimited geographic scope and duration.

Box 6.1

Excerpt: House Resolution Authorizing the Use of Military Force against Iraq, October 2, 2002

Section 1

This joint resolution may be cited as the "Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq."

Section 2: Support for United States Diplomatic Efforts

The Congress of the United States supports the efforts by the president to:

a. strictly enforce through the United Nations Security Council all relevant Security Council resolutions applicable to Iraq and encourages him in those efforts; and

b. obtain prompt and decisive action by the Security Council to ensure that Iraq abandons its strategy of delay, evasion and noncompliance and promptly and strictly complies

with all relevant Security Council resolutions.

Section 3: Authorization for Use of United States Armed Forces

a. Authorization. The president is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to

1. defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and

2. enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions regarding Iraq.

b. Presidential determination. In connection with the exercise of the authority granted in subsection (a) to use force the president shall, prior to such exercise or as soon thereafter as may be feasible, but no later than 48 hours after exercising such authority, make available to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the president pro tempore of the Senate his determination that

1. reliance by the United States on further diplomatic or other peaceful means alone either (A) will not adequately protect the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq or (B) is not likely to lead to enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq, and

2. acting pursuant to this resolution is consistent with the United States and other countries continuing to take the necessary actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations or persons who planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on Sept. 11, 2001.

c. War powers resolution requirements:

1. Specific statutory authorization. Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.

2. Applicability of other requirements. Nothing in this resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.

Section 4: Reports to Congress

a. The president shall, at least once every 60 days, submit to the Congress a report on matters relevant to this joint resolution, including actions taken pursuant to the exercise of authority granted in section 2 and the status of planning for efforts that are expected to be required after such actions are completed, including those actions described in section 7 of Public Law 105338 (the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998).

b. To the extent that the submission of any report described in subsection (a) coincides with the submission of any other report on matters relevant to this joint resolution otherwise required to be submitted to Congress pursuant to the reporting requirements of Public Law 93–148 (the War Powers Resolution), all such reports may be submitted as a single consolidated report to the Congress.

c. To the extent that the information required by section 3 of Public Law 102-1 is included in the report required by this section, such report shall be considered as meeting the requirements of section 3 of Public Law 102-1.

There is nothing automatic about receiving an AUMF from Congress. In February 2015, Obama formally requested an AUMF to send troops to fight ISIS. He made it clear that, in his view, he already possessed the constitutional authority to conduct military operations against ISIS. The AUMF was sought to add further legitimacy to the actions he would take as commander in chief. It never reached the House or Senate floor for a vote.

Commerce Powers

The Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations. In theory, this power belongs exclusively to Congress. In practice, power sharing between the two branches has been necessary. Congress may have the power to regulate foreign commerce, but only the president has the power to negotiate treaties.

Power sharing in the area of commerce has produced cooperation as well as conflict. The first innovative power-sharing arrangement was the 1934 Trade Agreements Act, by which Congress delegated to the president the authority to "implement into domestic law the results of trade agreements as they relate to tariffs." This authority greatly enhanced the president's power position in multilateral trade negotiations; it removed the threat of Congressional obstructionism in the formal approval and implementation of the negotiated agreement. Congress periodically renewed this grant of authority for a succession of presidents, changing only the time frame and permitted value of the reduction and inserting legislative veto provisions.

The Trade Reform Act of 1974 introduced the second major innovative power-sharing arrangement when it created a *fast-track* reporting procedure; Congress was required to vote "yes" or "no" on trade legislation that came before it within ninety days, and was prohibited from adding any amendments. Presidents often have found it difficult to obtain this negotiating authority, now renamed **trade promotional authority**. Proponents of fast-track authority argue that, without it, countries are unwilling to enter into agreements with the United States, since Congress may reject or

amend the agreements. Fast-track authority also is seen as valuable because it protects Congress from domestic trade protectionist pressures. Critics are concerned that presidents will sacrifice environmental protection, food safety, intellectual property rights, and labor standards in the name of furthering free trade.

Bill Clinton was forced to allow his fast-track authority to lapse as part of the political price for Senate ratification of the treaty establishing the World Trade Organization. In December 2001, the House of Representatives passed a bill restoring fast-track authority to George W. Bush by a vote of 215–214. In 2015, Obama succeeded in obtaining fast-track authority for a three-year period, which was seen as necessary to gain approval of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) then being negotiated. Soon after becoming president, Donald Trump announced his intention to withdraw from the TPP, and initially showed little interest in gaining fast-track authority. This changed when a successor agreement to NAFTA, the U.S.–Mexico–Canada Trade Agreement, was under negotiation. In July 2018, Congress approved a three-year extension with little controversy.

The new agreement, signed on November 30, 2018, faces an uncertain future. Democrats have indicated that they might not permit a vote without stronger enforcement provisions for labor rights. Some Republicans have called for removal of steel and aluminum tariffs.

Congressional Structure and Foreign Policy

The four constitutionally based powers are brought to bear on foreign policy problems through Congress's internal structure and its standard operating procedures. This section highlights four important by-products of these features: reliance on blunt foreign policy tools, absence of a single voice that can speak for Congress, presence of policy entrepreneurs, and significant power possessed by staff aides.

Blunt Foreign Policy Tools

Foremost among the tools for influencing policy on which Congress relies are its general legislative, budgetary, and oversight powers. Although these are formidable, Congress often finds itself frustrated in its efforts to fine-tune U.S. foreign policy or give it a new sense of direction, because of their bluntness and essentially negative character.

General Legislative Powers Four basic forms of congressional action exist:

- *simple resolution*, a statement made by one house
- *concurrent resolution*, a statement passed by both houses
- *joint resolution*, a statement made by both houses that if signed by the president becomes law.
- *legislative bill*, passed by both houses and signed by the president.

Congress can override the president's veto of joint resolutions and legislative bills. This occurred just prior to the 2016 presidential election, when the Senate voted 97–1 and the House voted 348–77 to override Obama's veto of a bill that would allow families of those killed in the 9/11 attack to sue Saudi Arabia if it were found to have aided al-Qaeda. Obama had opposed the bill for setting a possibly dangerous precedent that other countries might use against the United States in response to military or intelligence activities. Congress failed to override Trump's presidential veto of joint resolutions to block $8.1 billion in arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates that he authorized by using emergency powers in the Arms Export Control Act.

An early post–World War II study of Congress found that, while presidential policy proposals were primarily presented as bills, congressionally initiated actions tended to be expressed as simple resolutions.[11] The challenges facing legislation originating in Congress is illustrated by the fate of comprehensive immigration reform. The foundational law governing U.S. immigration and citizenship policy is the 1952 McCarren-Walter Act. It was vetoed by President Truman for being un-American and discriminatory, and then passed over his veto. The last comprehensive immigration reform legislation passed by Congress occurred in 1986 during the Reagan administration. Both George W. Bush and Barack Obama identified comprehensive immigration reform as high-priority items and failed.

Barnacles is the term often used to describe the amendments that Congress attaches to foreign policy legislation sought by the president.[12] One type of barnacle is *earmarking*, or designating funds contained within a piece of legislation for a specific country. Foreign aid earmarks for Israel are among the most prominent and recurring examples of funds designated for specific purposes. For example, the December 2010 budget resolution directed that $205 million be given to Israel to help construct a missile defense system. A different type of barnacle can be found in the House 2014 budget bill. It forbade the Obama administration from spending funds to transfer detainees at Guantanamo Bay to the United States, and from U.S. military involvement in Syria unless approved by Congress.

Budgetary Powers In the fall of 2017, press reports observed that "rank and file senators are eyeing the annual defense bill . . . as a chance to challenge President Trump's recent controversial moves on national security." When the budget was passed in March 2018, it was describe as a "broad rebuke" to Trump's policy agenda. While providing him with a sizable increase in funding for the military, Trump was prohibited from building a concrete wall along the Mexican border. Instead, money was provided for 33 miles of fencing, which had already been authorized under previous legislation. The budget bill also rejected Trump's proposed 30 percent cut in State Department funding and the administration's request to start a new round of base closures, as well as more money for specific pieces of military hardware.

Undercutting the perception that Congress can use its budgetary powers to influence policy is the reality that these powers are difficult to use because of how the budget is constructed. Authorization decisions are made separately by the committees with legislative jurisdiction over the relevant policy area. Appropriations decisions are made by the House and Senate Appropriations Committees and their subcommittees. The omnibus spending bill passed by the House in January 2014 comprised funds found in twelve different spending bills.

Three problems for foreign and defense policy stand out:

1. **Coherence.** In 2015, the Senate passed a $600 billion defense policy bill authorizing the sale of lethal offensive weapons to Ukraine. It then voted down a bill authorizing the government to spend money to pay for it.
2. **Inconsistency in application.** Foreign aid allocated by the State Department comes under far more scrutiny than aid distributed by the Pentagon. In Afghanistan, the State Department had to verify, among other things, that the programs were sustainable and transparent, and that the Afghan government was taking steps to reduce corruption, empower women, and protect human rights before releasing its funds. The Pentagon faced no such constraints.
3. **End runs.** The primary vehicle for end runs, the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) account, was created to fund temporary war-related costs in frontline states, most notably Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. However, it has been used to fund war-related operations in places such as Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Philippines to circumvent serious objections that might be encountered if the expenditures surfaced in other spending bills.

A second problem with using the budget as an instrument to shape the direction of U.S. foreign policy is that programs cost money, but "policies" may not. Policies are able to raise expectations, place U.S. prestige on the line, or commit the United States to a course of action in the eyes of other states. Congress tends to find that it has little choice but to support—fund—policy initiatives, at least on the surface. Senator John Kerry spoke to this point in expressing his opposition to the congressional resolution supporting the Persian Gulf War: "I hear it from one person after another—I do not want the President to look bad. . . . The President got us in this position. I am uncomfortable—but I cannot go against him."[13]

A third problem with Congress's ability to influence foreign policy lies with the implementation of congressional budgetary decisions. In 1971 Congress appropriated $700 million for a new manned bomber. The funds went unspent because the Nixon administration opposed the project. The reconstruction of Iraq provides another example of the limited ability of Congress's budgetary powers to influence the implementation of American foreign policy. In 2003, the Bush administration called for a quick infusion

of money into Iraq to speed its recovery and transformation in the aftermath of the war. Yet in June 2004, just days before power was transferred to a new Iraqi government, none of the $500 million for health care, $400 million for roads and bridges, or $4.2 billion for water and sanitation improvements had been spent.

Oversight The term **oversight** refers to the actions of Congress regarding the bureaucratic implementation of policies. It is no easy matter. For political and bureaucratic reasons, getting presidents to reverse policies is difficult. Two general approaches exist: firefighting and police patrolling. *Firefighting oversight* occurs after the fact,[14] as in congressional efforts to find out key details of the 2017 attack on U.S. soldiers in Niger: why they were attacked, by whom, and why they were surprised. Firefighting investigations often take on a highly charged political atmosphere, such as those into the 2012 attack on the U.S. government buildings in Benghazi and into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. The latter case is discussed in box 6.2. *Police patrolling* is oversight carried out on a regular basis to keep informed about an ongoing situation and to anticipate problems. It can be carried out in public sessions, such as one by the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2017 on foreign cyber threats, or closed-door briefings, such as those on Syria's civil war and North Korea's nuclear program.

Box 6.2

Investigating Russia's Involvement in the 2016 Presidential Election

Oversight is one of Congress' most fundamental powers in exercising its voice in foreign policy. One of the most difficult challenges in using that power is getting members of Congress to agree about what to investigate and what conclusions to draw. This was quite evident in the House Intelligence Committee hearings into Russian involvements in the 2016 presidential election. For Democrats, the main issue was Russian meddling through social media and interactions with the Trump campaign. For Republicans, the primary concern was the behavior of the FBI and intelligence agencies in carrying out its investigation of Russian links to the Trump campaign. Particularly controversial during this investigation were the actions of committee chair Daniel Nunes (R-Calif.); he collaborated with White House officials to secretly examine classified intelligence files, which revealed that Trump and his campaign had been caught up in the FBI surveillance operations. Nunes then briefed Trump on this information and went public with it.

The House report, issued by the Republican majority without Democratic input, found no evidence of collusion or coordination between the Trump campaign and Russian operatives. It also found "significant intelligence tradecraft failings." The Democratic rebuttal stated that the Department of Justice

had provided the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which approves domestic covert intelligence gathering, with "contemporaneous evidence" of Russia's interference in the 2016 election, and information related to Russian links and outreach to Trump campaign officials.

The controversy did not end there. It continued after Justice Department special counsel Robert Mueller III finished his two-year investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. His report charged 34 people, including seven Russian nationals. He obtained guilty pleas from seven individuals, including several from the Trump administration. The Mueller Report did not find sufficient evidence to charge the Trump presidential campaign with conspiring with Russia to influence the election, but did present evidence that Russia spread disinformation in a systematic fashion over social media and stole and disseminated personal emails from Clinton campaign officials. While arguing that sitting presidents cannot be charged with wrongdoing through the criminal justice system, it also presented evidence of the Trump administration's efforts to block the investigation. In his testimony before the House Judiciary and Intelligence Committees on July 24, 2019, Mueller reaffirmed that his report did not totally exonerate President Trump or say that there was no obstruction. Mueller also warned that Russia was preparing to interfere in the 2020 presidential election.

Mueller's testimony was reinforced by the release of the first of four volumes of a highly redacted investigative report by the Senate Intelligence Committee. A later volume will examine Russia's use of social media. The report concluded that all 50 states had been targeted by Russia in the 2016 presidential election in what it termed "an unprecedented level of activity against state election infrastructure." This included the ability to change or delete voter data in Illinois. The Intelligence Committee report went on to conclude that Russia and other adversaries would seek to interfere in the 2020 elections, and that other countries were working to replicate what Russia had done.

These hearings and reports did not lay an immediate foundation for congressional action. At the time they were released, the Democrat-controlled House had just passed legislation that would provide states with hundreds of millions of dollars in grants to improve election security. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell has blocked Senate consideration of the bill, arguing that it is highly partisan, built around the conspiracy theory of Trump's collaboration with Russia, and ignores the progress made in correcting the Obama administration's failure to prevent Russian interference.

In addition to holding briefings, Congress often establishes **reporting requirements** that must be met. Three major types are used. One standard tool is to require government agencies to provide periodic reports on their activities and events abroad. The 2019 annual State Department report on human trafficking placed twenty-two countries in Tier 3, defined as those

countries without policies meeting minimum standards that are not making an effort to improve. Included among them were Iran, Russia, Libya, Kuwait, and Venezuela. The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom's 2019 Annual Report identified twenty-eight countries in which significant religious freedom violations existed, either in terms of persecution or discrimination. Typically, countries identified as not meeting U.S. performance standards in a policy area must be recertified in order to qualify for foreign aid and trade preferences.

A second type of reporting requirement is a onetime report. For example, in the 1986 Anti-Apartheid Act, Congress identified ten issues on which it wanted the president to furnish information. The third type is notification that a particular type of foreign policy action has been or will be taken. Most of these reports do not concern politically charged issues or involve changes in the distribution of foreign aid funds, arms sales, and arms control initiatives, but on occasion they do. Recently, reporting issues have arisen around military operations. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Defense bill for short) required the Secretary of Defense to promptly submit written notices to congressional defense committees of any sensitive military cyber operations, no later than forty-eight hours after they are carried out.

One long-standing sensitive reporting policy area involves covert action. Initially, there was little if any meaningful Congressional control over the CIA. When asked if the committee he chaired had approved funding for a 36,000-man "secret" army in Laos, Senator Allen Ellender, chairperson of the Senate Appropriations CIA subcommittee, replied, "I did not know anything about it . . . I never asked. . . . It never dawned on me to ask about it. I did see it published in the newspaper some time ago."[15]

Beginning in 1974, Congress's attitude toward the intelligence community began to change.[16] One factor prompting the new outlook was a series of revelations about CIA wrongdoing and excess. The two most publicized events were one implicating the CIA in a destabilization campaign directed at bringing down the socialist government of Salvador Allende in Chile, and another including allegations that the CIA had violated its charter by undertaking surveillance of U.S. citizens inside the United States. In their aftermath, Congress passed the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act. The amendment required that, except under exceptional circumstances, the CIA must inform members of six congressional committees "in a timely fashion of the nature and scope of any CIA operation conducted for purposes other than obtaining information."

According to the terms of the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, the president was also required to make a "finding" that each covert operation is important to national security. **Presidential findings** have included such information as the time and duration of the activity, the risks involved, funding restrictions, their relationship to prior National Security Council (NSC) decisions, policy considerations, and proposal origin.[17] This has

not always meant that Congress has been well informed. The presidential finding for the Iran arms transfers carried out by the NSC was signed after the operation began, and Director of Central Intelligence William Casey was instructed not to inform Congress. The 1975 presidential finding supporting U.S. activities in Angola was so vague that the entire continent of Africa was identified as the location of the operation.[18]

The Absence of a Single Voice

Traditionally, the work of Congress has been done in committees. It is here that political deals are made and the technical details of legislation worked out. Congress, as a whole, was expected to quietly and expeditiously give its consent to committee decisions; more often than not, it did. Beginning in the early 1970s, the focus of decision-making shifted from the full committee to the subcommittee. The result has been an even greater decentralization of Congress in a number of different ways.

First, the executive branch must give increased attention to the foreign policy views of all members of Congress, because foreign-policy-relevant legislation now springs from a greater variety of sources. As one State Department official put it, "It used to be that all one had to do was contact the chairman and a few ranking members of a committee, now all 435 members plus 100 senators have to be contacted."[19] In 2000, legislation allowing the sale of food to Cuba was part of an agricultural spending bill. A prohibition on spending funds for planning related to the Kyoto Protocol was inserted as an amendment to an appropriations bill for the Environmental Protection Agency.

Second, there is the growing tendency for prospective pieces of legislation to be referred to more than one committee. Multiple referrals are necessary because of the lack of fit between the jurisdictions of congressional committees and policy areas. At least three Senate committees and seven subcommittees claim jurisdiction over cybersecurity. A dozen Senate committees are involved in foreign economic policy, and nearly fifty subcommittees are involved in foreign policy regarding the Third World.[20]

Policy Entrepreneurship

A change in attitude has accompanied the trend toward increasing decentralization. Policy individualism has replaced party loyalty as the motivation behind much congressional action. As a result, the long-standing congressional norms of deference and apprenticeship have been replaced by expectations of power sharing and policy input. *Entrepreneurship* is the label frequently attached to this new outlook. A **policy entrepreneur** is someone who is looking for opportunities to make political capital out of policy gaps.[21] Many saw policy entrepreneurship at play in the establishment of a select committee to investigate the Benghazi attacks six months before the

midterm elections. This perception was reinforced by comments made by Republican House Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy; he stated that the hearings had achieved the desired result because Hillary Clinton's positive image in polls had declined.

The entrepreneur is different from the traditional foreign policy **gadfly**, someone who raises issues to influence the terms of the policy debate and is concerned with long-term policy gains.[22] Gadflies are found across the political spectrum. Among the most outspoken gadflies of late have been John McCain and Ron Paul. Before his death, McCain was identified as the "critic in chief" of the Trump administration's foreign policy. Paul has been a leading congressional critic of the NSA electronic surveillance program and the presidential use of military power without explicit Congressional approval.

Regardless of whether the member of Congress is a gadfly or policy entrepreneur their increased visibility in foreign policy issues has the potential for creating conflict. In 2011 Representative Dana Rohrabacher was visiting Iraq and told its prime minster that the killing of Iraqi dissidents might be a crime against humanity. The entire U.S. delegation was asked to leave Iraq. In 2019, at the urging of President Trump, Prime Minister Netanyahu changed his position and prohibited Reps. Ilhan Omar and Rashida Tlaib from visiting Israel. They were two of four liberal congresswomen who routinely opposed Trump who characterized them as "the Squad."

Staff Aides

A shortage of information has always been a problem for Congress when it comes to making foreign policy. Few members can hope to acquire the background and expertise to understand the full range of topics that may come before them. They heavily rely on staff aides for information. The number of staff aides has grown dramatically. In 1947, there were roughly five hundred committee staffers and two thousand personal staffers. By the 1990s, the House was employing some eleven thousand staffers and the Senate another six thousand. The major House and Senate foreign policy committees (Armed Services and Foreign Affairs/Foreign Relations) each have over fifty staffers.

The emergence of numerous and well-informed staff aides has given the problem a new focus.[23] Concerns have been expressed about (1) whether the staffers are serving Congress, or just leading willing members from issue to issue, and (2) whether an activist staff might be overloading Congress with new issues, robbing it of the time needed for debate and deliberation. Congress as a whole has also increased its information-gathering and information-processing capabilities by establishing or increasing the size of the Congressional Research Service (established in 1914), the Government Accountability Office (which dates back to 1921 under a different name), and the Congressional Budget Office (established in 1974).

Representatives and senators can also draw on the products of private nonprofit research institutes and think tanks (see chapter 5) such as the Brookings Institution, the Cato Institute, and the Heritage Foundation.[24] Until the 1970s, think tanks were relatively few in number. Today, they are prominent fixtures on the Washington, DC, political landscape.

Influence of Party and Region

It is clear that Congress' difficulty in speaking with one voice on foreign policy greatly complicates its efforts at efficiency. This difficulty is brought into even greater focus by examining the influence of party and region on foreign policy decisions. The overwhelming majority of votes occur along party lines, a tendency that has become more pronounced since the 1980s. One area in which partisanship appears to surpass all other factors in influencing congressional involvement in foreign policy involves control of presidential war powers. The single best predictor of whether Congress will remain quiet or vocally oppose presidential calls for the use of force is its partisan composition. When the opposition party is in control, Congress raises its voice.

Strong as it may be, party affiliation cannot withstand all of the competing pressures facing representatives and senators when they vote. Splits within the Republican and Democratic parties are a recurring problem. In the late 1990s, senior Republican leaders embraced an internationalist outlook rooted in Cold War foreign policy triumphs, while more junior Republicans tended to have a different worldview.[25] They opposed supporting loan guarantees to Mexico and expensive new weapons systems, favored privatization of foreign aid, and showed little interest in bipartisan resolutions supporting the president in Bosnia or elsewhere.

The arrival of Tea Party members into Congress after the fall 2010 election accentuated this split. A revolt against Republican leadership by Tea Party members defeated legislation that would have extended the provisions of the Patriot Act for one year. The bill had to be introduced a second time to get it passed. Tea Party members also tend to be *budget hawks*, who are less willing than the party leadership as a whole to spare the defense budget from cuts. This divide was quite visible as Congress grappled with how to respond to Obama's call for a vote on military action in Syria. Traditional conservative hawks led by McCain supported it, while noninterventionist Republicans led by Rand Paul opposed it.

The Democratic Party is beset with its own internal struggles on foreign policy, which have split conservatives and liberals. This came through quite clearly in the conflict over revelations that the National Security Agency had engaged in a covert electronic communications collection program that gathered data on Americans. Democratic Senator Dianne Feinstein, chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, strongly supported the NSA. Democratic committee members Mark Udall and Ron Wyden were vocal opponents of the program, arguing that it violated the Fourth Amendment.

Geographic interests are also a significant influence on congressional votes. Today, as in the past, U.S. involvement in the global economy has an uneven impact on different areas of the country, producing regional conflict over how to define the American national interest.[26] U.S. foreign policy can be seen as driven by a coalition of the South and the West, regions that benefit from a foreign policy designed to promote free trade and ensure international stability. Opposed to this view is the Northeast; although it once benefited from such policies, it now sees itself as economically disadvantaged by them and favors protectionism and cuts in defense spending. Geography and economics come together to influence foreign policy votes in other ways as well. Those representing districts negatively affected by foreign imports from oppressive regimes raise human rights issues more often than those whose districts rely more heavily on foreign markets.[27] The potential for tension between party and region was very much in evidence in the Congressional Republican reaction to Trump's efforts to use tariffs as leverage in trade talks with China. Those from states with aging industries supported it; those in farming states, against whom China was retaliating with tariffs of its own, urged caution or were opposed.

Members of Congress are also especially protective of how their constituents fare in receiving government funds. In 2019, House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy stopped a bipartisan effort to prevent Chinese companies from contracting with U.S. transit systems because one of those firms had a plant in his district. During the cold war, Henry "Scoop" Jackson, who sat on the Armed Services Committee, was known as the "Senator from Boeing" for his ability to steer aircraft contracts to the Boeing Company, which was headquartered in his home state of Washington. This concern for "pork" extends beyond the committee system. At one time, the contract for the B-1 bomber had four hundred subcontracts in more than 400 of the 435 districts of the House.

Outsourcing Foreign Policy

Congress has turned with increasing frequency to another mechanism for overcoming the many forces that impede efficiency in making policy and exercising oversight: the special commission. These may be composed of outside experts, retired government officials, or handpicked members of Congress. Commissions deal with the inefficiency problem in a number of ways. First, the appointment of a commission represents a positive symbolic response to a perceived foreign policy problem. Second, commissions remove political pressure from policy makers by providing them with political cover for making difficult decisions. Third, commissions provide opportunities for educating the public, and for information gathering that extends beyond the closed network of congressional staffers, committee and subcommittee chairs, and executive branch officials.

Commissions have been created to deal with several different types of problems. One type is formed to investigate and make recommendations on a particular policy issue or problem. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) was this type of committee. A second type is set up to investigate and report back on an ongoing problem. The Commission on Wartime Contracting is an example; of particular concern to this commission have been questions of waste, fraud, and financial abuse stemming from the increased use of private contractors in combat theaters. The third type of committee is created to provide Congress with policy options to deal with a problem. The Defense Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission was created for this purpose. Closing military bases is a politically unpopular decision, given the economic impact on local communities. Instead of having Congress identify which bases to cut, the BRAC Commission was established. Five BRAC rounds have taken place, in 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995, and 2005. More than 350 military installations have been closed by this process.

There is nothing automatic about action on commission proposals. Many of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission were ignored. The December 2005 "report card" issued by members of the 9/11 Commission gave the administration five Fs and twelve Ds for its follow-through in implementing its recommendations. It received only one A, for its anti-terrorism finance efforts.[28] Commissions can also produce political backlash because of their recommendations. Since 2005, presidents, including Trump, have been unsuccessful in establishing a new BRAC round. Congress has forbidden the Pentagon from spending any funds "to propose, plan or execute" the base closing process.

Not everyone is pleased with the increasingly frequent use of commissions. In addressing the Senate in 2002 on the subject of special commissions, specifically the creation of the 9/11 Commission, Trent Lott observed that, in his opinion, congressional commissions were "an abdication of responsibility." Why, he wondered, "do we have an Armed Services Committee, an Intelligence Committee, a Government Affairs Committee, or a Foreign Affairs Committee?"[29]

Congress and the President: The Changing Relationship

The relationship between Congress and the president is not static. One way to capture the changing relationship is by analyzing the degree to which Congress has been assertive and active in its dealings with the president on foreign policy matters.[30] Combining these two dimensions produces four patterns. A *competitive* Congress is both active and assertive in foreign policy and thus quite willing to challenge a president's lead. A *disengaged* Congress is neither active nor assertive and tends to readily follow

a president's foreign policy preferences. A *supportive* Congress is active but not aggressive. It cooperates with the president on a broad range of foreign policy initiatives without challenging him. Finally, a *strategic* Congress is not particularly active, but is willing to and capable of challenging a president on specific issues that conflict with its foreign policy agenda.

From the end of World War II until about 1958, a *supportive Congress* existed. Relations between the two branches were largely harmonious. Bipartisanship was the order of the day. The president was the acknowledged architect of American foreign policy, and Congress's role was to reaffirm his policy initiatives and provide him with the means to act. Often its participation took on a plebiscitary character, with the passage of area resolutions such as those on the Middle East, Taiwan, and Latin America. Periods of dissent did occur, such as after the "loss of China" and during the McCarthy hearings, but overall, the Cold War consensus held.

The next decade, 1958–1968, saw the emergence of a *strategic Congress*. The Cold War principles around which the earlier bipartisan consensus was built began to fray. Congress was not in open revolt against the president; proclamations of support were still present, most notably for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, and failures such as the Bay of Pigs invasion did not evoke partisan attacks. However, pockets of resistance formed, and Congress moved to challenge the president selectively. Two key points of confrontation were the Vietnam War and the existence of a missile gap.

From 1968 into the mid-1980s, Congress was both active and assertive. This *competitive Congress* not only sought to limit the president's ability to conduct foreign policy by passing such measures as the War Powers Resolution and the Case-Zablocki Act, but it also resisted many of the president's most important foreign policy initiatives. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment undermined Nixon's détente policy, and Carter was challenged on the Panama Canal Treaties.

The period from the mid-1980s until September 11, 2001, marked a return to a *strategic Congress*. Once again, Congress selectively engaged the president on foreign policy issues. In some cases, such as the annual vote on most favored nation status for China, the interactions became almost ritualistic. On other occasions, such as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, ratification of NAFTA, and granting of fast-track trade authority, the conflicts were highly partisan and spirited.

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 led to the emergence of a *disengaged Congress* willing to cede the authority to the president in making crucial foreign policy decisions. Nowhere is this more evident than in George W. Bush's ability to obtain an AUMF resolution from Congress against Iraq by votes of 77–23 in the Senate and 296–133 in the House. Congress was not totally compliant, but it did not challenge the president directly. Objections to the Bush administration's proposed language authorizing the president "to use all means that he determined to be appropriate" were addressed in behind-the-scenes meetings and led to mutually acceptable

language being found. This disengaged Congress did not last long. It soon showed signs of moving back toward a *strategic Congress*, which by 2005 was firmly in place as Bush and Congress sparred regularly over the Iraq War.

By the end of Obama's presidency, a *competitive Congress* had reemerged. Congress often acting in a preemptive manner, as highlighted by two examples from 2015. In March, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed a joint session of Congress at the invitation of House Speaker John Boehner. Obama was not consulted on the invitation. In his speech, Netanyahu spoke out strongly against a nuclear arms agreement with Iran. In December, after Obama promised world leaders at the Paris climate conference that the United States would be in the lead in responding to global climate change, the House joined the Senate in passing a resolution preventing the Environmental Protection Agency from enforcing tighter standards.

Trump has also faced a *competitive Congress*. The Dateline feature that opened this chapter highlighted one area of deep competition: the Yemen War. Later in 2019, Trump found it necessary to sign the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act. It placed economic sanctions on China and required that the State Department annually review Hong Kong's status as an autonomous region in China. Trump had threatened a veto citing ongoing trade negotiations with China. The Senate unanimously approved the bill and the House voted to adopt it 417–1.

Trump's ongoing positive assessment of Putin has confounded both Republicans and Democrats in Congress. Prior to their summit meeting in July 2017, Trump indicated that he respected Putin. When reminded that Putin was a killer, Trump responded, "There are a lot of killers." Trump further angered Congress with his praise of Putin at the Helsinki Summit and failure to confront Putin with the evidence of Russian meddling in the 2016 presidential campaign. Less than one month into his presidency, nine Republican senators wrote to Trump urging him to be tough on Russia, citing Ukraine, Syria, and cybersecurity. In April 2017, the Senate passed sanctions legislation by a 98–2 vote. In July, a House–Senate compromise was reached containing language limiting the president's power to lift sanctions without congressional consent. The Senate again passed the bill by a 98–2 vote. The House followed with a 419–3 vote. Given the ease with which a veto would have been overridden, Trump signed the bill but included a signing statement to the effect that certain provisions were unconstitutional and might not be enforced.

The competitive relationship between President Trump and Congress reached new heights in October 2019, when the House began to move forward with impeachment hearings over his conduct of foreign policy. The immediate spark was a whistleblower report related to a July 25 phone call between Trump and the president of Ukraine, in which Trump sought to use his presidential powers to advance his re-election. At the center of

the controversy was the holdup of U.S. arms sales to Ukraine in an effort to push Ukrainian officials to publicly announce the launch of an investigation into the 2016 presidential election and into a Ukrainian energy company that employed the son of 2020 Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden.

The existence of a competitive Congress does not by definition preclude cooperation between the two branches of government. One example is the innovative way in which Congressional participation was handled in approving the Iranian nuclear accord. Obama had initially claimed the authority to enter into a nuclear agreement with Iran without congressional approval. When this proved to be politically untenable, Obama agreed to a compromise. The legislation was structured in a way that would allow Congress to exercise its voice by voting its disapproval, but at the same time give Obama the upper political hand since his veto would be difficult to overcome.

Over the Horizon: A New War Powers Act?

The fundamental problem facing Congress in exercising its foreign policy voice in the future will continue to be the challenge of managing the contradictory pressures of efficiency and participation. Nowhere does this challenge appear more difficult to resolve than in the exercise of congressional and presidential war powers. The focal points of the debate over how to proceed are the requirements of the War Powers Act and the use of AUMF to justify a wide range of military activities. Efforts to modify or end the use of these grants of presidential authority have become increasingly common in recent years, raising the following question: Are we moving closer to bringing them to an end, or is their failure an indication of their permanence?

In January 2014, Senators Tim Kaine and John McCain put forward the War Powers Consultation Act. They characterized the Act as bipartisan legislation to strengthen the current ineffective consultative process between Congress and the president regarding whether and when to engage in military action. The Act was based upon a 2008 bipartisan National War Powers Commission report,[31] with a number of key provisions: consultation between the president and Congress before deploying U.S. troops into significant armed conflict; the creation of a permanent Joint Congressional Consultation Committee; and a congressional yes/no vote on significant armed conflicts within thirty days. For some, this did not go far enough. In November, Senator Rand Paul called for Congress to vote on a declaration to proclaim war against ISIS. His declaration would have limited military action to one year, and placed significant restrictions on the use of ground forces.

The following year, Rep. Chris Gibson, along with thirty-four cosponsors, introduced a bill to reform the War Powers Resolution. Among its provisions was the requirement that in every possible instance the president

must submit a written report to Congress before introducing U.S. armed forces into hostilities or situations in which involvement in hostilities is imminent. It also prohibited the use of available military forces from being used unless specific legal or operational conditions were met.

In 2017, Senator Paul sought to repeal the 2002 AUMFs used to send military forces to Afghanistan and Iraq, through an amendment to the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act. During Congressional testimony, the Trump administration asserted that it was not interested in Congress passing a new AUMF, and that, if it did, the agreement should be of unlimited duration. The amendment was tabled by a 61-36 vote.

The question of the president's right to place troops into combat situations came up again in 2019 with the Iranian crisis, which is detailed in the Dateline section at the beginning of chapter 9. As the threat of war faded, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell announced that he would permit a vote on a bipartisan amendment to the Defense Authorization bill currently before Congress to require Congressional approval for any military action against Iran. The amendment required 60 votes to be included in that bill. It failed with a 50–40 vote. Four Republicans voted with the Democratic majority in support of the bill.

As the crisis was unfolding, the Trump administration laid the foundations for military action without the consent of Congress. Among the arguments considered were that ties existed between Iran and al-Qaeda which would permit use under the AUMF. That position was not endorsed by the Pentagon.[32]

Critical Thinking Questions

1. Is there a need for a new War Powers Act? Why or why not?
2. Is party identification or geography (state or district represented) a more important influence on how members of Congress vote on foreign policy issues? Support your answer.
3. What changes would you make to Congress's internal structure and operating procedures to make its voice more effective in foreign policy?

Key Terms

Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), 143
barnacles, 147
gadfly, 153
legislative veto, 142
oversight, 149
policy entrepreneur, 152
presidential finding, 151
ratify, 136
reporting requirement, 150
trade promotional authority, 145
War Powers Resolution, 140

Further Reading

Michael Allen, *Blinking Red* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2013).

This book chronicles the often tense and combative congressional politics that went into the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence following the 9/11 attacks.

Linda Fowler, *Watchdogs on the Hill* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015).

This book examines the decline of congressional oversight of U.S. foreign policy. Using case studies, the author attributes this decline to several factors, argues for the importance of oversight in generating information for the public, and proposes reforms.

Michael Hayes, "Congress and War Powers: Symbolism and Nondecisions in the Struggle for Influence," *Congress and the Presidency* 45 (2018), 185–207.

This article focuses on four in-depth case studies of foreign policy in the Clinton administration as the basis for testing the theory of non-decision-making, situations in which the mobilization of bias prevents action.

Louis Henkin, *Foreign Affairs and the Constitution* (Mineola, NY: Foundation Press, 1972).

This classic account looks at American foreign policy making from a constitutional perspective that emphasizes the distribution of powers in the Constitution and the legislative legacy that developed from it.

John Kyl, Douglas Feith, and John Fonte, "War of Law," *Foreign Affairs* 92 (July 2013), 115–25.

This article defends the congressional record of rejecting treaties and international agreements on the grounds that international law subverts U.S. sovereignty and lessens accountability of the government to voters.

Douglas Kriner and Eric Schickler, "The Resilience of Separation of Powers? Congress and the Russia Investigation," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 48 (September 2018), 436–55.

This article places the Russia investigation in a larger historical context. The authors argue that it fits with past historical patterns, and that congressional investigations do have the potential to impact politics and policy.

Jordan Tama, "Independent Commissions as Settings for Civil-Military Deliberation," *Armed Forces and Society* 42 (April 2016), 407–26.

This article examines the activities and impact of three independent advisory commissions established by Congress to examine issues related to women in the military.

7 Presidency



Dateline: Trump's First 100 Days

Presidential performance can be judged by any of a number of different standards. One that continues to be embraced is what they accomplished during their first 100 days. This builds on a sense of high expectations (and sometimes fear) that a newly elected president will move quickly to implement campaign promises. Let's compare Donald Trump and Barack Obama's first 100 days of making foreign policy.

Immediately after his inauguration, Donald Trump moved to implement some of his foreign policy campaign promises. On January 23, 2017, he signed a presidential memorandum withdrawing the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. On his sixth day in office, January 25, Trump signed an executive order directing the Department of Homeland Security to begin constructing a wall along the U.S.–Mexico border. The source of funding for the wall was not specified. The following day, he tweeted that "if Mexico is unwilling to pay for the badly needed wall, the, it would be better to cancel the upcoming meeting [with Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto]." Nieto cancels the meeting. On January 27, 2017, Trump issued Executive Order 1379, "Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry in the United States." More commonly known as the Muslim ban, it lowered the number of refugees that were to be admitted to the United States and suspended entry of individuals from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. The policy was quickly challenged in the courts, and in early February the administration stopped enforcing it. A revised ban issued in March was also challenged successfully in the courts. In March, on his 68th day as president, Trump reversed a series of environmental policies intended to combat climate change.

Trump held a series of meetings with foreign leaders at Mar-a-Lago. One, with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, was interrupted by news of a North Korean ballistic missile test. Another, with Chinese President Xi Jinping, occurred the same day that Trump authorized air strikes in Syria in response to its use of chemical weapons. This decision reversed a campaign pledge not to get involved in the Syrian conflict. Trump would also reverse his position on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) after meeting with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, and no longer referred to it as obsolete. After meeting with Xi, he stated that China was not a currency manipulator and raised the possibility of moving away from a one-China policy.

In addition to the authorization of Syrian air strikes, the Trump administration engaged in other military actions during its first 100 days. On January 29, the United States carried out an information-gathering military raid in Yemen, in which a U.S. Navy SEAL and several civilians were killed. The Trump administration called it a success, and asserted that it had been under consideration by Obama in December. Initial assessments challenged the conclusion that new intelligence was obtained or that it had been approved by the Obama administration. In early April, the administration announced that the USS *Carl Vinson* supercarrier had been repositioned in the western Pacific Ocean in response to North Korea's test firing of a ballistic missile. "We are sending an armada," said Trump. The announcement proved inaccurate, as the USS *Carl Vinson* was in the Indian Ocean at the time.

Trump's national security system began a series of changes that would become frequent during his first two years as president. Retired General Michael Flynn, his first National Security Advisor, resigned after twenty-four days for having misled Vice President Mike Pence about a

conversation with Russia's ambassador concerning economic sanctions placed by the Obama administration. He told a former business partner that the new administration would "rip up" the sanctions.

The mystique surrounding a president's first 100 days in office began with the election of Franklin Roosevelt in 1932 at the height of the Depression. In his first 100 days, Congress passed fifteen major pieces of legislation as part of the New Deal economic recovery program. FDR also began his famous series of radio fireside chats during that time. First 100 days' performance since then has been spotty, especially in the area of foreign policy. Dwight Eisenhower concentrated on ending the Korean War; in his presidential campaign he had pledged to bring it to an end, and actually went to Korea weeks after being elected. Richard Nixon went on a five-country tour of Europe, announced the end of the draft, and stated that the United States would deploy an anti-ballistic missile defense system in his first 100 days. Jimmy Carter announced that he was pardoning Vietnam draft evaders. Bill Clinton announced a controversial plan to allow gays to serve in the military. George W. Bush announced that the United States was withdrawing from the Kyoto Climate Accord. For details on John F. Kennedy's first 100 days in office, see the Historical Lesson.

Historical Lesson

John F. Kennedy's First 100 Days

John Kennedy's first 100 days in office were among the most active insofar as foreign policy was concerned. The results were both good and bad. Kennedy was inaugurated on January 21, 1961. Three days later he announced that, via an executive order, he was establishing the Peace Corps as a pilot program, naming George McGovern as its director. Congress would be asked to establish it on a permanent basis.

On February 22, Kennedy sent a letter to Nikita Khrushchev, head of the Soviet Communist Party, in which he extended an invitation to hold personal talks on foreign policy matters of interest to both countries. Earlier, Khrushchev had sent Kennedy a congratulatory letter following the election. Kennedy's advisors urged him not to hold such a meeting. They feared that he would misread Khrushchev's personality and intentions. [The meeting was held in Vienna in June, after the 100-day period, with Berlin and Laos as the major points of discussion. Initially the summit was seen as a diplomatic success, but that assessment soon changed. Kennedy did not fare well in the private discussions, and Khrushchev appears to have come away from the summit with the view that Kennedy was an inexperienced leader who could be outmaneuvered.]

In March, Kennedy announced an ambitious ten-year plan for economic growth and development in the Western Hemisphere. A central feature of the plan was an economic partnership between the United States and Latin American countries. This

partnership became the Alliance for Progress, which officially came into existence in August 1961. The short-term impact of the Alliance for Progress was significant, as the amount of U.S. foreign aid to the region virtually tripled. Long-term assessments were not as positive, as much of the money flowing into the region benefited U.S. corporations that returned profits to the United States rather than local economies.

The most significant foreign policy decision made by Kennedy in his first 100 days came in April 1961, when he approved the Bay of Pigs operation. It called for covert training of Cuban exiles into a paramilitary force. The force would secretly be sent back to Cuba, where it would help spawn a popular uprising designed to overthrow Castro. The plan was developed by the CIA during the Eisenhower administration's final year in office. During the 1960 presidential campaign, both Kennedy and Richard Nixon called for taking a hard-line stance against Castro, with Kennedy asserting that Eisenhower had not done enough to end his rule. Kennedy was elected president on November 8, 1960, and on November 18 he was briefed on the invasion plan. On January 3, 1961, the Eisenhower administration broke diplomatic relations with Cuba. Kennedy was briefed again on January 28, 1961. At these briefings he called for changes in the invasion plan, one of which was to move the landing to the Bay of Pigs in order to further hide its link to the United States. At an April 12 press conference, when asked what the United States would do to help support anti-Castro Cubans, Kennedy said that the United States had no intention of intervening in Cuban affairs.

The Bay of Pigs invasion took place on April 17, 1961. Little went right. Overwhelmed by Cuban military forces, the U.S.-backed Cubans quickly surrendered. When confronted with news of the invasion's imminent collapse, Kennedy rejected calls to openly provide additional U.S. assistance. The failure was not a surprise to many. Both the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense had voiced their doubts about the CIA plan, as did former Secretary of State Dean Acheson and current members of Kennedy's State Department.

Applying the Lesson

1. What standard should be used in assessing presidential performance in the first 100 days, and why?
2. How deeply should presidents be involved in the decision-making process? Explain your answer.
3. What is more important in the first 100 days of a presidency: continuity with the past or changing the direction of foreign policy? Explain your answer.

The historical record suggests that focusing too heavily on a president's first 100 days is not necessarily a good indicator of what foreign policy is to come in the 1,361 days that follow. However, the standard will continue to be used and comparisons made. This chapter looks at the president and foreign policy from various perspectives to provide a better foundation for evaluation.

It examines the president's constitutional powers, then turns to the president as a person and the presidency as an institution. It begins by noting the ongoing debate over whether presidents are strong or weak leaders.

Weak President or Strong President

Some see the president as a weak leader, little more than a clerk lacking the power to command others to act who must rely on the ability to persuade.[1] Far from running the government, the president struggles simply to make sense of events.[2] Information does not come to presidents automatically, nor can they count on speed and secrecy in making and carrying out decisions. In 2003, George W. Bush had a conversation with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Jerry Brenner, who headed the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. Bush asked who was in charge of finding weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Rumsfeld said it was Brenner; Brenner said it was Rumsfeld.[3]

Others see the president as, at least potentially, a strong and powerful leader capable of unilateral action.[4] By acting first and alone, they argue, the president places political competitors in the position of having to undo what they have just done. Unilateral presidential action is not a matter of usurping congressional powers as much as it is taking advantage of ambiguities in the constitutional distribution of powers, the existence of vaguely worded legislative language, and the inherent difficulties that Congress, the courts, and other political competitors face in acting in a unified fashion. The **unilateral president** has many tools at his disposal, ranging from issuing executive orders and national security directives to setting up new organizations and redefining their responsibilities.

The President and the Foreign Affairs Constitution

Chapter 6 introduced the Constitutional distribution of powers within which the president operates in making foreign policy. The Constitution binds both the president and Congress, but over time presidents have developed a number of strategies for circumventing its restrictions. This section examines four of the most important strategies at the president's disposal: using executive agreements, issuing signing statements, employing unofficial ambassadors, and engaging in undeclared wars. This does not mean that presidents will always get their way or that their actions will go unchallenged. When Congress did not act on immigration reform, Obama issued an executive order providing deportation relief to illegal immigrants in the United States. A federal court judge ruled the order unconstitutional, and the administration was forced to appeal the case to the Supreme Court. On a tied vote, the Supreme Court held that Obama's immigration reform policy was illegal.

Executive Agreements

From the outset, presidents have claimed the constitutional authority to engage in international agreements by means other than treaties. Over time, this alternative, known as an **executive agreement**, became the favored presidential method for entering into understandings with other states. Unlike a treaty, an executive agreement does not require the consent of the Senate before coming into force. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that it carries the same legal force as a treaty. The principal limit on its use is political, not legal: the fear that an angry Congress would retaliate by blocking other presidential foreign policy initiatives.

The proportion of executive agreements to treaties has increased steadily over time. Between 1789 and 1839, the United States entered into 60 treaties and 27 executive agreements. A century later, between 1889 and 1939, those numbers had grown to 524 treaties and 917 executive agreements. Because Obama preferred to act through executive orders and memorandums, he did not make as much use of executive agreements as his predecessors. Midway through his last year in office, Obama had entered into 183 executive agreements, compared to 291 for George W. Bush. However, many were for high-profile foreign policy issues, such as a 2012 strategic partnership agreement with Afghanistan (establishing the outlines for U.S.–Afghanistan relations after U.S. combat forces left in 2014), the 2015 climate agreement, and the nuclear agreement with Iran.

Consistent with its America First perspective, the Trump administration has not embraced executive agreements to the extent of its predecessors, preferring instead to leave previously established agreements, such as the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement and the Paris Climate agreement. The major exception is Trump's pursuit of the U.S.–Mexico–Canada Agreement. A numerical comparison shows that the U.S. entered into 76 executive agreements or treaties in 2018, and only 23 as of June 2019. This compares to an average of just over 100 in previous years.[5]

The Senate has attempted to curb the president's use of executive agreements on a number of occasions. Two efforts have been particularly noteworthy. The first, the **Bricker Amendment,** would have required that executive agreements receive the same two-thirds vote of approval from the Senate as treaties. In 1954, the Bricker Amendment failed by one vote to get the two-thirds Senate majority needed to set into motion the amendment ratification process at the state level.

The second was the 1972 Case-Zablocki Act, which required that Congress be informed of all executive agreements so that it could take action to block them if it saw fit.[6] This Act was seen as necessary because executive agreements have not always been made public. Particularly revealing in this regard is the history of secret presidential agreements with Saudi Arabia.[7] Both Harry Truman and John Kennedy entered into agreements to use military force to protect the Arab nation under certain conditions. However, the Case-Zablocki Act has not ended the practice of secret executive

agreements. In part, the problem is definitional. In 1975, Representative Les Aspin estimated that four hundred to six hundred agreements had not yet been reported to Congress because the White House claimed that they were understandings, oral promises, or statements of political intent, not executive agreements.[8] Included among these were a 1973 secret message that President Nixon had sent to North Vietnam promising reconstruction aid in return for a peace agreement, Henry Kissinger's 1975 understanding with Israel and Egypt that U.S. personnel would be stationed in the Sinai as part of the disengagement process, and the 1975 Helsinki Accords.

Signing Statements

Presidents may also act unilaterally by issuing **signing statements**. Some amount to little more than claiming credit for a piece of legislation or thanking key supporters. Others are statements of Constitutional rights and prerogatives. Such was the case in 2005, following the passage of anti-torture legislation. Two weeks after its public signing, Bush quietly attached a signing statement dealing with the rights of detainees. It stated that he would interpret the legislation "in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief and . . . in achieving the shared objective of the Congress and the President in . . . protecting the American people from further terrorist attacks."[9] In effect, this statement claimed presidential authority to conduct the War on Terror as the executive saw fit.

Both Obama and Trump actively used signing statements. For example, in June 2009 Obama signed a spending bill that placed conditions on money given to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. In his signing statement, Obama stated that he would not allow this legislation to interfere with his presidential authority to conduct foreign policy and negotiate with other countries. In signing the $716 billion defense bill in August 2018, Trump raised objections to fifty provisions of the bill, including one that called for formal consultations with South Korea and Japan before reducing the size of the U.S. military footprint in South Korea. Trump did not say he would refuse to abide by these provisions, but indicated that he would implement them "consistent with his authority as commander in chief."

Executive Orders, Spending, and Administrative Powers

Presidents also have a number of more subtle options to pursue their foreign policy agendas.[10] One is to issue *executive orders*, directives issued to U.S. government agencies. These differ from executive agreements, which the president enters into with other countries. Obama issued executive orders in a variety of foreign policy areas. In 2016, he signed an executive order ending a twenty-year-old economic sanctions program against Iran

for its pursuit of nuclear weapons. The order revoked four previous executive orders and modified a fifth one. Eight executive orders imposing sanctions on Iran remained in place. During his second term, Obama issued controversial executive orders involving cybersecurity. One provided for expanded information sharing and collaboration between the government and private sector and development of a voluntary framework for cybersecurity standards and best practices. Another allowed his administration to impose sanctions on groups or individuals engaged in cyberattacks or commercial espionage in cyberspace.

Trump has used foreign policy executive orders for a variety of issues including drone strikes, trade violations and abuses, and imposition of economic sanctions on Venezuela and Iran. As noted in the Dateline section at the beginning of this chapter, Trump's most controversial executive order was his travel ban. Drafted largely within the White House and during the transition, it did not follow the vetting system traditionally used in formulating executive orders. Typically, the White House staff sends a proposed executive order to Congress for comment. It is then sent for review to the Office of Management and Budget, which in turn sends it to relevant departments for comment. The president is also required to obtain guidance from the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel. In the case of the travel ban, input was restricted to Trump's appointees and did not involve professional staffers. NSC officials raised concerns and presented lengthy comments. Secretary of Defense Mattis was not given an opportunity to comment on the proposal and did not see the final version until the day it was announced.

Presidents may also use their spending and administrative powers to advance foreign policy initiatives blocked by Congress:

- In 1999, the Senate rejected the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Yet Bill Clinton helped fund a global network of monitoring stations that were vital to detecting illegal tests.
- The United States has not yet signed the 1997 treaty banning land mines, yet it has avoided producing, transferring, or deploying new ones. It is also the world's leading funder of de-mining projects and helps fund follow-up meetings on the treaty's progress.
- The United States has not signed the treaty establishing an International Criminal Court (ICC), yet Bush supported a UN resolution referring Darfur to the ICC. Obama sent U.S. forces to Africa to help capture ICC fugitive Joseph Kony and turned over a Congolese warlord to the ICC after he surrendered to a U.S. embassy.
- Trump sought to use funds from other agencies or projects to fund his border wall when Congress did not provide him with the funding he desired. For example, it was announced in September 2019 that $3.6 billion would be redirected from Department of Defense military construction projects to fund the wall.

Informal Ambassadors

Presidents have also reduced the Senate's confirmation powers from what was originally intended by using personal representatives as negotiators. President Franklin Roosevelt relied heavily on Harry Hopkins in making international agreements, leaving Secretary of State Cordell Hull to administer "diplomatic trivia." President Jimmy Carter had Hamilton Jordan conduct secret negotiations during the Iranian hostage crisis. The Reagan administration relied on National Security Council (NSC) staffers and private citizens to carry out the Iran-Contra initiative. Obama turned to informal ambassadors for dealing with a number of high-profile foreign policy problems, most notably reopening relations with Cuba; negotiations were conducted by two White House officials and begun without the knowledge of Secretary of State John Kerry.

A similar problem confronts the Senate if it wishes to influence the type of advice the president receives. Presidents are free to listen to whomever they please. Under Woodrow Wilson, Wilson's friend and confidant Colonel House was more influential than Secretaries of State William Jennings Bryan and William Lansing. Today, it is widely recognized that the National Security Advisor often has more influence on presidential thinking than the Secretary of State. Yet the former's appointment is not subject to Senate approval.

Two informal ambassadors have risen to prominence in the Trump administration. One is Rudolf Giuliani, Trump's personal lawyer who also headed a lucrative international consulting firm. Giuliani emerged as a central figure in foreign policy to Ukraine, for which Trump was impeached. Giuliani made contact with key Ukrainian individuals and parsed for the removal of key State Department officials. Also influential is Jared Kushner, Trump's son-in-law, who holds the title of Senior Advisor. Kushner was put in charge of formulating the administration's Middle East Peace Plan. Kushner's lack of foreign policy experience led foreign governments to see him as easily manipulated. A case in point is Saudi Arabia. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who was linked to the killing of Jamal Khashoggi, became Kushner's primary source of information and analysis of events in the region. A related concern was that Kushner lacked the necessary security clearance level to gain access to the most sensitive information. Chief of Staff John Kelly had Kushner's clearance level downgraded at one point. It was raised back to full Top Secret level in May 2018 over the objection of staffers. Ivanka Trump received a full Top Secret level clearance at the same time.

Undeclared Wars

By one count, the United States has used force over three hundred times.[11] However, it has declared war only five times. The passage of the 1973 War Powers Resolution (see the Historical Lesson in chapter 6) did little to redress this imbalance. Rather than willingly abide by it, many presidents

have submitted reports to Congress declaring that they were doing so voluntarily and characterized their decisions to use force as lying beyond the jurisdiction of the War Powers Resolution. Carter did not engage in advance consultations with Congress in carrying out the Iranian hostage rescue effort, claiming that it was a humanitarian action. Reagan used the same logic in bypassing Congress on the invasion of Grenada. He would later argue that, because U.S. Marines were invited in by the Lebanese government, they were not being sent into a combat situation, so the War Powers Resolution did not apply. This assertion lost much of its support when 241 U.S. soldiers were killed in a terrorist attack. Even though George H. W. Bush did obtain congressional resolution supporting the 1991 Persian Gulf War, he continued to stress that "I don't think I need it . . . I feel that I have the authority to fully implement the United Nations resolution." In a twist on this situation that occurred well before the War Powers Resolution, President Grover Cleveland went so far as to tell Congress that even if it declared war against Spain over Cuba, he would not honor that vote and begin a war.

Obama's thinking on presidential war powers evolved during his presidency. As a presidential candidate, Obama stated, "the president does not have the power under the Constitution to unilaterally authorize a military attack in a situation that does not involve stopping an actual or imminent threat to the nation." As president, his position was consistent with that of his predecessors. Obama sought congressional approval neither for military action against Gaddafi nor for the continuance of military operations there after the mandated sixty-day reporting period established by the War Powers Resolution. Approval, he held, was not necessary because it was a humanitarian operation. Later, he asserted that the sixty-day reporting requirement did not apply because U.S. military activities in Libya fell short of "hostilities."[12]

In the case of the Yemen resolution discussed in the Dateline section of chapter 6, Trump has similarly rejected congressional efforts to control his use of military power. In contemplating the use of military force against Iran in response to its downing of a U.S. drone, Trump talked with congressional leaders but did not seek official congressional support or inform them that an attack had been authorized and was under way (only to be recalled).

When Does the President Matter?

In a study of twentieth-century U.S. foreign policy, John Stoessinger was struck by how few individuals made crucial decisions shaping its direction.[13] He found that *movers* (exceptional individuals who, for better or worse, not only find turning points in history but help create them) have been far outnumbered by *players* (individuals caught up in the flow of events, who respond in a standard and predictable fashion). One explanation for this imbalance is

that relatively few situations may exist in which the personal characteristics of the president or other policy makers are important for explaining policy.

A useful distinction can be made between action indispensability and actor indispensability.[14] **Action indispensability** refers to situations in which a specific action is critical to the success or failure of a policy. The identity of the actor is not necessarily a critical factor in explaining the action. It is possible that any individual (player) in that situation would have acted in a similar manner. **Actor indispensability** refers to those situations in which the personal characteristics of the involved individual are critical to explaining the action taken. In Stoessinger's terms, the individual involved is a mover, increasing the odds of success or failure by bringing unique qualities to bear on a problem.

A crucial element of action indispensability is the degree to which the situation permits restructuring. Some situations are so intractable or unstable that it is unreasonable to expect the actions of an individual policy maker to have much of an impact. In concrete terms, the identity of the president will have the greatest impact on policy under four conditions, all of which were met by the events of 9/11:

1. **The issue is new on the agenda.** Although the administration of Bill Clinton had given terrorism more attention than the incoming George W. Bush administration, no firm plan of action was in place.
2. **The issue is addressed early in the administration.** The terrorist attacks occurred early in the Bush administration.
3. **The president is deeply involved in ongoing issues.** Bush was deeply involved in decision-making following the attacks.
4. **The issue is in a state of precarious equilibrium, and events are primed to move in any number of directions.** Certainly, from the viewpoint of key individuals in the administration, the terrorist attacks presented the United States with a unique opportunity to remake the political map of the Persian Gulf.

Students of the presidency have focused most heavily on two aspects of the president as individual in attempting to understand U.S. foreign policy. The first is presidential personality. The second is the president's managerial or leadership style.

Presidential Personality

Textbooks and newspaper accounts of U.S. foreign policy are dominated by references to policies that bear a president's name, such as the Monroe Doctrine, the Truman Doctrine, or the Bush Doctrine. Personalizing the presidency in this way suggests that the identity of the president matters greatly, and that if a different person had been president, U.S. foreign policy would have been different. Is this really the case?[15] A persuasive case can

be made that situational factors, role variables, and the common socioeconomic backgrounds of policy makers place severe constraints on the impact of personality on policy. This section first looks at a leading effort to capture presidential personality and then examines the conditions under which presidential personality should be expected to make a difference.

The most famous effort to classify presidential personality and explore its implications for policy is that of James David Barber, who defines personality in terms of three elements.[16] The first element is *worldview*, which Barber defines as an individual's politically relevant beliefs. The second is *style*, an individual's habitual ways of responding to political opportunities and challenges through "rhetoric, personal relations, and homework." Both are heavily influenced by the third and most important component of personality: *character*, which develops in childhood. *Character*, the way individuals orient themselves toward life, involves two dimensions: energy and personal satisfaction. Presidents are classified as either passive or active by the amount of energy they put into the presidency. A president who derives personal satisfaction from the job is classified as positive, and one who gets no personal satisfaction from it is classified as negative. Together, these two dimensions produce four presidential personalities. Each type of **presidential personality** has different implications for U.S. foreign policy.

Active-positive presidents, such as Truman, Kennedy, Carter, Clinton, George H. W. Bush, and Obama, put a great deal of energy into being president and derive great satisfaction from doing so.[17] They are achievement-oriented, value productivity, and enjoy meeting new challenges. The primary danger facing active-positives is the possibility that pragmatism will be seen as "flip-flopping." Carter's handling of the Panama Canal Treaties illustrates the ability of active-positives to engage productively in coalition-building efforts and accept the compromises necessary to get a policy measure passed. Carter's presidency also illustrates the problem with active-positive presidents: They may overextend themselves by pursuing too many goals at once, and may be insensitive to the fact that the irrationalities of politics can frustrate even the best-laid plans. Carter was roundly criticized for being too flexible in the search for results and for trying to do too many things at the outset of his administration: negotiate a SALT II treaty, negotiate a Panama Canal treaty, and reorder U.S. foreign policy priorities by emphasizing human rights and economic problems over the Soviet threat.

Active-negative presidents, such as Johnson and Nixon, are compulsive individuals who are driven to acquire power as a means of compensating for low self-esteem. Active-negatives adopt a domineering posture toward those around them and have difficulty managing their aggressive feelings. The great danger of active-negatives is that they will adhere rigidly to a disastrous foreign policy. Woodrow Wilson did so during the League of Nations controversy; Johnson, with Vietnam; and Nixon, with his actions in the Watergate scandal and the impeachment proceedings.

Donald Trump exhibits many of the characteristics of the active-negative president in his decision-making. Trump has actively used his presidential powers of communication to advance his policy positions and attack those who challenge him. He has not hesitated to use his formal and informal presidential powers of executive orders and memos, budgetary allocations, and appointments (or nonappointments). At the same time, Trump's frustration by his limited ability to fully exercise what he sees as his presidential powers and the lack of credit for what he has accomplished—including winning the presidency—have been noted repeatedly. Critiques of his policies are taken personally, as illustrated by his response to Harley Davidson's decision to move some of its production outside the U.S. Aides described him as feeling betrayed. There are numerous accounts of him lashing out at aides for failures to implement his policies. Most significantly, Trump often finds himself locked in losing or overly costly policy disputes, such as building a wall along the Mexican border, his embrace of Vladimir Putin and rejection of findings about Russian influence in the 2016 presidential election, and his trade war with China.

Passive-positive presidents, such as Reagan, are directed individuals who seek affection as a reward for being agreeable. They do not make full use of the powers of the presidency but feel satisfied with the job as they define it. *Passive-negative* presidents, such as Eisenhower, get little satisfaction from the job and use few of the powers available to them. They are in politics only because others have encouraged them to be, and feel a responsibility to meet these expectations. Their actions are plagued by low self-esteem and feelings of uselessness. They do not enjoy the game of politics. Rather than bargain and compromise, they seek to avoid confrontation by emphasizing vague principles and procedural arrangements. Passive-positive and passive-negative presidents are especially prone to two problems. The first is policy drift. Problems may go unaddressed and opportunities for action may be missed because of both a general disinterest in using the powers of the presidency and reluctance to engage in the nitty-gritty political work necessary to forge a consensus and move ahead. The second potential danger is the absence of accountability. Without the energetic involvement of the president in making policy, an inevitable question arises: "Who is in charge?"

Placing a president in one of Barber's categories involves a great deal of subjective judgment. Consider the case of Eisenhower, who he defined as a passive-negative president. Recent evidence suggests that this may not be the case.[18] Eisenhower may have deliberately cultivated the image of not being involved in policy making in order to deflect political pressures. His "hidden-hand leadership" combined a behind-the-scenes activism with a low public profile.

An even more significant complicating factor is that Barber's personality traits may not be permanent. Change may occur over time, because multiple traits are present. George W. Bush is a case in point.[19] Bush can

be seen as passive in his delegation of authority to others, his preference for focusing on a few select themes, and his engagement in binary black-and-white thinking, which allowed him to make decisions without getting into the deeper questions involved in an issue. At the same time, he had a very active side. Bob Woodward, who chronicled the Bush administration's decisions to go to war in Afghanistan and Iraq, said that Bush's decision-making style "bordered on the hurried. He wanted actions, solutions. Once on course, he directed his energy at forging on, rarely looking back, scoffing at—even ridiculing—doubt and anything less than 100 percent commitment."[20]

Presidential Managerial Style

Presidents do not lead by personality alone. Just as important to the outcome of their presidency is the managerial style they embrace to get others to follow. In addition, while the influence of presidential personality might be greatest under a limited set of conditions, a president's managerial and leadership style can be expected to have a more uniform effect on U.S. foreign policy. Getting others to follow is not easy.

Presidential managerial styles can be described in any number of ways. Zbigniew Brzezinski gave the following thumbnail sketches of how the first three post–Cold War presidents managed foreign policy.[21] George H. W. Bush had a "top-down" managerial style that placed him firmly in command of decisions. This did not mean that he was always happy with the way the system worked, however. Commenting on discussions about dealing with Soviet pressure on Lithuania, Bush later said, "I was dissatisfied with this discussion since it did not point to action and I wanted to take action."[22] Bill Clinton had a *kaffeeklatsch* (informal get-together over coffee) approach to decision-making. His meetings lacked an agenda, rarely began or ended on schedule, were frequently marked by the spontaneous participation of individuals who had little reason to be there, and often ended without any clear sense that a decision had been reached. George W. Bush is described as having "strong gut instincts" along with a "propensity for catastrophic decisiveness" and a temperament prone to "dogmatic formulations."

Viewed from a more analytical perspective, four basic managerial options have been employed by presidents to bring order and coherence to their foreign policy.[23] None is, by definition, superior to another. All have contributed to foreign policy successes and failures. The first is a **competitive system**, which places a great deal of emphasis on the free and open expression of ideas. Jurisdictions and grants of authority overlap, as individuals and departments compete for the president's attention in putting forward ideas and programs. Franklin Roosevelt is the only president who successfully employed such a model. Johnson is seen as having tried and failed. A second leadership style involves setting up a **formalistic system**, in which

the president establishes orderly routines and procedures for organizing the administration's policy deliberations. The system is hierarchically structured, with the president deeply involved as the final arbitrator in defining strategy and policy choices. Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon, Ford, Reagan, and Obama each set up variations of formalistic systems.

The third management style centers on the creation of a **collegial system**, in which the president tries to bring together a group of advisors to operate as a problem-solving team. Kennedy, Carter, George H. W. Bush, and Clinton set up this type of system. The fourth management style, employing a **chief executive officer (CEO) system**, was introduced by George W. Bush. In spirit, it harkens back to a Nixon-style attempt to govern by stressing loyalty, tightly controlling the flow of information, and surrounding the president with an "iron triangle" of aides to the exclusion of others in the White House. There have been noticeable differences in implementation of the CEO system. In contrast to the Nixon NSC system, which stressed hierarchy and centralized control, Bush put into place a flattened power structure, in which the president set the overall direction of policy but delegated responsibility for carrying through on policy to key individuals.

On one level, Trump's managerial system leaves no doubt that foreign policy decisions reside with him. As one observer who worked in the Clinton and Obama White Houses noted, "it's a presidency of one person" or as Trump put it, "I alone can fix it." His foreign policy decisions, often expressed as tweets, have routinely contradicted comments made by key advisors and department heads or have caught them by surprise, as was the case with a Tweet to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un that resulted in Trump crossing the DMZ into North Korea for a meeting. Trump placing himself at the center of managing foreign policy is far from unique; what distinguishes his system is the organizational foundation on which his emphasis rests—the centrality of presidential choice.

A deeper look into Trumps' managerial system reveals a resemblance to the competitive managerial system successfully employed by Roosevelt (but less so by Johnson). Trump created a flat decision-making organization with multiple centers of power vying for his attention, creating what some have called a "team of rivals" operating environment. Others have called it chaos because of his initial set of principal advisors: Chief of Staff Reince Preibus, son-in-law and Senior Advisor Jared Kushner, and Chief Strategist Stephen Bannon. Competitive multiple power centers have continued to exist even as major personnel changes have taken place in these positions and others. What changed was the dynamics of interaction between these power centers and Trump. Initially, the competition was between groups advancing different agendas, most notably anti-globalists (Bannon) and pro-business voices (Kushner). Competition then shifted, highlighting efforts by new advisors, such as McMaster and Kelly, to curb Trump's inclination to create turmoil as the operating context within which foreign policy decisions are made. Most recently, the competition for

Trump's attention highlights efforts by those who agree with his America First agenda to energize Trump to act, and by less prominent voices who raise obstacles to doing so.

Further managerial problems in the Trump administration are found on examination of staffing issues and the problems they create. Two staffing issues stand out. The one receiving the most comments is the high turnover rate among staff members and the large number of vacancies. By spring 2018, the turnover rate in the White House had reached 43 percent, which did not include the upcoming departures of Chief of Staff John Kelly and national security advisor General H. R. McMaster. The turnover rate in Trump's first year as president was three time as high as Obama's and twice as high as Reagan's. The comparison with Reagan brings out a second point. Both Reagan and Trump campaigned as outsiders, but Reagan came to the White House with a large and skilled set of foreign policy advisors and staff to consult for advice. Trump did not. A significant number of Republican foreign policy experts declared that they would not join his administration, and many of those whose names were put forward for key foreign policy positions were rejected by the Trump transition team for their lack of loyalty. The end result was referred to by administration officials as a "lean administration" that had "shed excess baggage"; others saw it as lacking the skills or resources to comment on and implement Trump's foreign policy effectively.

The National Security Council

Leadership requires more than getting individuals to work together toward a common set of goals. It also has an organizational foundation. Bureaucracies are needed to provide advice, develop policy alternatives, and implement policies. Experience has taught presidents that bureaucracies are not easily moved. As a result, presidents have been forced to look elsewhere for organizations that will allow them to lead. The central foreign policy structure on which presidents have grown to rely is the National Security Council (NSC) system, which is composed of three parts: an advisory body of cabinet rank officials, a National Security Advisor, and a professional staff.

According to the 1947 National Security Act that founded it, the purpose of the NSC was to advise the president "with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security."[24] The NSC went through four phases prior to the start of the Trump administration. Each altered the manner in which foreign policy problems come to the president.

The first phase of the NSC's history ran from 1947 to 1960. During this period, the NSC gradually became overly institutionalized. Truman was the first president to have the NSC, and was cautious in using it. He particularly wanted to avoid setting any precedents that would give the

NSC the power to supervise executive branch agencies or establish a norm of group responsibility for foreign policy decisions. For Truman, foreign policy was the responsibility of the president alone. The NSC was to be an advisory body, and nothing more. To emphasize this point, Truman did not attend early meetings of the NSC. However, the outbreak of the Korean War changed Truman's approach. He started to use the NSC more systematically, and began attending its regularly scheduled meetings. All national security issues were now to be brought to his attention through the NSC system; the NSC staff was reorganized, and the emphasis on outside consultants was replaced by a senior staff served by staff assistants.

The institutionalization and involvement of the NSC in policy making continued under Eisenhower, who created a Planning Board, to develop policy recommendations for the president, and an Operations Coordinating Board, to oversee the implementation of national security decisions. Eisenhower also established the post of assistant for national security affairs (commonly known as the president's national security advisor) to coordinate the national security decision-making process more forcefully. This NSC system never really functioned as envisioned. Instead of producing high-quality policy recommendations, decisions were made on the basis of the lowest common denominator of agreement. Rather than increasing presidential options, it limited them. Policy implementation continued to be governed by departmental objectives and definitions of the problem, rather than by presidential goals and perspectives.[25]

During the second phase of the NSC's history, which began with the Kennedy administration and lasted until 1980, it became overly personalized. Under Kennedy, the importance of the NSC system that Eisenhower had created declined. Kennedy adopted an activist approach to national security management grounded in informal operating procedures. The emphasis was on multiple lines of communication, direct presidential contacts with second- and third-level officials, and securing outside expert advice. Ad hoc interagency task forces replaced the formal NSC system as the primary decision-making unit. Within the NSC system, emphasis switched from the council itself to the NSC staff.

In Kennedy's revamped management system, the National Security Advisor played a key role. This person was responsible for ensuring that the staff operated from a presidential perspective. McGeorge Bundy held this post under Kennedy and in the first part of the Johnson administration. He was replaced by Walt Rostow in 1966. The change in advisors brought with it a change in operating style. Bundy saw his role as a facilitator or honest broker whose job was to encourage the airing of ideas and policy alternatives. Rostow was more of an ideologue, concerned with policy advocacy over process management.

Like Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson took an activist stance and favored small, informal policy-making settings over the formal NSC system. Major decisions about Vietnam were made at the Tuesday lunch group that

brought together Johnson and his key foreign policy advisors. According to William Bundy, the Tuesday lunch group was a "procedural abomination," lacking a formal agenda and clearly stated conclusions, wearing on participants, and confusing to those at the working levels.[26] The NSC coordinating system was overwhelmed by the pressures of Vietnam, and was often bypassed because of the tendency of the White House to make key policy decisions.

Nixon began his presidency with a pledge to put the NSC system back at the center of the foreign policy decision-making process.[27] This was achieved by, first, selecting Henry Kissinger as his National Security Advisor and William Rogers as his Secretary of State. The combination of a strong, opinionated, and activist National Security Advisor and a Secretary of State with little foreign policy experience guaranteed that foreign policy would be made in the White House. Second, Nixon created an elaborate NSC committee and staff system with Kissinger at its center; Kissinger was allowed to direct the flow of paper in the direction he wanted, bringing the NSC system into play on certain issues and cutting it out of others. By the end of the Nixon administration, the NSC was largely "on the outside looking in." It met only three times in 1973, compared with thirty-seven times in 1969. Such important decisions as the invasion of Cambodia, Kissinger's trip to China, the Paris peace negotiations, bombing in Vietnam, and putting U.S. troops on worldwide alert during the Yom Kippur War in the Middle East were made outside the NSC system.

Carter dismantled the elaborate Nixon-Ford-Kissinger committee system in favor of two committees. The Policy Review Committee handled long-term projects. A Special Coordinating Committee dealt with short-term problems, crisis situations, and covert action. Collegiality also returned, as evident in the prominent policy-making roles played by the Friday foreign policy breakfasts (attended by Carter and his key foreign policy advisors), but at a price. The Friday foreign policy breakfasts became substitutes for full NSC meetings; decisions made during the breakfasts were not always fully integrated into the NSC system, nor did they necessarily result in clearly articulated positions.[28]

During the Reagan administration, the NSC entered a third phase. Pledging to depersonalize the system, Reagan pushed too far in the opposite direction, causing it to go into decline. The National Security Advisor became a "nonperson," with little foreign policy influence or stature. With no force able to coordinate foreign policy, an unprecedented degree of bureaucratic infighting and fragmentation came to characterize (and paralyze) Reagan's foreign policy. The NSC staff moved in two different directions. On the one hand, it became preoccupied with bureaucratic trivia (including twenty-five committees, fifty-five midlevel committees, and some one hundred task forces and working groups). On the other hand, it became involved in the actual conduct of foreign policy in the Iran-Contra initiative. Only with the arrival of Colin Powell as National Security Advisor

and the passing from the Cabinet of such powerful and highly opinionated figures as Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Director of Central Intelligence William Casey did a coherent foreign policy agenda appear.[29]

In the George H. W. Bush and Clinton administrations, decision-making in the NSC was transformed again, becoming more collegial in nature. Both presidents selected low-key National Security Advisors who were expected to stay out of the public limelight. The final result was less than anticipated. The primary problem encountered in George H. W. Bush's administration was too much homogeneity in outlook. All of the participants, including the president, were confident that they understood the world, and they were slow to adapt to the end of the Cold War. Bill Clinton failed to make his collegial system work because he was unable to provide a constant vision to guide his team, or to construct an effective division of labor among its members.

George W. Bush and Obama continued to try and construct a collegial system. Central to George W. Bush's advisory system was the "War Cabinet," consisting of some twelve key Bush advisors on the war against terrorism. Instead of operating in a collegial fashion, however, this system became highly competitive and split over how to conduct foreign policy. No real discussions took place. Instead, key officials holding strong views on policy issues, such as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney, routinely employed back channels to communicate with Bush privately about policy matters.[30] Commenting on the decision to invade Iraq, one CIA official recalled that "there was no meeting; no policy options papers, no showdown in the Situation Room where the wisdom of going to war was debated or the decision to do so made."[31]

In setting up his NSC system, President Obama created an advisory system that emphasized his role as the key foreign policy decision-maker. In surveying Obama's system, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair was moved to note that, at any one time, there was not one National Security Advisor in the Obama administration, but at least three and as many as five.[32] Obama's national security system also continued a controversial trend. Under Carter, the NSC had twenty-five staffers; under George W. Bush, it had reached two hundred. Under Obama it doubled in size to four hundred staffers, who increasingly were perceived as lacking in professional expertise. Critics of this growth saw it as reducing the input of the State Department, Defense Department, and other foreign policy bureaucracies. Defenders saw it as reflecting the changed nature of foreign policy making; the more important role of domestic political considerations require the White House to play a more active and controlling role.

Trump's first national security advisor, retired General Michael Flynn, resigned after twenty-four days. Flynn was replaced by Gen. H. R. McMaster, who quickly moved to reorganize the operation of the NSC by removing "flynnstones" and White House chief strategist Stephen Bannon from the NSC's cabinet-level Principles Committee. Bannon did, however,

retain walk-in rights to speak with Trump, something McMaster did not have. McMaster also succeeded in returning the Homeland Security Council to the control of the NSC (it was an independent unit in Trump's original NSC blueprint). McMaster was known as a forceful, independent thinker. He often came into conflict with other high-ranking officials, such as Mattis and Kelly. In addition, he often disagreed with Trump, most notably on Russia, a situation that led to his removal after slightly more than one year in the position. Trump routinely spoke of the need to get along with Russia, but, in public remarks following his removal, McMaster identified Russia as using "old and new forms of aggression to undermine our open societies and the foundations of international peace and stability" and criticized the administration for failing to respond strongly enough.

On April 9, 2018, John Bolton became Trump's third National Security Advisor in fourteen months. Bolton had previously served in the George W. Bush administration, where earned a reputation as a strident hawk who favored direct military action against U.S. adversaries. He was one of the leading voices for invading Iraq, because of its supposed pursuit of nuclear weapons. Just prior to assuming the position of National Security Advisor, Bolton wrote a newspaper editorial that presented a legal justification for a preemptive first strike against North Korea, saying that it was on the cusp of being able to attack the United States and was helping Iran and ISIS develop nuclear weapons. Bolton brought an immediate change to NSC operations. Where McMaster held regular NSC meetings, Bolton isolated the council. Bolton also reached out regularly to members of Congress to advance his views and engaged in social media postings.

Bolton served 520 days as National Security Advisor before being fired by Trump (or, as he claimed, resigning) after the collapse of peace talks with the Taliban. While both hold hawkish foreign policy views, Bolton and Trump differed on using military force and entering into diplomatic talks with adversaries. Trump advocated the former but was also interested in making diplomatic deals. Bolton opposed both, and clashes between them became common. Trump also came to view Bolton's loyalty with suspicion. By summer 2019, Bolton was isolated from decision-making on an Afghanistan/Taliban peace agreement. He opposed pursuing the agreement, while Secretary of State Mike Pompeo supported it. The agreement collapsed when Trump cancelled a meeting at Camp David where he had planned to announce it. That meeting and the details of the agreement had been advanced by Trump and pursued by a small circle of Trump advisors without input from the National Security Council.

Robert O'Brien replaced Bolton as national security advisor. O'Brien holds conservative foreign policy views and came to the position with little government experience outside of serving as the lead hostage negotiator for the State Department. It is widely speculated that, rather than serving as an independent source of foreign policy ideas or critical commentary, he would largely act as a supporting voice of Trump's foreign policy.

Other White House Voices

The NSC system is not the only body close to the president that exercises influence over the making of U.S. foreign policy. Four other voices have grown in prominence: the vice president, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), the president's Chief of Staff (COS), and the First Lady.

The Vice President

Political folklore assigns the vice president little more than a ceremonial position in the policy-making process, barring the death of the president. There is often great truth in these images. Harry Truman spoke with Franklin Roosevelt only eight times and knew nothing of the development of the atomic bomb or Roosevelt's discussions with Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin about the shape of the post–World War II international system.

Of late, however, much has changed. More and more, vice presidents are playing selective but important foreign policy roles.[33] Dan Quayle, George H. W. Bush's vice president, became the administration's most active voice on Latin American affairs, and his decidedly pro-Israel position was important in maintaining the Persian Gulf War alliance against Iraq. Al Gore, Bill Clinton's vice president, established himself as a key administration expert on Russia and some of the important newly emerging states, such as Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Joe Biden continued in the role of activist vice president as part of the Obama administration. In 2013 Biden traveled to China, where he played the administration's "bad cop," publicly criticizing Chinese leaders for their attempts to silence American media criticism by blocking their websites in China and not renewing correspondents' visas. In some respects, Mike Pence has followed in Biden's footsteps, being sent abroad to advance and defend the Trump administration's foreign policy. However, Pence has also advanced his own foreign policy agenda, based on his conservative Christian world view. He has spoken out for religious freedom, criticizing countries such as Myanmar for its persecution of Muslims more forcefully than Trump. He has also pressured the State Department and USAID to redirect some $300 million in development funds intended for Iraq to help Christian and other minority groups in the region.

By far the most active and influential vice president in making foreign policy decisions was Dick Cheney, George W. Bush's vice president. He assembled a national security staff larger than that of any previous vice president, and brought a clear-cut perspective on foreign policy matters and considerable foreign policy experience to the office. As Secretary of Defense under George H. W. Bush, Cheney had established himself as the most aggressive member of that administration's inner circle in dealing with the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War, arguing that "we ought to lead and shape events."[34]

After the 9/11 attacks, Cheney became a powerful voice for taking the war to Iraq, often engaging in spirited exchanges with Secretary of State Colin Powell, who opposed such a move. Both before and after the invasion of Iraq, Cheney vehemently and publicly asserted that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, and that a link existed between Iraq and al-Qaeda. His behind-the-scenes efforts to root out intelligence supporting this position and his preoccupation with discrediting opponents of the war are among the most controversial aspects of the Bush administration's handling of prewar intelligence. Bush and Cheney were not always in agreement in foreign policy matters, however, and by the end of his presidency the distance between their views grew.[35]

The U.S. Trade Representative

Up until the early 1960s, the State Department had primary responsibility for conducting international economic negotiations. That changed with the passage of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act, which created the Office of the Special Trade Representative to head an interagency trade organization located in the White House. The move, which was led by Congress, was seen as necessary because the State Department was not viewed as a strong enough advocate of American economic interests.

The USTR is charged with the responsibilities of overseeing U.S. activity in multilateral trade negotiations, and negotiating trade issues with other states and within the UN system of organizations. Thus, it was Trade Representative Robert Zoellick, rather than Secretary of State Colin Powell, who accompanied George W. Bush to meet with Latin American leaders in hopes of laying the foundation for the Free Trade Area of the Americas. Zoellick also supervised U.S. negotiations at the Doha Round of World Trade Organization talks.

Robert Lighthizer, Trump's USTR, is a longtime Trump supporter who worked on trade issues in the Reagan administration, has a reputation as a tough negotiator, and is an advocate of high tariffs an instrument of foreign policy. Shortly after he assumed this position in 2017, Trump announced his intention to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In December 2018, Trump announced that Lighthizer would be the new chief negotiator in trade talks with China. (Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross and Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin had been the first two negotiators.) Lighthizer has long been critical of China's trade policies. He opposed its entry into the World Trade Organization and charged the nation with intellectual property theft.

The White House Chief of Staff

By convention, a division of labor has evolved in White House decision-making circles between the Chief of Staff (COS) and the National

Security Advisor. Each acts as a principal source of advice for the president—the COS for domestic policy and the National Security Advisor for foreign policy. This division of labor is disappearing; more and more, the COS has come to have an important voice in foreign policy matters. Several reasons for this change stand out. Foremost is the blurring of the boundary between foreign and domestic policy. As you learned in Chapter 2, many of today's traditional foreign policy problems can be characterized as *intermestic* issues, with elements of both foreign and domestic policy. As a consequence, the COS's domestic political expertise has become relevant to decisions on many foreign policy issues. As Carter's COS Hamilton Jordan recalls, he sought to play the role of an early warning system to alert officials to potential domestic political problems embedded in foreign policy decisions.

In addition to providing advice, the COS acts as a **gatekeeper**, regulating those who have access to the president. Leon Panetta, Bill Clinton's second COS, insisted that all decision papers, including those from the NSC, go to the president only after his review. If he felt that not enough options were begin given to Clinton, the paper was returned. The influence of domestic considerations filtered through the COS's office affects not only what decisions are made, but also to how foreign policy decisions are communicated. Brent Scowcroft, George H. W. Bush's National Security Advisor, noted that he had expected the NSC to write the first draft of the president's national security speeches because the language was so very important, butthis was not the case. Instead, the White House speech writers took the lead, with the result that foreign policy speeches often sounded like campaign speeches laced with dramatic rhetoric.

Examples of the prominent foreign policy role played by the COS in recent administrations are easy to find. Andrew Card, George W. Bush's first COS, was one of those placed in charge of the Homeland Security Council after the 9/11 attacks. As the Bush administration moved toward war with Iraq, Card established the White House Iraq Group to make sure that the various parts of the White House were working in harmony on Iraq. Secretary of Defense Gates was highly critical of Obama's COS Thomas Donilon, complaining that decisions about military intervention into Libya were made without significant military input. At one point, Gates told the Pentagon not to give the White House staff too much military information because they did not understand it.

The foreign policy influence of the COS in the Trump administration comes through most strongly in the role definitions adopted by General John Kelly and Mick Mulvaney. After replacing Reince Preibus, Kelly was charged with bringing order to the White House. To a large extent he succeeded in managing the flow of paper and the number of people who had access to Trump. What Kelly was unable to do was impose discipline on Trump; after initially welcoming Kelly's presence, he grew to resent it, along with Kelly's efforts to modify his foreign policy thinking on such

issues as the border wall. When asked how to evaluate his tenure as COS, Kelly responded that it was best measured by what the president did *not* do. Mulvaney, a former Member of Congress and leader of the Tea Party movement, reversed direction. He decentralized the White House, removing many of the procedural changes in access that Kelly had initiated. Most significantly, rather than try to manage Trump, his approach was to let him follow his instincts.

The First Lady

According to traditional thinking, first ladies play largely ceremonial foreign policy roles. It is important to recognize that, while the most common, this not the only role that first ladies have played. First ladies have long been involved informally in making U.S. foreign policy. Abigail Adams lobbied President John Adams on a treaty with the Netherlands in 1799. Edith Wilson served as Woodrow Wilson's communication link with both foreign governments and others in the U.S. government while he was incapacitated by a stroke. While generally neutral on policy matters, she tried but failed to get Wilson to accept Senator Henry Cabot Lodge's reservations about the League of Nations. Eleanor Roosevelt engaged in a wide series of debates with President Franklin Roosevelt during his presidency.

Two recent first ladies who adopted a much more visible and active role in foreign policy were Rosalynn Carter and Hillary Clinton. The signature foreign policy undertaking of Rosalynn Carter's stay in the White House was a June 1977 trip to Latin America. With Jimmy Carter heavily involved in completing the Panama Canal Treaties, the Middle East peace process, and arms control talks with the Soviet Union, the decision was made to send her to Latin America as signs of U.S. interest in the region and its commitment to human rights. In preparation for the trip, Rosalynn Carter met with scholars and representatives from the State Department, Treasury Department, National Security Department, and Organization of American States.

As first lady, Hillary Clinton's signature foreign policy initiative involved advocacy for women's rights and her attendance at the Fourth United Nations Conference on Women, held in Beijing in September 1995. In addressing that body, she strongly criticized China's treatment of women.

Melania Trump has embraced the traditional passive foreign policy role of first ladies, advancing in a low-key manner her signature foreign policy agenda, highlighting the role of U.S. foreign aid in helping children exemplified by her 2018 trip to Africa. Similarly, Laura Bush was seen much more than heard, but did have a focal point for her foreign policy activities, including freedom in Burma. Michelle Obama's primary area of international involvement was youth engagement.

Over the Horizon: Improving Presidential Transitions

As noted at the outset of this chapter, for many, the first 100 days of a president's term in office are seen as sending important signals as to what the future holds for their presidency. For others, just as important—and perhaps even more important—are the seventy-two days between election as president in November and inauguration the following January, when the transition from one president to another takes place.

Newly elected presidents whose predecessor was from a different party face a number of common challenges in constructing an effective and efficient transition process. According to Kurt Campbell and James Steinberg, six stand out: (1) Government by Amateurs, (2) Solving the Jig Saw Puzzle, (3) Promises to Keep, (4) the Clean Slate Syndrome, (5) Fumbled Information Handoffs, and (6) Only One President at a Time.

Prior to 2008, very little formal transition planning took place to help overcome these problems. Transitions were largely ad hoc affairs consisting of occasional national security briefings after the election. 9/11 changed that. As one senior George W. Bush administration official involved in both the 2000 and 2008 transitions noted, "Thank goodness it was September 11 and not February 11 because we would have been completely incapable of dealing with them." Still, another official noted that in 2008 "we were kind of making it up as we went along."

The desire to better prepare a presidential candidate to become president led to the creation of the nonpartisan Partnership for Public Service. In studying the 2008 transition, it found that both McCain and Obama began transition planning in spring 2008; McCain's campaign was less aggressive, believing that he would face fewer problems succeeding a Republican president. Fears of appearing overly presumptuous or overly confident about victory were major psychological and political impediments to transition planning. The report recommended that future presidential candidates appoint transition directors within two weeks of gaining the nomination, and that by January 1 the president-elect should give Congress the names of its nominees for the top fifty State Department, Defense Department, national security, and economic positions. The Senate should vote on them on or shortly after inauguration day.

In March 2016, Congress passed legislation establishing a set of deadlines that both presidential candidates and the administration had to meet, which Obama signed into law. That very month, transition coordinators from some forty different agencies met to discuss transition planning. The legislation had established a May deadline, six months before the election, for a president to create a transition coordinating council at the White House and in federal agencies.

Trump's transition experienced all six of the challenges identified above. In this respect it was not unique. On the other hand, many of the

problems it encountered were more severe, demonstrating little evidence of learning form the past. His transition highlights how much work remains to be done to improve presidential transitions. Another step in that direction was announced in March 2019; two former CIA officials created an unclassified briefing book on major challenges facing the United States, which is being given to announced presidential candidates in an effort to help them address issues rising from fake news and foreign election interference.

Critical Thinking Questions

1. Where does presidential responsibility begin and end in foreign policy making, and why?
2. Is there a "best" type of presidential personality for foreign affairs? Explain your answer.
3. Is the way the NSC is organized or presidential management style more important in determining presidential success in foreign policy? Explain your answer.

Key Terms

action indispensability, 172
actor indispensability, 172
Bricker Amendment, 167
Chief executive officer (CEO) system, 176
collegial system, 176
competitive system, 175
executive agreement, 167
formalistic system, 175
gatekeeper, 184
presidential personality, 173
signing statements, 168
unilateral president, 166

Further Reading

Michael Armacost, *Ballots, Bullets and Bargains: American Foreign Policy and Presidential Elections* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015).

This book examines the influence of the electoral process on how candidates define their foreign policy positions. Particular attention is paid to how sitting presidents select foreign policy problems to fix and the pressures on newly elected presidents to act boldly.

James David Barber, *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1985).

This study popularized the concept of presidential character, and presents a still widely used framework for studying presidential personality and its impact on foreign policy.

Matthew Eshbaugh and Christopher Linebarger, "Presidential and Media Leadership of Public Opinion on Iraq," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 10 (2014), 351–69.

Examining presidential speeches, news coverage, and levels of public support for the Iraq War, the authors find that, while the tone of media coverage drove support for the president, the tone of presidential rhetoric influenced the public's assessment of George W. Bush's handling of it.

David Kaye, "Stealth Multilateralism," *Foreign Affairs* 92 (September 2013), 113–24.

This article highlights the extent to which presidents have managed to circumvent congressional rejection of foreign policy initiatives that they consider threats to U.S. sovereignty. It concludes by noting the limitations of such work-around tactics.

Richard Neustadt, *Presidential Power* (New York: Free Press, 1960).

This classic account of presidential power emphasizes the weaknesses of the president in pursuing his foreign policy agenda.

Paul Rutledge and Heather Larson-Price, "The President as Agenda Setter-in-Chief," *Policy Studies Journal* 42 (2014), 443–64.

This article examines the influence of the presidency on setting the congressional policy agenda in six areas, from 1956 to 2005. It finds compelling evidence of presidential leadership and a reactive Congress, especially with regard to international affairs issues.

Elizabeth Saunders, *Leaders at War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011).

This study on how presidents shape decisions on military intervention develops a typology and applies it to cases that stress the importance of threat definition and the nature of the selected intervention strategy.

8 Bureaucracy



Dateline: Fixing the State Department

Viewed in terms of lines on an organizational chart, the foreign affairs bureaucracy provides presidents with a powerful set of tools to use in promoting their foreign policy agendas. Examined more closely, these organizations cannot be used freely. They have their own histories, operating styles, and concerns. The inherent tension within these conflicting perceptions often leads to policy disputes, feelings of frustration, and laying blame. It can also lead to calls for organizational reform and creation of new organizations.

From the very beginning of the Trump presidency, reorganizing the State Department was a primary focus of his efforts to reshape the foreign affairs bureaucracy. This was not surprising. Two prominent themes of Trump's campaign were "Make American Great Again," and put

"America First." Trump asserted that too many existing international agreements were bad deals, in which other countries took advantage of the U.S. The Trump administration saw reorganization as long overdue. Foreign service officers saw it as an effort to cripple or dismantle the State Department.

The Trump administration's structural reform agenda presented two different types of challenges to the State Department. One involved its relationship with other foreign policy bureaucracies. The most notable proposal was the possible merger of the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Under the existing framework, USAID operates as an independent agency under the guidance and supervision of the Secretary of State. The purpose of this reorganization was to begin the process of concentrating U.S. foreign aid programs spread across many military and civilian agencies under a single umbrella. Some within the State Department feared that this would result in a smaller and more politicized foreign aid budget.

The second structural challenge involved internal day-to-day operations. Here, public attention centered on the Trump administration's proposal to cut the State Department budget by as much as 33 percent. Producing a strong negative response both inside and outside the State Department, this proposal was widely considered to be "dead on arrival" in Congress. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis went so far as to state, "if you don't fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition."

Less visible was incoming Secretary of State Rex Tillerson's reorganization of decision-making. He quickly expanded the size of the policy planning staff attached to his office. Traditionally, it housed twenty to twenty-five people who provided strategic advice to the Secretary of State. Rumors were that Tillerson sought to double or triple its size. One consequence of this expansion was to isolate Tillerson from input by State Department professionals creating blockages in State Department decision-making. Some characterized his new advisors as a praetorian guard. One example of Tillerson's isolation was the September 2017 meeting of the Community of Democracies, which was expected to be attended by leaders from more than a hundred countries. For months, Tillerson was silent regarding his approval for the meeting. Formal invitations to embassies were delivered only eight days before its scheduled start. As a result, only a small number of foreign ministers attended.

Structural reforms and personnel reforms go hand in hand. Along with calls for deep budget cuts came proposals for a potential nine percent cut in personnel, as many as 2,300 positions in the State Department. Downsizing the State Department began immediately and at all levels. Days into the new administration, even before Tillerson was confirmed by the Senate, the entire senior management team at the State Department

either resigned unexpectedly or were terminated in a cloud of controversy. A hiring freeze ordered by Tillerson reduced the number of new Foreign Service Officers from 366 in 2016 to 100 in 2018. By November 2017, the number of minister counsellors (the equivalent of two-star officers) had declined by 15 percent, career ministers (three-star officers) by 42 percent, and career ambassadors (four-star officers) by 60 percent, as another wave of resignations swept through the State Department. There was no Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern affairs or ambassadors to Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt or Qatar to help formulate policy toward Syria.

Personnel changes brought about by Tillerson also resulted in a rise in tension within the State Department. An Assistant Secretary of State accused several career staffers as being disloyal and retaliated against those who had served under Obama. Another high ranking Tillerson appoint was forced out of their job because of how she treated the career and political staff.

The Trump administration's reform agenda included a changes in the State Department's mission. Some took the form of decisions made by Tillerson, such as removing Afghanistan, Burma, and Iraq from the list of countries ineligible for some forms of military aid because they were identified as using child soldiers; this decision produced an internal protest memo within the State Department. Others included removal of references to reproductive rights for women and of the term "occupied territories" (i.e. Israel's presence in Gaza and the West Bank) from the State Department's annual human rights report. Under Mike Pompeo who succeeded Tillerson as Secretary of State a new advisory commission on Human Rights was established that to reevaluate how human rights are thought about in U.S. diplomacy. Most fundamentally, there occurred a change in the State Department's official mission statement. On May 1, 2019, it read:

> The U.S. Department of State leads America's foreign policy through diplomacy, advocacy, and assistance by advancing the interests of the American people, their safety and economic prosperity.

In the State Department's Fiscal Year 2015 Report and on its website the following statement appeared:

> The [State] Department's mission is to shape and sustain a peaceful, prosperous, just and democratic world, and foster conditions for stability and progress for the benefit of the American people and people everywhere.

This chapter examines the organizational structure and internal value systems of the State Department, the Department of Defense, and the intelligence community, and takes a brief look at key domestic bureaucracies that have developed a foreign policy role. The chapter concludes with an examination of how policy makers respond to the challenges of dealing with the foreign affairs bureaucracy.

Presidents and the Bureaucracy

According to Henry Kissinger, "The purpose of bureaucracy is to devise a standard operating procedure that can cope effectively with most problems."[1] Doing so frees high-level policy makers to concentrate on the unexpected and the exceptional, and to pursue policy innovations. While true in theory, this view is misplaced. In practice, two problems arise:

1. Policy makers expect far more from bureaucracy than help in dealing with the normal—probably too much more. Consider President Gerald Ford's statement about the U.S. involvement in Vietnam: "We could have avoided the whole darn Vietnam War if somebody in the Department of Defense or State had said, 'Look here. Do we want to inherit the French mess?' "[2] As you saw in chapter 4, the reality of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam was far more complex.
2. Policy makers often feel trapped by the bureaucracy. Obama put it this way: "There's a playbook in Washington that presidents are supposed to follow. It's a playbook that comes out of the foreign policy establishment. . . . But the play book can also be a trap that can lead to bad decisions."[3]

One important player in the bureaucratic foreign policy playbook is the U.S. State Department.

The State Department

Then called the Department of Foreign Affairs, the State Department was created in 1789 as the first department under the new Constitution. According to historical tradition and government documents, the president looks first to the State Department in making foreign policy.

Structure and Growth of the State Department

The State Department serves as a transmission belt for information between the United States and foreign governments, and as a source of expertise and skills on which senior policy makers can draw. These are daunting tasks. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State under Presidents John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, estimated that he saw only six of every one thousand cables sent to the State Department each day, and that the president saw only one or two.[4] By the end of the twentieth century, the State Department was electronically processing over fourteen thousand official records and ninety thousand data messages each day, and over twenty million e-mail messages per year. The full magnitude of this explosion of electronic messaging came into focus when the congressional investigation into the terrorist attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi inquired into Hillary Clinton's use of a personal computer to engage in official business. It found that some two

thousand messages contained pieces of redacted information considered confidential. Of these, three-quarters dealt with "foreign government information," a catch-all category including information obtained through meetings and conversations with foreign officials.

Annually, the State Department represents the United States in over fifty major international organizations and at over eight hundred international conferences. In 2019, the United States had diplomatic relations with 191 countries, and had 170 embassies, along with consulates and liaison and branch offices. Together, these overseas posts represented thirty different government agencies. Present in a typical embassy are representatives from the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Departments of Defense, Agriculture, Commerce, and the Treasury, the CIA, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Export-Import Bank.

The concept of a **country team** was developed to bring coherence to the welter of agencies and programs now represented at an embassy. The ambassador heads the country team. In practice, ambassadors have found it quite difficult to exercise enough authority to transform a set of independent and often competing policies into a coordinated and coherent program. For example, in 2005, the Pentagon requested that it be allowed to put special operations forces into a country without the explicit approval of the ambassador. Also complicating the problem is the ambassador's background. Frequently, the ambassador is not a career diplomat. A study of ambassadorial appointments from 1960 to 2014 found that in twenty-nine countries and diplomatic missions such as the United Nations, 81–100 percent of ambassadors were political appointees.

The State Department's basic structure remained largely unchanged for the duration of the Cold War. Beneath the Secretary of State were two Deputy Secretaries of State and six undersecretaries with responsibility for such matters as political, economic, and management affairs, and international security. The remainder of the State Department was organized around geographical areas and functional tasks. While the number and identity of the regional areas held steady, the functional bureaus showed considerable change over time. Certain units—such as the education and culture bureau—disappeared, and others—such as the refugee bureau and a bureau responsible for human rights and humanitarian affairs—were created. Today a very different picture exists. There are over sixty bureaus and offices covering geographic (Africa, Near Eastern Affairs), policy (Global AIDS, Arms Control, Verification and Compliance), and administrative (Budget and Planning, Human Resources) issues. There are also over one dozen Special Envoys (hostage affairs, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, North Korean human rights issues); over one dozen Special representatives (the Arctic, international labor affairs); and six ambassadors at large (religious freedom, criminal justice).

Running parallel to this significant organizational growth is a "shrinking presence" overseas. In June 2008 there were 6,636 **foreign service officers** (FSOs). This was just 10 percent more than twenty-five years earlier. In an

attempt to rectify this problem, a hiring initiative called Diplomacy 3.0 was begun; its goal was to increase the size of the Foreign Service by 25 percent by 2013. This goal was not met; the number of FSOs only increased to 8,000 by 2013, and dipped to just below that level in 2019.

The State Department's Value System

Capturing the essence of the State Department's value system is best done by looking at how Secretaries of State have defined their roles and how the FSO corps approach their jobs.

The Secretary of State The job of Secretary of State is not an easy one. All too frequently, post–World War II Secretaries of State have left under a cloud of criticism. Among the charges leveled are lack of leadership (Dean Rusk), aloofness and arrogance (Dean Acheson), and overly zealous attempts to dominate foreign policy making (Henry Kissinger). Secretaries of State have also found themselves excluded from key decisions. Cyrus Vance resigned from the Carter administration partly in protest over his exclusion from decision-making on the Iranian hostage rescue effort.

In order to participate effectively in foreign policy making, Secretaries of State, like their counterparts at the Department of Defense and the CIA, need a power base from which to work. In practice, this has required them to either become advocates of the State Department perspective or serve as loyal allies of the president.[5] Neither guarantees success, and each power base has its dangers and limitations. Adopting the first perspective makes them suspect in the White House, while the second makes them suspect within the State Department and runs the risk of letting the department drift for lack of effective oversight. Under President George W. Bush, Colin Powell's primary role orientation was as a spokesperson for the State Department perspective. Condoleezza Rice built her power base around the close personal ties she had developed with Bush during the campaign and as National Security Advisor.

The greatest danger comes with the failure to establish any power base, a situation most recently experienced by Trump's first Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson. As noted in the Dateline section at the beginning of this chapter, Tillerson failed to establish support within the State Department. Referred to as "the phantom of Foggy Bottom," his reform agenda was viewed as little more than an exercise in cost cutting and reorganization. It was seen not as an effort to improve the ability of the State Department to carry out its mission, but as an act of obedience to Trump. The problem for Tillerson was that he never gained the trust of Trump, either. Trump was attracted to Tillerson by his experience as Chief Executive Office of ExxonMobil and his reputation as a global deal maker. Once in office, Trump came to see Tillerson as weak, and the two were seldom on the same page. Tillerson supported the Iran nuclear agreement, but Trump opposed it and gave Tillerson no advance notice

of his decision to terminate it. When Tillerson talked of negotiating with North Korea, Trump tweeted that "he is wasting his time trying to negotiate with Little Rocket Man." After fourteen months, Trump used Twitter to fire Tillerson.

Mike Pompeo, who was an enthusiastic defender of Trump's foreign policy as head of the CIA, replaced Tillerson. Pompeo took office announcing his intention to get the State Department's "swagger" back. However, as information about his supportive role in Trump's Ukraine policy and its undercutting of the State Department emerged, Pompeo's standing dropped significantly.

Foreign Service Officers At the heart of the State Department system is its FSO corps. The Foreign Service was created in 1924 by the Rogers Act. Foreign service officers were intended to be generalists, "trained to perform almost any task at any post in the world."[6] The principal organizational device for producing such individuals is to rotate them frequently among functional tasks and geographic areas. The State Department relied on civil service, which existed apart from the FSO corps, to perform its "lesser" technical and administrative tasks. Increasingly, FSOs feel themselves under siege by the blurring of the line between civil service and Foreign Service personnel, and by increasing politicization within the State Department. Senior positions are routinely filled with short-term political appointees, a process referred to as **political creep**.

The distinction between FSOs and civil servants in the Foreign Service has long been the subject of controversy. In 1954, a reorganization proposal developed by Harry Wriston led to the merger of these two personnel systems. "Wristonization" was not a complete success. The hope had been this merger would "Americanize" the Foreign Service by bringing in individuals with backgrounds different from those of the typical eastern, Ivy League, and upper-class officers. This broadening of outlook was seen as necessary; many viewed FSOs with suspicion for becoming aloof and separate from American society. They were a prime target of the McCarthy investigations into un-American activities. In 1953 alone, some 70–80 percent of the highest-ranking FSOs were dismissed, resigned, or were reassigned to politically safe positions.[7]

The representativeness of the FSO corps continues to be a major problem. In 1976, a class action discrimination lawsuit was brought against the State Department. That year, only 9 percent of FSOs were women. In late 1993, the FSO corps was 56 percent white male, 24 percent white female, 7 percent minority male, and 4 percent minority female. In 2019, 6.3 percent of FSOs were Hispanic, 5.4 percent were African American, and 4.8 percent were Asian; 41.2 percent were female. Additional problems surround the nature of key overseas appointments. For example, under George W. Bush, there were only three Hispanic FSOs serving as ambassadors, all in Latin America. Only one of the thirty-two diplomats heading embassies or U.S. missions in Europe in 2009 was black.[8]

Impact of the State Department on Foreign Policy

Once the centerpiece of the foreign affairs bureaucracy, the State Department has seen its power and influence steadily erode. It has gone from being the leading force behind such policies as the Marshall Plan, NATO, and containment, to largely playing the role of the critic who finds fault with the proposals of others. It has become defensive and protective in interdepartmental dealings, unable to centralize and coordinate the activities of the foreign affairs bureaucracy.[9]

Two complaints frequently are voiced about the State Department's performance. The first centers on the FSO corps value system, which consists of a clearly identifiable world outlook and set of guidelines for survival within the State Department bureaucracy.[10] The FSO is empirical, intuitive, and cautious.[11] Risk taking in the preparation of analysis or processing of information is avoided. The FSO mission is to keep intact the policy inherited from predecessors.[12]

Second, State Department recommendations are insensitive to the presidential perspective on foreign policy matters. Because it fails to frame proposals in ways that will produce political support for, or at least minimize political costs to, the president, State Department recommendations are easily dismissed. In the eyes of many, it has become more of a spokesperson for foreign viewpoints within the U.S. government than an advocate of U.S. national interests. This situation is not universally condemned. Some feel that it is an appropriate role for the State Department to play, and that it should stop trying to perform functions for which it is no longer suited.[13]

Efforts are underway to change the FSO system and the culture of the State Department. One change is in how FSOs are selected. A new selection process has been put in place for selecting applicants for the Foreign Service; it changes the focus from doing well on a lengthy national exam to emphasizing team-building abilities and résumés.

The Department of Defense

For most of its history, the military security of the United States was provided by forces under the command of the War Department and the Department of the Navy. No political or military authority, other than the president, existed to coordinate and direct the affairs of these two departments. During World War II, the ineffectiveness of this system became apparent, leading U.S. policy makers to take a series of ad hoc steps to bring greater coherence to the U.S. war effort. In 1947, the National Security Act formalized many of these arrangements by establishing a Department of the Air Force, giving legal standing to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and creating a National Military Establishment and the position of Secretary of Defense. Further changes were made in 1949, when the National Military Establishment was redesignated the Department of Defense.[14]

Structure and Growth of the Department of Defense

A number of different organizational reform issues have arisen since the Department of Defensewas created. In the early 1980s, the pressing issue was improving the operational efficiency of the armed forces. The failed 1979 hostage rescue effort, the 1983 terrorist attack on the marines in Beirut, and problems encountered during the 1983 invasion of Grenada were cited by military reformers as proof that reforms were needed, beginning at the very top.[15] Congress shared these concerns. Over the objections of the executive branch and many in the military, Congress passed two pieces of legislation in 1986 designed to remedy the perceived shortcomings. The Goldwater-Nichols Act strengthened the position of the JCS relative to that of the individual services. It also gave added weight to those areas of the Pentagon with an interservice perspective. The second piece of legislation, the Cohen-Nunn Act, established a unified command for special operations and created an Assistant Secretary of Defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict.

A recurring organizational challenge is budget size. Advocates of increased defense spending routinely identify four great waves of post WW II defense budget neglect.[16] Each followed the end of a major U.S. military commitment, but also reflected the onset of additional economic and social problems facing the military. The first (1945–1950) followed the end of WW II; the second (1970–1980) followed the end of the Vietnam War; the third (1991–2000) followed the end of the Cold War; and the most recent period began in 2009 with the decisions to withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan.

President Trump has aggressively moved to end this fourth period in seeking a $54 billion increase over Obama's proposed 2017 defense budget. He requested a $716 billion defense budget for 2019 and a $750 billion budget for 2020. Even though Trump got most of what he asked for in 2018 ($700 billion), budget problems remain. One issue is, where is the money coming from? As you saw in the Dateline section at the beginning of this chapter, reallocating money from the State Department to Defense was politically unacceptable to many in Congress; so, too, is simply spending more money. Another issue is whether authorizing the military to spend $700 billion is enough. According to a 2011 law setting limits on federal spending, Defense Department spending for 2018 must be capped at $549 billion.

A second, complex set of recurring challenges involves personnel issues. The military is facing a numbers crunch. In 2018, the Army missed its recruiting goal for the first time since 2005. With a goal of 76,000 (reduced from the initial target of 80,000), the Army signed up fewer than 70,000 recruits, despite offering waivers for previous marijuana use, bad conduct records, and health problems. Compounding matters, the Army is much smaller than it was at the end of the Cold War. At that timeit

had 732,403 active-duty soldiers; a 2014 Pentagon study projected a 420,000-person army in 2019.

One part of the solution has been to **outsource** many tasks to private contractors. These tasks range from cleaning military facilities to supervising supply lines, operating combat systems, and training troops. At one point there were more than sixty private firms with twenty thousand employees in Iraq. While typically seen as a means of saving money and dealing with personnel shortfalls, outsourcing can also be used for political purposes, such as when use of U.S. forces would arouse negative public opinion or run against congressional limits on the size of U.S. military operations. An example of the latter occurred in Colombia during its civil war. Another part of the solution to the personnel shortage problem has been to rely more heavily on National Guard and reserve forces. By 2005, almost 400,000 of the nearly 870,000 members of the reserves had been activated since 9/11. This represents the greatest proportional use of the National Guard and reserves since World War II. Part of the solution to the personnel problem may be to rethink the all-volunteer army. In 1973, military conscription in the United States ended for a variety of reasons; the leading arguments made for ending the draft included demographics, cost, moral arguments about imposing military service, and opposition to Vietnam.

Related to the numbers crunch problem is how representative the military is of American society and how individuals are treated by the military. More and more, the military has come to rely on young men and women from economically depressed rural areas. There has also been a decline in the number of African American recruits. The Historical Lesson reviews the path toward integrating African Americans into the military. Today, much of the focus is on its treatment of women, LGBTQ+, and immigrants. At issue here are both the roles they are allowed to play and the respect they are shown.

Historical Lesson

Integrating the Military

On July 26, 1948, President Harry Truman signed Executive Order 9981:

> WHEREAS it is essential that there be maintained in the armed services of the United States the highest standards of democracy, with equality of treatment and opportunity for all those who serve in our country's defense:
>
> NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, by the Constitution and the statutes of the United States, and as Commander in Chief of the armed services, it is hereby ordered as follows:
>
> 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the President that there

> shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin. This policy shall be put into effect as rapidly as possible, having due regard to the time required to effectuate any necessary changes without impairing efficiency or morale. . . .

Executive Order 9981 went on to create a President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services one of whose tasks was to examine how rules, procedures, and practices might be altered or improved upon to carry out this policy.

The history of black American participation in the military shows a continued pattern of white reluctance to allow it along with the military necessity that it occur. From the very outset, free and slave blacks fought on both sides in the American Revolution. New England states offered freedom to slaves who fought, as a means of meeting their quota of troops in the Continental Army. Some southern states did likewise, but to a lesser degree. For its part, the British also offered freedom to blacks who joined with them.

During the Civil War, manpower shortages led Congress to pass legislation to allow blacks to fight but required them to serve in racially segregated military units; 180,000 blacks fought for the North. It is estimated that one-fifth of the Northern Army was black. After the war, many of those promised freedom remained in slavery. After the war, four black regiments were established, which fought in the Indian wars and the Spanish-American War.

This policy of segregated military units was still in effect when World War II began. An additional policy was a quota system, which limited the number of blacks in the military to their percentage of the total American population. Once again, pressures of wartime led to de facto changes in policy. With an insufficient number of Allied forces available to counter the German offensive at the Battle of the Bulge, black soldiers were allowed to volunteer to fight alongside white soldiers rather than serve in support roles but were placed in separate platoons.

After the end of World War II, political pressures mounted for ending segregation. A 1945 Army report called ending discrimination a desirable goal but concluded that it was impractical. In 1947, the Army permitted states to determine the level of integration of their National Guard above the company level. New Jersey ended military segregation at that point. As a result, some states had partially integrated reserve units, but the active military was still segregated.

Also in 1947, A. Philip Randolph helped establish the Committee Against Jim Crow in Military Service and Training as part of a broader civil rights movement effort to end discrimination in the military. The focal point of their concern was Truman's plan for universal military service; while it did not endorse discrimination, it was perceived by Committee founders to endorse segregation. It was against this backdrop that Truman issued his executive order. It came shortly after he was nominated to run for president, an election many expected him to lose,

especially since southern democrats, unhappy with the party's endorsement of civil rights, decided to run their own candidate for president under the banner of the Dixiecrats.

Truman's executive order encountered resistance and was not uniformly accepted. In 1949, the secretary of the army was forced into retirement for refusing to desegregate the army. That same year, 32 percent of white army personnel opposed integration in any form. During the Korean War, a shortage of white enlisted men and increasing black enrollment created yet another crisis. Ninety-eight percent of blacks still served in segregated units, and black soldiers were trained at a segregated military base. In 1951, while General MacArthur was still the commanding officer in Korea, evidence surfaced that far more black soldiers than white soldiers were being court martialed. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) sent Thurgood Marshall to investigate. He defined the military situation there as one of "rigid segregation." As a result of his investigations, charges against most black soldiers were dropped. In September 1954, under the Eisenhower administration, the last all-black military unit was abolished. Many consider the endpoint of segregation in the military to be July 26, 1963, when Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ordered an end to discrimination against blacks outside of military bases.

Applying the Lessons

1. Did Executive Order 9981 go far enough to address discrimination and segregation in the military? Explain your answer.?
2. To what extent should the military be representative of all groups in society?
3. How do you measure the extent to which real change takes place in the military, the Foreign Service, intelligence agencies, or other national security bureaucracies?

On December 3, 2015, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter announced that the Defense Department would open all combat jobs to women. "There will be no exceptions." When the announcement was made, the Navy and Air Force had already opened most of their combat positions to women, and the Army was moving in that direction. In September of that year, the Marine Corps, which was 93 percent male, had asked for an exemption for its infantry and armor positions. With this announcement, their request was denied. An estimated 220,000 military jobs were now available to women.

While the history of women serving in combat positions in the military goes back to the American Revolution, it was not until the passage of the Army Reorganization Act in 1901 that women could formally join the military (through the Army Nurse Corps). The 1948 Women's Armed Forces Integration Act gave women a permanent place in the U.S. military, but limited the number of women to 2 percent of the enlisted force and

10 percent of the officer corps. Since the 1970s, the military has repeatedly turned to the question of the role of women in combat. An early 1990s Presidential Committee on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces called for determining military assignments on the basis of qualifications, not gender. The War on Terrorism and the military conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, both of which lacked clearly defined combat zones, brought this issue into sharp focus. Women soldiers searched homes and people for weapons, engaged in door-to-door neighborhood patrols, and were embedded in special operations forces. By the end of 2015, at least 161 women had died and 1,016 had been injured in these conflicts.

The role of women goes beyond their ability to engage in combat. It extends to the problem of harassment, which potentially affects all active duty service members. In 2015, the Pentagon reported 6,131 cases of sexual assault, more than double the number in 2007. In 2018, that number jumped to 7,623. According to estimates, about 20,500 service members (13,000 women and 7,500 men) were sexually assaulted in FY2018, up from 14,000 in 2016.

Controversy over the ability of gays to serve in the military long centered on the "don't ask, don't tell" policy put in place in 1994, which allowed gays to serve, but did not stop them from being discharged. In December 2010, after months of political maneuvering by opponents in Congress along with a Pentagon study supported the policy, President Obama signed legislation repealing "don't ask, don't tell."

The major point of controversy in the Trump administration has been the ability of transgender individuals to serve in the military. A June 2016 directive banned the military from involuntarily separating transgender individuals in the military, and allowed them to begin receiving medical treatment. In June 2017, just before the new policy was to take effect, Mattis delayed its implementation. One month later, Trump announced on Twitter that transgender individuals would not be allowed to serve in the military, calling their presence disruptive and overly expensive. Trump indicated that he had consulted military leaders on the decision, but Mattis had received only one day's notice. A 2016 RAND study had concluded that the costs were not that high, and that only two thousand to eleven thousand active duty personnel were transgender. In March 2018, Trump issued a revised order, which took a step back from the previous total ban on transgender troops and deferred implementation to the Pentagon. To many observers, it echoed the "don't ask, don't tell" policy. A series of lawsuits have accompanied the Trump administration's efforts to implement a transgender ban. On January 22, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court allowed President Trump's transgender military ban to go into effect while it was still being contested in lower courts.

Trump's policies have also highlighted the place of immigrants in the military. The primary avenue for immigrants to enter the military has been the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) program.

Since 2009, more than 10,400 individuals with language, medical, and other skills, considered vital to U.S. security and in short supply, entered the military through the program with the promise of citizenship. Some five thousand immigrants were recruited in 2016. That same year the Pentagon, citing espionage dangers, put new security measures in place, which added considerable time to the process of gaining citizenship, placed MAVNI under review, and closed it to new recruits indefinitely. The waiting time was so long that a thousand recruits lost their legal immigrant status, risking deportation. In July 2018, it was revealed that the Pentagon was discharging immigrants who had entered the military through the MAVNI program. In August 2018, the Army announced that it was reviewing the matter and suspended the discharge program.

The Value System of the Department of Defense

Understanding the internal value system of the Department of Defense requires examination of how Secretaries of Defense and the professional military have defined their jobs.

Secretary of Defense Secretaries of Defense generally have adopted one of two roles.[17] The first is that of the generalist. *Generalists* recognize and defer to military expertise. They are concerned with coordinating and integrating the judgments they receive from military professionals, and see themselves as representatives of the Department of Defense in the policy process. In contrast, the *functionalist* is concerned with consolidating management and policy control in the office. Functionalists reject the notion a unique area of military expertise exists, and see themselves as first among equals in defense policy decision-making. Above all, the functionalist seeks to manage the system efficiently in accordance with presidential policy objectives.

James Forrestal, the first Secretary of Defense, adopted the generalist perspective. As Secretary of the Navy, he had opposed creating a unified military establishment, and his tenure as Secretary of Defense was marked by repeated efforts by the services to protect their standing as independent organizations. Since Forrestal, the most prominent Secretaries of Defense have adopted a functionalist perspective. Robert McNamara, who served as Secretary of Defense during the Vietnam War, was a functionalist who sought to move decision-making power out of the hands of the military services and into those of civilians in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. To do so, he brought Planning, Programming, and Budgetary System (PPBS) analysis to the Department of Defense. Instead of organizing the budget by department (Army, Navy, Air Force), the PPBS examined spending by its principal missions, such as conventional defense of Europe or nuclear deterrence.[18]

Donald Rumsfeld, George W. Bush's first Secretary of Defense, sought to alter the fundamental direction of American military policy and

organization. Military professionals saw his presence as a "hostile takeover."[19] Victory against the Taliban in Afghanistan and early military success in Iraq appeared to vindicate his positions. However, subsequent problems with the occupation and reconstruction of Iraq led to open questioning of his ideas and management style.

Retired Marine Corps General Jim Mattis, Trump's first Secretary of Defense, was also a functionalist. He took office with a clearly defined set of views regarding the structure and operation of the military; his goal was to create a better equipped, more deadly, and more effective fighting force less dependent on alliances, but he did favor working with allies. As stated in his military defense strategy, the focus of the U.S. military was on countering Russia and China, not counterterrorism and corralling rogue nations. Trump delegated Mattis significant leeway on issues such as implementing the ban on transgender troops and sending more troops to Afghanistan, but Mattis often disagreed with Trump's policies In his letter of resignation, he stated his opposition to the announced removal of troops from Syria and Afghanistan, the downgrading of NATO, and the threat that Russia posed to U.S. security.

Professional Military To understand the system of values inside the Defense Department, it is necessary to examine the outlook of the professional military toward policy making at two different levels. At the highest level is the general pattern of **civil–military relations**. Two different general sets of perspectives have long shaped thinking about this relationship.[20] The *traditional* view sees professional soldiers as above partisan politics. They are expected to restrict themselves to speaking out only on those subjects that fall within their sphere of expertise. In turn, policy makers stay out of military matters. In the *fusionist* perspective, the professional soldier must acquire and use political skills in order to exercise an effective voice on military matters.

Neither approach is without its problems. The line separating military decisions from political ones is anything but clear, making it difficult—if not impossible—for the professional to stand above politics. The challenges to a president created by an embrace of the fusionist perspective were on full view in both the Trump and Obama administrations. The commanding general in Afghanistan called for increasing the U.S. presence in opposition to Obama's view, publicly challenging Obama's Afghanistan policy. Trump repeatedly had policy disagreements with Mattis, who resigned in protest over his Syria policy. Trump later angered many military professionals with his intervention into the case of a Navy SEAL accused of war crimes in Iraq.

One level down from civil-military relations, there are differences in outlook among the military services, each of which has a different "personality."[21] It is said that the Navy worships at the altar of tradition, the Air Force at the altar of technology, and the Army at the altar of

country and duty. The services also have different views of their own identities. The Navy sees itself, above all, as an institution with a stature and independence that must be protected. The Air Force sees itself as the embodiment of the idea that air power is the key guarantor of national security in the modern age. The Army views itself as artisans of warfare. A challenge facing the U.S. Army today is how to conceptualize modern warfare. The success of the Persian Gulf War in 1991 gave impetus to the idea of a **Revolution in Military Affairs,** in which technological advances are central to success on the battlefield. At the same time, the development of counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare thinking (see chapter 4) emphasizes the soldiers and their interaction with the local population.[22]

Impact of the Defense Department on Foreign Policy

The professional military's impact on foreign policy is a subject that is often discussed with great emotion, as evidenced by concerns expressed about Trump's appointment of Mattis, Mike Flynn, and H. R. McMaster as National Security Advisors, and John Kelly as Chief of Staff. All were retired generals who Trump often referred to collectively as "My Generals." The fear was that the generals would set a confrontational tone to Trump's foreign policy and use military force rather than diplomacy as the foreign policy instrument of choice. Reality proved to be more complex. Trump's initial foreign policy did take a hawkish turn, but it was only after the exit of the generals and their replacement by civilians that U.S. foreign policy took on a more aggressive and high risk profile, with the Venezuelan crisis and the possibility of U.S. military action in the Persian Gulf.

Overall, historical evidence suggests that military professionals are not necessarily more aggressive than their civilian counterparts.[23] Where the military professional and the civilian policy maker part company is over how and when to use force, not whether to use it. The military prefers to use force quickly, massively, and decisively, and is skeptical of making bluffs that involve the threatened use of force. Diplomats, on the other hand, prefer to avoid using force as long as possible, because they see its use as an indication of a failure in policy; they are positively predisposed to making military threats.

The military's real policy influence comes through its ability to set the context of a decision through the presentation of information, capabilities, and tactics. Bob Woodward, author of *The Commanders*, similarly reflects on the variability of military influence on decisions regarding the use of force.[24] The Pentagon, he notes, "is not always the center of military decision making." "When the President and his advisors are engaged, they run the show."

The CIA and the Intelligence Community

The intelligence community comprises sixteen agencies plus the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) is the head of the intelligence community. Until this position was created in 2004, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) served as head of both the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the intelligence community. Members of the intelligence community are charged with working independently and collaboratively to gather the information necessary to conduct foreign relations and national security activities.

Structure and Growth of the CIA and the Intelligence Community

Two points mustbe stressed before turning attention to three of the most prominent members of the intelligence community: the CIA, the National Security Agency (NSA), and the ODNI. First, the intelligence community is not a static entity. Its composition, and the relative importance of its members, has changed over time as new technologies have been developed, the international setting has changed, and bureaucratic wars have been won and lost. The status of charter membership is best conferred on the CIA; the State Department's intelligence unit, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR); and the intelligence units of the armed forces. All of these were given institutional representation on the National Security Council at the time of its creation in 1947. Three institutions that have a long-standing but lesser presence in the intelligence community are the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Treasury Department, and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which is now part of the Energy Department. The newest addition to the intelligence community is the Department of Homeland Security.

Second, the concept of a community suggests the existence of a group of actors who share common goals and possess a common outlook on events. In these terms, U.S. intelligence is a community in only the loosest sense. More accurately, it is a federation of units with varying degrees of institutional autonomy that both work together and challenge one another.

This point can be illustrated through several examples. The CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) have often been in conflict over matters of intelligence analysis. The DIA was created in 1961 for the purpose of unifying the overall intelligence efforts of the Department of Defense. During the Vietnam War, the CIA and DIA were often at odds over estimates of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troop strength; CIA estimates were far more pessimistic than those of the DIA. During the Iraq War, the challenge to the CIA came from a newly created Office of Special Plans (OSP) within the DIA; its mission was to provide independent review of raw intelligence, and dispute the mainstream interpretations by the intelligence community.

Selective examination of members of the intelligence community begins by looking at the CIA. For most Americans, the CIA is the public face of the intelligence community. In addition, since its director was also the head of the intelligence community until the DNI came into existence, it long enjoyed the status of first among equals within the intelligence community.

The organizational predecessor of the CIA was the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which was created by a 1942 military order and tasked with collecting and analyzing strategic information and conducting special operations. At the end of World War II, Truman disbanded the OSS and assigned its intelligence duties to units within the State Department, the Army, and the Navy. The 1947 National Security Act reestablished the CIA as a stand-alone intelligence unit.[25]

The CIA began a major reorganization in 2015. According to CIA director John Brennan, the goal is to break down organizational "stove pipes" that artificially separate CIA personnel into different operating units, making communication between them difficult. Central to the new organizational structure are ten mission centers that will bring together analysts and covert action operators on a day-to-day basis. The mission centers are modeled on the CIA's Counterterrorism Center and will focus on such issues as terrorism, weapons proliferation, global issues, and the Middle East. Until the reorganization, analysts were housed in the Directorate of Intelligence and operators were in the Directorate of Operations. These units were two of the four major operational arms of the CIA. The Directorate of Intelligence has been the primary producer of government intelligence documents, which range in frequency from daily briefs to weekly, quarterly, and yearly summaries, and occasional special reports. The best known of these reports are the National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs). The Directorate of Operations, more recently identified as the National Clandestine Service, has had three basic missions: the secret collection of information, counterintelligence, and covert action. Those missions will continue to exist, but the National Clandestine Service will now focus on recruiting and training personnel to be assigned to the centers. The two other arms (the Directorate of Science and Technology and the Directorate of Personnel) continue to operate.

These four directorates will be joined by a new directorate: the Directorate of Digital Innovation. It is tasked with such responsibilities as cyber espionage, protecting the CIA's internal e-mail system, and monitoring global social media and other open source information sources. No timetable has been set for completing the reorganization.

The second prominent member of the intelligence community, the NSA, was the first major addition to the intelligence community. It came into existence in 1952 and operates as a semiautonomous agency of the Department of Defense.[26] In 2013, the NSA became the center of unwanted public attention when the media began reporting on the existence of a

secret domestic surveillance program (discussed in the Dateline section in chapter 5). Controversy over the NSA's intelligence collection practices resurfaced more recently. In 2017, there was a major leak of its highly classified hacking tools by a group calling itself the Shadow Brokers. In 2019, it was revealed that Chinese intelligence agents already possessed these NSA hacking tools, and had redirected them for cyberattacks on U.S. allies and private companies operating abroad.

The NSA has also undergone major internal organizational changes. In 2009, the U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) was created and placed inside the NSA under a "dual hat arrangement," in which the head of the cyber command was also the head of NSA. Its focus was to be on developing policy and legal frameworks for the defense of the military's computer systems, along with protecting private sector computers that provide a potential entryway into government computer systems. In 2013, following a Department of Defense study concluding that the military was unprepared for a full-scale cyberattack, the Pentagon began a major expansion of its cybersecurity force capabilities. Three different missions now have been identified for the expanded Cyber Command: (1) national mission forces to protect computer systems and other infrastructures from foreign attack, (2) combat mission forces to plan and execute offensive operations, and (3) cyber protection forces to strengthen the computer networks of the Department of Defense. In 2017, USCYBERCOM was elevated to the status of a full and independent unified combatant command; it is scheduled to be split from the NSA and become an independent agency. Most recently, in 2019 the NSA announced that it would create a Cybersecurity Directorate to pursue a more aggressive cyber policy and more closely align its offensive and defensive cyber operations.

The third organization is the newest agency involved in intelligence; the ODNI came into existence as part of the post-9/11 reforms of the intelligence community. Its head, the DNI, is identified as the principal intelligence advisor to the president, and is charged with overseeing and directing the implementation of the National Intelligence Program. The two principal organizational subunits within the ODNI focus on collection and analysis.

Two broad areas of concern have been raised about the operation of the ODNI. The first is its size. As originally envisioned, the ODNI was to be a lean management organization sitting atop the intelligence community. It quickly grew into an organization with a staff of over 1,500 people. In 2010, the President's Intelligence Advisory Board concluded that the ODNI had become "bureaucratic and resource heavy" to the point that its ability to coordinate the intelligence community was impeded. A second concern is the powers of the office, particularly its budgetary powers and ability to shape intelligence programs. Only the CIA exists as a separate organizational entity within the intelligence community. All other organizations are parts of larger departments, most often the Department of

Defense. Consequently, the other members of the intelligence community look with only one eye to what the DNI demands, while keeping the other eye firmly fixed on departmental positions and priorities. Shortly after its creation, the FBI moved 96 percent of its intelligence budget into units that were not under the jurisdiction of the DNI. More recently, the DNI reached an agreement in principle with the Department of Defense that the civilian portion of the Pentagon's intelligence budget will come under its control. The Pentagon's covert action/spy budget will remain under Pentagon jurisdiction.

The Intelligence Community's Value System

Periodically throughout its history, the CIA has found itself an institution under siege, both because of covert action and intelligence failures. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan was so outraged over the CIA's failure to anticipate the fall of communism in the Soviet Union that he called for its abolition.[27] One area that has received a great deal of attention is the manner in which both its top leadership and professionals approach their jobs. The Senate Intelligence Committee's report placed a major portion of the blame for the intelligence failures on Iraq and preceding 9/11 on "a broken corporate culture and poor management." Let's turn our attention to the informal organizational side of the CIA.

Director of Central Intelligence Because the DCI was simultaneously head of the intelligence community and head of the CIA, the office has had many role orientations available from which to choose. Few sought—and none achieved—real managerial control over the intelligence community. The most recent to try was Stansfield Turner, President Carter's DCI, who ran into stiff and successful resistance from Secretary of Defense Harold Brown.

When defining the role of head of the CIA, three outlooks have been dominant: managerial, covert action, and intelligence-estimating. Only John McCone (1961–1965) gave primacy to the intelligence-estimating role, and he was largely an outsider to the intelligence process before his appointment. Allen Dulles (1953–1965) and Richard Helms (1966–1973) both stressed the covert action aspect of the agency's mission. Since the replacement of Helms by James Schlesinger, DCIs have tended to adopt a managerial orientation. Although their particular operating styles have varied, a common theme has been to increase White House control over the CIA. Mike Pompeo, Trump's first head of the CIA, very much fit this mold. He has been characterized as the most openly political head of the CIA in a generation. Not only was he a strong public supporter of Trump's foreign policy agenda, but he actively participated in White House policy discussions. Pompeo received a mixed reception at the CIA, where he was valued for his support of intelligence gathering operations but faced misgivings over his contradictory public statements; on occasion

they supported the intelligence community's analyses, but other times they echoed Trump's criticism of intelligence. Pompeo's successor, Gina Haspel, a career professional described by some in the intelligence community as "the consummate insider," also adopted a managerial orientation on taking the position. During her confirmation hearings, she called for returning the CIA to its traditional mission of focusing on foreign states and less on counterterrorism. Haspel's nomination was politically controversial because of her involvement in the CIA's post-9/11 torture programs; she had run the Thailand prison where waterboarding took place. It was welcomed from those within the agency, who saw it as placing intelligence professionals back in charge of the CIA.

According to critics of the managerial role orientation, one frequent result of this outlook is politicization of the intelligence process. In other words, the heads of the CIA have used their managerial control over intelligence products to ensure that its findings are consistent with the policy preferences of the administration rather than reflecting the judgment of intelligence professionals.

Politicizing intelligence, a charge directed at William Casey, Robert Gates, and George Tenet, was also a major concern raised from the outset of the Trump presidency. While some concern was directed at Pompeo's deep engagement in policy making and his open support of Trump's agenda, most (from retired DCIs Michael Hayden, John Brennan, and James Clapper) pointed to Trump's repeated public attacks on the intelligence community's findings concerning Russian interference in the 2016 election. Especially troubling to the intelligence community was his statement at the Helsinki summit with Vladimir Putin: "They said they think it's Russia; I have President Putin, he just said it's not Russia. . . . I will say this: I don't see any reason why it would be. I have great confidence in my intelligence people, but I will tell you that President Putin was extremely strong and powerful in his denial today."

Director of National Intelligence The DNI is torn by the same types of role conflicts that have afflicted DCIs: the need to establish a power base and the need to define an orientation to intelligence. There have been four DNIs in a little more than five years. John Negroponte, the first DNI, moved quickly to solidify his position as the president's primary intelligence advisor by personally presenting the president's daily intelligence briefing.

Later DNIs have struggled to establish an effective working relationship with both the president and the intelligence community. Dan Coats, Trump's first DNI, joined with DCI Pompeo in resisting an attempt by Stephen Bannon and Jared Kushner to bring in a political ally to head a White House review of the intelligence community. In another step in the direction of politicizing intelligence in the new administration, at Trump's request Pompeo rather than Coats began briefing the president on intelligence. Coats resigned in 2019 following a series of conflicts with Trump

over intelligence assessments on North Korea and Russia and Trump's critiques of the intelligence community. Coats was to be replaced by Representative John Ratcliffe, a staunch Trump supporter on the House Intelligence and Judiciary Committees who was considered by some Republicans and Democrats in Congress to be too political and not experienced enough for the position. Within days of his nomination, Ratcliffe withdrew his name from consideration. When it became clear that she would not be nominated to be the next DNI, Susan Gordon, a career professional who Coats had recommended as his successor, resigned from government service.

Intelligence Professionals Views on intelligence within the intelligence community are far from uniform. Differences exist both between and within organizations.[28] For example, some suggest that, within the cyber command, four different outlooks can be identified, all of which should be present: cyber priests (who think in terms of deterrence), cyber prophets (adaptation), cyber designers (resilience), and cyber detectives (resistance).[29]

With these outlooks in mind, it is possible to identify four tendencies in the approach to intelligence by members of the intelligence community.[30] One tendency is to be a current-events-oriented "butcher," cutting up the latest information and presenting the choicest pieces to the consumer. A second tendency is for analysts to adopt a "jigsaw theory" of intelligence. Here the analyst acts like a "baker"; everything and anything is sought after, classified, and stored, on the assumption that at some point in time, it may be the missing ingredient to solving a riddle. Similar to the butcher's role, the baker's orientation is consistent with the policy maker's notion of intelligence as a free good and the assumption that the ambiguity of data can be overcome by collecting more of it.

A third tendency is the production of "intelligence to please" or "backstopping." This occurs when consumers desire only the intelligence that supports their policy preferences, ignoring efforts at providing anything but supportive evidence. The final role orientation is the "intelligence maker," who acts as an organizational broker, forging a consensus on the issue at hand. The danger here is that the consensus reached may not be based on an accurate reading of events. Facts bargained into existence provide an equally suitable basis for consensus, but can lead to policy failures.

Impact of the CIA and the Intelligence Community on Foreign Policy

The challenges the intelligence community has faced in interacting with Trump are not unprecedented. Intelligence is not easily integrated into the policy process.[31] The relationship between intelligence and policy makers is marked by a series of tensions that often serve to make the impact of

intelligence on policy less than what it could be under optimum circumstances. As Paul Pillar, who once served as deputy director of the CIA's counterterrorism center, observed about the Iraq War: "Had Bush read the intelligence community's report, he would have seen his administration's case for the invasion stood on its head."[32]

A starting point to understanding the challenges that intelligence faces in influencing policy is the view held by many policy makers that facts are self-interpreting. Intelligence is about connecting the dots, not providing meaning to the data. [33] The limitations on the influence of intelligence produced by this perspective are reinforced by the tension between the logic of intelligence and the logic of policy making.[34] The logic of intelligence is to reduce policy options by clarifying issues, assumptions, and consequences. The logic of policy making is to keep options open for as long as possible and build policy support. As such, policy makers are most eager to get information that will help them convince Congress or the public about the merits of a policy. [35] Finally, intelligence produced by the intelligence community is not the only source of information available to policy makers. Interest groups, lobbyists, the media, and personal acquaintances all compete with intelligence, and presidents are free to listen to whichever intelligence they choose.

The Domestic Bureaucracies

The most recent additions to the foreign affairs bureaucracy are organizations that, traditionally, have been classified as domestic in their concerns and areas of operation. Their foreign policy involvement parallels a development after World War II, when the Defense Department, rather than the State Department, was instrumental in shaping global arms development programs and international security arrangements.[36]

Integrating these newcomers into the foreign affairs bureaucracy has not been an easy task. At the core of the problem is finding an agreed-on balance between foreign policy and domestic concerns. In the early post–World War II period, the foreign policy goal of containing communism dominated over private economic goals; more recently, domestic goals have become dominant and are often pursued at the cost of achieving broad foreign policy objectives.

Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture

Of all of the domestic bureaucracies, the Department of the Treasury (also called the Treasury Department) plays the most prominent role in foreign policy. By the mid-1970s, its influence had made the State Department become more of a participant than a leader in the field of international economic policy. It now takes a strong Secretary of State to neutralize the influence of the Treasury Department and its domestic allies.[37]

The two departments approach international economic policy from quite different perspectives. Like the other domestic bureaucracies, the Treasury Department takes an **"America first" perspective** (a term used long before being embraced by Trump), placing the needs of its clients at the center of its concerns. One author describes it as having an "undifferentiating adversary attitude" toward world affairs.[38] In contrast, the State Department's tendency is to adopt a long-range perspective on international economic problems that is sensitive to the positions of other states. A type of standoff for influence in the policy process currently exists between the State Department and Treasury Department,; however, Treasury has been ascending in importance due to the rise in the use of economic sanctions, the recent global economic downturn, and the central role played by China in holding U.S. debt and maintaining an undervalued currency. Treasury gained additional importance as a foreign policy actor when, along with trade restrictions, economic sanctions began to include financial sanctions directed at individuals.

The Department of Commerce (also called the Commerce Department) has also emerged as a major foreign affairs bureaucracy. However, it is more involved in administrative or operating issues than policy ones. Until 1969, the Commerce Department's primary foreign policy involvement stemmed from its responsibility for overseeing U.S. export control policy. These controls were aimed largely at restricting the direct or indirect sale of strategic goods to communist states. Since 1980, the Commerce Department has become the primary implementer of nonagricultural trade policy and the chief administrator of U.S. export and import programs. The Commerce Department is not without its own challengers for influence on trade policy. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative has also benefited at the expense of the State Department, and its activities enjoy a great deal of congressional support.

The Department of Agricultural (also called the Agriculture Department) remains a junior partner in the foreign affairs bureaucracy. Active in administering U.S. food export programs, Its best-known foreign policy role is as administrator of P.L. 480, the Food for Peace program, which provides free export of government-owned agricultural commodities for humanitarian and developmental purposes. In 2003, the Agriculture Department became embroiled in controversy for providing export help to American tobacco companies. Its Foreign Agriculture Service provided market information to firms about where the demand for American cigarettes was high, and where control laws were weak.

Numerous others play occasional roles as well. The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) has eighty-six foreign offices in sixty-seven countries, where it carries out bilateral investigations; sponsors and conducts counternarcotics training; participates in intelligence gathering activities; and provides assistance in developing drug control laws and regulations. The DEA gained notoriety recently, when its agents accompanied Honduran counternarcotics

police in two firefights with cocaine smugglers. One of these incidents left four people dead, leading to demands that the agency leave the country.

The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has become more active in foreign policy issues through its inspection program of drug and food imports into the United States. Some 150 countries export FDA-regulated products to the United States. As of 2008, the FDA operated foreign offices in China and India, as well as countries in Europe and Latin America. Movement in the opposite direction (decreases in influence) have also taken place. In 2017, the Trump administration closed the Department of Energy's Office of International Climate and Technology, which was established in 2010 to provide technical advice to countries trying to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

Homeland Security

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is an uneasy fit in the foreign affairs bureaucracy. It has elements of both foreign and domestic policy, given the wide range of activities that fall under its jurisdiction. The DHS was established on November 25, 2002, as a response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Its creation combined twenty-two different agencies from eight different departments with a total of 170,000 employees, and had a projected budget of $37.45 million. It absorbed all of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Coast Guard, the Secret Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Customs Service, and was charged with overseeing the new Transportation Security Administration. The FBI and the CIA were not directly affected by the creation of the DHS, but the new department was given an "intelligence and threat analysis" unit that would serve as a customer of FBI and CIA intelligence for assessing threats, taking preventive action, and issuing public warnings. In 2017, the DHS had an estimated two thousand individuals stationed in over seventy countries, who engaged in activities ranging from flying surveillance aircraft to questioning travelers at airports.

The DHS has encountered problems in virtually all aspects of its work, beginning with the ineffective color-coded terrorist warning system put into place after 9/11 and the tracking of activities of peaceful war protestors. As recently as 2015, it faced the possibility that Congress would deny it operating funds. In December 2017, the DHS announced the creation of a new office to deal with weapons of mass destruction. Between 2015 and 2017, it was at the center of the political controversy over Trump's travel ban on people from seven Muslim countries. John Kelly, then head of the DHS, took responsibility for failing to hold up the policy announcement until Congress had been briefed. A DHS study contradicted Trump's assertion of the existence of a terrorist threat requiring the ban. Later, Kelly's successor Kirstjen Nielsen was roundly blamed in cabinet meetings for DHS failure to secure the southern border from illegal immigration effectively.

Policy Makers' Response to Bureaucracy

Policy makers have adopted three different strategies for dealing with bureaucracies that are perceived to be failing them.[39] The first is to replace senior leaders. The second is to reorganize bureaucracies. Rare is the bureaucracy that is simply eliminated. Instead, the solution is to combine the offender with another or rearrange its internal structure. In the extreme, this solution takes the form of creating a new bureaucracy to address an ongoing problem. Finally, policy makers may simply choose to ignore the bureaucracy, either by becoming their own experts or by establishing an informal in-house body of experts to produce policy guidance.

This last strategy is not without its shortcomings that can affect the content and quality of foreign policy. British Ambassador to the United States Kim Darroch resigned in 2019 after a leaked correspondence characterized the Trump administration as "clumsy and inept." Two years earlier, revelations in the Mueller Report showed that Russian officials were frustrated in dealing with the incoming Trump administration because it could not find out who was in charge of matters.

It also needs to be noted that bureaucrats have their own view of the problem of integrating the bureaucracy with policy makers. When asked by President Kennedy what was wrong with the State Department, career diplomat Charles Bohlen replied, "You are."[40] Indications are that this sentiment still exists. In January 2017, some nine hundred State Department employees signed a dissent cable criticizing Trump's travel ban citizens from seven Muslim-majority countries. The year before fifty-one State Department employees signed a letter to President Obama in which they asserted his policy toward Syria would not end the civil war and called for the ousting Syrian president Assad.

Over the Horizon: U.S. Space Command

This chapter began by recounting efforts by the Trump administration to restructure the State Department, an existing foreign affairs bureaucracy. It ends by looking over the horizon to the challenge of thinking how best to organize the **military after next**,[41] one geared to addressing future defense needs: Trump's plan to create a U.S. Space Command.

Trump first advocated the establishment of a separate military space force in March 2018. In June of that year he signed an executive order directing the Pentagon to construct a space force as the sixth branch of the military. (The other five are the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.) This was followed in December by a memorandum authorizing the Department of Defense to create a new space command.

A U.S. Space Command had existed from 1985 to 2002, and had been given the task of coordinating the Army, Naval, and Air Force space forces. The command was disbanded after the 9/11 terrorist attack so that homeland security efforts could be better funded. Its operations were taken

over by the U.S. Strategic Command and the Air Force. The first political steps in the direction of creating a true space command came in 1999, when Congress established a Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization. Advocates argued that this was necessary because treaties had negotiated away the U.S. space advantage. The commission's report warned against the dangers of a "Space Pearl Harbor," and called for creating a military department for space operations. In 2017, a bipartisan proposal was introduced in Congress to create a separate space service within the Air Force, along the lines of the Marine Corps' status in the Department of the Navy. Doing so would allow the space force to develop its own organizational and professional culture, and speed up the acquisition of space technology. The proposal was defeated, but language was added to the 2018 defense bill requiring the Defense Department to conduct a study of how to organize military space forces.

Trump's endorsement and authorization of a space command provided few details on what was to be created, and left many obstacles in place. The most significant obstacle is that only Congress can create a new military service. While Congress contains supporters of the concept of an independent Space Command, it also has powerful opponents who serve on the House Armed Services Committee. Not to be ignored is the political competition over which state receives the economic benefits that would accompany its creation. Alabama, California, and Colorado were the early finalists in the competition.

Many senior military officials who had publicly opposed the idea of a separate military branch before Trump's announcement, especially those in the Air Force, argue that creating a separate space force would only complicate national security decision-making, weaken the military capabilities of existing services, and create internal conflict within existing branches of the military, as many of their uniformed and civilian personnel would have to join the new service. According to one estimate, the new space command would pull some six hundred people from other military space operations in the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and then add at least another one thousand staff members.

Another complicating factor is the nature of space warfare. James Moltz argues that Cold–War era thinking about the nature of space warfare and space power is obsolete[42] and needs to be reshaped, with greater attention to the idea of networked power and the collaboration of military and commercial/entrepreneurial space power resources. Doing so may require creating a Space Command quite different from the one being proposed.

In February 2019, Trump issued Space Policy Directive (SPD) 4, centralizing all military space functions under a new Space Force Command led by a civilian Undersecretary of the Air Force and a four-star general. This announcement marked a step back from creating a sixth military service, but found added support in Congress. In December 2019, Congress approved limited funding for the Space Command.

Critical Thinking Questions

1. Is the formal structure of a bureaucracy or the value system of its members more important to the quality of bureaucratic performance? Explain your answer.
2. Is there a place for the domestic bureaucracies identified as making American foreign policy or should their tasks be taken over by more traditional foreign policy agencies? Explain your answer.
3. Can the State Department lead in the making of U.S. foreign policy? Should it lead? If not, who should lead?

Key Terms

"America first" perspective, 212
civil-military relations, 203
country team, 193
foreign service officers, 193
military after next, 214
outsource, 198
political creep, 195
politicizing intelligence, 209
Revolution in Military Affairs, 204

Further Reading

Gordon Adams and Shoon Murray, eds., *Mission Creep* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014).

This book argues that a militarization of U.S. foreign policy has taken place as a result of the Defense Department's involvement in the implementation and formation of foreign policy programs in nontraditional areas such as foreign aid, public diplomacy, economic development, and covert action.

American Diplomacy at Risk (Washington, DC: American Academy of Diplomacy, April 2015).

This study of American diplomacy is critical of the politicization of American diplomacy, which it argues has contributed greatly to the disappearance of foreign service professionals. It concludes with recommendations to improve the State Department's organization and management.

Roger George and James Bruce, *Analyzing Intelligence*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014).

The authors provide an excellent overview of the analytic challenges facing the intelligence community and the dynamics of intelligence analyst—policy maker relations.

John Harr, *The Professional Diplomat* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969).

This book provides an early but still valuable and frequently cited study of the attitudes and values of professional diplomats.

Benjamin Jensen, *Forging the Sword* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016)

This book, which traces the process of doctrinal reform within the U.S. Army, finds that "incubators" and advocacy networks are central to bringing about change

in military organizations. Together, they can bring about changes in elite thinking that otherwise would not occur.

Thomas Mackubin, "Military Officers: Political without Partisanship," *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 9 (Fall 2015), 88–101.

According to tradition, military officers are to remain apolitical in carrying out their duties. This essay examines this tradition and several ways in which military officers exercise influence in public debates over military policy.

Amy Zegart and Michael Morrell, Spies, Lies, and Algorithms: Why U.S. Intelligence Agencies Must Adapt or Fail," *Foreign Affairs* 98 (May 2019), 85–96.

Commenting on the intelligence community's failure to identify the magnitude of Russia's interference in the 2016 election, the authors argue that the major challenges it faces include open source information and artificial intelligence.

9 Policy-Making Models



Dateline: Iran Crises

International crises are situations of high surprise, high threat, and short response time. A common characteristic of crisis situations is an action-reaction cycle in which the action of one side produces a quick response by the other. While each move may be calculated, the sum effect of the moves in an action-reaction cycle is the loss of control, as a conflict moves up an escalation ladder toward war. The June 2019 conflict between the United States and Iran was a crisis with an action-reaction cycle. The Iran crisis was not a bolt out of the blue but followed a series of calculated actions by each side designed to achieve their aims. For the United States, the aim was denuclearization (and perhaps regime change). For Iran, it was ending economic sanctions. The chronology of events leading up to the crisis are presented in box 9.1.

Box 9.1

Chronology of Events Leading up to the Downing of a U.S. Drone by Iran

- **May 8, 2018.** In response to Trump's announcement that the United States was withdrawing from the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement, Iran's President Hassan Routhani said that the country would continue to abide by its terms.
- **May 21, 2018.** Secretary of State Pompeo presents twelve demands that Iran must meet for a new agreement.
- **August 7, 2018.** The United States puts in place a first round of economic sanctions.
- **November 5, 2018.** A second round of sanctions is announced.
- **April 8, 2019.** Trump designates the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist group; Iran counters by designating the U.S. Central Command as a terrorism group.
- **May 5, 2019.** National Security Advisor Bolton announces that the United States is sending an aircraft carrier strike group and Air Force bombers to the Middle East in response to "troubling and escalatory indications and warnings" and that "any attack on the United States interests or those of our allies will be met with unrelenting force"; Trump states that there is a "chance" of military action against Iran.
- **May 8, 2019.** Trump announces a new round of economic sanctions; Iran announces that it is preparing to increase enriched uranium and heavy war production, which are not permitted by the 2015 agreement.
- **May 12, 2019.** Four ships, including two Saudi oil tankers, are damaged in sabotage attacks; Iran characterizes the incidents as "alarming and regrettable."
- **May 14, 2019.** Houthi rebels in Yemen use drones to attack an oil pipeline in Saudi Arabia; the United States and Saudi Arabia blame Iran for supporting the Houthi attack, but Iran denies it.
- **May 19, 2019.** A rocket lands near the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, Iraq. Trump tweets "If Iran wants to fight, that will be the official end of Iran"; Iran's Foreign Minister responds that Trump had been "goaded" into "genocidal taunts."
- **May 24, 2019.** Trump orders 1,500 additional troops to the Middle East and announces arms sales to Saudi Arabia and others in the region.
- **June 13, 2019.** Two tankers are crippled by explosives in the Gulf of Oman in an attack similar to the May 12 incident; one video shows a Revolutionary Guard patrol boat next to a tanker, removing an unexploded mine. U.S. reports speak of the tankers as being under attack; Iran describes the incidents as accidents and calls the allegations alarming, saying that "the U.S. and its regional allies must stop warmongering and put an end to

mischievous plots as well as false flag operations in the region."
- **June 17, 2019.** Iran says that it is within ten days of violating the 2015 agreement; the United States announces deployment of another 1,000 troops to the Middle East.
- **June 20, 2019.** Iran shoots down a U.S. surveillance drone.

The crisis trigger was Iran's downing of an unmanned U.S.RQ-4 Global Hawk surveillance drone, which had taken off from an airbase in the United Arab Emirates, on June 29 at 4:05 a.m. local time (7:35 p.m. Wednesday, Washington time). It was shot down by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary National Guard Corps using a surface-to-air missile near the Strait of Hormuz, a body of water through which nearly 25 percent of the world's oil travels. Iran claimed that the drone had entered Iranian air space, and that warnings had been sent and ignored, claiming that the last warning had been sent at 3:55 a.m. A second spy plane in the area, with thirty-five people aboard, responded to the warning and altered its course. After the incident, Iranian officials stated that "our borders are Iran's red line and we will react strongly against any aggression." The United States denied that the drone had entered Iranian airspace and called the incident an unprovoked attack in international airspace.

Trump met with National Security Advisor John Bolton, Patrick Shanahan and Mark Esper (the acting incoming and outgoing heads of the Department of Defense, respectively), Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joseph Dunford Jr. at 7:00 a.m. to formulate a response.[1] Accounts portray Trump at this meeting and later ones as being supportive of a military action. Later that morning, Trump Tweeted that Iran had "made a very big mistake" and gave the military the go ahead to prepare a military strike. Accounts state that he had been informed of the risks accompanying military action, including possible casualties, at this and subsequent meetings.

Around 11:00 a.m., administration and military officials met to review twelve response options, which were narrowed down to two. Although all favored some response, administration officials were split on how to respond. Bolton and Haspel supported military action. General Dunford urged caution, because possible repercussions in the region could endanger U.S. forces and allies. Pompeo also supported a military strike, but stressed the long-term effectiveness of economic sanctions.

In a different meeting that had already been scheduled, Congressional leaders from both parties were briefed by intelligence. In a public statement, Trump appeared to move away from military action, stating that "I find it hard to believe that it was intentional . . . it could have been somebody who was loose and stupid that did it." Congressional leaders

including House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, and the Chairs and ranking minority members of the House and Senate Intelligence and Armed Services Committees, returned to the White House in the afternoon with Trump, CIA Director Gina Haspel, Shanahan, and Esper, among others. They expected to be told of an upcoming attack, but this did not happen. Instead, a dialogue took place with Trump failing to endorse any specific plan and asking them to go to on television and defend him on Friday.

The Pentagon continued to plan for an attack, and had a 6:00 p.m. meeting with Shanahan. About an hour later, two hours before the strikes were scheduled to start and with planes in the air, Trump held another meeting in the Oval Office, when he asked about civilian casualties and was told that there could be as many as 150; this figure came from Pentagon lawyers, was based on worst case scenarios, and had not been cleared by either Shanahan or General Dunford. Judging the number to be too high, Trump cancelled the attack. Pence, Pompeo, and Bolton were all out of the White House and caught off-guard when Trump made this decision.

Political and military maneuvering between the U.S. and Iran did not end with the decision not to conduct a military strike. First, the U.S. carried out a secret cyber strike against the database used by the Revolutionary Guard to target tankers in the Persian Gulf. Next, an action-reaction sequence occurred; Great Britain seized an Iranian tanker because it was believed to be going to Syria, violating a European Union economic blockade, and Iran seized a British oil tanker in retaliation. Iran also announced a series of moves that would have it exceed the nuclear enrichment limit set by the 2015 nuclear agreement. The United States responded with the threat of more sanctions. This was followed by a Houthi attack on major Saudi Arabian oil facilities. Secretary of State Pompeo blamed Iran and labeled it an act of war. Iran denied responsibility for the attack. Trump threatened military action against it but settled on sending additional military forces to Saudi Arabia to aid in protecting it from additional attacks.

Action-reaction cycles like the Iran drone crisis are common throughout history. One ended up starting World War I, the so-called war to end all wars (see the Historical Lesson).

It is one thing to recount key aspects of an important foreign policy decision, but how do you decide which influences were important in shaping the key decisions? One way to answer this question is to employ a foreign policy decision-making model. This chapter surveys five of the most frequently used **models**, highlighting both their strengths and weaknesses.[2] It illustrates how they can be used to understand U.S. foreign policy making by applying three of them to the Cuban missile crisis.

Foreign Policy Decisions and Models

One former foreign policy maker has observed that "the business of Washington is making decisions."[3] What is a foreign policy decision? What is it we are trying to understand? Answering these questions is complicated by a number of factors. First, the notion of a decision is itself somewhat misleading. It suggests the existence of a specific point in time at which a conscious judgment is made about a problem. Reality is often far less organized. Decisions are seldom final or decisive, tend to lack concrete beginnings and endpoints, and often amount to only temporary breathing spells or truces before the same issue arises again. In addition, decisions are often made with far less attention to their full meaning and consequences than is commonly recognized: "A government does not decide to inaugurate the nuclear age, but only to try and build the bomb before its enemy does."[4]

A second complicating factor is the relationship of the policy process to policy outcomes. Our intuitive sense is that if the policy process can be made to work properly, the policy outcome should also work. So bad policy can be attributed to bad decision-making. Unfortunately, the link between the two is imperfect. Good decision-making does not ensure good policy. According to a provocative account of the U.S. experience in Vietnam, the fundamental irony of Vietnam is that, while U.S. policy has been roundly criticized, the policy-making system worked[5]; it achieved its basic purpose of preventing a communist victory until domestic political opinion coalesced around a strategy of either victory or withdrawal. The political system produced policies responsive to the wishes of the majority and near the political center, while at the same time allowing virtually all views to be aired. The bureaucracy selected and implemented measures designed to accomplish these ends, and these policies were undertaken without illusions about their ultimate chances of success.

In an effort to make sense out of the complicated business of making decisions, models have been developed to help explain, describe, predict, and evaluate how U.S. foreign policy is made. **Models** are analytical tools that are designed to serve as simplified representations of reality. As simplifications, they leave out much of the detail and texture of what goes on in the policy-making process. Models can be distinguished from one another in terms of how they seek to capture and depict reality.

Before turning to descriptions of the models, two caveats need to be raised. First, these models can help us understand what happens during the policy-making process, but are not necessarily chosen consciously by policy makers. Second, they should not be judged in terms of right or wrong; a more useful standard is how helpful they are for explaining, describing, or evaluating the workings of the foreign policy process for the particular policy being studied.

The Rational Actor Model

The most frequently employed policy-making model is the **rational actor** model. At its core is an action-reaction process; foreign policy is viewed as a calculated response to the actions of another actor. In carrying out these calculations, the state is seen as being unitary and rational. Unitary means viewing the state as calculating and responding to external events as if it were a single entity; there is no need for the analyst to delve into the intricacies of governmental organization, domestic politics, or personalities in trying to understand why a policy was selected. The state can be treated as a **black box**, responding with one voice to the challenges and opportunities confronting it. For example, it is employed implicitly when speaking of Israeli goals, Argentine national interests, or Soviet adventurism.

The basic elements of a rational decision process are the following: (1) goals are clearly stated and ranked in order of preference, (2) all options are considered, (3) the consequences of each option are assessed, and (4) a value-maximizing choice is made. Broadly speaking, there are two ways of carrying out a rational actor analysis of policy making. The first is *inductive*, which is frequently employed in diplomatic histories. Analysts try to understand the foreign policy decision by placing themselves in the position of the government taking the action. The objective is to appreciate the situation as the government sees it and to understand the logic of the situation. The second approach, *deductive,* is best exemplified by game theory; it is frequently employed by military strategists and deterrence theorists. Here it is assumed that "a certain kind of conduct is inherent in a particular situation or relationship."[6] Rather than relying on actual events to support its analysis, the deductive approach relies on logical and mathematical formulations of how states should (rationally) behave under given conditions.

The rational actor model is attractive because it places relatively few informational demands on the observer. However, it is frequently criticized for essentially the same reason. Foreign policy is not just made in response to external events; it is heavily influenced by domestic political calculations, personalities, and organizational factors. In addition, the rational actor model assumes that "important events have important causes." Doing so downgrades the importance of chance, accidents, and coincidence in foreign affairs. Critics also contend that the model's information-processing demands exceed human capabilities. Goals are seldom stated clearly or rank ordered. The full range of policy options and their consequences are rarely evaluated. In making decisions, the need for value trade-offs is denied more often than it is faced.

Critics of the assumption of rationality often advance two other models. One is based on the concept of incremental decision-making, in which goals are only loosely stated, a limited range of options is examined, and the policy selected is one that "satisfies" (is satisfactory and sufficient) rather than optimizes.[7] Another decision-making model, known as

prospect theory, asserts that individuals tend to value what they have more than what they do not have; they prefer the status quo more often than one would predict; and they tend to be risk-averse with respect to gains and risk-accepting when it comes to losses. **Prospect theory** implies that leaders will take more risks to defend their state's international position than to enhance it, and that, after a loss, leaders tend to take excessive risks to recover that position.[8]

A final challenge to the rational actor model centers on its methodology. Carried out either inductively or deductively, the rational actor model relies heavily on personal judgment in interpreting actions or in weighting policy payoffs. Graham Allison has captured this criticism in his rationality theorem: There is no pattern of activity for which an imaginative analyst cannot find objectives that are maximized by a given course of action. [9]

The Bureaucratic Politics Model

Bureaucratic politics is the "process by which people inside government bargain with one another on complex public policy questions."[10] As this definition suggests, the **bureaucratic politics** model approaches policy making in a completely different way from the rational actor model. Policy making is seen as a political process dominated by conflict resolution, not problem solving. Politics dominates the decision-making process because power is shared, and the individuals who share power disagree on what should be done because they are located at different places within the government and see different faces of the problem.

Using military force to punish terrorists looks different to a Secretary of State, who must balance the diplomatic pluses and minuses of such a move, than it does to the military Chiefs of Staff, whose forces would be used, or to a presidential aide, who is most sensitive to the domestic implications of the success or failure of such a mission. Not everyone in the government is a participant in a particular policy-making "game." Fixed organizational routines define the issue, produce the information on which policy decisions are made, link institutions and individuals together, and place limits on the types of policy options that can be implemented.

Furthermore, the players in the game are not equal in their ability to influence the outcome of the bargaining process. Deadlines, the rules of the game, and **action channels** confer power to some and deny it to others. Rules determine what kind of behavior is permitted and by whom. Can unilateral statements be made? Can information be leaked? Action channels link policy makers and determine who is in the best position to make a unilateral statement or to be included in a committee that approves action. Deadlines, which force issues by accelerating the tempo of the decision-making process and creating pressure for an agreement, take many forms, and may include a meeting with a foreign head of state, a presidential speech, or Congressionally established reporting deadlines.

Rarely do policy problems enter or leave the policy process in a clearly definable manner. More frequently, they flow through it in a fragmented state and become entangled in other ongoing policy issues. The result is that policy is not formulated with respect to any underlying conception of the U.S. national interest. Instead, its content is heavily influenced by the way in which the problem first surfaces and how it interacts with the other issues on the policy agenda.

In putting all of this together, advocates of the bureaucratic politics model argue that policy is not, and cannot be, a product of deliberate choice. Instead, policy is either a result of a political bargaining process or the product of organizational **standard operating procedures**.[11] In either case, a new policy is not likely to differ greatly from the existing policy because bargaining is an expensive, time-consuming process. In addition, policy makers are often committed quite deeply to their positions. The need for agreement pushes policy makers toward acceptance of a minimal decision that will allow all sides to claim a partial victory. The inflexible and blunt nature of organizational routines and procedures reinforces the tendency for policy to change only at the margins. Administrative feasibility is a constant check on the ability of policy makers to tailor policy options to meet specific problems. In sum, from the bureaucratic politics perspective, the best predictor of future policy is not the policy that maximizes U.S. national interests, but the one that is only incrementally different from current policy.

The bureaucratic politics model makes important contributions to understanding U.S. foreign policy by highlighting the political and organizational nature of policy making. However, it has also been subjected to extensive criticism. First, by emphasizing compromise, bargaining, and standard operating procedures, this model makes it very difficult to assign decision-making responsibility.[12] Second, it misrepresents the mechanism of bargaining by overstating the extent to which policy simply emerges from the policy process.[13] Third, the bureaucratic politics model is chastised for artificially separating the executive branch bargaining process from the broader social and political context. Attention must also be given to the domestic political forces and the values of policy makers, not just to how policy-making games are played. Finally, the model is criticized for being too complex, a virtual "analytic kitchen sink" into which almost anything can be thrown that might be related to how an issue is resolved.[14] The result is a story that may make for interesting reading, but it violates a fundamental rule: all things being equal, simple explanations are better than complex ones.

The Small-Group Decision-Making Model

A third policy-making model focuses on the dynamics of **small-group decision-making**. Advocates of this perspective hold that many critical foreign policy decisions are made neither by an individual policy maker nor by large bureaucratic forces. From a policy maker's perspective, small-group

decision-making offers a number of advantages over its bureaucratic counterpart:

- The absence of significant conflict; there are few viewpoints to reconcile
- A free and open interchange of opinion among members; there are no organizational interests to protect
- Swift and decisive action
- Possible innovation and experimentation
- The possibility of maintaining secrecy[15]

Three different types of small groups can be identified:[16]

1. **Informal small group that meets regularly but lack an institutional base.** The Tuesday lunch group in the Johnson administration and the Friday breakfast and Thursday lunch groups of the Carter administration are prominent recent examples.
2. **Ad hoc group created to deal with a specific problem, then ceases to function once its task is completed.** In the first week of the 1950 Korean crisis, six small-group meetings were held. During the Cuban missile crisis, the key decisions were made by the Executive Committee (ExCom), an ad hoc group of about fifteen individuals brought together by President John Kennedy specifically to deal with this problem.
3. **Permanent small group that possesses an institutional base and is created to perform a series of specified functions.** The subcommittees of the National Security Council (NSC) fall into this category. During the Carter administration, a Special Coordinating Committee (SCC) was set up to deal with crisis situations; during the Iranian hostage crisis it met at 9:00 a.m., at first daily and later less frequently to go over an agenda put together by the NSC staff.[17] Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the George W. Bush administration established a "war cabinet" consisting of some dozen people including Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice.

Despite its advantages, small-group decision-making often results in policy decisions that are anything but rational or effective. Pearl Harbor, the Bay of Pigs invasion, and key decisions in Korea and Vietnam have all been analyzed from a small-group decision-making perspective.[18]

Policy failures are seen as the result of strong in-group pressures on members to concur in the group's decision. This pressure produces a "deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment" that increases the likelihood of the group's making a potentially defective

decision.[19] Irving Janis coined the term **groupthink** to capture this phenomenon. He also identified eight symptoms that indicate its presence, and divided them into three categories: overestimation of the group's power and morality, closed-mindedness, and pressures toward conformity. Janis argued that the more symptoms are present, the more likely it is that concurrence-seeking behavior will result and that defective decisions will be made. Table 9.1 aligns Tower Commission Report observations about the decision-making on the Iran-Contra Affair with Janis' elements of groupthink. Although the match is not perfect (e.g., illusion of unanimity is better seen as an illusion of presidential support), the parallels are striking.

Groupthink is a phenomenon that occurs regardless of the personality traits of group members. It is not an inevitable product of a tight-knit decision group, nor is it necessarily the cause of a policy fiasco. Poor implementation, changed circumstances, or accidental factors also produce policy failures. Groupthink exists as a tendency that is made more or less likely by three sets of antecedent conditions: the coherence of the decision-making group, structural faults of the organization, and the nature of the decision context. At its core is the assumption that concurrence-seeking behavior is an attempt on the part of group members to cope with stress by developing a mutual support base.[20]

Because groupthink is a tendency and not a condition, in theory, it can be avoided. Recognizing that each proposed solution has its own drawbacks, Janis puts forward several measures to improve the quality of small-group decision-making.[21] They include establishing multiple groups for the same task (multiple advocacy), establishing a devil's advocate, and having a "second chance" meeting at which decisions can be reconsidered one final time.

Three general lines of criticism have been directed at the groupthink approach to small-group decision-making. First, Janis' proposed solutions probably will not work. Consider the idea of multiple advocacy, which attempts to ensure that all views, "however unpopular," will receive serious attention.[22] Two dangers exist here. In each case, they are brought on by overloading the intellectual capabilities of policy makers and by highlighting the ambiguity of the evidence before them. One outcome is that policy makers will simply choose whatever policy option is in accord with their preexisting biases. If a wide range of options are all made to appear respectable and doubts exist about the effectiveness of each, why not "let Reagan be Reagan" and select the one that best fits his image of the world? The other, equally undesirable, outcome is paralysis. Confronted with too many policy options, all of which appear to have problems, policy makers may end up doing nothing.

Second, criticism is directed at the criteria used to establish a good decision.[23] The standard used (vigilant appraisal) virtually duplicates the logic of the rational actor model. The point remains: If the rational actor model is an unrealistic benchmark for judging decision-making, isn't the same true for vigilant appraisal?

TABLE 9.1 Groupthink and the Iran-Contra Affair

Element of Groupthink	Findings of the Tower Commission Report
Illusion of invulnerability	The president "was all for letting the Israelis do anything they wanted at the very first briefing" (McFarlane, p. 131).
Unquestioned belief in group's morality	The president distinguished between selling someone believed able to exert influence with respect to the hostages and dealing directly with the kidnappers (p. 39). The administration continued to pressure U.S. allies not to sell arms to Iran and not to make concessions to terrorists (p. 65).
Collective efforts to discount warnings	"There is a high degree of risk in pursuing the course we have started, we are now so far down the road that stopping . . . could have even more serious repercussions. We all view the next step as confidence building" (North, p. 167).
Stereotyping the enemy	Release of the hostages would require influence with the Hezbollah, which could involve the most radical elements of the Iranian regime. The kind of strategy sought by the United States, however, involved what were regarded as more moderate elements (p. 64).
Self-censorship	Evidence suggests that he [Casey] received information about the possible divergence of funds to the Contras almost a month before the story broke. He, too, did not move promptly to raise the matter with the president (p. 81). Secretary Shultz and Secretary Weinberger, in particular, distanced themselves from the march of events (p. 82).
Illusion of unanimity	"I felt in the meeting that there were views opposed, some (presidential support) in favor, and the President didn't really take a position, but he seemed to, he was in favor of this project somehow or other" (Shultz, p. 183). "As the meeting broke up, I had the idea the President had not entirely given up on encouraging the Israelis" (Casey, p. 198).
Direct pressure against	"Casey's view is that Cap [Weinberger] will continue to dissenters create roadblocks until he is told by you that the President wants this move NOW" (North to Poindexter, p. 232).
Emergence of mindguards	"I don't want a meeting with RR, Shultz, and Weinberger" (Poindexter, p. 45). North directed that dissemination be limited to Secretary Weinberger, DCI Casey, McFarlane, and himself. North said McFarlane had directed that no copy be sent to the secretary of state and that he, McFarlane, would keep Secretary Shultz advised orally on the NSC project (p. 149).

Source: President's Special Review Panel, *The Tower Commission Report* (New York: Bantam, 1987). Citations from Robert McFarlane, national security advisor, 1983–1985; Col. Oliver North, national security council staffer; George Shultz, secretary of state; William Casey, director of central intelligence; Adm. John Poindexter, national security advisor, 1985–1986; Caspar Weinberger, secretary of defense.

A third criticism is more theoretical in nature. The groupthink approach is grounded in a conflict model of individual decision-making. According to this model, individuals often confront decision-making situations in which they feel "simultaneous opposing tendencies to accept and reject a given course of action."[24] According to the cybernetic approach to decision-making, individuals do not necessarily attempt to resolve value conflicts and tensions in making decisions. From this vantage point, attention should be directed toward how uncommitted thinkers make decisions.[25]

Even with these problems, recent decision-making studies continue to point to the importance of groupthink.[26] The approach has also been extended from just explaining a defective decision to explaining shifts in a stream of policy decisions. These include the war on terrorism and the invasion of Iraq.[27]

Elite Theory and Pluralism

During the 1960s and early 1970s, elite theory and pluralism served as the focal point for an intense debate raging among political scientists over how best to understand the process of public policy making. Although no longer the center of attention, they remain important approaches for understanding how U.S. foreign policy is made.

Elite theory represents a quite different perspective on foreign policy making than the three approaches examined so far. It is concerned with the identities of those individuals who make foreign policy and the underlying dynamics of national power, social myth, and class interests. Elite theory stresses the ties that bind policy makers rather than the forces that divide them.

From this perspective, foreign policy is formulated as a response to demands generated by the economic and political system. Not all demands receive equal attention, and those that receive the most attention serve the interests of only a small sector of society. These special interests are transformed into national interests through the pattern of office holding and the structure of influence that exists within the United States. Those who hold office are seen as a stable and relatively cohesive group of people who share common goals, interests, and values.

Disagreements exist only at the margins; they surface most frequently as disputes over policy implementation, not policy goals. Those outside the elite group are held to be relatively powerless. Furthermore, public reactions are often "orchestrated" by the elite rather than being expressions of independent thinking on policy matters. This explains why certain policy proposals routinely fail to attract serious attention: Ideas that do not build on the relatively narrow range of value assumptions shared by the elite and rooted in the underlying dynamics of the socioeconomic structure are rejected as unworkable, fundamentally flawed, or fatally naïve. Elite theory also suggests that the basic directions of U.S. foreign policy will change slowly, if at all.

Although consensus is broad, elite theorists do disagree on a number of points:

1. **Constraints on elite behavior.** Some elite theorists see few, if any, constraints on the type of policies that elites can pursue. Others see a more open policy process subject to periodic "short-circuiting" by the public.
2. **Conspiring elites**. Some elite theorists pay great attention to the social backgrounds and linkages among members of the elite class, but others deemphasize these features in favor of attention to the broader and more enduring forces of a capitalistic economic system that drives U.S. foreign policy to be expansionist, aggressive, and exploitive.[28]

Several recent administrations have been the subject of conspiratorial-style elite analysis. In the case of the Carter administration, the object of attention was the presence of large numbers of members of the Trilateral Commission in policy-making positions. The Trilateral Commission was formed in 1973 to foster cooperation among the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. During the Reagan administration, analysis focused on links between his appointees and the Committee on the Present Danger, a group established in the 1970s to warn against the continuing threat posed by the Soviet Union. In the George W. Bush administration, the focus was the influence of neoconservatives on foreign policy decisions. Unlike the other two groups, the neoconservatives were not part of an institution; rather, *neoconservative* refers to a broad philosophical outlook on America's role in world politics.

Pluralism is regarded as the orthodox interpretation of how the U.S. policy-making system works. Like elite theory, no single comprehensive statement of the argument exists. Still, six common themes can be identified:

1. Power in society is fragmented and diffused.
2. Many groups in society have power to participate in policy making.
3. No one group is powerful enough to dictate policy.
4. An equilibrium among groups is the natural state of affairs.
5. Policy is the product of bargaining among groups and reflects the interests of the dominant group(s).
6. The government acts as an umpire, supervising the competition and sometimes compelling a settlement.

Pluralists acknowledge that power resources are not distributed evenly throughout society. However, they hold that merely possessing the attributes of power (wealth, status, etc.) is not equal to possessing power itself[29] because the economic and political sectors of society are considered separate. In addition, power resources may be substituted for one another.

Large numbers may offset wealth; leadership may offset large numbers; and commitment may overcome poor leadership. One example of pluralism was the grassroots movement in the United States to force South Africa to end apartheid. What began as a movement on college campuses in the late 1970s and early 1980s to force companies to disinvest from South Africa gradually succeeded in sensitizing policy makers and the American public to the problem; as a result, by 1985, U.S. policy toward South Africa began to show signs of change.

A number of flaws have been suggested in the pluralists' argument.[30] Pluralists assume that competition between groups produces policy makers who compete over the content of policy. What happens when policy makers do not compete over policy but instead are so fragmented that they rule over separate and self-contained policy areas? Theodore Lowi suggests that such conditions better describe the operation of the U.S. government than the pluralist model; when this happens, the government is not an umpire but a holding company. Pluralism then exists without competition, as interest groups capture different pieces of the government and shape its policies to suit their needs. New groups or the poorly organized are effectively shut out of the decision-making process. Just as important, interest-group liberalism reduces the capacity of the government to plan, because it is unable to speak with one voice or examine problems from a national perspective.

Historical Lesson

The War to End All Wars

Known to many simply as "the Great War," World War I was an international system-changing event. The action-reaction cycle setting World War I in motion began with the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand, the heir to the Austrian-Hungarian throne, by a Serbian nationalist on June 28, 1914.

Existing alliance systems that divided the European Great Powers into two groups contributed to the speed with which events unfolded. Britain, France, and Russia formed the Triple Entente. Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy made up the Triple Alliance.

On July 23, Austria-Hungary issued to Serbia a set of ten demands that were deliberately constructed to be unacceptable. When they were rejected, Austria-Hungary broke off diplomatic relations, mobilized its troops, and declared war on Serbia on July 28, 1914. The next day, Russia mobilized its forces in support of Serbia. Germany asked Russia to cease mobilization and drop its support. Germany also sent a communication to France requesting that it not support Russia. When Russia refused, Germany declared war on Russia. Germany then demanded that France remain neutral but began mobilizing in accord with the Schlieffen Plan, Germany's prewar military plan, which saw invasion of France as necessary

to protect its western borders before sending troops to fight Russia. On August 3, Germany declared war on France. On August 4, Britain declared war on Germany. The United Sates declared war on Germany on April 6, 1917.

By the time World War I ended on November 11, 1918, with a death toll exceeding nine million, a number of significant events had occurred. Four empires had been destroyed: Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire. Russia had experienced one of the world's most important revolutions; in 1917, Russia's czar was overthrown and a communist government came to power, committed in principle to the overthrow of capitalism around the world. The United States had established itself as a major power and brought to that role a very different interpretation of international politics than the European Great Powers. The League of Nations was created. The map of Europe was redrawn as Poland, Finland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Austria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Turkey came into existence as independent states.

Given these far-reaching consequences, you would think that avoiding the onset of the Great War would have been a major concern to policy makers and the public alike. Yet this was not the case. For almost a hundred years, the Great Powers had worked together through a series of alliances that had provided them with a mechanism for managing political and military affairs in Europe in a way that minimized the potential occurrence of systemic disruptions. Public fears of a systemic changing war were calmed by Norman Angell's argument in *The Great Illusion,* first published 1909; he argued that, while war was not impossible, it would be economically harmful to both the winners and losers due to the dynamics of economic interdependence. The conclusion was clear: war should be rejected and reason and respect for international law should be embraced as the logical path to follow in managing world affairs.

You might also expect national memories of World War I to be consistent. Yet, they differ greatly. France looks back upon it as a tragic but noble cause. Great Britain views it with mixed feelings. Germany came out of the war humiliated and required to pay heavy reparations to the victors, a combination many see as laying the domestic political foundations on which Hitler rose to power.

Japan also emerged from World War I with a sense of having been dishonored; as a victorious Allied Power, Japan entered the Paris Peace Talks expecting to gain control of German colonies in Asia just as France and Great Britain had acquired control over territories ruled by Germany and the Ottoman Empire in Africa and the Middle East. Japan also expected to be treated as an equal; to that end, it put forward a racial equality clause for inclusion in the League of Nations charter. Neither goal was realized. For its part, the United States championed the concept of a League of Nations and then declined to join it, instead adopting a policy of disengagement from the power politics of Europe and Asia.

While debates continue over whether World War I made World War II possible, caused it, or was irrelevant to

it, it is clear that World War I did not end global wars. What is unclear is the possibility of reappearance of the factors that contributed to its outbreak. Niall Ferguson suggests that many of those factors are already in place in today's international system:[31] (1) imperial overstretch (Great Britain was showing signs of tiring in its role as the keeper of global peace and prosperity); (2) growing imperial rivalry (between Germany and Russia); (3) instability of existing alliance systems; (4) support by rogue regimes (e.g., Serbia) of international terrorism (the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand); (5) the rise of a revolutionary terrorist group hostile to capitalism (emergence of the Bolsheviks). Today, Ferguson argues that the United States is overstretched militarily; a rivalry is growing between the United States and China; NATO is struggling to define its role; states are sponsoring international terrorism or are reluctant to challenge it; and al-Qaeda is much more of an Islamo–Bolshevist terrorist group than an Islamo–fascist group.

Applying the Lesson

1. Are today's crises different from the one which set of World War I? Explain your answer.
2. What is the most dangerous step to be avoided in an action-reaction cycle, and why?
3. What decision-making models are best suited for studying crises, and why?

Integrating Models

Given the complexity of the situations faced and the variety of factors that might go into selecting a course of action, it stands to reason that no single foreign policy model will be able to help us understand a foreign policy decision or outcome completely. Such an understanding often requires integrating several different models. Typically, integration can be attempted in four ways. The first is to shift from model to model as the focus of the analysis changes. For example, from the rational actor perspective, the decision to send U.S. troops to Korea in 1950 is a single decision. From the bureaucratic or small-group perspective, a series of separate decisions might be identified. A distinction can also be made between the sociopolitical aspects of policy making and the intellectual task of choosing a response.[32] The pluralist and bureaucratic politics models help us understand why policy makers act as they do once they are "in place," but they tell us little about how they got there or the values they bring to bear in addressing a problem. To answer these questions, we might turn to elite theory or the rational actor model for insight.

A second way to integrate policy-making models is to recognize that some are more appropriate for analyzing some problems or issue areas, than for others. Generally, the more open the policy process and the longer the issue is on the policy agenda (as is typically the case for structural and

strategic issues), the more useful the bureaucratic and pluralist models will be. For more closed processes and quicker responses, the rational actor, elite theory, or small-group model are more applicable.

A third way to integrate these models is to shift from one to another as the policy problem develops over time. The elite or rational actor model might be especially helpful for understanding how the United States got involved in Vietnam, but the small-group or bureaucratic politics model might be most helpful for understanding key decisions during the course of the war. The **poliheuristic decision-making** model suggests another way to combine approaches, arguing that individuals only engage in a rational calculation of the costs and benefits of a limited number of alternatives in a second stage of decision-making, after most alternatives have been eliminated.[33] Similarly, individuals are likely to approach policy implementation differently than policy selection.

A final way of integrating these models is based on the values that guide analysis. As has already been suggested, although the rational actor model may be deficient as a description of the policy-making process, it is still valuable for the purpose of evaluating the policy process. However, be careful in using models in this way, for embedded in each are assumptions about how policy should be made that are not always readily apparent. For example, implicit in the rational actor model is a belief in the desirability of a strong president and the ability to act quickly. The model does not place great value on widespread participation in decision-making or on a system of checks and balances.

The Cuban Missile Crisis

This section examines the Cuban missile crisis, one of the most important events in U.S. foreign policy. Many consider it the defining foreign policy crisis of the Cold War. The section begins with an overview of how the crisis unfolded, and then employs three models—rational actor, bureaucratic politics, and small-group decision-making—to show how models can help you understand foreign policy.

The Crisis: An Overview

The Cuban missile crisis, which took place over thirteen days (October 16–28, 1962), is widely regarded as a major turning point in the Cold War.[34] Never before and never after did the United States and the Soviet Union appear to be on the brink of nuclear war. At the time of the crisis, President John Kennedy estimated that the odds of averting such an outcome were between one in three and 50/50.[35]

Soviet weapons shipments to Cuba had been taking place since the summer of 1960. A slowdown occurred in early 1962, but the pace quickened again in late July. By September 1, the inventory of Soviet equipment in

Cuba included surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), cruise missiles, patrol boats, and large quantities of transportation, electrical, and construction equipment, as well as over five thousand technicians and other military personnel.[36] The first strategic missiles, medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) with a range of 1,100 nautical miles, arrived secretly in Cuba on September 8. Forty-two of these missiles reached Cuba before the crisis was resolved. Equipment for the construction of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and IRBM sites also began arriving, although no IRBMs actually reached Cuba. Finally, Soviet shipments in September included IL-28 jet bombers and MIG-21 jet fighters, plus additional SAMs, cruise missiles, and patrol boats.

Intelligence on the exact dimensions of the Soviet buildup in Cuba came from a number of different sources: refugee reports, CIA agents operating in Cuba, analyses of Soviet shipping patterns, and U-2 spy plane overflights. Not all of the information was reliable, nor did it all come together at the same time and place for analysis. For example, refugees were reporting the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba before Cuba began receiving weapons of any kind from the Soviet Union, and great care had to be taken in processing reports from agents operating inside Cuba. The United States Intelligence Board met on September 19 and approved an intelligence estimate indicating that the Soviet Union would not introduce offensive missiles into Cuba.

This conclusion was not shared uniformly in the administration. In late August, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) John McCone told President Kennedy, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk that the Soviet Union was preparing to place offensive missiles in Cuba. In late September others began to agree with McCone, and a U-2 overflight over western Cuba was considered. No U-2 overflights over this area had been authorized since September 5 because of recent mishaps with U-2 overflights in Asia. Fearful that all U-2 flights might be canceled if another incident occurred, the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) had decided not to send any U-2s over western Cuba, where SAM sites were known to be under construction. On October 4, COMOR did approve a U-2 overflight over western Cuba. A jurisdictional dispute between the Defense Department and the CIA over who would conduct the mission led to an unsuccessful flight on October 9, and it was not until October 14 that a successful U-2 flight took place. Its photographs firmly established the presence of Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba. On October 22, President Kennedy went on national television to announce the discovery.

Kennedy called together a special ad hoc advisory group known as the ExCom of the National Security Council (NSC) to deal with the crisis. During ExCom's first meeting on October 16, it began to identify the options open to the United States. Six major options surfaced: (1) no action, (2) diplomatic pressures either at the United Nations or at the Soviet Union, (3) a secret approach to Castro with the option of "split or

fall," (4) invasion, (5) a surgical air strike, and (6) a naval blockade.[37] The first option seized on was the surgical air strike.[38] The blockade was not lobbied for strongly until the end of the day, and Kennedy's initial response to this option was skeptical, as he was not sure how a blockade would get Soviet missiles out of Cuba.

By the end of the first day, Kennedy identified three options. Participant accounts suggest that attention focused primarily on two of these, the surgical air strike and the blockade. (The third option appears to have been invasion.) In his October 22 statement, Kennedy also announced that a naval quarantine would be imposed on Cuba on October 24; he threatened future action if the missiles were not removed. The blockade was chosen both for what it did and for what it did not do. It was a visible, forceful, military response, but it did not put the Soviet Union into a position where it had no choice but to fight. In fact, it placed responsibility for the next move back on Soviet Chairman Nikita Khrushchev. A number of additional measures were taken publicly to impress on the Soviets the depth of U.S. resolve and to make credible Kennedy's threat of additional action: Squadrons of U.S. tactical fighters were moved to points from which they could attack Cuba; an invasion force of two hundred thousand troops was readied in Florida; some fourteen thousand thousand air force reserves were called up; and U.S. forces around the world were put on alert.[39]

The air strike remained a live option. One had tentatively been scheduled for October 20 but was postponed in favor of the blockade. On October 27, one day before Khrushchev offered to remove the missiles, at an ExCom meeting Kennedy approved plans for an October 29 air strike on Soviet missile silos, air bases, and Cuban and Soviet antiaircraft installations. At that same meeting, ExCom concluded that an invasion would follow. McNamara held that an "invasion had become almost inevitable," and he felt that at least one missile would be launched successfully at the United States.[40]

The blockade did bring an end to Soviet military shipments to Cuba, but it did not bring a stop to the construction of Soviet missiles and missile sites in Cuba. SAMs became operational during the crisis and shot down a U-2 on October 23. According to President Kennedy's original orders, if this happened the United States would destroy the site that had launched the missile. However, when the incident occurred, Kennedy delayed retaliating to allow additional time for quiet diplomacy to bring about the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles.

Recent accounts of the Cuban missile crisis suggest that Kennedy would not have ordered an air strike had Khrushchev not responded favorably to U.S. demands, and that the president was prepared to pursue additional negotiations—perhaps through the United Nations—to resolve the crisis.[41] These accounts also argue that U.S. policy makers felt a sense of urgency in their deliberations, not out of a fear that Soviet missiles might

soon become operational, but because the longer the missiles remained in Cuba, the more legitimate they would come to be seen by other states.

On October 28, Khrushchev agreed publicly to remove Soviet missiles in Cuba in return for a U.S. pledge of nonintervention into Cuba, allowing both sides to achieve their publicly stated goals. The United States got the missiles out of Cuba, and the Soviet Union could claim that it had succeeded in protecting Cuba from U.S. aggression (which was the justification given for having placed the missiles in Cuba when confronted by Kennedy). Recently released documents reveal the existence of a secret agreement between Kennedy and Khrushchev with terms different from those that officially ended the crisis. In order to entice Khrushchev into removing the missiles from Cuba, Kennedy promised to remove U.S. missiles from Turkey. The secret offer was made by Robert Kennedy to Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin on October 27. Dobrynin was also told that a commitment was needed from the Soviets the next day if the crisis was to end on these terms. For reasons of domestic politics and international prestige, Kennedy had refused to publicly accept this trade-off, which had been repeatedly called for by the Soviets and suggested to him by some members of ExCom. Implementation of the U.S. part of the agreement was made conditional on the Soviets' maintenance of secrecy about the agreement.

October 28 marks the conventional ending point for the Cuban missile crisis, but it, in fact, continued for several more weeks as both sides struggled with implementation of the agreement. Particularly troublesome issues involved defining what was meant by "offensive" weapons (the United States insisted that the IL-28s be removed),and establishing a date for ending the blockade (the Soviets wanted the blockade ended and a no-invasion pledge issued before removing the bombers). Within the U.S. government, the earlier debate on how to proceed was repeated: take unilateral military action to resolve the issue, tighten the blockade, or concede the point and go on to other matters? Diplomacy again came to the rescue when, on November 20, Kennedy announced that the Soviet Union had agreed to remove the IL-28s and that the blockade was coming to an end.

Applying the Rational Actor Model to the Crisis

The preceding account of the Cuban missile crisis is largely consistent with a rational actor interpretation of U.S. foreign policy making. It emphasizes the thorough canvassing of alternatives once a problem has been identified and the selection of a value-maximizing choice. For U.S. policy makers, the goal directing the search for policy options was clear: Get the Soviet missiles out of Cuba without appearing to appease the Soviets and without starting a war. A hardline stance was dictated in part by domestic political considerations. Cuba had become an important and recurring emotional issue in American electoral politics since Fidel Castro had come to power

there in 1959, and Kennedy was vulnerable. The Bay of Pigs fiasco had made Cuba his political Achilles' heel, raising questions about his judgment and leadership. The Republican Senate and congressional campaign committees had already identified Cuba as the major issue in the upcoming 1962 election. Therefore, inaction (a possibility suggested at one point by McNamara) and quiet diplomacy were not policy options capable of achieving both the removal of the missiles and a demonstration of political resolve. The air strike was rejected because the Air Force could not give Kennedy a 100 percent guarantee that the missiles would be knocked out. Similar problems confronted the option of invasion. The blockade, coupled with highly visible signals of further military action, was selected as the option that offered the greatest likelihood of getting the missiles out and demonstrating U.S. resolve without running a high risk of setting off a war between the United States and the Soviet Union.

As the rational actor model suggests, the blockade itself was structured to fit the needs of U.S. policy makers. It was not implemented until U.S. officials were sure that Soviet leaders had been able to communicate with Soviet ship captains, and the blockade was placed closer to Cuba than was militarily prudent in order to give the Soviet leadership the maximum amount of time to formulate a peaceful response. The first ship stopped—a U.S.-build World War II Liberty ship registered in Lebanon, owned by a Panamanian firm, and under lease to the Soviet Union—was carefully selected to minimize the possibility of a hostile Soviet response; it did not carry missiles. Two ships that clearly did not carry missiles were allowed to pass through the blockade.

A similar analysis of policy options and consequences late in the crisis would identify Kennedy's secret offer to remove U.S. missiles from Turkey as the logical follow-up move. The blockade did buy time and show U.S. resolve; however, it could not, in and of itself, remove the missiles. Domestic political considerations again limited Kennedy's options, as did the continued inability of the military to guarantee that an air strike or invasion would prevent Soviet missiles from reaching the United States. Kennedy's publicly announced deadline ensured that the military option, with all of its drawbacks, would be used unless Khrushchev could be convinced to take the missiles out of Cuba. The key was to find a face-saving way out for the Soviets that was also true to Kennedy's stated objectives. This was accomplished by the combined secret agreement and public pledge of the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba in return for a nonintervention pledge by the United States.

Applying the Bureaucratic Politics Model to the Crisis

The bureaucratic politics perspective on decision-making during the Cuban missile crisis paints a very different picture. Rather than emphasizing the logic of policy making, it stresses its political and organizational context.

Politics is first evident in the discovery of missiles in Cuba. Consider the following:

- As early as August, DCI McCone had voiced concern about Soviet offensive missiles being placed in Cuba, but he was overruled by McNamara and Rusk.
- No U-2 flights were directed over the area most likely to have Soviet missiles from September 5 until October 14;
- The October 14 flight had been authorized on October 4, but a jurisdictional dispute over who would fly the aircraft and which aircraft would be used delayed it. (The agreed-upon solution was that an Air Force officer in uniform would fly a CIA plane.)

Moreover, evidence now points to the fact that the United States underestimated by one-half the number of troops (forty-two thousand) the Soviet Union had sent to Cuba. Had this figure been known or had the United States discovered the missiles earlier, the nature of policy options considered, the reading of Soviet goals, and U.S. objectives might have been quite different.

The "logic" of the blockade also suffers when the air strike option is examined more closely. First, the Air Force did not specifically design an option to meet ExCom's goal of removing the Soviet missiles. Instead, it merely dusted off an existing contingency plan that also called for air strikes against arms depots, airports, and artillery batteries opposite the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay. Second, Air Force calculations of its ability to destroy the Soviet missiles were based on an incorrect labeling of the missiles as mobile field-type missiles; they were actually movable missiles that required six days to be switched from one location to another. Because the Air Force believed that the Soviet missiles might be moved between the time the last reconnaissance mission was flown and the time of the air strike, it was only able to offer Kennedy a 90 percent guarantee that it could knock out all of them. The limits of rational choice are also revealed in the implementation of the blockade. The Navy, like the Air Force, did not tailor its plans to meet ExCom's needs. After-the-fact reconstructions of the timing of ship stoppings show that, contrary to Kennedy's orders, the Navy placed the blockade in the location originally proposed rather than moving it closer to Cuba.

The bureaucratic politics model also raises a number of troubling questions about the logic of the agreement that ended the Cuban missile crisis. One point centers on the nature of Soviet goals. No one in ExCom gave serious consideration to the possibility that the Soviet Union was genuinely concerned with deterring a U.S. invasion of Cuba. Evidence now suggests that this, along with balance-of-power considerations, was one of Khrushchev's goals. Moreover, it appears that it was the possibility that the United States might use the crisis as a pretext for invading Cuba, not the threat of nuclear retaliation, that led to the decision to remove the missiles.

The formal ending of the crisis on the Soviet side also raises troubling questions. Early accounts suggested that Khrushchev was not in full control of the Politburo, so contradictory messages were being received in Washington concerning the terms for ending the crisis. Evidence now suggests that faulty intelligence, not lack of political control, may have been responsible for the mixed messaging. The first, more conciliatory note was sent when Soviet intelligence was indicating an imminent U.S. attack on Cuba. The second, more stringent, communiqué was sent once it became clear that there would not be an invasion.

Applying the Small-Group Decision-Making Model to the Crisis

Early accounts of the Cuban missile crisis from the small-group decision-making perspective praised ExCom for not falling victim to groupthink. Janis credits ExCom with actively trying to understand what led the Soviets to try to place missiles in Cuba secretly, rather than stereotyping them.[42] Janis cites Robert Kennedy's concern about a Pearl Harbor in reverse as evidence of sensitivity to the moral dilemmas involved in the air strike option. He also notes that members of ExCom frequently changed their minds and eventually came to the conclusion that there were no good policy options at their disposal. President Kennedy is credited with having learned from the Bay of Pigs fiasco and practicing a leadership style that maximized the possibility of ExCom producing quality decisions. To encourage free debate, Kennedy did not attend all of its meetings, and he split ExCom into smaller groups to debate the issues and reexamine the conclusions reached by other participants.

More recent accounts of ExCom's deliberations suggest that its escape from groupthink was far less complete than was originally believed.[43] At least three decision-making defects surfaced that are fully consistent with the groupthink syndrome:

1. ExCom operated with a very narrow mandate: It was to consider the pros and cons of a variety of coercive measures. Kennedy had declared off-limits any consideration of either acquiescence to the Soviet move or diplomacy. True to that mandate, 90 percent of ExCom's time was spent studying alternative uses of troops, bombers, and warships. So it did not engage in a full search for policy options or operate as an open decision-making forum.
2. Those who sought to expand the list of options under consideration and break out of the group consensus were ostracized. U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson initially opposed the use of force and wrote Kennedy a note cautioning him on the dangers of this option. Kennedy was annoyed by the note and blocked efforts by McNamara and Stevenson to include diplomacy on the options list. Stevenson also suggested a trade of Soviet missiles for U.S. missiles

in Turkey or for the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. He came under sharp personal attack by Kennedy and was frozen out of the core decision-making group for these suggestions.

3. Theodore Sorensen, special counsel and advisor to President Kennedy, and Attorney General Robert Kennedy acted as surrogate leaders, reporting back to the President on the discussion and pushing group members to reach a consensus. Here, too, the impact was to limit the number of policy alternatives and stifle discussion. Stevenson observed that "we knew little brother [Robert Kennedy] was watching and keeping a little list where everyone stood." On Friday night, October 25, President Kennedy informed ExCom that he had chosen the blockade. The very next day, the consensus within ExCom for the blockade began to unravel. At that point, Kennedy told his brother to "pull the group together quickly." Sorensen would tell the group that they were "not serving the president well," and Robert Kennedy would tell them that the president could not possibly order an air strike.

Models: A Critique

As you have seen, decision-making models involve dissecting a complex set of political activities. Inevitably, the result is that certain features of the decision-making process receive greater attention and are accorded greater importance than others. For these reasons, policy makers often are uncomfortable with decision-making models. They see the models as oversimplifying policy decisions by putting forward a mechanistic, highly segmented interpretation of a process that is better seen as a seamless web of activity involving efforts at consensus-building, problem-definition, and problem-solving. They contend that generalizations about decision-making are dangerous because each situation is unique in terms of both the problem at hand and the domestic political context in which decisions are made.

For these reasons, many prefer conveying the intricacies of decision-making through memoirs or historical narratives of the type written by David Halberstam on Vietnam and Bosnia and by Bob Woodward on Iraq.[44] Constructed as stories, memoirs and historical narratives place individuals at the center of the decision-making process, rather than abstract concepts and forces such as value-maximizing choices, bureaucratic routines, mind guards, and elites.

Over the Horizon: Individual-Centered Models

The central role that personal characteristics play in Donald Trump's foreign policy decision-making suggests the need to better incorporate individual-centered decision-making models into studies of U.S. foreign policy. Two possible starting points for doing so are also suggested by Trump's presidency: intuitive decision-making and impulsive decision-making. On the surface, both are consistent with Trump's statement about how

he makes decisions: "I don't think about them,..I don't think about, you know, how I make them. I make what I consider the right decision."[45]

Intuitive decision-making operates on the basis of knowledge stored in long term memory and moves to a decision automatically at a subconscious level. In contrast, *deliberative decision-making* is sequential, moving from collecting information to evaluating it and making a decision. Intuitive decision-making examines multiple pieces of information simultaneously and immediately arrives at a judgment without any conscious awareness of how the decision was reached. The dangers of intuitive decision-making include overconfidence, inappropriate application of past experiences, a lack of openness regarding the reasons that decisions are made, limited consideration of alternatives, and prejudice, which causes flawed experiences to overrule accepted facts and evidence.

Impulsive decision-making can be broken down into four dimensions:

1. **Urgency.** Feeling the need to act quickly with a strong sense of purpose and force.
2. **Lack of premeditation.** Insensitivity to potential long-term consequences.
3. **Lack of perseverance.** An inability to remain focused.
4. **Sensation seeking.** Taking pleasure in making the decision.

Based on these traits, impulsive decision-making leads to risky decisions that focus on short-term gains and jeopardize long-term goals.

The challenge is how to incorporate individual decision-making into the array of policy making models currently used to study foreign policy.[46] Possible approaches include examining whether intuitive and impulsive decision-making are more likely under certain circumstances than others or in certain issue areas. Another approach is to look at how these decision-making styles link up with different stages in the decision-making process and the models with which they are best paired. For example, former Secretary of Defense Mattis is known to have ignored or resisted directives from Trump or limited the options presented to him regarding military action against North Korea, Iraq, and Iran. Trump is known to allow dissent but not disloyalty or self-promotion in the media to advance a position.[47]

Critical Thinking Questions

1. What are the strengths and limitations of using models to understand U.S. foreign policy making?
2. How might the pluralist and elitist models explain the Cuban missile crisis?
3. Which model might be most helpful in trying to understand the foreign policy of China, Iran, or Russia, and why?

Key Terms

action channels, 224
black box, 223
bureaucratic politics, 224
elite theory, 229
groupthink, 227
model, 221
pluralism, 230
poliheuristic decision-making, 234
prospect theory, 224
rational actor, 223
small-group decision-making, 225
standard operating procedures, 225

Further Reading

Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1971).

This landmark study of the policy-making process and its impact on policy presents readers with three alternative explanations for the Cuban missile crisis.

John Donovan, *The Cold Warriors: A Policy Making Elite* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1974).

This volume examines the backgrounds, careers, thinking, and interactions of key figures in a series of case studies on American foreign policy making during the early Cold War period.

Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts, *The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1979).

This provocative study argues that, rather than contributing to the failure in Vietnam as many argue, the American political process worked as intended and can be said to have succeeded.

David Houghton, *The Decision Point* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

This book examines six post–World War II cases in U.S. foreign policy decision-making through bureaucratic, group decision-making, and psychological decision-making models.

Irving L. Janis, *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascos*, 2nd ed. (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1982).

This classic study examines the dynamics of small-group decision-making and the ways in which they lead to flawed foreign policy decisions.

Alex Mintz and Carly Wayne, *The Polythink Syndrome: U.S. Foreign Policy Decisions on 9/11, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and ISIS* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016).

Where groupthink emphasizes conformity in group decision-making, polythink emphasizes the impact of a plurality of opinions and perspectives. This book examines the dynamics and consequences of polythink and makes recommendations to improve group decision-making.

Paul Pillar, "Intelligence, Policy and War in Iraq," *Foreign Affairs* 84 (2006), 15–27.

The author, a retired intelligence professional, provides a cogent account of how intelligence and politics interacted in the lead-up to and conduct of the Iraq War.

10 Diplomacy



Dateline: Paris Agreement

Diplomacy is a process of communication between governments that is the primary means by which states seek to protect and promote their interests. The negotiation of the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change and President Donald Trump's decision to leave it are examples of this process in action.

Attended by 195 states and the European Union, the 2015 Paris Agreement was a treaty formulated at the 21st annual United Nations Climate Change Conference, and marked the culmination of six years of negotiations. Officially coming into effect in November 2016, the agreement, which needed a unanimous vote and required all sides to compromise

on their demands, broke new ground in dealing with the problem of climate change.

The Paris Agreement set a goal of reducing the global temperature increase to 1.5°C above preindustrial levels. This target is to be met by submission of nationally developed contribution plans by each country. These targets are not legally binding, and no enforcement mechanism was put in place. This marks a change from previous treaties, which sought to set legally binding commitments, producing opposition from the United States and others. Instead, a "name and shame" mechanism was put in place where peer pressure and publicity would serve as the primary enforcement mechanisms. Virtually all states are required to submit reports on a regular basis using agreed-upon measures to judge the progress of their efforts. The first public reports are due in 2023. In addition, every state is tasked with resubmitting its national plan targets every five years, so a report in 2020 is required.

A recurring area of controversy in climate negotiations has been the issue of responsibility for global climate damage. President Obama stated that "the United States not only recognizes our role in creating this problem, we embrace our responsibility to do something about it." Another aspect of this debate centers on who should bear the financial burden of actions needed to address "loss and damage" problems associated with the adverse effects of climate change. This was the first time that the phrase "loss and damage" was included in a climate treaty, at the insistence of smaller island countries. According to the Paris Agreement, developed countries should take the lead in mobilizing climate finance, but it does not establish a specific dollar amount they are obligated to provide.

A key element of U.S. support for the Paris Agreement was Obama's commitment. He personally attended the conference and lobbied the heads of key developing countries such as India and Brazil. A weakness in the U.S. commitment was the continuing conflict between Obama and Republicans in Congress. Prior to the conference, more than a hundred members of Congress sent a letter to foreign leaders indicating that Obama did not have their support.

On June 1, 2017, President Donald Trump announced that the United States was withdrawing from the Paris Agreement. A longtime climate change skeptic, he had promised to cancel the agreement during his presidential campaign. His announcement came some months later than expected, largely due to conflict within his administration. Chief strategist Steve Bannon was a strong advocate of leaving the Paris Agreement, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson argued against it, and Energy Secretary Rick Perry recommended renegotiating its terms. In making his announcement, Trump asserted that the Paris Agreement was a "draconian deal." Asserting that "I was elected to represent the citizens of Pittsburgh, not Paris," he termed it an attack on U.S. sovereignty that imposed unfair environmental standards on U.S. businesses and workers. There is no

penalty for withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, but states who signed cannot leave until November 4, 2020, making that the effective date of U.S. withdrawal.

After his announcement, Trump contacted European leaders, indicating a willingness to renegotiate the Agreement. Germany, Italy, and France quickly responded that the Paris Agreement was irreversible. Disagreement with U.S. allies continues. At the 2018 G-7 meeting, Trump did not sign a joint statement on climate issues; he did not attend the session of the 2019 meeting devoted to climate issues.

The Paris Agreement marks the third time since the initial United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was signed in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The first two agreements were the Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen Accord (see the Historical Lesson).

The Paris Agreement serves as an example of what diplomacy can accomplish and how fragile those accomplishments can be. This chapter first examines the fundamental choices and dilemmas facing policy makers in using diplomacy. It then turns to the major forms of diplomacy in which the U.S. has engaged, beginning with a broad overview of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy and then looking at more specific types including summit diplomacy, UN diplomacy, public diplomacy, and variations on the political use of force.

Diplomacy: Choices and Dilemmas

For many, diplomacy remains the classic policy instrument best suited to producing lasting and workable solutions to foreign policy problems. Others point out that the use of diplomacy is not without its dangers. Negotiations also hold the potential for exacerbating hostilities, strengthening an aggressor, preparing the way for an attack, and eroding the moral and legal foundations of peace[1] because they can be used to stall for time, obtain information, and make propaganda plays.

The Diplomatic Tool Kit

Diplomacy is closely identified with government-to-government **bargaining** and **negotiation**, but the diplomatic tool kit extends well beyond these processes. Most significantly, diplomatic efforts have often involved the use of military and economic power. States now also rely on individuals and private sector groups to reach out and communicate with foreign governments as part of the negotiation process, a strategy known as Track II diplomacy. In addition, as captured by the concept of public diplomacy (described later in the chapter), diplomacy today also reaches out directly to the people of another state in hopes of laying a foundation favorable to U.S. foreign policy initiatives.

An enlarged diplomatic tool kit is not without problems. Not all tools are equally effective in dealing with every problem, but often the temptation is to keep using those that work and avoid tools that have recently failed. Advocates of using military power have long struggled to adjust to this reality. Using multiple diplomatic tools can also create confusion if different messages are received; under certain circumstances, they can also be self-defeating, if one undermines the effectiveness of another.

Bilateralism versus Multilateralism

While countries may prefer to act unilaterally because of the high degree of freedom it affords, unilateralism is rarely a viable option. For most, including the United States, foreign policy involves partnering or at least interacting with others. The two most common forms of diplomacy are *bilateral diplomacy*, in which two states interact directly with each other, and *multilateral diplomacy*, in which many states participate. Bilateral relations are assuming a new prominence today because, without the Cold War to frame negotiations, diplomacy has become heavily influenced by country- and situation-specific considerations. Multilateral diplomacy has not vanished completely, however. Many issues of concern to policy makers require the cooperation of multiple countries if they are to be addressed effectively. In such cases, bilateral diplomacy loses much of its appeal due to the large amount of time and the high cost that come into play in reconciling the different views of many countries on a case-by-case basis.

Multilateralism is not without its own drawbacks as a diplomatic problem-solving strategy.[2] One set of obstacles is domestic. Public opinion tends to support acting through the United Nations and other multilateral bodies, but only up to a point, because unilateralism runs deep in the American national style[3] (see chapter 3). A second set of obstacles is international. How does you enter into a multilateral partnership? The choice at its most fundamental level is between **alliances**—such as membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or economic organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO)—and creating ad hoc **coalitions** of states that share a common interest with regard to a specific problem, be it genocide, Iraq, or the environment.

Process versus Product

Another point of tension is whether diplomacy should be viewed as a process or a product (an outcome). According to some observers, this long-standing tension is growing; while interest in diplomacy-as-process is on the rise, the preconditions needed for diplomacy-as-product are on the decline.[4] Three of the most important factors standing in the way of the success of diplomatic efforts today are (1) the absence of shared principles

on which to base international agreements, (2) the increased presence of non-negotiable goals, and (3) the growing role of public opinion in foreign policy making. The first two make compromise difficult and greatly reduce the common ground on which solutions can be built. The third complicates the ability of governments to implement agreements.

Incentives versus Sanctions

One of the most difficult decisions that must be made in conducting diplomacy is the choice between employing sanctions and offering incentives. **Sanctions** are penalties generally directed at adversaries. The most frequently employed sanctions are economic in nature, and will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. *Diplomatic sanctions* include threatening to withhold or actually withholding recognition of a government, recalling an ambassador either temporarily (for "consultations") or more permanently, and closing an embassy. One such episode during the Trump administration involved the European Union (EU). In 2018, without any formal announcement, the administration downgraded the diplomatic status of the EU's representative in Washington. Trump had been referring to the EU as a "foe" in economic competition with the United States. The EU also opposed his Iran policy. In 2019, that decision was reversed, and the EU representative was again given ambassador rank.

The historical record shows that sanctions have often been used against both allies and friends. Many argue that sanctions potentially are most effective against friends; when relations are minimal or already strained, sanctions may do little additional damage, so there is little reason for states to comply U.S. trading partners have been the frequent target of economic sanctions by Trump as he sought to redress "bad deals." For example, he put steel and aluminum tariffs in place against Mexico and Canada while the new North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was being ratified (see Dateline section in chapter 11).

Diplomatic sanctions strike many as being more symbolic than economic sanctions and, thus, less costly to employ. However, there are costs associated with the use of diplomatic sanctions.[5] First, there is a loss of intelligence. When the United States closed its embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, it lost the ability to engage in human intelligence collection and was forced to rely heavily on Pakistan's intelligence service for information about the Taliban government. Second, diplomatic sanctions may also lead to misperceptions because of the inability to communicate directly. Because China's warnings to the United States that it would intervene in the 1950 Korean War went through India (there was no U.S. embassy in China), they were not believed. Third, a country loses the ability to promote a positive image, which can be a valuable resource for building negotiations with other states and influencing global public opinion.

Engagement of other states through offers of incentives is less well studied than sanctions.[6] Incentives can include the removal of sanctions or offers of additional trade or foreign aid. Diplomatic recognition, joint military training exercises, and building people-to-people contacts are also examples of incentives. Offering incentives to a friend or ally is easy, but it is much more controversial when the target state is a foe. Yet it is precisely with these states that the strategy of engagement may offer its greatest benefits, because it provides an avenue for dialogue that did not previously exist. Trump's nuclear negotiations with North Korea, his administration's support for peace talks with the Taliban, and Obama's talks with Cuba illustrate this point.

Trump's Approach to Diplomacy

It is useful to summarize President Trump's approach before examining in more depth the various pathways and diplomatic instruments used in U.S. diplomacy. Trump views diplomacy in very personal terms. This is demonstrated both in his preference for bilateral diplomacy over multilateral diplomacy for negotiating deals and in his view of deal making as a personal undertaking. Bargaining style, establishing friendly relationships, and seizing the moment matter more to him than institutional processes of gathering data, evaluating options, and laying the foundation for talks. As he said when asked about the large number of State Department vacancies and their impact on his foreign policy, "I'm the only one that matters."

Trump's general orientation to diplomacy has three recurring themes. First, he seeks to undo "bad deals" by ending them or by placing pressure on other states to reverse their policies. Second, because campaign rhetoric tends to dominate his diplomatic statements, his diplomacy has a short-term focus. Trump seeks to unravel existing foreign policy but gives far less attention to the long-term implications of fixing the bad deal. Third, Trump tends to center his diplomacy in self-contained silos, focusing on narrow objectives. A case in point is South Korea, a long-time critical ally of the United States in Asia. In February 2017, Trump announced that he was considering terminating a trade agreement with South Korea because of its high trade surplus with the United States. This statement left unrecognized South Korea's strong support of economic sanctions against North Korea, and came at a time when North Korea (which he then considered a hostile state) had just conducted a new round of missile tests. Rather than stressing the need for continued military collaboration, Trump blasted South Korea for its interest in negotiating with North Korea ("appeasement"). His comment also left unrecognized the fact that South Korea had only recently changed its position, allowing the United States to place a missile defense system there.

The remainder of the chapter examines major forms of diplomatic activity, starting with a closer look at bilateral diplomacy.

Allies, Friends, Adversaries

Countries enter into three different types of bilateral relationships: allies, friends, and adversaries. Each has its own unique set of characteristics. Dealings with allies are marked by high levels of commitment to the negotiation process, recognition of the existence of a wide area of common interests, and willingness to address the specific issues involved in a dispute. Leaks of the existence of covert National Security Agency (NSA) programs to intercept communications among foreign leaders brought home the reality that being an ally does not preclude being the target of intelligence-gathering efforts. The NSA captured communications among allies including the European Union, Germany, Mexico, Spain, France, and Brazil. The reputed goal was to obtain information regarding their policy positions on global issues. The diplomatic fallout from the leaks escalated into a high-profile conflict between the United States and its allies. In response, a senior NSA official said that identifying the intentions of foreign leaders is a "fundamental given" for intelligence services.[7]

Relations with adversaries are also marked by a high degree of commitment and attention; the difference is a lack of any sense of shared interests. Instead, there is an underlying sense of conflict and distrust. As a result, much of the bilateral dialogue centers on finding formula-based solutions for problems such as those reached in U.S.–Soviet arms control agreements.

Finally, bilateral relations among friends are relations between states that are on good terms but lack extensive dealings with one another. As a result, it is often difficult to strike a deal, as each side advances its own particular interest in the absence of widely perceived common interests. U.S. relations with India is one example.

A fourth category of (non)relations can also be said to exist. During the George W. Bush administration, the most prominent countries with which the United States lacked formal diplomatic relations were the three members of the so-called "axis of evil": Iran, North Korea, and Iraq. Consistent with Obama's pledge to reach out to all states, the United States began reestablishing relations with several countries, the most prominent of which was Cuba.

In some cases, the nature of the bilateral relationship is easy to determine. The United States and Great Britain are long-standing allies. In other cases, it is not as easy. China is a potential military adversary, but it is also a potential friend and ally in managing international economic relations. The uncertain nature of bilateral relations is a major problem for U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia has long been a staunch U.S. ally, helping keep the price of oil low and funding U.S. covert operations in the Middle East and Africa. The United States has relied heavily on Saudi Arabia to fund antigovernment rebel forces in Syria; the Trump administration continues to see it as an ally and has promoted arms sales. Yet, long-standing speculation that Saudi Araba gave financial support to the 9/11 terrorists,

its efforts to improve relations with Russia along with increased formal cooperation between Russia and OPEC, and the government's role in the murder of Jamal Khashoggi have led many to view it as more of a questionable friend than an ally, resulting in congressional opposition to arms sales.

Shuttle Diplomacy

In many respects, the choice between bilateral and multilateral diplomacy is a false one. Bilateral diplomacy can be an important component of any multilateral diplomatic undertaking. This is notably the case in **shuttle diplomacy**. Here, because the political distance between two states is so great that they are unable to engage in face-to-face negotiations, a trusted third party travels between them in an effort to end the diplomatic stalemate.

Shuttle diplomacy is most famously associated with Henry Kissinger, who served as National Security Advisor and later Secretary of State under President Richard Nixon. His shuttle diplomacy occurred following the 1973 Yom Kippur War. A coordinated surprise attack by Egyptian and Syrian forces seriously weakened Israeli forces and raised the possibility of defeat. Eventually, Israeli forces launched a successful counterattack. A UN-arranged truce failed, and fighting continued until October 25, when efforts by the United States and Soviet Union ended the fighting. A UN peace conference began in December 1973 and ended in failure in early January 1974. On January 14, 1974, Kissinger flew to Egypt to discuss terms of a possible peace agreement. For the next week Kissinger would repeatedly fly between Egypt and Israel in an effort to narrow the differences between the two states. On January 18, a peace agreement placing UN peacekeeping forces in the Sinai as a buffer between the two states was announced. Kissinger then turned his attention to the Syria-Israel standoff. Beginning in mid-March and running through most of April, he met separately and regularly with Syrian and Israeli embassy officials in Washington. Feeling that the foundations of an agreement had been identified, Kissinger left on May 1 for another round of shuttle diplomacy that ultimately produced a peace agreement on May 31.

Obama's Secretary of State John Kerry also engaged in shuttle diplomacy. Over the course of five months in 2013, Kerry made six trips to the Middle East and engaged in what were termed "marathon sessions" with leaders on both sides for the purpose of restarting negotiations. His efforts failed. Rex Tillerson undertook a shuttle diplomacy mission in the Middle East in 2017 to resolve a crisis that pitted Qatar against Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain. The dispute threatened to undermine counterterrorism efforts in the region and endangered two U.S. military bases. The four states had placed an economic embargo on Qatar for its support of terrorism and its close ties with Iran, but the State Department felt that older, long-standing grievances between Saudi Arabia

and Qatar were at the heart of the dispute. A list of thirteen demands were placed for the embargo to be lifted, all of which Qatar rejected. Tillerson spent a week shuttling among Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar but failed to end the conflict.

Summit Diplomacy

The most visible of all forms of diplomacy is summit diplomacy, in which heads of state meet personally with one another at conferences. **Summit conferences** perform a number of valuable services.[8] Foremost is establishment of a personal relationship between leaders that sensitizes each to the domestic constraints operating in the other's political system. A second potentially valuable service is energizing the bureaucracy and setting a deadline for decision-making. The benefit here is not so much the summit itself but the preparations for it.

Aligned against these virtues of summit diplomacy are a number of potentially negative consequences.[9] First, the personal contacts established through face-to-face negotiations may result in an inaccurate reading of the adversary's character and the constraints under which they operate. This appears to have happened at the 1961 Kennedy-Khrushchev summit in Vienna. Khrushchev reportedly came away with the impression that Kennedy could be intimidated; many link the Soviet attempt to place missiles in Cuba to this meeting. Similarly, summit deadlines offer the recalcitrant state a golden opportunity to exploit the other's eagerness for resolution.[10] Misreading of intentions also appears to have played a role in the failure to achieve a U.S.–North Korea nuclear agreement. Trump came away from the 2018 meeting in Singapore claiming that he and Kim Jung-un had established a close personal bond and that Kim had written him "beautiful letters." Kim appears to have come away from that meeting with the view that Trump's flowery comments were evidence of his desperation to make a deal. Their second summit, in 2019, adjourned unexpectedly without an agreement.

Energizing the bureaucracy does not necessarily guarantee the emergence of a coherent policy, which is only realized when the planning process is given time and political attention. Moreover, it may only intensify the ongoing bureaucratic struggle, resulting in only a lowest-common-denominator position being brought to the summit. Summit deadlines may also politicize or impede decision-making. This point is raised most forcefully with reference to annual economic summitry, but as the many accounts of U.S.–Soviet arms control talks reveal, it is equally applicable to other forms of international diplomacy.[11] Other commentators suggest that periodic meetings are a questionable device for addressing a continuously evolving problem. Agreements reached in April become obsolete in November, when the next summit is still months away.

More generally, summit conferences have been criticized for unfairly raising public expectations. They are part of a cycle characterized by "a burst of publicity about new initiatives or special envoys, followed by policy drift and an unwillingness to push either side," until "eventually the effort goes dormant, sometimes for months, until yet another approach is crafted."[12]

East-West Superpower Summits

East-West summit conferences were a frequent, if irregularly spaced, feature of the Cold War. The early summits, from 1955 to 1967, dealt with European security issues. Later they became an important mechanism for institutionalizing détente (see chapter 1). All told, they produced more than twenty-four agreements, including SALT I and SALT II. Reagan and Gorbachev conducted a series of post-détente summit conferences, the most famous of which was the Reykjavik summit in 1986. There, Reagan proposed abolishing all ballistic missiles, and Gorbachev countered with a proposal to eliminate all strategic arms. Nothing came of these initiatives because they would have prohibited Reagan from engaging in Strategic Defensive Initiative testing beyond the laboratory, something he was determined to do. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, East-West summits declined in overall strategic importance.[13] Increasingly, they focused on economic assistance and ways to enlist Russian help in the War on Terrorism.

Economic Summits

Beginning in 1975, the heads of state of the six major Western economies (the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and Italy) have been meeting at an annual summit. Originally known as the Group of 6 (G6), today (with the addition of Canada) it is the Group of 7 (it was the G8 until Russia was expelled after the Ukraine crisis). These meetings began as a means for informal discussion among the leaders of the major economic powers as they dealt with the effects of the post–Arab-Israeli War oil crisis, global inflation, and the removal of the dollar from the gold standard.

In mid-2007, a financial crisis began to work its way through the international economic system. As the need for a global response to the financial crisis (rather than separate national responses) became evident, the search for a proper forum for conducting negotiations began. The G8 was seen as having too narrow a membership to construct a global solution, so attention shifted to the Group of 20 (G20). The G20 was created as a response to the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis and included developed and developing economies such as Saudi Arabia, Brazil, India, China,

Mexico, and South Africa. The G20 held its first formal summit in 2008 to address the financial crisis. At the September 2009 G8 summit, it was agreed that the G20 would replace the G8 as the main forum for international economic discussions. Regardless of the setting, over time political and military questions have also become prominent agenda items.[14] As early as 1996, the G8 agenda was broadened to include terrorism and international crime. At the 2013 G20 summit, Obama sought to build global support for a military strike against Syria for its use of chemical weapons. At the 2019 G7 summit, Trump sought to have Russia invited back as a member, but failed.

The Trump-Putin Summit

Given Trump's approach to diplomacy, it is no surprise that he has actively engaged in personal one-on-one conversations with the leaders of other countries. Not all of these would classify as summits; some are better categorized as meetings due their informal nature and purpose as photo opportunities rather than problem-solving sessions. Three that fit the category of summits are those Trump has had with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un. Those with Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un will be addressed in later chapters. Here the focus is on Trump's meeting with Putin in Helsinki in 2018. While all very different in setting, each failed to confirm Trump's self-proclaimed ability as a negotiator.

Trump and Putin have met and talked on the phone multiple times. The first face-to-face meeting between Trump and Putin took place in July 2017 during the G20 economic summit. Scheduled as a short introductory meeting, it turned into a two-hour discussion of global issues and possible solutions. Their most often discussed meeting took place on July 18, 2018 in Helsinki. As with their other meetings, much of what was said at Helsinki remains unknown. Trump and Putin met for two hours without advisors or note takers. No agenda was published for their discussion, and no communique was issued afterward.

Controversy quickly arose on two points. The first centered on the topics discussed and the agreements reached. After the meeting, Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats acknowledged that he did not have any details about what was discussed. Russian leaders asserted that "important verbal agreements "had been reached, including keeping the new START and INF arms control agreements. They also suggested that Putin had put forward proposals on how the U.S. and Russia could cooperate on Syria. Complicating matters further, Trump appeared to accept Putin's assertion that Russia had not interfered in the 2016 presidential election, even though the intelligence community concluded this was the case. Trump also did not reject out of hand Putin's proposal to let Robert Mueller interview Russians indicted for hacking in the 2016 election in exchange

for allowing Russia to question U.S. officials, including former Ambassador Mike McFaul who they accused of interfering in Russian affairs.

Second, during the Helsinki summit Putin drew attention to Trump's approach to diplomacy. No National Security Council meetings were held in preparation for the summit, nor was a post-summit meeting held. Prior to the meeting, advisors had covered such matters as the Crimea conflict and the 2016 election and urged Trump to take a firm position with Putin. Instead, they noted that Trump made a "game-time decision" to handle it differently, referring to Putin as a competitor rather than an adversary. Where Putin struck observers as in control and with a strategy for moving forward, Trump appeared to improvise with vague promises. A similar scenario appeared to have unfolded during their first meeting. After he was no longer Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that at the first meeting Putin out-prepared Trump, putting the United States at a disadvantage; Trump countered this overall assessment of his performance at Putin summits, saying that "we did very well at those meetings."

Conference Diplomacy

Conference diplomacy starts from the logic that some problems in international politics affect the interests of too many states to be solved unilaterally, bilaterally, or at summit conferences. Instead, what is needed is to bring all of the concerned states together at a regional or global level. Three different forms of conference diplomacy can be identified. The first centers on the operation of formal international organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). The second involves regularly scheduled meetings of states that share a common concern. Conferences on human rights and environmental protection fall into this category. The third is impromptu or irregularly scheduled meetings designed to address a common problem, the end product of which can be described as a *coalition of the willing*. Prominent recent examples include George W. Bush's creation of a coalition of the willing to support the Iraq War, and the coalition of states that came together to take military action against Gaddafi, which led to his downfall and death during the Obama administration.

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO)

In the area of trade, the United States has relied heavily on international conferences to accomplish its foreign policy objectives. Historically, the most important of these centered on meetings of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The last GATT conference, which ran from 1986 to 1994, was known as the Uruguay Round. It culminated with the signing of an agreement that established the World Trade Organization

(WTO) to supervise international trade law and formally bring the GATT process to an end.

From its first meeting in Geneva in 1947, GATT had been seen as a transitional body that would deal with international trade matters only until an International Trade Organization (ITO) was set up. Because of political opposition in the United States to the broad powers that were to be given to the ITO, President Harry Truman never submitted the treaty to Congress for approval. Similar concerns about the loss of U.S. sovereignty were expressed when the WTO was proposed. Only a last-minute compromise reserving the right of the United States to leave should the WTO consistently rule against the United States cleared the way for the treaty's approval by the Senate. An especially important early GATT trade negotiation round was the Kennedy Round (1964–1967), which reduced barriers to international free trade and marked the high point of international trade cooperation.

Four conflict areas dominated the agenda at the Uruguay Round, and continue to be the principal areas in which meaningful agreements have eluded WTO negotiators. The first is trade in agriculture. At the heart of the problem is the need for more markets for agricultural goods, the widespread presence of subsidies and quotas that protect farmers from foreign competition, and the unwillingness of governments to antagonize the politically powerful agricultural interests in their states. A second area of disagreement involves strengthening international protection for intellectual property. U.S. firms charge that Third World states routinely disregard copyrights and patents in the production of such items as books, pharmaceuticals, and computer software. A third area of controversy centers on the demands of the United States and Europe for international labor standards with regard to child labor, convict labor, minimum wages, and unions. Fourth, over Third World objections, the United States and Europe have pressed for the establishment of a body to examine the environmental impact of global trade agreements.

WTO meetings have struggled to achieve success. The 2001 WTO meeting in Doha took place two months after the 9/11 attacks and was viewed by many in the United States and abroad as an opportunity to promote global cohesion. The talks were set to produce an agreement in 2005, but it was not until December 2013 that an agreement was reached. Trump's election as president created a new and deeper set of problems. Trump characterized the WTO as "a disaster" and "very unfair." One reason that he identified his tariffs on steel and aluminum as national security issues was to circumvent Congress' ability to block them. Another is that his tariff policies ran counter to the spirit and intent of the WTO but were permitted if defined as a matter of national security. Trump also has been slow to approve new members to the WTO appeals board, which undermines its ability to resolve trade disputes. At the same time, the United States has filed several cases and complaints with the WTO, citing trade violations by China, the European Union, Mexico, and others.

Historical Lesson

The Kyoto Protocol and Copenhagen Accord

Under the terms of the initial UNFCCC, signatory states were required to develop programs to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases. No targets or requirements were included in the treaty. President George H. W. Bush signed the agreement and the Senate ratified it following Bush's promise that targets and timetables from future agreements would be sent to the Senate for ratification.

The agreement reached at the1992 UNFCCC mandated annual meetings to continue work on the problem of global warming. The first follow-on agreement came in 1997 with the signing of the Kyoto Protocol, formally an amendment to the Rio Treaty. The legal requirement of the Kyoto Protocol was a 5 percent reduction in greenhouse emissions from 1990 levels by 2012 by all developed states that signed and ratified the agreement. Six greenhouse gases were identified as requiring action. Three strategies were specified, including removal of greenhouse gases from the atmosphere by such measures as planting trees, investing in clean technologies, and trading emissions. Regarding the latter measure, states that had reduced greenhouse emissions to a point lower than the required target could sell emissions credits to countries that were not meeting them. Countries that failed to meet their targets would be assessed a 30 percent penalty in future reduction rounds. Developing countries, of which China claimed—and continues to claim—to be one, were exempt from any requirement to reduce greenhouse emissions.

For the Kyoto Protocol to come into force, fifty-five countries responsible for at least 55 percent of the total carbon dioxide emissions in 1900 had to ratify the agreement. The fifty-fifth country signed in 2002, but the percentage requirement was not met until 2004, when Russia ratified it. The United States signed the Kyoto Protocol under President Bill Clinton, who called it "environmentally strong and economically sound." While it was being negotiated, Congress passed a resolution stating that the United States should not sign any climate agreement without targets and timetables for all countries, or any agreement that seriously hurt the American economy. President George W. Bush withdrew the United States from the agreement in 2002 without sending it to the Senate for ratification, calling it "fatally flawed."

The second attempt at negotiating a climate treaty came in December 2009 when the fifteenth annual meeting following the signing of the Rio Treaty took place in Copenhagen. The basic outline of the agenda and the agreement to be negotiated had been set two years earlier at the 2007 meeting in Bali. The two weeks of negotiations to flesh out the "Bali roadmap" that took place in Copenhagen were described as raucous, disorganized, and frantic. Documents leaked by Edward Snowden in 2014 revealed that the United States had spied on other delegations and possessed details about their negotiating

positions. One account characterized the negotiations as a textbook case of how *not* to do a deal.

No agreement was in hand as the conference was about to adjourn on December 18. Press reports suggested that only a weak political statement might be announced. At that point, state leaders, including President Obama, had only recently arrived for a ceremonial signing of the final document. What followed in the remaining thirteen hours was intense, round-the-clock negotiations among the United States, China, India, Brazil, and South Africa. Obama was particularly active, rejecting calls from some states that the United States should simply sign the Kyoto Protocol, making an agreement in Copenhagen unnecessary. It has been reported that he entered, without invitation, a meeting between Chinese leaders with other heads of state. In the end, an agreement was reached.

Advocates called it a historic step forward. Others complained that they had not yet seen it and had been excluded from these last-minute negotiations. This proved to be its downfall. Under United Nations procedures, unanimous consent is needed for any agreement to become official. This rule held at Kyoto and Paris. At Copenhagen, angered at their exclusion and objecting to some of its terms, some countries, notably Bolivia, Venezuela, Sudan, and Tuvalu, objected. As a result, when the meeting conference ended on December 19, rather than being adopted, the agreement, officially known as the Copenhagen Accord, was merely "taken note of." It was not a legally binding document.

The initial response in the United States was mixed. Obama called it a "meaningful and unprecedented" agreement. Among the breakthroughs it contained were recognition of the need to keep temperatures from rising more than 2°C, pledges of aid to developing countries, and recognition that all countries must reduce emissions. An aide to Senator Richard Lugar called it a "home run." Senator McCain called it a "nothing burger." The longer-term political reaction in the United States and elsewhere was to pull back from seeking a new global climate agreement. The next climate meeting was held in Cancun in December 2010. The Center for Climate and Energy Solutions noted that the Cancun meetings basically stayed close to the script of the Copenhagen Accord, leaving all options open and setting no clear path forward to a binding climate agreement.

Applying the Lesson

1. Should all states have an equal say in negotiating a climate treaty? Should there be a unanimity rule? Explain your answers.
2. How would you rank the Paris Agreement, the Copenhagen Accord, and the Kyoto Protocol in terms of their significance, and why?
3. What criteria should be used to measure the success and failure of international conferences, and why?

Environmental Conferences

As you can readily see from the three environmental conferences discussed earlier in this chapter (the Paris Agreement described in the chapter-opening Dateline section and the Kyoto Protocol and Copenhagen Accord discussed in the Historical Lesson feature), conference diplomacy is a central but not necessarily effective vehicle for international environmental policy making. Just as with international economic conference diplomacy, the complexity of these issues—coupled with the imperatives of American domestic politics—has made it difficult for the United States to exert leadership and has often placed it at odds with the rest of the world. This section introduces and reviews two of the earliest efforts at environmental conference diplomacy.

The first effort was the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.[15] The convergence of many factors, not the least of which was the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident, brought about a policy shift in the Reagan administration position on environmental protection that made the agreement possible. The Montreal Protocol was hailed both for the cuts it was able to make in the production and consumption of ozone-depleting materials and for its procedural approach to the problem. It established a framework for addressing environmental problems and committed states to periodic review conferences at which target figures and timetables could be adjusted.

The second conference was the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Better known as the Earth Summit, it resulted in the signing of seven major pacts and initiatives. It also found the United States on the defensive again, as the only major state not to sign a biodiversity treaty. The George H. W. Bush administration objected to provisions calling for all states to protect endangered animal and plant species, on the grounds that it did not provide patent protection to U.S. biotechnology firms. The treaty was later signed by Bill Clinton. Also virtually alone in its objections to a treaty on protection against global warming, the United States agreed to support it only after references to binding targets and timetables were dropped in favor of a more general pledge to reduce the emissions of gases that cause global warming.

Human Rights Conferences

The subject matter of international human rights conferences varies greatly. Topics range from commonly defined rights, such as those associated with the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to concerns of more specific groups of individuals, such as women and children, the disabled, or refugees and displaced persons. The United States generally has been an active participant in these conferences. For example, the United States

played an active role in the September 2015 Global Leaders' Meeting on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment held in Beijing. This conference is notable for putting forward a breakthrough blueprint for advancing women's rights and is remembered for Hillary Clinton's statement that "women's rights are human rights."

The United States has tended to participate in human rights conferences only when the proposed treaty or agenda involves advancing and protecting traditionally defined political and civil liberties. One prominent decision to abstain took place in 1996; the United States was absent from the Ottawa Conference on land mines, which resulted in a treaty banning the production and development of antipersonnel mines, which has now been signed by over 150 countries. One reason given by the United States for not signing the treaty is the continued need for such mines along the demilitarized zone along the border between North and South Korea.

The United States has also refused to participate in international conferences on racism because of concerns over language in proposed treaties. A recurring example is a UN conference to end racism and discrimination. Obama did not send a delegation to the 2009 Durban Review Conference because it equated racism with Zionism. The George W. Bush administration balked at participating in the 2001 conference because of this language and the inclusion of a proposal calling for reparations for slavery.

Overall, the promotion of human rights has not played a major role in the Trump administration's foreign policy. In 2017, for the first time, the United States did not participate in a review meeting of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). Created in 1959 as an autonomous unit within the Organization of American States, the IACHR reviews petitions filed about violations of human rights. The 2017 meeting was called to review a petition concerning Trump's travel ban. Trump also has been largely silent on questions of human rights violations in authoritarian regimes such as the Philippines, North Korea, China, Russia, and Egypt, raising the issue only when he opposes the regime in power (such as Iran and Venezuela).

UN Diplomacy

Viewed from one perspective, the U.S. diplomatic relationship with the United Nations (UN) has shown great variation over time. In its early years, the United Nations existed as a virtual extension of the State Department, so support from the UN General Assembly could be taken as a given. This began to change in the 1960s, as colonial areas gained independence and sought to use the United Nations as a tool for advancing their own agendas. The United States used its veto power for the first time in 1970, and today often finds itself on the defensive.

At the same time, there is great consistency in how the United States has approached the United Nations. U.S. policy toward the UN represents an amalgam of four different roles:[16]

1. **International reformer.** Viewed from this perspective, the UN is an important instrument deserving of U.S. support, because it holds the potential to transform world politics.
2. **Custodian.** The United States sometimes usurps or resists the powers of the UN because its agenda conflicts with the greater purposes of the UN as identified and defined by the United States.
3. **Spokesperson for the American public.** A problem here is that policy makers do not necessarily have a clear sense of what the public thinks.
4. **Protector of American national interests.** This is exemplified by such actions as applying international sanctions against Iraq, vetoing resolutions condemning Israel, and opposing an international criminal court.

The Obama administration's UN diplomacy reflected a relative balance among these four role orientations. In the Trump administration, this balance has been replaced by a strong emphasis on the UN as an instrument for advancing the U.S. national interest. It has turned to the Security Council for imposing sanctions on North Korea and fought with Russia over sanctions against Syria. It punished countries with the loss of U.S. foreign aid if they voted to condemn the U.S. decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital city. It cancelled U.S. funding for all Palestine programs of the UN Relief and Works Agency and withdrew from the UN Human Rights Council for its frequent criticism of Israel's treatment of Palestinians. In addition, Trump announced that the United States would not pay more than 25 percent of the cost of UN peacekeeping operations.

Public Diplomacy and Digital Diplomacy

Public diplomacy consists of the statements and actions of leaders that are intended to influence public opinion in other countries. Public diplomacy is more than just words, however. It is a set of institutions, programs, and practices designed to accomplish three strategic objectives:

1. Inform the world accurately, clearly, and swiftly about U.S. policy
2. Represent the values and beliefs of the American people
3. Explain how democracy produces prosperity, stability, and opportunity

In contrast, classic diplomacy emphasizes secrecy and confidential bargaining among government officials; Therefore, it has been largely neglected and often disparaged as propaganda. An inherent tension exists in public diplomacy undertakings: Is it an alternate source of information

for citizens in these countries or an instrument of U.S. foreign policy? The Voice of America (VOA) is the best example of an information source, and Radio Marti is the most prominent example of how it serves as a foreign policy tool. VOA, which began broadcasting during World War II, eventually came under the control of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA). During the Cold War, USIA radio broadcasts reached into the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe through Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe. Both were heavily funded (covertly) by the Central Intelligence Agency. Radio Marti was set up by the Reagan administration in 1983 to broadcast into Cuba. From the outset, its broadcasts contained a strong anti-Castro flavor.

The War on Terrorism breathed new life into America's public diplomacy, through the increased interest in using social media technologies. Some refer to this development as the beginnings of **digital diplomacy;** others call it Public Diplomacy II. In 2003, a U.S. Office of eDiplomacy was established. By 2012, it was operating an estimated six hundred social media platforms, including blogs (DipNote), Twitter accounts (@StateDept), and Facebook pages (eJournal USA). A Rapid Response Unit was created to monitor social media responses to ongoing situations that impact U.S. national interests.

Recent presidents have engaged in public diplomacy with varying degrees of success. Clinton is widely recognized as one of its most skilled practitioners, bringing an American-style political campaign atmosphere to his trips abroad that won foreign publics over to his cause. This stands in sharp contrast to Reagan's forays into public diplomacy, which tended to have a hit-and-run quality to them. Reagan's references to the Soviet Union as the "evil empire" played well at home but scared the public abroad. George W. Bush's black-and-white perception of the world and use of phrases associated with the American frontier were similarly off-putting to foreign audiences. Obama's efforts at public diplomacy had a mixed record. On the positive side, his foreign policy rhetoric contributed greatly to his win of the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize. On the negative side, it led to feelings of disappointment, as his rhetoric was not matched by similarly bold action.[17]

Trump has largely abandoned public diplomacy as a soft power tool. Instead he has used public statements as hard power tools to force others to agree to his policy initiatives. This has been especially true for U.S. allies and their leaders, about whom Trump often has tweeted caustic and critical comments. He called Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau Canada's "easily worst president yet." He tweeted, "Emmanuel Macron suggests building its own army to protect Europe against the US, China and Russia. But it was Germany in World Wars One & Two—How did that work out for France." More often than not, such comments have been followed up by assertions of positive close working relations. On occasion his comments to the world community have also brought derision and disrespect,

as when his claim at the UN in 2018 that his presidency had the most accomplishments of any U.S. president led to laughter.

The newfound emphasis on public and digital diplomacy is not without its critics. There are two broad areas of criticism. At the strategic level, those who see soft power as being difficult to use perceive public diplomacy as only helping at the margins and incapable of addressing the underlying images of distrust or dislike that may exist abroad.[18] At the tactical level, many are critical of continued attempts to use public diplomacy channels for partisan political purposes, such as presenting U.S. foreign policy in overly favorable terms or keeping critical stories about the president off the air.[19]

The Political Use of Force

By its very existence, American military power serves as an instrument of diplomacy. Without ever having to be used or even referenced, it heightens U.S. prestige and gives importance to U.S. proposals and expressions of concern. The knowledge that both conventional and nuclear military power exist in the shadows of international crises influences both the manner in which U.S. policy makers approach problems and the positions adopted by other states.

Coercive Diplomacy

The use of conventional military force for political purposes by the United States is not new. Researchers identified 218 incidents between 1946 and 1975 in which the United States did so.[20] To qualify as a political use of force, the military action had to involve a physical change in the disposition of U.S. forces and had to be done consciously to achieve a political objective without going to war or trying to physically impose the U.S. position on the target state. On average, the political use of force lasted ninety days. Actions taken ranged from a port visit by a single warship to the deployment of major land, sea, and air units in conjunction with a strategic alert and reserve mobilizations. In any given year, as many as twenty incidents or as few as three took place.

The end of the Cold War did not end America's interest in using military power for political ends. In fact, a number of factors made the political use of force very attractive. Using a slightly different definition of the political use of force than was used at the beginning of this section, a recent study examined instances of post–Cold War **coercive diplomacy**. It found that of sixteen cases in which military power was used to persuade rather than defeat the opponent, success was realized only five times. Coercive diplomacy clearly failed in eight cases. The limited success rate is not surprising. Studies of attempts at coercive diplomacy during the Cold War documented an even lower success rate.

Although none of them guarantees success, three factors seem to have contributed to the limited success enjoyed by coercive diplomacy:

1. **Positive inducements.** Offering positive inducements to the other state to adjust its policy was important.
2. **Timing of inducements**. Inducements were most effective when offered *after* the demonstrative use of force or after threatening force. Inducements had little positive effect if they were offered *before* such shows of resolve.
3. **Consequences.** It was important to be able to demonstrate clearly to the opponent what would happen to their military forces should war occur, and that failure of their military strategy was inevitable.

Interestingly, the type of demand made by the United States had little relation to success or failure.

The increased prominence of international crises caused by domestic security threats (as opposed to cross-border conflicts) has created an additional problem for the conduct of coercive diplomacy today: the challenge of legitimizing the use of force for political purposes. In 2011, in the case of Libya, this was accomplished through a UN resolution invoking the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. In the case of Syria's use of chemical weapons, Obama threatened military action without significant international support.

The Trump administration has engaged in a number of very different coercive diplomacy undertakings. The first one is an extension of the Obama administration's show of force in the South China Sea, where the United States and China have been engaged in a prolonged series of military provocations and countermoves over the political, military, and economic status of the region (see the Dateline section in chapter 2). The key uses of military force here are overflights by U.S. military aircraft and freedom of navigation exercises by the U.S. Navy. A second involves the Venezuelan crisis (see the Dateline section in chapter 4). Here, the political use of military force has threatened military action in support of opposition forces rather actually using it. A third instance of coercive diplomacy involves the escalating tensions between Iran and the United States in 2019 (see the Dateline section in chapter 9), which culminated in Iran shooting down a U.S. drone and Trump ordering a military response only to change his mind at the last moment. This was soon followed by new threats of military retaliation against Iran for the Houthi attack on Saudi Arabian oil facilities, attacks for which Iran denied responsibility.

Nuclear Diplomacy

In contemplating the use of military power for political purposes, American policy makers have not limited themselves to thinking in terms of conventional weapons. On at least two occasions, they have threatened to use

nuclear weapons in an effort to compel others into action.[21] Evidence suggests that Dwight Eisenhower made a **compellence** threat in 1953 as part of his plan to bring an end to the Korean War. Richard Nixon also made such a threat in 1969 in an attempt to end the Vietnam War. [22] Unlike the Eisenhower case, when the threat of using nuclear weapons was presented as part of a deliberate U.S. strategy, Nixon cast his in quite different terms, telling his chief of staff H. R. Haldeman:

> I call it the Madman Theory, Bob. I want the North Vietnamese to believe I've reached the point that I might do anything to stop the war. We'll just slip the word to them that "for God's sake, you know Nixon is obsessed about Communism. We can't restrain him when he is angry and he has his hand on the nuclear button." Ho Chi Minh himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace.[23]

On October 10, 1969, U.S. nuclear forces were put on alert "to respond to possible confrontation by the Soviet Union." The actions taken were designed to be picked up by Soviet intelligence but still not be visible to the American press or public. It was Nixon's hope that this would be part of a lead-up to a massive conventional offensive in Vietnam and would stampede the Soviets into working toward a diplomatic solution to the war. In fact, Nixon had already decided against such a military operation for two reasons: the domestic opposition it would unleash in the United States and military doubts about its effectiveness. Although Soviet leaders did not respond to this political use of nuclear power in any meaningful way, it does appear that Soviet intelligence recognized the change in nuclear readiness.

Two significant points emerge from a detailed look at the history of this episode. First, the military did not automatically and uniformly implement Nixon's alert order. The Strategic Air Command balked, as did Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, suggesting that Nixon was in far less control of the U.S. nuclear forces than he believed or than most commentators thought. Second, to the Nixon administration, it was obvious that this was nuclear signaling over Vietnam. However, at that same time, the Soviet Union and China were involved in an intense border dispute. Chinese leaders had been evacuated from Beijing, and its nuclear forces were on alert. From both the Chinese and Soviet perspectives, the U.S. nuclear alert could have just as easily been seen in light of this separate conflict.

Arms Transfers

Arms transfers have established themselves as a favorite instrument of policy makers.[24] The Arms Export Control Act of 1976 requires that all arms transfers valued at $25 million or more or those involving the transfer of significant combat equipment be reported to Congress. Soon thereafter, one study found that over a hundred arms transfers were being reported yearly.

No single measure exists on how to calculate the size of arms sales. Some studies use purchase price. Others calculate the unit production costs of the weapons being sold. Regardless of how it is calculated, the overall picture remains the same. In the calendar years 2014–2018, the United States was the leading exporter of major weapons systems controlling 36 percent of the world's market; Russia was second with 32 percent, and France was third with 6.8 percent. In FY2018 alone, the United States sold $55.6 billion worth of weapons. This was a 33 percent increase over FY2017 (although some of these sales had been in process for several years). The three-year rolling average for U.S. arms sales from FY2016 to FY2018 is $43.7 billion. In 2018, the export value of arms sales in constant 1990 dollars was to Saudi Arabia, which made $3.35 billion in purchases. Australia was second, with $918 million. A listing of the top five recipients of U.S. arms exports in the Middle East is found in table 10.1.

States sell and buy weapons for a number of different reasons. The relationship between buyer and seller has been compared to a reciprocal bargaining process, in which each tries to use the other to accomplish goals that are often incompatible.[25] For arms sellers, three strategic rationales are most often advanced:

1. Arms transfers can provide influence and leverage abroad by serving as a symbolic statement of support for a regime and providing access to elites.
2. They can be used to protect specific security interests abroad and further regional stability.
3. They can be used as barter in acquiring access to overseas bases.

None of these rationales is without problems. One problem is that arms sales can provoke retaliation. For example, in 2019 China threatened the U.S. with sanctions after it announced the sale of jet fighters to Taiwan, the first such arms sale since 1992. Second, leverage tends to be

TABLE 10.1 **Top 5 U.S. Arms Deliveries to Middle East (in millions of current U.S. dollars)**

Recipient	2008–2011	2012–2015
Saudi Arabia	5,800	10,500
Egypt	3,800	4.800
Israel	3,800	3,500
Iraq	2,600	4.400
United Arab Emirates	1,900	3,000

Source: Catherine Theohary, *Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2008–2015*. Congressional Research Service Report, December 19, 2016, Table 22, page 47.

a transitory phenomenon in world politics, and an arms transfer relationship can just as easily promote friction and set off regional arms races as it can cement ties. In 2019, Turkey—a member of NATO—defied Trump's threats to cancel an F-35 fighter sale and purchased a Russian anti-missile system after being unable to purchase the U.S. Patriot system. Under the 2017 Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act, the Trump administration had to impose of five of twelve sanctions. Trump sought to waive the sanctions and go forward with selling Turkey more than one hundred F-35s on the grounds that the sanctions were unfair to American companies and unfair to Turkey. It was also feared that Turkey might retaliate by placing restrictions on the use of its air bases as a launching point for raids into Syria and Iraq. Supporters in Congress and the Pentagon argued that the F-35's stealth technology would now become readily accessed by Russia, and U.S. and NATO security interests would be compromised.

There have been five major turning points in the development of U.S. arms transfer policy prior to the Trump administration. The first came in the early 1960s, when the Kennedy administration made a distinction between **arms sales** and arms transferred abroad as foreign aid. Kennedy turned to arms sales in an effort to counter the growing U.S. balance-of-payments problem, which had been brought about in part by the high cost of stationing U.S. troops in Europe. The second turning point came during the Nixon administration. Arms transfers became an important instrument of foreign policy and a cornerstone of the Nixon Doctrine, which stressed the need for Third World allies of the United States to assume the primary responsibility for their own defense (see chapter 1). Sales also replaced aid as the primary vehicle for transferring arms, and the quality of the transferred weapons increased dramatically. No longer were arms transfers dominated by obsolete weapons in the U.S. inventory. Now they regularly involved the most sophisticated weapons the United States possessed. Measured in constant dollars, U.S. arms transfers increased 150 percent between 1968 and 1977. Just as important, the Middle East now became the primary region for U.S. arms transfers.

The third turning point in the evolution of U.S. arms transfer policy came with the Carter administration. Carter sought to make arms transfers an "exceptional tool of foreign policy rather than a standard one."[26] Gradually, the Carter administration found it difficult to work within its own guidelines. The first major exception to its own rules was approving the $1.8 billion sale of the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) to Saudi Arabia. Carter eventually abandoned all signs of restraint by approving weapons sales to Israel and Egypt as part of the Camp David Accords, and to Saudi Arabia after the shah fell and the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The fourth turning point in U.S. arms transfer policy came with the arrival of the Reagan administration, which moved quickly to use arms transfers as a tool in its global struggle against communism. In its first

three months, the Reagan administration offered approximately $15 billion in weapons and other forms of military assistance to other states.

The fifth period in arms sales policy began after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. One of the most notable features of this period is the embrace of arms transfers to developing countries that were once on restricted lists. Armenia, Azerbaijan, India, and Pakistan, all of which are key allies in the War against Terrorism, now receive U.S. arms. In the case of India, 2002 marked the end of a nearly forty-year period during which no export licenses were granted. As the Obama administration came to an end, some brakes were put on the sale of weapons abroad. His Conventional Arms Transfer Policy (CAT) stressed considering the second- and third-order long-term consequences of arms sales, both for the U.S. and the recipient, in such areas as human rights and regional stability.

Trump has shifted direction again, and has energetically embraced arms sales. In April 2018, he rescinded Obama's CAT policy, calling it overly restrictive and unfair to American defense industries. He changed the logic of approval to allow the United States to act proactively rather than responsively in arms sales in order to expand export opportunities for American industry and create American jobs. In May 2019, Trump also broke from accepted arms sales policies when he announced that he was using his emergency powers to sell $8 billion worth of precision-guided weapons and combat aircraft arms to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Acting in this manner took Congress out of the standard approval process and ignored a bipartisan Congressional resolution to ban arms sales to Saudi Arabia that resulted from its involvement in the Yemen civil war.

Over the Horizon: A Climate Coalition of the Willing

According to one unnamed State Department official, the War against Terrorism expanded the role of the military and intelligence agencies to the point where "in a lot of ways, diplomacy is a historical anachronism."[27] The discussion in this chapter provides evidence that this is not yet the case, but it also has identified how difficult and complex diplomacy is today, and explained that many of its challenges have long histories.[28] Over the horizon, there may be increased emphasis on a middle course of diplomacy emerging as coalitions of the willing. Protecting the global environment is one policy arena in which there have already been calls for forming coalitions of the willing due to frustration with both the pace and content of global environmental negotiations. Under this form of diplomacy, the United States would partner with interested countries to the exclusion of others.[29] A key area in which climate coalitions of the willing may be able to expand climate protection beyond current levels is enforcement. The argument is that, given the strong norm requiring universal consensus in international conference decision-making, any form of meaningful

enforcement may be impossible. It becomes politically more feasible when a smaller group of like-minded countries can agree on credible enforcement obligations and establish sufficient incentives to pursue them.[30]

President Trump's decision to leave the Paris Agreement produced a series of moves designed to save the "spirit of Paris." Not all have been successful. Where the 2017 G 20 Summit produced a detailed plan of action to save its goals, the December 2019 annual UN climate talks attended by almost two hundred countries in Madrid produced few meaningful results after marathon negotiations and were accompanied by street riots.

U.S. states and cities also indicated continuing support, putting in place bans on agricultural pesticides, new policies on greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuel drilling, and other restrictions. A dozen states announced their commitment to carry out at least a partial version of the plan, and California governor Jerry Brown went to China for a climate meeting with President Xi Jinping. Former New York City mayor Michael Bloomberg coordinated an effort called American Cities Climate Challenge to promote sustainable development, which twenty-five cities have now joined.[31] Congress has also indicated continuing symbolic support for the Paris Agreement. On a vote largely along party lines, it passed a Climate Action Now Act, which requires Trump to develop a plan to meet Paris Agreement goals and blocks the use of federal funds for withdrawal from the Agreement.

Critical Thinking Questions

1. Under what conditions should the United States *not* enter into diplomatic negotiations with another country or group of countries? Explain your answer.
2. Is it wise for the United States to use weapons as an instrument of diplomacy? Why or why not?
3. Confronted with an international crisis, would you turn first to bilateral, multilateral, or public diplomacy? Which is most needed to solve the problem in the long run? Explain your answers.

Key Terms

alliance, 247
arms sales, 267
arms transfer, 265
bargaining, 246
coalitions, 247
coercive diplomacy, 263
compellence, 265
conference diplomacy, 255
digital diplomacy, 262
diplomacy, 244
negotiation, 246
public diplomacy, 261
sanctions, 248
shuttle diplomacy, 251
summit conference, 252

Further Reading

Katherine Brown, et. al., *Public Diplomacy and National Security in* 2017 (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2017).

This study examines the lessons learned from efforts to engage in public diplomacy over an eight-year period. It highlights successes of the Obama administration and outlines future challenges.

Robert Falkner, "A Minilateral Solution for Global Climate Change," *Perspectives on Politics* 14 (March 2016), 87–101.

Gridlock has become common at global climate conferences. The author examines the potential ability of minilateral conferences to produce agreements. He argues that while climate clubs are unlikely to overcome all barriers to reaching an agreement, they offer a more conducive setting for reaching agreements.

Fred Ikle, *How Nations Negotiate* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964).

This is a classic account of the dynamics of international diplomacy and continues to serve as a valuable organizing device for studying the negotiation process.

David Milibrand and Ravi Gurumurthy, "Improving Humanitarian Aid," *Foreign Affairs* 94 (July 2015), 118–29.

The authors argue that a need exists to reconceptualize the provision of foreign aid, and recommend starting with the concept of fragility. They argue that many of the lessons from stable contexts are not transferable and call for a greater emphasis on evidence-based outcomes.

Todd Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, *Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

The authors examine the largely neglected question of whether nuclear weapons can be used to coerce other states. They argue that nuclear weapons are not any more effective than non-nuclear weapons in making compellent threats.

Jonathan Spalter, "Open Source Diplomacy," *Democracy Journal* 23 (2012), 59–70.

In the wake of the WikiLeaks publication of large numbers of secret State Department documents, the author calls for moving away from secret diplomacy to a more open and transparent approach.

Geoffrey Wiseman, *Isolate or Engage* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015).

Through a series of case studies, this book examines the manner in which U.S. foreign policy interacts with adversarial states. The role of public diplomacy is of particular importance in shaping this relationship.

11 Economic Instruments



Dateline: New NAFTA

During his 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump repeatedly referred to the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as "the worst trade deal maybe ever signed anywhere." (See the Historical Lesson at the end of this section for details about this agreement.) He promised that on his first day in office he would announce plans to renegotiate it.

Day one came and went with no NAFTA announcement. Instead, Trump's rhetoric suggested otherwise; he threatened to abandon NAFTA much as he had already done with the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). However, in late March 2017, the administration circulated an eight-page draft that did not contain a threat of withdrawal. Instead, it put forward

negotiating points consistent with the views of many free trade pro-NAFTA Republicans in Congress.

Just under thirty days later, the pendulum swung in the opposite direction and then back toward negotiation. First, stories emerged that Trump was going to announce a new executive order putting the withdrawal process in motion. This set off a wave of activity, including phone calls from the president of Mexico, the prime minister of Canada, and congressional Republicans warning against doing so. By that evening, Trump announced that he would not withdraw. The White House asserted that the confusion following word of his upcoming announcement had energized Mexico and Canada into coming to the negotiating table. Critics noted that Canada and Mexico were already at the table, as they had already made trade concessions and were waiting for the United States. Some two weeks later, on May 18, Trump sent a short notice to Congress indicating that he planned to renegotiate NAFTA, a legal necessity (Congress had to be given ninety days' notice of such a decision). Unlike the earlier draft sent to Congress, this announcement was vague regarding the changes that would be sought.

Negotiations began in August, with the Trump administration defining NAFTA as having "fundamentally failed." Each country brought its own set of concerns to the table. The United States was concerned with reducing the trade deficit, forcing carmakers to use more parts made in the United States, and increasing U.S. influence in NAFTA's dispute resolution process. Canada's main concerns were with low wages in Mexico and right-to-work laws that weakened labor unions. Among Mexico's primary concerns was revitalization of its energy industry. All three countries agreed that NAFTA had to be modernized to take telecommunications and digital trade into account. This was not seen as difficult, since such provisions had already been incorporated into the TPP and could now be placed into the new NAFTA agreement. More contentious were calls by the United States for a sunset clause that would allow the treaty to end after five years unless all three countries agreed to renew it.

Negotiations dragged on into the spring of 2018. President Trump became increasingly impatient. In March he announced that he was considering new tariffs on steel and aluminum but told Mexico and Canada that they might be exempted if they completed renegotiations. On May 31, Trump announced that he was imposing these tariffs on Mexico, Canada, and the European Union. Administration officials also indicated that Trump now wished to proceed with bilateral negotiations rather than multilateral ones.

On August 27, 2018, Trump announced that a breakthrough in bilateral negotiations with Mexico had produced an agreement in principle to replace NAFTA. Talks between the United States and Canada moved forward quickly. On September 30, with time running out on a self-imposed deadline set by negotiators for the two countries, Canada agreed to join the new NAFTA.

The United States was last to act on approving USMCA. The House only signaled its willingness to ratify USMCA in December 2019. In doing so, a new problem arose. Mexico objected to new language that would send U.S. diplomats to Mexico to verify it was upholding labor standard. This issue was resolved by reassuring Mexico that no violation of sovereignty was involved.

This chapter begins with an overview of the concept of economic statecraft and then presents an inventory of economic options and strategic outlooks available to policy makers. This is followed by a discussion of different forms of trade agreements, economic sanctions, foreign aid, and the trade with China. It concludes by raising the question of how trade wars end.

Economic Statecraft

Defined as a deliberate manipulation of economic policy to promote the goals of the state, **economic statecraft** is an age-old instrument of foreign policy. Past examples include the Louisiana Purchase, economic intimidation directed at Great Britain to end its support of the South during the American Civil War, dollar diplomacy in the late 1800s, the Lend-Lease Act during World War II, and the Marshall Plan for rebuilding Europe after World War II. More recently, it has been described as a "lost art" of U.S. foreign policy.[1] This may no longer be the case; as shown in the Dateline feature opening this chapter, economic statecraft has been rediscovered in the Trump administration.

Supporters see the use of economic statecraft as part of the legitimate pursuit of American national interest, but critics often see the exercise of American economic power as a part of a foreign policy of **imperialism and domination**. No matter its purpose or context, American economic power exerts its influence by its ability to lure other countries to the U.S. economic system and then trap them in it. For that reason, many refer to it as America's "sticky power."[2] Less recognized is that this American sticky power can also entrap the United States, limiting its ability to pursue foreign policy initiatives. China, for example, has jumped to the forefront as a trading partner and holder of U.S. debt, thus complicating efforts to deal with it in strictly adversarial terms.

A major complicating factor in the use of economic statecraft is uncertainty over judging its successes and failures.[3] Its supporters argue that economic statecraft is dismissed as ineffective all too frequently. Advocates of economic statecraft as an instrument of foreign policy make four arguments in its defense:[4]

1. Day-to-day economic exchanges under the heading of **free trade** are generally—and incorrectly—defined to be outside the scope of economic power.

2. Economic power is often said to fail when it does not produce a change in policy in the target state. Underappreciated is the added cost that economic sanctions place on the target state, even without a policy change.
3. Economic power has often been judged a failure because it is examined out of context. Policy makers often turn to it when no other instruments are available or to accomplish the almost impossible, such as removing Fidel Castro from power.
4. Economic statecraft suffers because writers on world politics underestimate the importance of symbolic actions to policy makers and domestic pressure groups.

Inventory of Options

Should American policy makers decide to employ U.S. economic power against another state, they have several options at their disposal, including tariffs, nontariff barriers, embargoes, boycotts, and quotas.

A **tariff** is a tax on foreign-made goods entering the country. Typically, tariffs are applied either to protect domestic industry against foreign competition or to raise revenue, but they can also be manipulated to serve foreign policy goals. More than once in the post–World War II era, the United States made notable efforts to manipulate its tariff structure to accomplish foreign policy goals. First, the United States used its tariff system as a lever in dealing with communist states, excluding them from equal access to the U.S. market. During détente, the United States sought to use access to the U.S. market and most favored nation status as an inducement for Soviet cooperation in noneconomic areas, such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) negotiations.

The primary danger inherent in the excessive use of tariffs is retaliation. The most serious instance took place in the early 1930s, after the United States passed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff intended to help solve the Great Depression. The highest tariff in U.S. history, it taxed imports at an average rate of 41.5 percent of their value. Retaliation by foreign governments led to a sudden and dramatic drop in U.S. exports, which only worsened the ongoing depression. The Trade Agreements Act of 1934 broke the spiral of raising tariffs by authorizing the president to lower existing tariffs by as much as 50 percent to those countries making reciprocal concessions.

Manipulating **nontariff barriers (NTBs)** to trade is a second policy option. NTBs are a modern variation on traditional tariffs and can range from labeling requirements, health and safety standards, and license controls to taxation policy; they have become powerful tools to protect firms from foreign competition or remedy a balance-of-payments problem. U.S. use of NTBs dates from the 1930s, when the Buy American Act required the government to purchase goods and services from U.S. suppliers if their prices were not unreasonably higher than those of foreign competitors.

The third economic instrument of foreign policy is an **embargo,** refusal to sell a commodity to another state. Embargoes (and the more subtle concept of export controls) played an important role in U.S. Cold War foreign policy. Building on the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, the United States embargoed financial and commercial transactions with North Korea, the People's Republic of China, Cuba, and North Vietnam. Trade with communist states was also controlled by the Export Control Act of 1949. During the Korean War, the list of restricted items reached one thousand. Many of these controls are still in place. In 2016 Obama lifted an arms embargo against Vietnam that had been in place since 1975.

A **boycott,** a refusal to buy a product or products from another state, represents the fourth economic instrument available to policy makers. One celebrated case involved U.S. participation in UN-sponsored sanctions against Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).[5] Off and on, these sanctions lasted for over a decade. They were first imposed by President Lyndon Johnson in a 1968 executive order to force the white minority Rhodesian government into accepting the principle of majority rule. The U.S. commitment to the boycott was never firm, however. Congress amended the boycott in 1971 to allow the export of raw chromium and other critical materials to Rhodesia.

The fifth policy tool is the **quota**, a quantitative restriction on goods coming from another state. Because of GATT, quotas have not played a large role in foreign economic policy making for most of the post–World War II era. This changed as concerns grew over the international competitiveness of U.S.-made products. Canada has often been the target of U.S. quotas. In 1994, Clinton threatened to limit the amount of Canadian grain entering the United States. In 2004, attempting to end a trade dispute, the United States offered to replace tariffs with a quota system for imports of Canadian lumber.

Strategic Outlooks

There is no single strategic outlook that forms the basis for economic statecraft. This section provides overviews of two outlooks: free trade and strategic trade. It also briefly examines monetary strategies and then introduces Donald Trump's strategic outlook.

Free Trade

Free trade is both an instrument of foreign policy and a strategic orientation for organizing economic power.[6] There is nothing inevitable or natural about free trade. International free trade systems exist because they serve the interests of the dominant power. This was true of Great Britain in the nineteenth century and of the United States in the post–World War II era. From about 1944 to 1962, access to U.S. markets was used as an inducement to get other states to adopt policies favored by the United States. Included

among those Cold War goals were strengthening military alliances, promoting the economic recovery of Western Europe, ensuring access to strategic raw materials, and stimulating economic growth and political stability in the Third World. American policy makers were also sensitive to the limits of free trade. On a selective basis, they permitted or encouraged discrimination against U.S. goods if it would further these broader U.S. foreign policy goals. At the strategic level, the United States used free trade to create an international system that allowed the U.S. economy to prosper and placed it at the center of international economic trade and monetary transactions.

Strategic Trade

Strategic trade competes with free trade as the foundation for American international economic policy.[7] Its advocates maintain that the comparative advantages enjoyed by states in international trade is due not to a country's resource base or historical factors but to imperfections in markets that have been deliberately created by government policy. Only by actively intervening in the international marketplace to create comparative advantages for selected industries can the United States hope to remain a world leader. A prime example is "buy American clauses" such as those requiring the use of U.S.-made iron and steel in certain infrastructure projects. Critics of strategic trade policy assert that, despite positive statement such as this, strategic trade policy often crosses the line into protectionism.[8]

The driving force behind post–World War II strategic trade was the inability to put a dent in the U.S.–Japan trade imbalance. In 1988, concern with the trade imbalance gave rise to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act. Section 301, commonly referred to as "Super 301," provides for retaliatory sanctions against states that engage in unfair trading practices against the United States. Presidents identify "priority countries" and set a timetable for resolving the dispute, after which time the sanctions will take effect. While its use has declined, concern remains. The 2019 annual report of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative placed eleven countries on its priority watch list, including China, Russia, Venezuela, and India, and included twenty-five countries on its watch list.

Strategic trade policy requires two things of the U.S. government. First, it must identify which high-growth industries are crucial to the overall global competitiveness of the American economy. Second, it must ensure that these firms are not shut out of foreign markets. Neither task is easy. Identifying industries for special treatment is a politically charged decision. Just as members of Congress fight to prevent military base closures in their districts, they also fight to ensure that their districts get a fair share of research and development money. A related problem is how to address the problems faced by industries, such as steel, that are no longer competitive internationally but retain enormous political clout. An overly aggressive strategic trade policy runs the risk of spawning a trade war in which U.S. goods are singled out for retaliation.

Monetary Strategies

Financial transactions can also be used to further foreign policy goals. This may occur at the strategic level, such as when the United States allowed the value of the dollar to float or provided debt relief funding after the 2008 global financial crisis. It may also occur at the tactical level, such as in blocking the ability of an individual, corporation, or government to access its funds held in the United States or in other countries.

The United States helped create two important international financial institutions as part of the Bretton Woods system: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or, more commonly, the World Bank). The IMF was intended to regulate international currencies to ensure that they did not suddenly and violently change in value. The World Bank was to provide additional funds that were believed necessary for European economic recovery. Virtually from the outset, the financial aspects of the Bretton Woods system did not function as anticipated. American dollars became the international currency of choice, and American foreign economic and military aid provided the necessary funds for economic recovery.

By 1960 the situation began to change, and the outflow of dollars reached the point where U.S. officials began to worry about the trade deficit. The Bretton Woods system ended in 1971 when President Nixon announced that the U.S. dollar would no longer be convertible to gold. Since then, international monetary management has taken the form of periodic exercises in crisis management rather than systemic reform.

The most recent exercise of crisis management came in 2008, with the largest financial and economic crash in over seventy-five years. It set in motion concerns within the United States about two aspects of China's international monetary policy for U.S. economic and national security.

1. **China's manipulation of the renminbi.** At one time the value of China's official currency was pegged, or fixed, against the U.S. dollar, but as China embarked on a development strategy in which exports played a central role, it devalued the renminbi, making its goods cheaper to buy than those made elsewhere. U.S. officials see the undervalued renminbi as costing American workers jobs and slowing the American economic recovery.
2. **China's massive holding of U.S. debt.** In 2019, China held $1.12 trillion of U.S. debt, making it the United States' largest debt holder. One fear is that this large debt holding will give China foreign policy leverage over the United States; for example, it could engage in a massive sell-off of its U.S. debt to drive down the value of the dollar in retaliation for a U.S. foreign policy decision it opposes. Referred to as the "nuclear option," it reportedly was included as a Chinese strategy in a 2009 Pentagon war game.

Trump's Trade Strategy

At its core, Donald Trump's strategic international economic outlook is economic nationalism, which fits into the strategic trade category. Its highest priorities are state autonomy and maximizing state power. It views economic transactions from a conflictual and zero-sum, win-lose perspective. In place of free trade, economic nationalism advocates state intervention and protectionism couched in the rhetoric of fair and reciprocal trade. To this end, Trump has embraced bilateral trade agreements over regional and global ones, asserting that "what we will no longer do is enter into large scale agreements that tie our hands, surrender our sovereignty, and make meaningful enforcement impossible." The size of this challenge is significant. In 2017 the U.S. lacked bilateral trade agreements with seven of its top ten trading partners.

Trump's preferred economic instrument is the tariff; he has gone so far as to identify himself as "Mr. Tariff." Trump advocates the use of tariffs in large part because he defines them as a tax paid by the exporting firm/country. Economists note that this is not the case. The cost of the tariff is paid by the importer and either absorbed—resulting in a lower profit—or passed on to consumers as higher prices. With globalization of supply chains, virtually every product sold on the U.S. market has parts made abroad, making them subject to tariffs.

As noted earlier in the chapter, Trump's embrace of tariffs and economic nationalism is not a radical break from the past.[9] The United States has long pursued an America First trade strategy but just went about it differently, abusing its power through global trade agreements that forced other states to make one-sided concessions and enter into voluntary export restraints. The concern is that Trump's heavy reliance on punitive tariffs and bilateral trade agreements rather than global agreements reduces the influence of the United States in driving international economic policy.

Varieties of Trade Agreements

There are a number of varieties of trade agreements. The United States engages in three different types: bilateral, regional, and global.

Bilateral Trade Agreements

Bilateral trade agreements govern the terms of trade between two countries. For much of the post–World War II era, bilateral trade agreements were viewed as a second-best method for strengthening the U.S. economy and promoting U.S. interests abroad. Regional and global multilateral agreements were preferred, since they promised to open more markets to American goods more quickly. This began to change in the post-9/11 era as dissatisfaction with regional and global trade agreements grew.

Virtually all of the bilateral agreements negotiated by President George W. Bush ran into domestic political problems. One problem Bush faced was that his **fast-track** presidential authority to sign trade agreements, which would limit Congress to a yes/no vote, expired. Many of these agreements were opposed by domestic interest groups that felt they would harm their constituents' interests. With fast-track authority expired, they were now in a position to demand modifications. Key bilateral free trade agreements with Singapore, Chile, and Australia were approved by Congress, but. when Bush left office, agreements with South Korea, Colombia, Panama, and Vietnam had not yet been approved.

During his presidential campaign, Barack Obama voiced concern about these treaties, but his administration was largely silent on trade issues during his first year in office. This changed in 2010, when Obama announced a major initiative to double U.S. exports as a way of spurring job growth in the United States. Bilateral export agreements were central to the success of this initiative. Difficult negotiations were entered into with South Korea (over trade in autos and beef imports), Colombia (over treatment of union officials), and Panama (over taxation policy). Congress approved the agreements in successive separate votes in 2011, and they took force in 2012.

In response to what he argues is foreign exploitation of the United States, Donald Trump typically initiates his bilateral trade negotiations with announcements of significant and punitive tariff rate increases on high profile items such as steel and aluminum, which will be implemented unless a new trade agreement is reached by his deadline. That strategy has produced agreements with smaller states such as Brazil, South Korea, and Argentina. It has not been as successful in coming to terms with larger trading partners, but it has compelled them to begin negotiations and offer up concessions. Trump had to delay or suspend the implementation of tariffs on cars and auto parts in 2019 with Japan and Europe when negotiations stalled. He also had to extend the license allowing the Chinese telecommunications firm Huawei to do business with U.S. firms after having announced a ban on such transactions for national security reasons.

Trump's high-profile imposition of tariffs followed by low-profile reversals also highlights a potentially high political cost of the unpredictability of his tariff policy: the challenges that allies have in responding to his demands. In short order, South Korea found itself attacked by Trump for an unfair bilateral trade agreement that he threatened to cancel, and congratulated on the signing of a new agreement (only to have Trump threaten not to sign it depending on progress in nuclear negotiations with North Korea).

Regional Trade Agreements

Regional trade agreements have held an uneven place in U.S. thinking about their merits in conducting international economic policy. The Historical

Lesson and the Dateline section earlier in this chapter examined the original NAFTA agreement and the New NAFTA agreement, respectively. This section looks at two other recent attempts at creating regional trade agreements: the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).

On February 4, 2016, the United States and eleven other states signed the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), creating what would be the world's largest free trade agreement. The initial impulse for an Asia-Pacific free trade agreement came from Singapore, New Zealand, and Chile in 2003. China was noticeably absent from these negotiations. In 2008, George W. Bush announced that the United States would join with these states to negotiate free trade issues relating to investment and financial services. Obama announced that his administration would continue these free trade talks, and a negotiating framework was announced in November 2011.

Not surprisingly, TPP negotiations proceeded at an uneven pace. Agreements in some areas were reached with relatively little controversy, while talks in others stalemated and threatened to block consensus on a treaty. Five issues were particularly difficult, because they raised serious domestic political and economic consequences for some states:[10]

1. The length of patents for drugs held by pharmaceutical companies.
2. Protection of the environment, wildlife, and worker rights.
3. Reduction of tariff protections by the United States, Canada, and Japan for dairy, beef, and poultry producers.
4. Opening up of TPP member automotive industries to foreign competition (with Japan being the primary target market).
5. Restrictions on trade of tobacco products (agreed to by the United States in return for an investor-state dispute mechanism that would allow foreign companies to sue host governments).

The Obama administration hailed the TPP as a model twenty-first-century trade agreement. Critics argued that its economic benefits were being oversold and that—at best—they would be distributed unevenly, with low income workers and industries benefitting the least. An often-voiced counterpoint was that critics underestimated the political and strategic importance of the TPP in overall U.S. foreign policy. Noting that China was not a member of the TPP, supporters argued that the TPP was an important vehicle for ensuring a highly visible and effective U.S. presence in the Pacific. On his third day as president, Trump announced the United States withdrawal from the TPP, which never entered into force.

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is another agreement that has not yet come into existence. Some refer to the concept of a transatlantic free trade area, which had been raised off and on since the 1990s, as an "economic NATO." President Obama advocated such a plan in his 2013 State of the Union address. Talks for creating a

TTIP began shortly thereafter in July 2013 with November 2014 set as the target date for an agreement. The talks began in an atmosphere of optimism, but all realized that it would not be an easy task because tariffs in U.S.-European trade were already low. Negotiations would have to address such domestically sensitive issues as regulations on genetically modified crops, safety standards, and financial services. An additional roadblock to a TTIP agreement was fear in Europe that it would lead to American cultural domination.

Regional trade relations have moved in different directions in the Pacific and Atlantic. In the Pacific, eleven countries (including Canada, Japan, and Australia) have signed an agreement to replace the TTP, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). In the Atlantic, new trade talks began between the European Union and the United States in 2019. However, they are not expected to succeed because of a key demand by the United States to include agricultural goods; the EU refuses to include them because of a need to protect its farmers and food standards.

Global Trade Agreements

At the global level, free trade in the form of *global trade agreements* became a major U.S. foreign policy priority for the post–World War II international system. It played a central role in establishing the **Bretton Woods system**. Through a series of negotiations, one of its core institutions was the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which succeeded in lowering national tariffs and other barriers to free trade. Out of the last series of GATT talks, the Uruguay Round (held from 1986 to 1994), came an agreement to set up the World Trade Organization (WTO).

WTO talks encountered problems from the outset. A 1999 meeting in Seattle to launch a new Millennium Round of trade talks ended in failure. Not only were the countries attending the meeting divided, but the event drew large numbers of anti-globalization protestors. U.S. interest in WTO talks only returned after the 9/11 attacks, when the Bush administration saw advancing global economic growth as a key part of its strategy to defeat terrorism.

Launched in Doha, Qatar in November 2001, the first round of WTO talks stalled, with rich and poor countries in deep disagreement over free trade in agricultural products. In December 2013, what many saw as a last-ditch effort to save the Doha Round was held in Bali, Indonesia. An agreement was reached when negotiators gave up on achieving a comprehensive agreement in favor of a more limited one, which agreed to cut the red tape and corruption existing in the customs procedures by which goods enter countries.

One of the WTO's few major successes was the creation of a dispute settlement procedure. Under the GATT, a dispute settlement panel was

set up only if requested, and its report was adopted only if there was a consensus in favor of it. Under the WTO, the report of a standing dispute settlement panel is adopted unless there is a consensus against it. This change transformed the WTO dispute settlement process into a compulsory and automatic instrument for resolving trade disputes. The United States has both won and lost rulings made by the WTO dispute resolution system. In 2015, the WTO ruled in favor of Mexico and Canada—and against the United States—in a case regarding meat labeling. The year before, the WTO had sided with the United States in a case against India for placing unfair restrictions on imported U.S. meat and eggs in the name of preventing the spread of avian flu. The very existence of the dispute resolution system also produced fears about the potential loss of sovereignty and the nondemocratic nature of the decision-making procedures; it was one of Trump's primary objections to the WTO.

Economic Sanctions

Even before the Trump administration, economic sanctions were a popular way of exercising American economic power. In 2016, the Department of the Treasury was implementing twenty-eight different sanctions programs. Some were directed at specific countries, such as Cuba, Iran, and Syria. Others were problem-oriented, such as those in place against terrorism, diamond trading, narcotics trafficking, and proliferation.[11] This section examines how sanctions are used in general, and then how they have been applied in three specific cases.

Using Sanctions

What exactly constitutes an economic sanction is highly contested. This text adopts a middle-of-the road definition of **economic sanctions:** "the deliberate withdrawal of normal trade or financial relations for foreign policy purposes."[12] It is important to recognize that sanctions are "not forever." They are intended to bring about change in targeted countries, and when that is accomplished, they are to be removed. Determining when sufficient changes have been made is no easy matter and not without controversy.[13] Economic sanctions against Cambodia were in place for seventeen years (1975–1992), while those against Japan ran for just twenty-four days in 1985. Evidence suggests that a major factor in determining how long sanctions will stay in place is whether they were imposed by Congress or by the president. Presidential sanctions are twice as likely to be lifted after one year. After five years, about 70 percent of congressional sanctions remain in place, compared to 30 percent of presidential sanctions.[14]

The effectiveness of sanctions can be undermined by a variety of factors. One problem is the pursuit of incompatible goals. For example,

George W. Bush imposed broad sanctions against Syria for its support of terrorism in 2004. All exports to Syria were barred except for food and medicine. Yet Bush delayed implementing the measure and indicated that he would continue to permit the sale of telecommunications equipment and aircraft spare parts. The telecommunications exemption was justified because of the need to promote the free flow of information. Critics argued that Bush really did this to protect the economic interests of the telecommunications industry.

A second problem is that economic sanctions are often imposed because policy makers find themselves needing to demonstrate resolve when they are unwilling or unable to use military force. In such cases, critics argue that sanctions amount to nothing more than "chicken soup diplomacy." They give the appearance of taking action and make people feel good without having to pay a cost.[15] One example was the Iran-Libya Sanctions Extension Act of 2001. It kept in effect sanctions approved by Congress in 1996 that were about to expire, even though no firms had been sanctioned under its terms.

A third problem is the response by other countries. Often described as *black knights*, some states provide economic support to the sanctioned country for political reasons, which lessens sanction effectiveness. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was a black knight for Cuba in the face of U.S. sanctions. In the post–Cold War period, Venezuela has been Cuba's black knight, while Russia has played that role for Syria and Iran. What holds true for getting around sanctions against governments also holds true for sanctions against rebel groups. In Syria, Sudan sold Chinese-made weapons to Qatar, which arranged for their delivery to Syrian rebels through Turkey. Recent studies suggest that help from black knights is of limited valued unless it is accompanied by sanction-busting actions of corporations interested in profit.[16] Cuba, for example, has benefited from investments by Canadian and European firms.

A very different criticism of sanctions is that, in reality, the primary targets of sanctions are ordinary people. The rich escape the pain. This gave rise to the concept of **smart sanctions**, so-called because they target the ability of government, businesses, and terrorist leaders to access personal funds and are intended to protect vulnerable social groups from economic harm. Initial evaluations of smart sanctions are not encouraging.[17] They do not appear to be significantly more successful than conventional ones. The fundamental problem is the same—a lack of political will to enforce them.

Sanctions in Action: Iran, Cuba, Russia

The discussion of economic sanctions concludes by examining three different types of situations and the policies employed by the United States to address them.

Iranian Sanctions The United States has a long history of imposing economic sanctions against Iran. Carter ordered a freeze on all Iranian assets under the jurisdiction of the United States after the American embassy was seized and hostages were taken in 1979. Reagan imposed sanctions against Iran for its ties to the bombing of the marine barracks in Beirut in 1984. Clinton instituted a boycott against Iran in response to evidence that it was seeking to acquire nuclear technology, and issued an executive order banning U.S. oil companies and their subsidiaries from trading with Iran. In 1996, Congress passed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (now the Iran Sanctions Act), which permitted the United States to issue penalties against foreign firms dealing with Iran. Originally set to terminate in 2001, the Iran Sanctions Act has been extended several times. After 9/11, George W. Bush issued an executive order freezing the assets of individuals, organizations, and financial institutions supporting terrorism. Many of those now on the list are Iranian, including corporations, banks, and the Revolutionary Guard.

Obama continued sanctions against Iran, but coupled them with a willingness to engage in talks. With little progress being made in July 2010, he signed the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act. It extended the Iran Sanctions Act to include trade in refined petroleum products and expand the types of sanctions that presidents could apply. Under pressure from Congress in 2011, Obama accepted new sanctions against Iran, preventing foreign banks from opening an account in the United States or limiting the funds in an existing account if that bank processed payments through Iran's central bank. This reduced Iran's ability to sell oil abroad. When Congress passes sanction legislation, presidents generally are permitted to waive the sanctions under specified circumstances. By mid-2012, twenty countries, including China and all of Iran's major purchasers, had received exemptions.

In 2013 the Obama administration further tightened its sanctions against Iran by enforcing a provision of the Iran Threat Reduction Act requiring any funds owed to Iran as a result of exempted oil purchases to be placed in a local bank and not transferred back to Iran. The election of Hassan Rouhani as president that year led Obama to remove sanctions affecting humanitarian aid. When the first round of nuclear talks produced promising results, Obama agreed to lift sanctions freezing Iran's overseas assets in limited amounts and in stages to encourage Iran to continue negotiations.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed in July 2015, placed limits on Iran's stockpiles of enriched uranium, and called for a reduction in UN nuclear related sanctions and U.S. sanctions against other countries for doing business with Iran. Unaffected were U.S. sanctions against firms conducting business with Iran and sanctions against support for terrorism, human rights abuses, and missile production. Under the terms of the 2015 Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, presidents must certify that Iran

is acting in accord with the JCPOA every ninety days. Trump repeatedly denounced the JCPOA during his presidential campaign, but certified Iran's compliance in April and July 2017. In September 2017, Trump extended waivers on Iran's sanctions but in October he declined to do so. In May 2018, the U.S. officially withdrew from the JCPOA. In August of that year the administration began reinstating U.S. economic sanctions. More than seven hundred individuals, organizations, aircraft, and vessels were sanctioned.

Trump further tightened sanctions in 2019. In April, he announced the end of exemptions that had been given to countries the previous November, allowing them to import oil from Iran without sanctions. Those now subject to U.S. sanctions included China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Turkey. This was followed by an announcement in early May of sanctions on Iran's steel and mining industries that would effectively end Iran's ability to export those goods. As noted in the Dateline section in chapter 9, the cumulative effect of these sanctions on Iran's economy were significant, and contributed greatly to the rising tensions that led to the ongoing crisis in the Persian Gulf and domestic riots in Iran.

Cuban Sanctions When Fidel Castro came to power in 1959, Cuba was heavily dependent on the United States; 67 percent of its exports went to the United States, and 70 percent of its imports came from the United States. Under the terms of legislation passed in 1934, the United States purchased the bulk of Cuban sugar at prices substantially above world market rates. Relations between the United States and Castro deteriorated quickly. In February 1960, Castro concluded a barter deal with the Soviet Union in which Cuban sugar was exchanged for Soviet crude oil. After U.S.-owned oil refineries refused to process the Soviet oil, Castro took them over. The United States responded by terminating all remaining foreign aid programs and canceling all purchases of Cuban sugar for the remainder of the year. Castro retaliated with additional nationalizations of U.S. property. Next, the United States imposed an embargo on all exports to Castro except for food and medicine. Cuba then entered into more economic agreements with the Soviet Union; in response, the United States broke off diplomatic relations.

Throughout the Cold War, economic sanctions were tightened periodically, often as a result of electoral considerations. In 1992, Congress passed the Cuban Democracy Act, which placed heavy penalties on U.S. firms that engaged in trade with Cuba through foreign subsidiaries. In 1996, the Helms-Burton Act threatened sanctions against countries that provided Cuba with foreign aid and allowed U.S. nationals to sue foreign firms that now controlled properties seized during the Cuban revolution. Opposition from American allies to this last provision has been intense, and presidents routinely waived it.

President Obama moved to restore normal diplomatic and economic relations with Cuba. While he was unable to convince Congress to end

economic sanctions, Obama did issue a series of executive orders easing regulations covering travel, trade, financial transactions, and commerce. President Trump entered office determined to reverse Obama's policy change, Tweeting "if Cuba is unwilling to make a better deal for Cuban people, the Cuban/American people and the U.S. as a whole, I will terminate the deal." His determination to do so intensified with Cuba's support for Venezuela's socialist government, which was involved in a civil war against U.S.-backed insurgents. Among the economic sanctions his administration put in place were limitations on the amount of money that could be remitted back to Cuba, and on tourist access to Cuba. The most controversial decision was to remove the ban on American citizens suing to obtain property nationalized by Castro. Lifting of the ban was vigorously opposed by European governments, as European firms had purchased property in Cuba and could be subject to thousands of lawsuits.

Russian Sanctions Cold War sanctions against the Soviet Union were commonplace. The first significant post–Cold War sanctions were placed in response to Russia's annexation of Crimea and its role in the Ukrainian crisis. In 1954, the Soviet Union had transferred control over the Crimea to Ukraine. The action was described as largely symbolic, because Ukraine was then part of the Soviet Union. This transfer of control took on a great deal of significance in 1991 with the fall of the Soviet Union. As an independent country on its borders, the foreign policy of Ukraine was of great importance to Russian leaders. Matters came to a head in February 2014, when public protests forced Ukraine's pro-Russian president out of office. Russian ground forces and pro-Russian Ukrainian militia soon seized control of the Crimea. On March 21, the Crimea became part of Russia.

With no credible military options at his disposal, President Obama turned to economic instruments of foreign policy. First, Russia lost its membership in the G8, and Obama announced economic sanctions targeting the financial holdings of Putin's key political and economic allies along with Russian banks. In late April, additional business leaders and companies linked to Putin's supporters were targeted by financial and travel sanctions. In July, sanctions were placed on Russia's largest financial, energy, and defense industries, restricting their access to foreign capital. Later in 2014, U.S. companies were prohibited from doing business in the Crimea. Judgments about the effectiveness of these sanctions are mixed. Defenders argue that they imposed significant financial, societal, and political costs on Russia.[18] Critics argue that any success was due to a general downturn in the global economy and the price of oil, that the sanctions brought unintended consequences, and that they were counterproductive.[19]

Sanctions against Russia became highly controversial under Trump, who repeatedly praised Russian President Vladimir Putin during the presidential campaign and continued to express warm feelings for and trust in Putin upon taking office. After his election, Trump offered to end

the Crimea sanctions (which were extended in 2019) if Russia agreed to nuclear arms control talks. Even more pointedly, Trumps stated that he and Putin did not discuss sanctions at their Helsinki summit. Trump's reluctance to place sanctions on Russia over interference in the 2016 presidential election and cyberattacks on U.S. energy grids put him at odds with both Republicans and Democrats in Congress. Disagreement over sanctions against Russia also existed within his administration, as he and UN ambassador Nikki Haley publicly disagreed in 2018 about imposition of new sanctions on Russia over its support for Syria's use of chemical weapons.

Ultimately, after Congress passed the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act in July 2017 with a veto proof majority, Trump found that he had little political choice but to impose sanctions. That bill required him to produce a list of individuals and government organizations by January 2019 that could be subjected to sanctions, and a list of businesses that dealt with Russian defense and intelligence programs by October 2018. The administration missed both deadlines, which Congress took as a sign of Trump's continued desire to avoid Russian sanctions. When the lists were finally announced, many viewed them as largely symbolic since many had already been sanctioned by Obama, and Trump lifted sanctions against a firm whose owner was linked to Russian meddling the 2016 presidential campaign.

The China Trade War

During his presidential campaign and early in his presidency, Donald Trump often claimed that tariff wars were easy to win. At least with respect to trade with China, this has not proven to be the case. It is now commonplace to refer to trade with China as a trade war. This section reviews its evolution and raises the following question: how do trade wars end?

Early in his candidacy for president, Trump identified China as stealing American technology, taking American jobs, and "ripping" the U.S. economy. Following his election, Trump moved away from this rhetoric. He did not label China as a currency manipulator and held out the promise of improved trade relations in return for help in dealing with North Korea. Movement toward a trade war began to build midway through Trump's first year in office with the announcement that his administration was opening an investigation into China's trade practices. In January 2018, he imposed a new 30 percent tax on solar panels. In March, new import taxes on steel and aluminum were announced. China responded that it would take "proper measures to safeguard its legitimate rights and interests." One month later, it announced $2.4 billion in tariffs on U.S. exports. Trump retaliated by identifying 1,300 Chinese goods that could face 25 percent tariff hikes totaling $50 billion. China countered by producing a list of 106 American goods that could face the same tariff increase.

There followed a rapidly changing series of actions with regard to ZTE, a Chinese telecommunications firm that the United States identified as having illegally exported U.S. goods to Iran and North Korea. In April 2018, the Commerce Department placed a seven-year ban on U.S. exports to ZTE and imposed a $1 billion fine for its actions. In early May 2018, ZTE announced a plan to end major activities due to the economic impact of this decision. On May 13, Trump announced that he was working with Chinese President Xi Jinping to revive ZTE because of the high number of jobs in China being lost. His statement followed in the wake of an agreement reached between the U.S. and China on easing market access for a wide variety of goods. That agreement proved to be somewhat illusory; the United States claimed that China had agreed to buy $200 billion worth of U.S. products by 2020, and Chinese officials claimed that no such firm agreement had been reached. By the end of the month Trump shifted his position again, announcing 25 percent tariffs on 1,100 Chinese goods totaling $50 billion. Three days later, he threatened to impose another $200 billion worth of tariffs. China labeled the threatened actions as blackmail. In early June, the United States and China concluded their trade talks without an agreement. China refused to buy more American goods unless the United States agreed not to impose additional tariffs.

Tensions eased in late June when Trump and Xi met at the 2019 G-20 summit in Tokyo and agreed to restart trade talks. Those talks took place in late July and did not go well, with Trump arguing that China kept changing its position and reneged on its commitment to buy agricultural goods. In short order this was followed by announcements that the U.S. was putting tariffs on $300 billion worth of Chinese imports and declaring China to be a currency manipulator. China responded by announcing $75 billion in retaliatory tariffs, stating that they were forced to do so by the "unilateralism and trade protectionism of the United States." A few days earlier Trump had defended the trade war by indicating that "this is not my trade war . . . this is a trade war that should have taken place a long time ago by other presidents." He added, somewhat enigmatically, "I am the chosen one."

Foreign Aid

A perennial debate exists regarding the purpose of U.S. foreign aid. Are its primary goals found in the areas of humanitarian assistance, development, and democratization, or is the purpose of foreign aid to advance core American national security interests? The existence of multiple goals means that foreign aid policy often runs the risk of working at cross-purposes: foreign aid given to support governments fighting terrorism or promoting regional stability may negate efforts to promote democracy.

Several underlying conditions need to be kept in mind in thinking about foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy: First, the size of the

U.S. foreign aid program has varied greatly. Calculated in 2015 dollars, the high point for foreign aid came in 1949 ($65.9 billion) and the low point came in 1997 ($19.5 billion). In 2015, it was estimated at $48.6 billion. Compared to other areas of government spending, the foreign aid budget is small, amounting to some 1.3 percent of the total federal budget. Second, U.S. foreign aid is not distributed evenly around the world, but concentrated in a few states. Table 11.1 provides a comparative listing of the top ten recipients of U.S. foreign aid in 2010, 2017, and 2019.

Third, U.S. foreign aid is often given with restrictions; however, these restrictions may be overridden by national security concerns. In October 2009, Obama approved a $7.5 billion, five-year aid program to Pakistan, which officials there quickly characterized as "insulting and unacceptable." Among the conditions attached by the United States were the establishment of monitoring mechanisms to see how the money was spent and the enactment of procedures for promoting military officers. In 2012, Obama announced that the United States would resume military aid to the new government in Egypt and waive restrictions that made such aid conditional on

TABLE 11.1 Top 10 Recent Recipients of U.S. Foreign Assistance for Selected Years (millions of dollars)

Country	FY 2019 (Requested)	FY 2017	FY 2010
Israel	3,300	3,100	3,075
Egypt	1,381	1,419	1,597
Jordan	1,275	1,280	776
Afghanistan	633	848	2,286
Kenya	624	706	*
Tanzania	553	547	*
Uganda	461	*	*
Zambia	440	*	*
Nigeria	352	515	647
Pakistan	336	525	1,821
Ethiopia	*	495	707
South Africa	*	471	542
South Sudan	*	*	620
Iraq	*	*	1,270

* Not in the top 10 that year.

Source: Susan Epstein, et.al., 2014 State and Foreign Operations Budget Request, Congressional Research Service, April 18, 2013, p. 7; Susan Epstein, et. al.., Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2018 Budget and Appropriations, Congressional Research Service, April 13, 2018, p. 14; and Department of State Foreign Operations and Related Programs: FY2019 Budget and Appropriations, Updated, Congressional Research Service, March 12, 2019, p. 16.

progress toward democracy. Fourth, a very high percentage of U.S. foreign aid funds are spent on U.S. products. The Congressional Research Service estimates that 90 percent of food aid is spent on U.S. goods and services.

Types of Foreign Aid

There is no standard method for categorizing the different types of U.S. foreign aid programs. One approach used by the researchers of the Congressional Research Service identifies six basic categories, which will be followed here. However, before examining the breakdown of official U.S. foreign aid, it is important to note three major trends in the organization and disbursement of foreign aid.

First, *remittances*, private foreign aid from individuals living abroad, are now among the most important sources of funds for Third World states. In 2018, $4.8 billion in remittances was sent to Honduras and $9.5 billion was sent to Guatemala. For countries such as these, the value of the remittances far exceeds the value of U.S. foreign aid (which totaled $2.6 billion for the region) and has a more direct impact on their lives; for example, Guatemala spent $241 per person on health care in 2016. One consequence is that threats to cut off foreign aid (such as Trump's threats against Guatemala in 2019 in an attempt to reduce the flow of migrants to the United States) may have a limited effect in ending the exit of individuals seeking jobs and income.

Second, it is becoming increasingly common to speak of a distinction between traditional and nontraditional official foreign aid. *Traditional foreign aid* is distributed by the State Department and affiliated agencies such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). *Nontraditional foreign aid* flows from other agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Institutes of Health, the Department of Energy, and most importantly, the Department of Defense.

The third trend is the increased importance of public-private collaboration and philanthropic foreign aid. The bottom line is that USAID, the primary source of foreign aid in the U.S. government, is now a minority shareholder in foreign aid.[20] One example of public-private collaboration is USAID's Global Development Alliance, which includes corporations such as Coca-Cola and Wal-Mart. The overall goal is to share expertise and information and carry out projects more efficiently.

The first of the six categories of official U.S. foreign aid is *economic aid* given for the purpose of advancing U.S. political and security objectives. This is the biggest category. Monies given in this category have supported such diverse programs as the Camp David Accords, the building of democracy, antinarcotics efforts, anti-terrorism plans, and attempts to counter weapons proliferation.

A particularly challenging problem confronting economic aid in the 1980s and 1990s was debt relief. The sums were staggering. In 1988,

Mexico's debt stood at $107.4 billion. At first, the U.S. approached the problem as solvable through a combination of government austerity measures and prudent lending policies by banks and international organizations. When this proved inadequate, the United States sought to increase the level of funding available (the Baker Plan). This was followed a program of limited and voluntary debt forgiveness with international guarantees of the remaining loan amounts (the Brady Plan). It, too, failed to solve the debt problem completely.

The second largest category of foreign aid is *military assistance*. These monies go to help allies maintain and train their armed forces, as well as fund purchases of U.S. military equipment. Included in this category are economic support funds, loans to countries that are not eligible for development assistance but are considered strategically important. Of growing concern here is the inability to account for the weapons that were provided. In 2014, the Pentagon discovered that 156,000 pieces of military equipment valued at almost $500 million could not be found in Afghanistan. Some of it was likely broken and discarded, and other pieces were probably stolen and sold to hostile forces.

The third category is *bilateral development assistance*. These aid programs are generally administered by USAID and have a long-term development focus on strengthening the economy, environment, health care delivery systems, and political institutions of recipient states. Funding for the Peace Corps and debt relief falls into this category. One of the major complaints about development assistance aid is that, rather than being transitional, it has become permanent, creating dependent societies and stifling rather than promoting development.[21]

The fourth category of foreign aid is *humanitarian economic assistance*. This aid tends to be short-term and emergency focused. Refugee assistance, emergency food aid, and disaster relief account for the bulk of this spending. The amount of money involved has fluctuated greatly from year to year, largely because of the unpredictability of the natural disasters that set such aid in motion. In fiscal year 2010, approximately $5 billion was spent on humanitarian programs. This figure was double that spent in 2006, but it still represented only 13 percent of the overall foreign aid budget. Providing humanitarian aid is often complicated by other policy goals. In 2011, the Obama administration had to relax restrictions on prohibiting aid to terrorist groups or their supporters in order to get relief to famine victims in Somalia.

The fifth category is *multilateral development assistance*. The smallest segment of the foreign aid budget, it consists of funds contributed to such international development organizations as UNICEF, the World Bank, and the African Development Bank. U.S. aid to multilateral organizations is affected by a number of concerns, such as organizations' international planning policies, conflicting goals, and the pace and nature of reform efforts at the United Nations.

The final category of foreign aid is *nonemergency food aid*. The Food for Peace program, also known as PL 480, is the primary instrument for distributing nonemergency food aid. It makes surplus U.S. agricultural goods available to Third World states in local currency and at concessionary prices. Critics of the Food for Peace program have noted that tension has always existed between the humanitarian and political purposes of this aid and that politics tends to triumph. Often, those countries receiving PL 480 funds are not the neediest by objective measures but are valuable U.S. allies. Egypt, for example, has always ranked among the leading recipients of PL 480 funds. A relatively new program has been created that provides those in need with cash to obtain food locally at less cost and more quickly. In 2014, Obama proposed that 25 percent of Food for Peace's emergency and development aid budget be dedicated to this new program.

Cold War Foreign Aid

The relative importance of military and economic aid varied considerably during the Cold War. The Truman administration's foreign aid program was dominated by economic development initiatives such as the Marshall Plan and the Point Four Program. Ninety-six percent of Truman's foreign aid budgets consisted of development funds. With the outbreak of the Korean War, policy makers increasingly viewed foreign aid as an instrument for furthering American national security; more than 60 percent of foreign aid was being given for military purposes. The geographic focus of American foreign aid also changed. At one time Europe received 86 percent of U.S. foreign aid, but it received only 6 percent between 1958 and 1961. The share of American aid to the Third World increased to 68 percent during this same period.

During the presidency of John Kennedy, the proportion of economic aid to military aid changed again, so that by the mid-1970s, economic aid accounted for 75 percent of all U.S. foreign aid. However, within the economic aid category, greater emphasis was given to loans (which had to be repaid) than to grants (which did not). With the deepening American involvement in Vietnam, the pendulum swung back in favor of military aid, which constituted 70 percent of U.S. foreign aid by the mid-1970s. After the American withdrawal from Vietnam, economic aid grew to 80 percent of the total, then faded again under the Reagan administration. From 1980 to 1985, economic aid rose from about $7.5 billion to almost $10 billion, while military aid virtually tripled, from $2 billion to almost $6 billion.

Post–Cold War Foreign Aid

During the first decade of the post–Cold War era, three issues dominated the foreign aid agenda. The first centered on foreign aid to Russia, with the major goal of helping Russia denuclearize by providing it with funds to

destroy chemical and nuclear weapons, establish safeguards against proliferation, and assess the environmental damage done by nuclear waste. The 1991 Nunn-Lugar Threat Reduction Program was designed with this goal in mind. Formally terminated in 2013, the Nunn-Lugar program remains operational in a modified form that includes a worldwide focus on chemical and biological weapons. As of March 2013, it had helped deactivate 7,616 strategic warheads (82 percent of its goal) and destroy 914 intercontinental ballistic missiles (88 percent of its goal).

Historical Lesson

NAFTA

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) among Mexico, Canada, and the United States came into effect in 1994. NAFTA talks began in 1991. On October 7, 1992, a two-thousand-page agreement was signed. Congress gave its approval in November 1993 by votes of 234–200 in the House and 61–38 in the Senate. President Bill Clinton signed the agreement into law on December 8, 1993. At the core of the NAFTA agreement were provisions to eliminate most tariffs on goods traded between the three countries. Some were to be eliminated immediately, others were to be phased out over fifteen years. Particularly affected by the NAFTA agreement were agriculture, automobiles, and textiles. Other portions of NAFTA established intellectual property rights protections, labor and environmental safeguards, and a dispute resolution system. George H. W. Bush, whose administration negotiated NAFTA, promised to negotiate labor and environmental protections in order to secure getting fast-track authority from Congress. These safeguards were included in the agreement, but many considered them to be insufficient.

The negotiating path that led to its signing began with President Ronald Reagan's advocacy of a North American Common Market during his 1980 presidential campaign. Armed with fast-track authority that Congress gave him in 1984, the United States and Canada entered into trade negotiations that led to the 1989 Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. The agreement was widely regarded as the most extensive bilateral trade agreement ever negotiated and contained several groundbreaking elements that would appear in later free trade agreements.

By this time Mexico had also become interested in a continent-wide free trade agreement. In the 1960s, Mexico pegged its development hopes on an import-substitution strategy that would protect domestic industries from foreign competition. It was now clear that this strategy had failed. From an economic perspective the most attractive alternative was integration into the U.S. market. Politically, however, this was an unattractive option due to fears that doing so would lead to Mexican dependence on the American economy. Instead Mexico proposed a North American free trade zone.

George H. W. Bush embraced the concept in his 1988 campaign, but once in office his administration was divided over the wisdom of entering into talks with Mexico. The National Security Council, the Commerce Department, and the State Department supported the idea. The Department of Agriculture and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative were less enthusiastic.

Bush looked on the NAFTA agreement as a vehicle for generating Republican votes in Texas and California in the upcoming 1992 presidential election. Instead, NAFTA became a controversial campaign issue. Leading the early charge against it was onetime supporter Ross Perot, who said NAFTA was the product of a conspiracy among Washington insiders, foreign lobbyists, and huge corporations that would cost the United States some five million jobs. He warned, "You're going to hear a giant sucking sound of jobs being pulled out of this country."[22] Bill Clinton straddled the fence on NAFTA during the presidential campaign. When he finally announced his support for NAFTA, it was conditioned on adding supplemental agreements to cover "serious" omissions dealing with the potential for sudden inflow of large amounts of foreign goods into the U.S. market, the environment, and labor.

Bill Clinton did not immediately push for congressional approval of the NAFTA agreement. Many of those who supported his candidacy for president opposed NAFTA as did a large number of Democrats in Congress. When it did act, it first negotiated a series of executive agreements with Mexico that were not officially part of the treaty and side deals with members of Congress. In one he promised that textile quotas would be phased out over fifteen years instead of ten. In another he pledged to protect peanut, wheat, tomato, and citrus growers by restricting imports to prevent lowering prices. Other side deals had nothing to do with NAFTA such as Bill Clinton's promise to a New York congressman to support a Small Business Administration pilot urban project in his district.

NAFTA continued to be at the center of political controversy after it came into effect in 1994 largely out of concern for its real or perceived impact on American workers, crime, illegal immigration, and drug trafficking. During the 2008 presidential campaign John McCain supported the agreement but the other major candidates attacked it. Barack Obama blamed it for the loss of American jobs. Both he and Hillary Clinton promised to amend the treaty or withdraw from it. Ron Paul called for abolishing NAFTA.

Applying the Lessons

1. Is Fast Trade Authority (trade promotion authority) a good idea? Is it necessary?
2. Are regional trade agreements in the U.S. national interest?
3. Should trade agreements come with expiration dates?

A second area of controversy surrounded funding for health and social programs. In particular, conflicts arose over combating human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) and aid for family planning programs. In 1984, in what is known as the "Mexico City policy," Reagan prohibited USAID from providing funds to foreign governments, international organizations, and nonprofit organizations that engaged in family planning programs. This ban was suspended by Clinton, put back into place by George W. Bush, suspended again by Obama, and put back in place (and expanded) by Trump.

The third area of controversy involved efforts to stop international drug trafficking. The most ambitious undertaking was Plan Colombia, a $7.5 billion aid package intended to advance the peace process in Colombia, strengthen its national economy, stop the production of drugs, promote justice and human rights, and foster democracy and social development. Critics were fearful that Plan Colombia was all too reminiscent of the 1980–1981 period when the United States became embroiled in El Salvador's civil war because of its overly close identification with the Salvadoran military.

Both defenders and critics of Plan Colombia acknowledge that drug production has not so much been curtailed as moved elsewhere, most notably to Mexico.

Post–9/11 Foreign Aid

After 9/11, foreign aid came to be viewed in a more positive light by those who had long criticized it under the assumption that it can make a major contribution to fighting terrorism. Almost immediately after 9/11, the George W. Bush administration sought authority from Congress to waive all existing restrictions on U.S. military assistance and weapons exports for five years to any country determined to be helping in the War on Terrorism. A similar pattern existed in the area of trade; the administration proposed dropping trade restrictions on eight Central Asian countries that emerged out of the Soviet Union after its fall, even though all had questionable records in the areas of human rights and democratization. In addition to being used as a carrot, trade restrictions were also used as a stick. In 2003, the Bush administration announced that it was suspending military aid to some thirty-five countries because they failed to meet a Congressionally imposed deadline exempting Americans from prosecution in the new International Criminal Court. Congress exempted twenty-seven states, including NATO members Israel and Egypt, from the loss of aid.

One new foreign aid plan put forward was the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). The MCC targets low-income countries to support economic growth and reduce poverty.[23] Money is given only to countries that meet a demanding set of criteria, and programs are implemented by the recipient country's government. The eighteen indicators used to

judge eligibility are presented in table 11.2. They fall into three categories: (1) good government ("ruling justly"), (2) economic freedom, and (3) investing in people. In 2018, there were eleven active compacts and five active threshold programs. As an independent government aid agency, a concern raised with the MCC's efforts is its potential impact on the coherence of U.S. foreign aid initiatives. Colin Powell described the relationship as one of the MCC "pulling" countries forward and USAID "pushing" them.[24]

TABLE 11.2 Millennium Challenge Corporation Selection Indicators

Indicator	Description	Category	Source
Access to credit	Depth of available credit information and effectiveness of laws in facilitating lending	Economic freedom	International Finance Corporation
Business start-up	Time and costs associated with business start-up and operation	Economic freedom	International Finance Corporation
Child health	Commitment to child health, including child mortality rates and control of water, sanitation, and sewage disposal	Investing in people	Columbia/Yale
Civil liberties	Country performance on elements such as freedom of expression and belief, human rights, and independence of judiciary	Ruling justly	Freedom House
Control of corruption	Extent to which public power is exercised for private gain and effectiveness of policy and framework to prevent and combat corruption	Ruling justly	World Bank/Brookings Institution
Fiscal policy	Commitment to prudent fiscal management and private sector growth	Economic freedom	International Monetary Fund
Freedom of information	Commitment to enable or allow information to move freely in society, including press freedom, freedom of information laws, and Internet filtering	Ruling justly	Freedom House Centre for Law and Democracy Freedom House

Indicator	Description	Category	Source
Gender in the economy	Commitment to promoting gender equality by providing equivalent access to legal and public institutions, property ownership, legal system, and employment	Economic freedom	World Bank
Girls' primary education completion rate	Commitment to basic education for girls in terms of access, enrollment, and retention	Investing in people	UNESCO
Girls' Secondary Education Enrollment Ratio	Commitment to secondary education for girls in terms of access, enrollment, and retention	Investing in people	UNESCO
Government effectiveness	Quality of public services, civil service, and policy formulation and implementation	Ruling justly	World Bank/Brookings Institution
Health expenditures	Commitment to investing in people's health and well-being	Investing in people	World Health Organization
Immunization rates	Commitment to providing essential public health services and reducing child mortality	Investing in people	WHO/UNICEF
Inflation	Commitment to sound monetary policy	Economic freedom	International Monetary Fund
Land rights and access	Whether and to what extent governments are investing in secure land tenure	Economic freedom	International Fund for Agricultural Development International Finance Corporation
Natural resource protection	Commitment to habitat preservation and biodiversity protection	Investing in people	Columbia/Yale
Political rights	Quality of the electoral process, political pluralism and participation, government corruption and transparency, and fair political treatment of ethnic groups	Ruling justly	Freedom House

Indicator	Description	Category	Source
Primary education expenditures	Commitment to investing in primary education	Investing in people	UNESCO
Regulatory quality	Ability to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development	Economic freedom	World Bank/Brookings Institution
Rule of law	Degree of confidence in and adherence to the rules of society by individuals and firms	Ruling justly	World Bank/Brookings Institution
Trade policy	Openness to international trade based on average tariff rates and non-tariff barriers to trade	Economic freedom	The Heritage Foundation

Source: mcc.gov

Contemporary Foreign Aid

Donald Trump left little doubt about how he viewed foreign aid upon becoming president. In a speech to the United Nations (UN) he declared, "we are only going to give foreign aid to those who respect us, and, frankly, are our friends." UN ambassador Nikki Haley followed up this statement by noting that the United States was taking note of those states that voted against the U.S. recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital. While this comment stunned many, it was not without precedent. The United States has collected statistics on UN votes since the Reagan administration. In 1990, the United States warned Yemen of the consequences of voting against the UN Security Council resolution calling upon Iraq to leave Kuwait, and cancelled virtually all of the $70 million in foreign aid it was giving to Yemen after the vote.

Trump frequently asks what the United States is getting in return for its aid. He has termed past foreign aid expenditures, such as those in the Middle East, "a mistake." His preference is to provide loans rather than grants. Following this logic, he has been reluctant to provide foreign aid for rebuilding war-torn states in the region. In 2018, Iraq requested $88 billion for this purpose. The United States offered only $4 billion and asked its allies to cover the rest. A funding conference in Kuwait resulted in the failure to secure any funding. In 2019, Trump threatened to cut off $450 million foreign aid to Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador for their failure to stop the flow of migrants to the United States Overall, Trump has sought to reduce the level of foreign aid spending drastically.

His proposed 2020 budget called for reducing funding for humanitarian aid, refugee assistance, and global health by more than $9 billion.

In one important case Trump has continued Obama's foreign aid policy rather than seeking to terminate it. This involves an effort to counter China's attempt to achieve political, economic, and technological dominance in the developing world through the Belt and Road Initiative. China's primary focus is to construct rail and roads connecting it with Africa, the Middle East, and the Balkans. To accomplish this, it intends to distribute $1 trillion in construction and investment funds to over a hundred countries. In response, Obama authorized the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) to spur investment in developing countries by U.S. business interests through loans and risk insurance. Although OPIC was a major target of Trump's foreign aid cuts, in its place he created a $60 billion foreign aid program within the Federal Aviation Administration to counter China's Belt and Road Initiative.

Over the Horizon: How Trade Wars End

The U.S.–China trade war has taken its toll on both economies. Imports of American-made goods fell by 22 percent in August 2019, and as of September 2019, the growth rate in China had slowed to its lowest level in thirty years. The U.S. economy has also shown signs of slowed growth and a loss of business confidence, leading the Federal Reserve to cut interest rates in an effort to stimulate growth.

No single ending exists for trade wars. Rather, a number of possibilities must be considered. Five deserve particular attention:

- **One side wins.** One side is able to exert sufficient pressure and costs on the other to obtain an agreement largely consistent with its goals.
- **A draw.** Neither side is able to achieve its goals. Exhaustion plus high domestic costs dictate ending the war and moving on; this outcome may require a change in leadership to one that is not committed to winning the war.
- **A cease-fire.** Neither side can achieve victory but, rather than walk away, each prepares for a future trade war that they see as inevitable and needed to restore national honor.
- **Return to a global free trade system.** Both sides lose. Neither is in a position to impose its will; rather than a cease-fire, the remaining global economic powers reassert the logic of a global free trade system through a modified WTO.
- **The emergence of trading blocs.** The trade war ends in the establishment of competing trading blocs, each with its own economic and political rules. Nationalist economic competition rather than cooperation now guide global economic interactions.

It remains to be seen which of these will be the ultimate outcome of the U.S.–China trade war.

Critical Thinking Questions

1. Which type of free trade agreement—bilateral, regional, or global—is of most value to the United States today, and why?
2. Should economic sanctions be used against friends or just foes? Explain your answer.
3. How do you think the U.S.–China trade war will end?

Key Terms

boycott, 275
Bretton Woods system, 281
economic sanctions, 282
economic statecraft, 273
embargo, 275
fast-track, 279
free trade, 273
imperialism, 273
nontariff barriers (NTBs), 274
quota, 275
smart sanctions, 283
tariff, 274

Further Reading

David Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985).

In this classic overview of economic statecraft as an instrument of foreign policy, the author clarifies the concept of economic statecraft and provides examples of its potential and use.

Robert Blackwell and Jennifer Harris, *War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016).

The authors assert that, once a mainstay issue in conducting foreign policy, economics has become a neglected and misunderstood foreign policy tool. They call for a new vision of U.S. statecraft to reintegrate economics into U.S. foreign policy.

Bryan Early, *Busted Sanctions* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015).

This book examines the role of third-party spoilers, "Black Knights," in undermining economic sanctions. The author examines over sixty years of U.S. sanctions, finding that often U.S. allies are a major impediment to their success.

Douglas Irwin, "The Truth about Trade," *Foreign Affairs* 95 (July 2016), 84–95.

The author notes that free trade is often blamed for America's economic problems, arguing that, on the whole, trade still benefits the United States. This article examines the validity of complaints leveled against free trade and examines future options.

Walter Russell Mead, "America's Sticky Power," *Foreign Policy* 141 (2004), 46–53.

This article argues that, for too long, the United States has overlooked the full potential of its economic power, which has the ability to entrap other countries in positive relationships, thereby making global relations more stable and manageable.

Nicoli Nattrass, "U.S. Foreign Aid and the African AIDS Epidemic," *Yale Journal of International Affairs* 8 (2013), 52–61.

In this overview of the content and evolution of U.S. AIDS funding and programs in Africa, the author discusses the merits of critiques of the program and puts forward suggestions for improving it.

Richard Nephew, "The Hard Part: The Art of Sanctions Relief," *Washington Quarterly* 41 (2018), 63–77.

This article discusses three common problems with policies of sanctions relief: unclear, confused or misaligned objectives; entrenched politics; and the complexity of pushing business interests.

Military Instruments: Big Wars 12



Dateline: North Korean Denuclearization

Donald Trump is not the first president to enter **denuclearization** negotiations with North Korea. His negotiation style and approach to these talks differ greatly from those of his predecessors, however. Bill Clinton and George W. Bush pursued *bottom-up negotiations*, in which the details of the agreement were reached by lower-level officials. Trump's approach has emphasized *top-down negotiations*, in which leaders meet and seek an agreement with little preparatory work by staffers. Frustration and disappointment have characterized both approaches.

The first North Korean nuclear weapons agreement was negotiated by the Clinton administration. Talks began in June 1993 and culminated in

an Agreed Framework in October 1994. North Korea agreed to freeze its nuclear program in return for fuel oil, economic cooperation, the international construction of two proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors, and the promise of improved diplomatic relations with the U.S. This agreement collapsed early in the Bush administration, as evidence showed consistent violations by North Korea. In April 2003, the Bush administration entered into the Three-Party Talks attended by the United States, China, and North Korea. Eventually, two agreements were reached. Under the terms of a 2005 agreement, North Korea agreed to abandon all nuclear weapons and return as soon as possible to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which it had left in 1994. For its part, the United States confirmed that it had no intention to attack or invade North Korea. All participants agreed to promote economic cooperation with North Korea. The 2007 agreement (which became a Six-Party Agreement including Japan, South Korea, and Russia) required North Korea to shut down and seal the Yongbyon nuclear facility under international supervision. In return, North Korea would receive emergency energy assistance and would be removed from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism.[1]

Early on in his presidency, advisors urged Trump to enter into negotiations with North Korea because of fears that it could build a nuclear weapon in six to seven weeks. In late February 2017, Trump agreed to informal talks, only to change his position hours later. Instead, the administration chose to step up the deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system in South Korea and increase pressure by financial institutions if North Korea's nuclear missile program was not restrained. In April, Vice President Pence asserted that the "era of strategic patience" which Obama had embraced in dealing with North Korea was over. In July, North Korea countered with its first successful test of an intercontinental ballistic missile. In early September, it detonated its sixth nuclear bomb; Trump responded with the pledge that even the threat of North Korea using nuclear weapons "will be met with massive military response." In late September, Trump issued an executive order placing strong financial sanctions on individuals, aircraft, ships, and firms trading in goods, services, or technology with North Korea. He also chided Secretary of State Rex Tillerson for proposing talks with North Korea.

In 2018, Trump's rejection of diplomacy in favor of military and economic pressure took a sudden about-face. In March, he accepted on-the-spot a meeting invitation from North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, which was passed to him by South Korean President Moon Jae-in during a visit to Washington. That meeting was held in Singapore on June12, 2018. Although short, the road to the meeting was not easy. On May 24, Trump cancelled the summit in response to the strongly worded negative response by North Korea to Pence's suggestion that the Libyan model (denuclearization and removal of leadership/change in government) would be in order if no agreement were reached. The next day Trump changed his

mind about canceling the summit, citing "a very nice statement" from North Korea.

No National Security Council preparatory meeting was held. Trump asserted that "within the first minute" he would know if Kim were serious. At the summit's conclusion a brief joint statement was signed, pledging both sides to establish more positive relations, build a lasting and stable peace on the Korean Peninsula, and work together to recover MIA/POW remains. North Korea also pledged to honor an existing commitment to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, but denuclearization was not defined. Trump also announced the end of "provocative" joint military exercises between the United States and South Korea and his hope to remove the thirty-two thousand U.S. troops in South Korea, and proclaimed that "there is no longer a nuclear threat from North Korea."

The sense of good will generated by the summit soon disappeared. In July, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo flew to North Korea to create a nuclear inventory for denuclearization. Kim refused to see him, and North Korea issued a statement complaining of the U.S. "unilateral and gangster like demand" for denuclearization. In August, Trump canceled a follow-up trip by Pompeo. North Korea countered by announcing its intent to strengthen its nuclear forces.

With negotiations stalemated, Trump announced his desire for a new summit. It was held in Hanoi in February 2019. Although aides of both Trump and Kim were skeptical of the prospects for success, both leaders appeared confident in their ability to come to an agreement in one-on-one negotiations. The conference ended abruptly, without a signed statement, after Trump walked out.[2] He had proposed that North Korea would denuclearize, trading all of its nuclear weapons, materials, and facilities for an end to economic sanctions. This offer was virtually the same as those offered by Clinton and Bush. North Korea rejected it, proposing to dismantle its Yongbyon nuclear facility in exchange for an end to sanctions put in place by the United Nations in 2016. Kim's position was also virtually the same as North Korea had put forward in the past: denuclearization (with a still-contested meaning) would proceed in stages, but sanction relief would come immediately. Each side blamed the other for the failure of the Hanoi Summit, then returned to past policies. The United States imposed new sanctions. North Korea tested a series of new weapons. The United States seized a North Korean ship for running the blockade.

To the surprise of most observers, a third Trump-Kim meeting took place in June 2019. Following the G-20 meeting in Japan, Trump flew to the DMZ and entered North Korea to talk with Kim. The meeting was judged to be largely symbolic, but it was agreed that working-level nuclear talks between the United States and North Korea would resume in July. Once again, optimism about a resolution soon faded. When the United States and South Korea announced their determination to go

ahead with their annual joint force exercise in August, North Korea indicated that it would resume nuclear testing. Within one month, it carried out seven weapons tests, including launches of two short-range ballistic missiles. Trump downplayed the tests, saying "he likes testing missiles. Many nations test those missiles." More tests followed in December and North Korea set the end of 2019 as the hard deadline for beginning negotiations, promising Trump a "Christmas Gift" if negotiations were not restarted. Trump responded "North Korea could lose everything." This chapter begins by looking at the use of nuclear weapons and large-scale conventional forces for preemption, deterrence, and war fighting. It then looks at arms control efforts.

Cold War Nuclear Thinking

The United States' nuclear strategy during the Cold War was not static; it changed several times. It also lacked internal consistency.[3] There often was a distinction between how policy makers described their strategy was and what it actually meant in terms of action. Recall from chapter 1 that the former is known as *declaratory policy*, and the latter as *action policy*. To fully appreciate this difference, the discussion begins by looking at the development of U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals and then examines the strategies built upon them.

The U.S. Cold War Strategic Arsenal

On July 16, 1945, the first atomic bomb was detonated at 5:30 a.m. in the New Mexican desert. On August 6, Hiroshima was destroyed by an atomic bomb. On August 9, Nagasaki was similarly destroyed by a plutonium bomb. These two attacks effectively depleted the U.S. (and therefore the global) inventory of atomic weapons. As World War II came to a close, a divided Truman administration looked out to the post–World War II era. Many decisions would have to be made, not the least of which was determining what to do with the nuclear bomb; for one proposed action, see the Historical Lesson.

The U.S. nuclear arsenal grew slowly. Two weapons were stockpiled at the end of 1945, nine in July 1946, thirteen in July 1947, and fifty in July 1948.[4] None of these weapons was preassembled; it took thirty-nine people over two days to put them together. The U.S. nuclear monopoly ended in 1949 when the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic bomb. The United States responded by developing a more powerful weapon, the hydrogen bomb (H-bomb). The United States successfully tested an H-bomb in November 1952. The Soviet Union duplicated the feat in August 1953.[5] By 1957, it is estimated that the United States probably had three thousand nuclear bombs, and the Soviet Union had a few hundred.[6]

Reinforcing this U.S. numerical advantage in bombs was a marked superiority in delivery systems. The Soviet bomber fleet was small and had to travel a great distance to strike the United States. The United States could use bases in Western Europe to attack the Soviet Union. This advantage disappeared in 1957, when the Soviet Union successfully tested an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and launched Sputnik into orbit. With these two actions, the Soviet Union demonstrated the theoretical capability to deliver a nuclear attack on U.S. cities and its overseas military bases.

Fearing the development of a "missile gap" in which the Soviet Union would have a significant advantage in nuclear weapons, the United States stepped up production of its own ballistic missile force. As it turned out, no missile gap developed because the Soviet Union did not engage in a crash buildup of its nuclear forces. The result was overwhelming U.S. nuclear superiority.

The U.S. nuclear arsenal reached its peak size in 1966 with an estimated 32,000 nuclear warheads. At that time, the Soviet Union possessed about 7,000 nuclear warheads. The long-predicted Soviet buildup got under way in the mid-1960s; by 1978, it held a slight numerical advantage over the United States: 25,393 Soviet warheads to the U.S.'s 24,826. Beginning at this time, the term "parity" was used to characterize the U.S.–Soviet nuclear relationship.

U.S. Cold War Nuclear Strategy

For the first eight years of the nuclear age, virtually no such thing as nuclear strategy existed per se at either the declaratory or action level. The uniqueness of nuclear weapons was not yet appreciated. They were simply treated as the largest explosive devices yet created. It was expected that the next war would be fought along the lines of World War II. Long-range bombers would deliver nuclear weapons against Soviet cities, industries, and military support facilities. When the small stockpile of atomic bombs was exhausted, plans called for using conventional bombs and a general mobilization of U.S. forces.[7] The first war plan to identify atomic bomb target lists was *Broiler* in the fall of 1947, which called for thirty-four bombs to be dropped on twenty-four cities.[8]

There was a certain degree of unreality to early war plans. Most fundamentally, Bernard Brodie questioned whether nuclear weapons could be used in the same way as other weapons, or if **deterrence** (the use of force to prevent something unwanted from happening) rather than war fighting was their sole credible use.[9] Moreover, if deterrence was the principal purpose of nuclear weapons, then thought was necessary about how to accomplish it. Deterrence could not simply be assumed to exist.

The first formal statement of nuclear strategy was put forward by the Eisenhower administration as part of its New Look defense posture. The nuclear component of this strategy was **massive retaliation**. It was

intended to deter a wide spectrum of Soviet attacks, guaranteeing not only the security of the United States but also that of its European and Third World allies by threatening the Soviet Union with massive destruction in retaliation for aggressive behavior. No details were given; all that was promised was "retaliation instantly, by means and places of our own choosing." The lack of specificity was intentional. The Eisenhower administration felt that the Truman administration's pledge of help to any country threatened by communism had given the initiative to the Soviet Union. Massive retaliation was designed to give it back to the United States.

Two recurrent lines of criticism of massive retaliation were leveled. The first concerned its credibility. Critics asserted that deterrence required more than just the capability to inflict damage. The threat also had to be believable. Threatening the Soviet Union with massive destruction for an attack on the United States was one thing; to make the same threat for attacks on Third World states was quite another. Soviet leaders would find the former credible, but not the latter; therefore, they would not be deterred, leaving the United States with the distasteful choice between implementing its threat and doing nothing. The second line of criticism was that massive retaliation was ill suited to the changing U.S.–Soviet nuclear relationship. Massive retaliation assumed the existence of an invulnerable retaliatory force, which was no longer the case. The growing vulnerability of nuclear forces to attack transformed deterrence from a certainty into an idea based on a "delicate balance of terror."[10]

Massive retaliation was U.S. declaratory policy. Action policy was reflected in U.S. war plans. Evidence suggests that U.S. war plans were not being tailored to meet the two primary contingencies spoken of by policy makers: retaliation and **preemption** (striking first in self-defense when a threat is imminent). Instead, U.S. war plans had become capability plans. They were constructed in such a way as to employ all of the nuclear weapons in the U.S. inventory and provide a rationale for acquiring additional weapons.[11]

The first coordinated effort to establish a nuclear action policy came in 1960, when President Dwight Eisenhower approved the establishment of a National Strategy Target List (NSTL) and a Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) for using nuclear weapons. Planners selected 2,600 separate installations for attack out of an overall list of 4,100 targets.[12] Plans called for launching all 3,500 nuclear warheads if sufficient warning time existed. According to one calculation, the SIOP assigned 300 to 500 kilotons of weapons to accomplish the level of destruction caused by a single bomb on Hiroshima.

The Kennedy administration differed in how to structure deterrence and gave attention to a problem not yet fully addressed: how to fight a nuclear war. Kennedy replaced massive retaliation with the concept of **flexible response**, under which the United States would have a range of conventional and nuclear options from which to choose in deterring

and responding to Soviet aggression. To make this happen, the Kennedy administration incorporated three new features into U.S. nuclear thinking:

1. More attention was given to the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the hope that, because of their less destructive nature, they might be more manageable.
2. A new targeting policy was adopted that emphasized attacks on military forces and avoidance of population centers.
3. The administration looked into two measures that might limit the damage done to the United States in case of a nuclear war: civil defense and damage limitation.[13]

The value of these changes in nuclear strategy was called into question by the 1962 Cuban missile crisis (see chapter 9).[14] Attention now shifted back to formulating a nuclear posture built on the ability to inflict widespread devastation on the enemy. To be credible, Robert McNamara initially estimated that U.S. forces must possess **assured destruction,** the capability to destroy 25–30 percent of the Soviet population and 66 percent of its industrial capacity.

Movement from massive retaliation to flexible response and then to assured destruction implied a parallel set of changes in U.S. targeting policy. Although changes in the SIOP did occur, SIOP remained a capabilities (action) plan rather than an objectives (declaratory) plan.[15] The most significant targeting change took place when the Nixon administration introduced the principle of **sufficiency**, which required strategic equality between the United States and the Soviet Union rather than the possession of a minimum level of retaliatory threat.[16] This was seen as providing crisis stability, so that neither side had an incentive to go first with its nuclear weapons in a crisis. A new Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (NUWEP) emphasized the destruction of Soviet economic recovery assets as the primary objective of U.S. nuclear forces. It stipulated that, under all circumstances, the United States must be able to destroy 70 percent of the Soviet industrial capacity needed for postwar economic recovery. The major notable and controversial addition to U.S. nuclear strategy made by the Reagan administration was to add the requirement that the United States must be able to "prevail" and "force the Soviet Union to seek the earliest termination of hostilities on terms favorable to the U.S."

Historical Lesson

The Baruch Plan

After World War II ended, on one side of the debate about what to do with the nuclear bomb was Secretary of War Henry Stimson, who argued that the United States could not keep a nuclear monopoly for long. It would only be a matter of time before the Soviet Union and other countries

acquired the scientific knowledge and technological capacity to build nuclear weapons. To prevent such nuclear **proliferation**, he favored placing nuclear power under international control. Aligned against Stimson was a group led by Secretary of State James Byrnes. Distrustful of Soviet motives and fearful of its power, Byrnes argued against any sharing of nuclear secrets. From this perspective, a monopoly over nuclear weapons would be crucial to maintaining the postwar balance of power. Truman was divided on the matter but ultimately supported Stimson's perspective.

In September 1945, the first international discussions about the future of nuclear power took place in Washington among representatives from the United States, Great Britain, and Canada, all of whom had worked on various aspects of the Manhattan Project responsible for development of the nuclear bombs that leveled Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This was followed by a foreign ministers meeting in Moscow in December, during which the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union agreed in principle to create a United Nations (UN) commission to work for the peaceful use of nuclear power and advise on the destruction of existing nuclear weapons (which only the United States possessed). In January 1946, to help formulate a U.S. position, Stimson appointed Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson to chair a committee that would draft a U.S. nuclear energy policy. Acheson formed a technical advisory group to support his committee's deliberations chaired by David Lilienthal, who also chaired the Tennessee Valley Authority.

The Acheson-Lilienthal Committee issued its report in March 1946. Its fundamental conclusion supported Stimson's position. International inspections of atomic energy facilities were unlikely to stop their spread and the diversion of atomic energy for military purposes. Accordingly, the best solution was to place atomic energy under the control of a new international agency, the Atomic Development Authority, and make it available in small quantities to all countries for peaceful use. In return for the United States taking this step, all other countries would agree not to develop nuclear weapons. The committee's approach was consistent with the prevailing view of the early post–World War II era that the primary obstacles to developing a bomb were not technological and scientific problems but access to raw materials.

After receiving the report, Truman arranged for it to be given to Bernard Baruch, whom he had appointed as the U.S. representative to the UN Atomic Energy Commission. Baruch proceeded to make important changes in the Acheson-Lilienthal Plan, the most significant of which dealt with modifying the enforcement procedures that could be wielded by the new Atomic Development Authority. Baruch eliminated the possibility that decisions by the Atomic Development Authority might be vetoed by participating countries. Only then did he believe that the phrase "immediate and direct enforcement" would carry any weight. Baruch also inserted additional language that Truman accepted. With Baruch's change in wording, the Baruch Plan was presented to the UN Atomic Energy Commission on June 14, 1946. Truman's about-face

appears to be tied to steadily deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union that made conflict appear far more likely than cooperation.

Baruch opened his presentation by telling the assembled delegates that they faced a choice between the "quick and the dead." His plan gave the Atomic Energy Authority the power to inspect nuclear facilities, made it illegal to possess an atomic bomb, and allowed for the seizure of facilities. The United States would end its nuclear monopoly in stages and destroy its nuclear weapons only when the Baruch Plan was fully implemented. The Soviet Union quickly rejected the Plan, objecting to its loss of a veto and calling for the United States to end its nuclear monopoly as a precondition for participation. In December 1946, the Baruch Plan was approved by a 10–0 vote, with the Soviet Union and Poland abstaining. Since a unanimous vote of all twelve members of the UN Atomic Energy Commission was needed, the plan was defeated. The Soviet Union detonated its first nuclear device on September 23, 1949.

Applying the Lesson

1. Could the Baruch Plan have slowed down or stopped nuclear proliferation? Why or why not?
2. Some argue that Truman knew that the plan would be rejected and was not serious about it. What do you think?
3. What would a new Baruch Plan have to look like to stop nuclear proliferation by North Korea or Iran?

Post–Cold War Nuclear Thinking

The end of the Cold War did not bring with it an end to nuclear weapons. Questions continued over the proper size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and strategies for its use. Additionally, questions were raised about whether nuclear weapons were still a stabilizing force in world politics or a source of instability.[17] Two different dynamics were at work here. The first involved the expanded number of states with nuclear capabilities and the variety of strategies that emergent nuclear powers might employ, which greatly complicated the challenges of deterrence for the United States.[18] The second was the pursuit by both Russia and the United States of low-yield nuclear weapons; some saw this as a dangerous development because it threatened to lower the threshold for their use.

The U.S. Post-Cold War Strategic Nuclear Arsenal

At the beginning of 2019, the U.S. nuclear stockpile included 3,800 nuclear warheads (1,750 of which were deployed) and over 800 ballistic missiles and aircraft. Of the deployed warheads, 1,300 are on ballistic missiles; 300 are on strategic bombers; and 150 tactical bombs are deployed in Europe. An additional 2,385 warheads are retired but still intact. The

actual and desired sizes of the U.S. nuclear inventory are subject to some debate today, as Trump has reversed Obama's policy of declassifying these numbers.[19] Some, such as former Deputy Secretary of Defense and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency John Deutch have called for deploying less than 1,000 warheads.[20] Others have countered that the reduction in nuclear weapons is too severe, indicating that a larger nuclear arsenal is needed if U.S. policy makers are to have a sufficient range of options when dealing with nuclear adversaries.

Two other debates are embedded in the debate over numbers. One deals with the readiness and reliability of U.S. nuclear warheads, especially those designed in the 1950s and early 1960s. In 2005, Congress began funding the Reliable Replacement Warhead program to address this concern. In 2014, Pentagon studies documented serious deficiencies in the nuclear weapons infrastructure, such as aging blast doors in nuclear silos and an aging submarine fleet. The second debate centers on the cost of modernizing and expanding the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Trump's 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), discussed shortly, has a price tag of $1.2 trillion to be spent over the next twenty years. Concerns center on both the total cost and the extent to which all aspects of the U.S. nuclear force (submarines, bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear command and control capabilities, and weapons production facilities) require upgrading.

U.S. Post-Cold War Nuclear Strategy: Content

U.S. nuclear thinking continues to bear the imprint of Cold War thinking. The first presidential statement of U.S. post–Cold War policy was Bill Clinton's 1997 Presidential Decision Directive 60 (PDD-60). According to PDD-60, the U.S. military should no longer prepare to win a protracted nuclear war, but instead to deter the use of nuclear weapons against the United States and its allies. It continued to call for the existence of a wide range of nuclear strike options against Russian nuclear forces and its civilian and military leadership. It also contained a requirement to plan for nuclear strikes against states that have "prospective access" to nuclear weapons or that may become hostile to the United States.

The major change in George W. Bush's nuclear weapons policy was to add flexibility to U.S. nuclear strategy by constructing a wider range of scenarios in which nuclear weapons might be employed. Operations Plan (OPLAN) 8010 contained nuclear strike options against combat forces and options for use of support equipment against six potential enemies: Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Obama reaffirmed the fundamental role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy but moved to reduce the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and minimize the role of nuclear weapons in defense planning.[21] His efforts met with mixed results. On the one hand, he announced the retirement of nuclear-armed, submarine-launched cruise missiles. On the other hand, he committed to modernizing the

U.S. nuclear arsenal in return for obtaining Senate approval of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START).

President Trump's 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) endorsed Obama's support for nuclear modernization but parted company with Obama in a number of important respects. It held that new arms control agreements were "difficult to envision" given changes in the dynamics of world politics and the growing threats from China and Russia. Trump's NPR calls for maintaining the U.S. nuclear triad of land-based, sea-based, and air-launched missiles, and for developing low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missiles and a new generation of cruise missiles that hug the ground after launch. One of the most controversial aspects of his NPR is advancing the integration of nuclear and conventional forces in military planning and training exercises, especially in identifying situations in which nuclear weapons might be used. They "include, but are not limited to, attacks on the U.S. allied or partner civilian populations or infrastructure, and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities . . . our strategy will ensure Russia understands that any use of nuclear weapons, however limited, is unacceptable."

Bridging the Nuclear-Conventional Divide

This new global context in which U.S. nuclear forces operate has drawn renewed attention to the following question: Where do you draw the line between using conventional and nuclear weapons?[22] The long-standing fear exists that, without a clearly defined **firewall** separating the two, a conventional war might escalate into a nuclear one.

Careful thinking about the interaction of nuclear and conventional weapons is especially important in two of the most controversial areas of contemporary U.S. military strategy: deterrence and preemption. Deterrence is controversial because some now argue that some U.S. enemies cannot be deterred. Preemption is controversial because of its offensive character and the possibility of it being carried out on the basis of incorrect information.

Deterrence

The United States is concerned with deterring attacks both on its own homeland (*direct deterrence*) and against its allies (*extended deterrence*). Up until the terrorist attacks of 9/11, it was taken for granted that direct deterrence was more easily achieved than extended deterrence. Now both are suspect.

Two different strategies have been used to implement a deterrence strategy. The first is to set up *trip wires.* This typically took the form of American troops stationed abroad—most notably in Germany and South Korea—that would stand in the way of any enemy attack. During the Cold

War, the presence of American troops abroad was seen as a sign of strength and resolve. Today, troops have become targets of opportunity for terrorists and insurgents.

A second strategy is to leave the door open to a nuclear response should deterrence fail. By threatening to take a crisis to the brink of nuclear war, it was assumed that the enemy would abandon its unwanted line of action. Reportedly, President Eisenhower threatened the use of nuclear weapons against China if it did not help bring about an end to the Korean War.

You can begin to understand the problems faced in constructing a successful deterrence strategy if you look at its past failures.[23] Two primary failure patterns exist:

1. **A fait accompli.** Hostile policy makers detect no U.S. commitment and feel that they can control their risks in challenging the United States. The 1950 North Korean attack on South Korea is an example of this type of deterrence failure. The attack was not irrational because no clear U.S. commitment existed, and the risks appeared to be controllable. Public statements by leading U.S. diplomats and military figures had placed South Korea outside of the U.S. "defense perimeter" and referred to it as a "liability" in the event of war in the Far East. The most likely response to an attack was expected to be diplomatic protest or a minimal military action.
2. **A limited probe.** The challenging action is easily reversed or expanded depending on the nature of the U.S. response. In these cases, the U.S. commitment is unclear, and the risks still seem to be controllable. The Berlin Wall crisis of 1961 is one example. The Soviet Union and East Germany moved at midnight on May 12 to close the Berlin border crossing by constructing a barbed-wire wall on East Berlin territory. Only when the minimal nature of the U.S. response was clear (the Western powers did not make a protest for four days) did they move to construct a more substantial and permanent wall with only a few well-guarded openings.

Failure patterns such as these led the George W. Bush administration to move away from deterrence to **preemption**.

Deterrence is not doomed to fail. According to advocates of deterrence, it is important to recognize that deterrence has two dimensions. It contains both a threat, "Cross this line and we will attack," and a promise, "If you do not cross this line, we will not harm you." Viewed from this perspective, recent U.S. deterrence failures such as those against Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Bashar al-Assad in Syria result from implementing only the first part of the deterrence equation. Instead of a promise not to do harm, the United States has treated its adversaries as villains who could not be trusted and had to be replaced. Similarly, efforts described in the Dateline section opening this chapter to come to an agreement deterring North Korea from building a larger nuclear force have suffered from

references to employing the Libyan model, which saw Gaddafi give up his nuclear weapons only to be captured and killed following Western military intervention into Libya in 2011.

A re-emerging deterrence challenge facing the United States involves NATO. It is both external and internal. The external challenge comes from Russia's growing military presence in Europe and came into focus with its 2014 annexation of the Crimea.[24] The United States responded with an increased presence of NATO ground forces in Poland and ballistic missiles in Romania. In 2019, it sent training and equipment to strengthen Ukraine's army and transferred Coast Guard cutters and radar systems to its navy in an effort to prevent blocking of Ukrainian Black Sea ports to commercial shipping following Russia's seizure of three Ukrainian naval ships. In a separate set of decisions, NATO announced that it would pre-position U.S. military equipment in Poland, and the Trump administration announced that it would send an additional thousand U.S. troops to Poland.

Russia is also modernizing its navy and has altered its naval doctrine to include developing a Russian presence in strategic areas such as the Mediterranean Sea and the blue water Atlantic (the deep waters of its open oceans). Especially troubling to the United States and its European allies is Russia's increasing military presence and military exercises in the Baltics. One such exercise, Zapad-2017, involved almost a hundred thousand military personnel and employed nuclear-capable missiles. This last point is significant, because Russia's nuclear doctrine includes an escalate-to-deescalate strategy, in which low-yield nuclear weapons could be employed to prevent military action by the United States and NATO.

The internal deterrence challenges to NATO come from two directions.[25] A general challenge is found in the internal politics of member states with the rise of authoritarian leaders. A more specific challenge comes from Trump's questioning of NATO's value. During his presidential campaign, Trump spoke of NATO as an obsolete organization that was a financial drain on the United States because member states were not paying their fair share. Several times early in his presidency, Trump went so far as to raise the matter of withdrawing from NATO with his national security staff. Members may withdraw from NATO after a one-year notification period. Dissention within NATO reached the point that, in 2019, a 70th anniversary meeting in Washington scheduled to be attended by heads of government was downgraded to a foreign ministers meeting.

Preemption

As indicated earlier in the chapter, *preemption* is striking first in self-defense when a threat is imminent. When a threat is not imminent but is still held to be real, striking first in self-defense is referred to as a *preventive strike*. Technically speaking, the George W. Bush administration ignored this long-standing distinction in putting forward its policy, and combined both

scenarios under the single heading of preemption. Preemption is not a new U.S. strategy. Ronald Reagan justified the invasion of Grenada in 1983 as a preemptive move. Lyndon Johnson did so when he sent troops to the Dominican Republic in 1965. In the more distant past, Woodrow Wilson's decision to send troops to Mexico in 1914 could be considered consistent with the logic of preemption.

The Iraq War represented the Bush administration's attempt to implement a policy of preemption. Particular attention has been directed at the *shock and awe* strategy used in its opening stage. The expectation was that, by rapidly overcoming the enemy's ability and will to fight, the United States would immobilize the enemy and reconstruction would be less expensive. The subsequent occupation problems in Iraq led to debate over the wisdom of using a small military force in this manner. Defenders of the strategy maintain that Operation Iraqi Freedom was not a good test case for a shock and awe strategy. They argue that operational difficulties and the less-than-perfect knowledge of the enemy reduced it to a mere slogan instead of a strategy. They cite a military conflict with China as a potential case in which it might be better applied.[26]

Even if the logic of striking first in self-defense is accepted, questions remain to be answered.[27] Perhaps the most pressing issues include the following: How long should a country have to wait before acting? And how should it respond? Here again the influence of Cold War thinking can be seen. In a bipolar nuclear world, preemption was focused on responding to national security superpower nuclear threats. Today, many crises are domestic rather than cross-border in nature. In addition, they are not necessarily nuclear in nature. Even when the threat is nuclear, the argument is increasingly being made that the increased lethality of conventional weapons makes them better suited for responding to certain types of nuclear threats than the use of nuclear weapons.

Using Large-Scale Conventional Military Force

Conventional military power can be used for many purposes.[28] This section examines the large-scale use of conventional military power for fighting wars. The next chapter returns to its use in the context of peacekeeping operations and as a stability force.

During the Cold War, the U.S. military fought two big wars: Korea and Vietnam. Three times since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the United States has sent large numbers of armed forces abroad to engage the enemy in conflict. The first occurred in 1991, when the United States led a United Nations–sanctioned war against Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait. A massive bombing campaign was initiated on January 17. The offensive military actions that followed met ineffective Iraqi resistance and after a hundred hours of fighting, President George H. W. Bush declared a cease-fire. The 2003 Iraq War got off to a similarly effective start. A massive

shock and awe bombing campaign was followed by twenty-one days of combat, which began on March 20 and encountered little resistance. Baghdad fell on April 9. There followed, however, a long and protracted unconventional war in which U.S. forces did not fare as well. In October 2011, Obama announced that the last U.S. troops would leave Iraq by the end of the year, bringing the war to a close. In 2019 there were still an estimated 5,200 troops in Iraq as part of a security agreement to provide military support and advice to defeat Islamic terrorist groups. The Trump administration also sought to shift U.S. forces from Syria to Iraq and keep U.S. forces in Iraq in order to monitor Iran.

The third major involvement of U.S. forces has been in Afghanistan. It is covered in depth in the next chapter in an examination of the challenges of exiting from wars. Here it is important to note that U.S. involvement in Afghanistan can be divided into two phases. The first phase, which came immediately after 9/11, had the goals of removing the Taliban from power and capturing or killing Osama bin Laden. It relied heavily on air power and Special Forces that operated in alliances with local resistance leaders. The second phase began in 2008, when U.S. forces began entering Afghanistan in large numbers. The Taliban insurgency had regrouped, forming an alliance with al-Qaeda and threatening the control of the U.S.-backed Afghan government. By 2010, the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan had reached ninety-four thousand.

War fighting has always been the ultimate measure of a state's power. For much of the post–World War II period, American military policy was cast in terms of a *two-war capability*, meaning that the United States needed the ability to fight two wars at the same time. This has not always been the case, however. Under Nixon, the standard was 1.5 wars, and under Reagan, it was 3.5 wars. After 9/11, the United States began moving away from this baseline. The 2015 National Military Strategy stated that the "if deterrence fails . . . our military will be capable of defeating a regional adversary in a large-scale, multi-phased campaign while denying the objectives of—or imposing unacceptable costs on—another aggressor in a different region."[29] This was characterized as a *one plus strategy*. Under Trump, the primary attention of defense planners has again been directed toward the possibility of major military conflict with China and Russia rather than toward terrorism or a regional adversary.

The possibly hostile superpower most frequently identified today is China. Concern over possible conflict with China centers on the South China Sea, and led to the development of the *Air-Sea Battle strategy* in 2010. At the low end of the conflict continuum, the Air-Sea Battle strategy was intended to provide policy makers with enough flexibility to be able to move military forces outside a specific theater of conflict, conduct a show of force, or engage in limited military strikes. At the higher end of the conflict continuum, the Air-Sea Battle strategy was designed to provide the ability to defeat aggression and maintain escalation advantages in the face

of advanced weapons systems. One version of the Air-Sea Battle strategy called for U.S. bombers and submarines to incapacitate China's long-range intelligence capabilities and precision missile systems, followed by larger air and naval assaults on Chinese targets. In 2015, the Air-Sea Battle strategy was replaced by the *Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons.* The change was intended to direct attention to two elements missing from the Air-Sea Battle strategy, which included no role for the Army and no detailed attention to the question of U.S. strategy after gaining access to denied territory.

The Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons directs attention to problems of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) in the South China Sea. These problems have long been a focus of military planners dealing with small war contingencies. *Anti-access (A2) challenges* refer to efforts by the adversary to prevent the United States from entering a theater of operation and block it from prepositioning forces near or moving forces to that area. Tactics range from denial of basing rights and overflight rights, expulsion from existing bases, terrorism, cyberattacks, opening alternative fronts requiring U.S. military engagement, and the use of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. *Area denial (AD) challenges* refer to possible steps taken by an adversary to resist and limit the freedom of action open to the U.S. military once it has entered an area. Area denial tactics include the use of ballistic missiles, mines, electronic warfare, and social media.

Reducing the Danger of War: Arms Control and Disarmament

In the earliest years of the Cold War, two general strategies were pursued to lessen the likelihood of nuclear war: disarmament and arms control. **Disarmament** has as its ultimate goal the systematic elimination of weapons, whereas **arms control** seeks to place restraints on the use of weapons. For the most part, disarmament tended to be pursued at the level of declaratory policy through formal treaties. Arms control did not always involve formal agreements or treaties. Instead, it took the form of more flexible and informal *traffic rules* agreements, such as arrangements to give advance notification of tests or military exercises to reduce the possibility that these actions might be incorrectly interpreted and spiral into military conflict. The rationale for pursuing such traffic rule agreements was that a treaty in and of itself did not produce arms control.

These multiple paths to arms control continue today, as does the tendency for disarmament to remain at the declaratory level. More recently, a third strategy, defense, has also been pursued. Before examining each of these as ways of controlling or preventing big wars, note that an often underappreciated dimension to the problem of controlling nuclear

weapons involves accidents. In 1979, a training video of a Soviet attack was accidently played and set off warnings of a nuclear attack. Even more serious were a series of Soviet missile, bomber, and submarine accidents between 1983 and 1987 that grew out of fears of a NATO first strike.[30] Most recently, a nuclear explosion at a Russian military testing site in August 2019 killed five scientists and released radiation off its northern coast. Russia provided little information about the accident. Speculation centered on the testing of a new type of nuclear-propelled cruise missile. Evidence later emerged that the explosion occurred underwater or near the surface when Russia was trying to salvage a sunken missile.

The Cold War Record

From 1946 to 1957, disarmament proposals dominated the international negotiating agenda. Little of significance was achieved, as proposals were put forward with an eye more to their propaganda value than to their substantive merits. The first nuclear disarmament proposal to command global attention was the Baruch Plan which was highlighted in the Historical Lesson. Presented by the United States at the United Nations in 1946, it sought to place all aspects of nuclear energy production and use under international control, but was rejected by the Soviet Union.

Proposals for lessening the danger of nuclear war were not forthcoming again until the Eisenhower administration. Its first proposal was the 1953 Atoms for Peace plan. This was followed in 1957 by the Open Skies proposal. Atoms for Peace was a disarmament plan only in an indirect sense. It sought state cooperation on the peaceful development and use of atomic power. Eisenhower's proposal led to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency, but it did not produce movement in the direction of disarmament. The proposed Open Skies Treaty focused on reducing the fear of surprise attack by exchanging blueprints of military installations and allowing each side to carry out aerial surveillance of the other's territory. It, too, failed to serve as a first step toward disarmament. Rather than accepting the plan as a way of sidestepping the question of on-site inspection, the Soviet Union interpreted it as a device for legitimizing U.S. spying.

The first major breakthrough in arms control came in 1963 following the Cuban missile crisis, with the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. This treaty outlawed nuclear explosions (testing) in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space. A second milestone was reached in 1968 with the signing of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly referred to as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Up until that time, the primary **proliferation** concern shared by the United States and the Soviet Union was stopping the spread of nuclear weapons in Europe, especially to West Germany. With the signing of the NPT, attention shifted to the Third World. The NPT represented an agreement between nuclear and nonnuclear states. Those states that had nuclear weapons promised not

to provide them to nonnuclear states and to negotiate in good faith to reduce their nuclear stockpiles. They also pledged to help nonnuclear states develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In return, the nonnuclear states agreed not to try to obtain nuclear weapons.

In addition to spurring interest in multilateral arms control treaties, the Cuban missile crisis also nudged the United States and Soviet Union toward bilateral arms control efforts. The first major product was the hotline (actually a telegraph link) between the White House and the Kremlin. During the crisis, it had taken nearly twelve hours for a key communication from Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev to reach President John Kennedy and be decoded. The hotline was first used in 1967 during the Arab-Israeli War, when the Americans and Soviets informed each other of the movements of their navies.

The negotiation of a formal arms control treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union had to wait until their nuclear inventories had grown to the point at which each side felt that a balance of power existed. The breakthrough agreements came with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and an agreement called the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT; it became SALT I upon introduction of the second, SALT II agreement). The ABM Treaty was of unlimited duration and was modified in 1975. Its key provisions limited each side to one ABM deployment area and prohibited the development, testing, or deployment of ABM components. Among the key provisions of SALT I were limits on the number of fixed launchers for ICBMs and numerical limits for submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

The SALT I agreement on offensive forces was set to expire in 1977. The expectation was that it would lead to a second agreement (SALT II). A first step in this direction was the November 1974 signing by President Ford of the Vladivostok Accords, which set ceilings on the total numbers of strategic launchers that each side could possess and the number of vehicles that could carry multiple independently targeted warheads. Movement from the Vladivostok Accords to SALT II did not proceed smoothly, in part because Jimmy Carter sought to achieve deeper cuts upon becoming president. As it finally emerged, SALT II was a complicated, multilayered document to which the U.S. Senate has never given its consent; it has now technically expired.

In his campaign for the presidency, Ronald Reagan attacked the SALT II treaty as fatally flawed because it placed the Soviet Union in a position of military advantage. Reagan's first concrete arms control proposal was directed at the problem of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe. These weapons had become NATO's main defense against the conventional military advantage held by Warsaw Pact troops. By the late 1970s, their military value was seriously challenged by the Soviet Union's introduction of mobile SS-20 missiles. In November 1981, Reagan presented his solution to this problem. His *zero option* called on the Soviet Union to

eliminate its existing intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) targeted at Europe in return for a U.S. pledge not to deploy a new generation of missiles there. The idea of a zero option was quickly rejected by the Soviet Union. The resulting deadlock was not broken until September 1987, with the signing of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

During the same speech in which he unveiled his zero option, Reagan indicated that his administration was preparing proposals for a new round of strategic arms talks, to be known as the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). Little visible movement was forthcoming, and public concern began to mount over the administration's commitment to arms control and its loose language about nuclear war.[31] Ultimately, the Reagan administration presented a series of arms control proposals that the Soviet Union rejected as "old poison in new bottles." Still, negotiations continued, and a START framework was agreed upon by the time Reagan left office. The agreement was signed by President George H. W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev in July 1991.

The Post–Cold War Record

The dynamics of arms control changed with the end of the Cold War. Rather than engaging in many rounds of protracted treaty negotiations, the United States and the Soviet Union entered into a series of unilateral cuts. For example, in September 1991, Bush ordered all tactical nuclear weapons, except those dropped from planes, to be removed from the U.S. arsenal; all nuclear cruise missiles and bombs to be taken off naval ships, attack submarines, and land-based naval aircrafts; and all strategic bombers to be taken off high alert status. He also halted the development and deployment of mobile ICBMs. Gorbachev responded by calling for the elimination of all land-based tactical nuclear weapons and the removal of all nuclear arms from ships, submarines, and land-based naval aircrafts.

The failed August 1991 coup against Gorbachev raised concerns in the United States that, should the Soviet Union disintegrate, the government and military's ability to exert command and control over the immense Soviet nuclear arsenal would also disappear, with potentially catastrophic proliferation consequences. In November 1991, to try and minimize the dangers inherent in thousands of "loose nukes," Congress passed the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (better known as the Nunn-Lugar Program) to help the Soviet leadership secure and dismantle its nuclear stockpile. With the passage of time, the focus has extended to all weapons of mass destruction; the United States now works with Ukraine, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and other countries that were once members of the Soviet Union.

The United States and Russia returned to formal arms control agreements in January 1993 with the signing of START II. It never came into

force, however. Domestic and foreign policy issues in both countries led to the treaty languishing in limbo. Russia delayed final approval as a sign of its disapproval of U.S. military action in the Balkans. In the United States, attention shifted to the politically charged question of whether it should withdraw from the ABM Treaty so that a national missile defense system could be created. This issue was settled when, in December 2001, President George W. Bush gave the required six-month notice that the United States was withdrawing from the ABM Treaty.

Russian President Vladimir Putin called the decision to withdraw from the ABM agreement a "mistake," but it did not stop him from signing a new arms control agreement with the United States in May 2002; the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) broke new ground in treaty language. It starts from the premise that Russia is a friend of the United States and not an enemy. The agreement was negotiated in six months and contains only ten sentences. In essence, the treaty permitted each side to do as it pleased as long as its nuclear arsenal was reduced to 2,200 deployed warheads by December 31, 2012. SORT expired on December 21, 2012.

With START I set to expire in December 2009, at a July 2009 summit meeting President Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev announced that they had agreed upon the outlines of a new arms control agreement: New START. Obama encountered significant problems in getting Senate approval. Many in Congress argued that its inspection provisions were inadequate, and that the U.S. nuclear inventory needed upgrading. Obama succeeded in gaining Senate approval of New START in December 2010 by committing to a ten-year, $85 billion nuclear weapons modernization program. According to the terms of the treaty, both sides can deploy no more than 1,550 strategic warheads and 700 launchers seven years after the treaty is ratified. On-site inspection agreements established in START I also would resume. New START was activated in February 2011 and will remain in force until 2021, with an option to extend its life to 2026.

U.S.-Russian nuclear relations took an antagonistic turn in 2014, when the United States accused Russia of violating the 1987 INF Treaty by testing a prohibited ground-launched cruise missile. That agreement banned producing or testing low-flying, ground-launched cruise missiles with a range of 310 to 3,420 miles. Although it had begun testing this missile in 2008, Russia denied the allegation. In 2015, the Obama administration determined that, despite Russia's violation, it was not in the interest of the United States to withdraw from the INF treaty.[32]

President Trump reached the opposite conclusion, announcing in October 2018 that the United States was planning to withdraw from the INF Treaty. In February 2019, following unsuccessful talks between the United States and Russia over preserving the treaty, the United States

formally suspended its participation. Ending the INF Treaty allows the United States (and Russia) to legally begin testing and developing a new generation of land-based, intermediate-range cruise missiles. It also allowed the United States to address the Chinese buildup of cruise missiles. Since China was not a party to the INF Treaty, its ability to build these weapons was not limited; it now had an inventory of more than two thousand ballistic and cruise missiles, presenting U.S. forces in the region with a growing military challenge. On August 18, 2019, sixteen days after the official U.S. withdrawal, the United States tested a Tomahawk cruise missile that would have been illegal had the INF Treaty still been in place.

The post–Cold War era has also seen the reemergence of nuclear proliferation as a central national security problem for the United States. In spite of the NPT, nuclear proliferation has become a political and strategic reality. India and Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons (in 1974 and 1998, respectively), and Israel is recognized to have possessed them since 1979. South Africa, Iraq, and Libya are known to have had or been in pursuit of nuclear weapons at one time. Attention today is focused on the nuclear ambitions of two states identified by Bush as part of the "axis of evil": Iran and North Korea.

As noted in the Dateline section opening this chapter, repeated efforts to negotiate North Korean denuclearization have accomplished little. Negotiations with Iran did produce an agreement, but success was short-lived. On July 14, 2015, after eighteen months of talks, the United States and its negotiating partners (Great Britain, France, Russia, and China, plus Germany, collectively known as the P5+1) and Iran reached an agreement on limiting Iran's nuclear program. Known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), it was controversial from the outset. President Obama stated that it would extend Iran's nuclear breakout time, the time it would take to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a single nuclear bomb, to one year in its first decade, up from two to three months. It would do so by actions such as freezing the size of Iran's uranium stockpile, reducing the number of uranium-enriching centrifuges, and reducing the allowed level of enrichment. The agreement also contained provisions for unannounced, on-site inspections of all phases of its nuclear development program. Should Iran not comply, the United Nations could begin *snap-back* of sanctions (reimposition of previously imposed sanctions). From Iran's perspective, the goal was removal of U.S. and international economic sanctions. The agreement contains a timetable for sanctions removal through a four-step process, defined as adoption day, implementation day, transition day, and termination day. Trump had campaigned against the treaty. In April and June 2017, he certified Iran's compliance, but in October 2017 he did not. In May 2018, fifteen months into his presidency, Trump officially withdrew from the JCPOA. Iran initially responded by stating that it would continue to abide by its terms, but began to move away from this position in 2019 as military tensions between the United States and Iran grew.

Defense

According to one observer, "The great missing innovation in the nuclear age is the development of means to defend against nuclear attack."[33] Without this ability, it is impossible to protect a nation's population and territory without the cooperation of the enemy. Strategists have established that such tacit cooperation between enemies is possible and often takes place during war.[34] Still, many are troubled that the defense of the United States in the nuclear age is possible only with the cooperation of an adversary. Reagan gave voice to these concerns in a March 1983 speech:

> What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack; that we could intercept and destroy their strategic missiles before they reached our soil or that of our allies? Is it not worth every investment necessary to free the world from the threat of nuclear war?[35]

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 added a new dimension to the defense problem. Nuclear weapons did not have to be delivered by long-range missiles or aircraft. Weapons could be assembled in the target state or cross national borders in a variety of ways, and there would be no clearly defined set of targets for retaliation.

The Strategic Defense Initiative

Reagan's solution to this dilemma was the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). He defined it as a long-term research and development program designed to identify viable policy options for creating a nuclear defense system. The decision as to which system—if any—to pursue was scheduled to be made in the 1990s. However, in early 1987, the Reagan administration began examining the possibility of an early deployment of SDI. As envisioned by most observers, Reagan's SDI system involved a series of defensive systems layered in such a way as to create a leak-proof umbrella or protective shield. Each layer in this system was to perform the same tasks: It would search out and detect targets, track them, discriminate between real targets and dummy targets, and intercept and destroy the real targets.

Although the goal was never formally abandoned, the scope of and funding for a "Star Wars" system were progressively cut back. The George H. W. Bush administration continued to seek funding for it under the guise of "brilliant pebbles," under which missiles possessing the ability to detect the launch of enemy missiles would be sent into space inlayered orbits. SDI's short-lived existence formally came to an end during the Clinton administration. It was replaced by interest in developing follow-on missiles to the Patriot system used against Scud missiles in the Persian Gulf War. Instead of constructing a nuclear shield over the United States, the new goal would be to prevent attacks by short-range, ground-launched missiles.

National Missile Defense Systems

The death of SDI did not mark the end of efforts to establish a national ballistic missile defense system. Surprise missile tests by Iran and North Korea in 1998 provided political support for creating such a system. In 2002, after George W. Bush withdrew the United States from the ABM Treaty, he put forward a national missile defense system plan calling for ground-based, long-range missile interceptors supported by a network of ground-based radars and space-based infrared sensors. Implementation of such a system in Alaska and California began in 2004. During his presidential campaign, Obama expressed skepticism about the merits of this missile defense shield. One of his first foreign policy initiatives was to terminate it. He also announced a comprehensive review of U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) policies, strategies, plans, and programs. The United States Congress also mandated such a review.

As a result of these reviews, in 2010 the Defense Department produced a Ballistic Missile Review Report. It concluded that the U.S. had the capability to defend the homeland against a ballistic missile attack from states such as North Korea or Iran for the foreseeable future. The report also called for greater international cooperation among allies on missile defense and pursuit of regionally focused missile defense arrangements. Overall, the report recommended proceeding in a fiscally sustainable manner, making reasonable judgments about threats, and developing reliable capabilities.

It was not until January 2019 that the next Missile Review Report was released, again under a mandate from Congress and led by presidential directives on U.S. security goals. In announcing it, Trump invoked the rhetoric of Reagan and imagery of SDI, claiming, "When it comes to defending America we will not take any chances. We will only take action. There is no substitute for American military power." The report moved in two directions. In terms of long-term goals and aspirations, it described attacking enemy missiles prior to launch or soon thereafter (the boost phase), and placing an array of sensors in outer space that could track missiles. In terms of concrete objectives, it largely continued down the path of the previous report, neither cancelling existing initiatives nor announcing the beginning of a new weapons program. One major addition was reference to Russian and Chinese missile defenses, but it continues to focus on destroying missiles launched by smaller powers. A second change was dropping "Ballistic" from the report's title, indicating concern about countering cruise missiles and hypersonic vehicles (those that can travel at Mach 5 or higher—five times the speed of sound).[36]

The potential benefits of missile defense systems are a subject of intense debate.[37] Four issues dominate the discussion. The first is the wisdom of constructing an overly robust system that could potentially negate

an opponent's nuclear capability. Many fear that such a system would force the targeted state to undertake large-scale expansions of their nuclear programs to deter the United States from acting unilaterally against them. The second issue is the military value of such systems, designed to protect the U.S. from rogue nuclear states. Where some see them as prudent, others see them as a largely symbolic response to domestic political pressures. The third issue is effectiveness. From 2004 to 2011, ten tests against incoming warheads were held on the west coast, five of which failed. The fourth issue is cost. Over $70 billion has already been invested in building a ground-based interceptor system. The price tag for a space-based system has been estimated at over $1 trillion.

Over the Horizon: The Fate of New START

As discussed earlier in the chapter, the New START treaty came into effect in 2011. It limits the number of deployed strategic warhead to 1,500 and calls for reducing the number of strategic missile launchers by half. New START is the last surviving U.S.–Russia arms control agreement. It expires in 2021 unless an agreement is reached to extend the treaty for a period of no more than five years.

New START's future is uncertain. Russia supports extending the treaty and has raised the issue with the Trump administration on several occasions. Former National Security Advisor John Bolton long argued that the treaty undermines U.S. national security. Trump appears to be more interested in creating a new agreement, which would include Chinese nuclear forces and cover Russian nuclear forces not currently controlled by a treaty, than in extending the life span of the New START treaty. In April 2019, Trump gave instructions to his staff to prepare for trilateral nuclear arms control talks. Such a trilateral treaty would be an unprecedented arms control accomplishment.

Observers are skeptical that this line of arms control negotiations can produce a meaningful agreement. Typically, arms control talks follow a bottom up negotiations strategy that requires a great deal of time, and agreement is not likely to be reached by early 2021 especially if it must be ratified by all three nations. Moreover, China has little interest in placing limits on nuclear weapons. These concerns lead many arms control experts to conclude that Trump is more interested in ending New START, which he has called a one-sided agreement, than he is in reaching a new agreement. If no new agreement is reached, what follows New START is uncertain. The principal fear is that its end will usher in a new nuclear arms race. Trump's frequently voiced frustration with the costs of an arms race might push him to an agreement, although there are still concerns about to the extent to which any agreement would be largely symbolic.

Critical Thinking Questions

1. Are nuclear weapons a usable military tool? Why or why not? Under what conditions should their use be considered in place of conventional weapons?
2. Should we be optimistic or pessimistic about the future of arms control efforts? Explain your answer.
3. Can arms control efforts become counterproductive? Explain your answer.

Key Terms

arms control, 317
assured destruction, 308
denuclearization, 302
deterrence, 306
disarmament, 317
firewall, 312
flexible response, 307
massive retaliation, 306
preemption, 307
proliferation, 309
sufficiency, 308

Further Reading

Alexei Arbatov, "Saving Nuclear Arms Control," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 72 (2016), 165–70.

While the number of nuclear arms has decreased greatly from the Cold War period, the probability of their use is higher now than in the past. The main barrier to arms control is that neither side is making it a high priority due to domestic and international impediments.

Richard Betts, eds., *Conflict after the Cold War*, 2nd ed. (New York: Pearson, 2005).

The author has compiled a wide-ranging series of essays that examine the question of war and conflict from a variety of theoretical perspectives and from the vantage points of specific issues such as economics, military doctrine, and democratization.

James Doyle, "Why Eliminate Nuclear Weapons?" *Survival* 55 (2013), 7–34.

The author presents a twofold argument for eliminating nuclear weapons: (1) strategic nuclear deterrence was a "least bad" choice by policy makers and not a desired policy; and (2) because the conditions of world politics have changed, a drastically different approach to nuclear weapons is needed.

Alexander George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).

This classic study, which examines the development of deterrence theory and presents eleven different case studies, includes important essays on the reasons why deterrence fails and the role of theory in policy making.

Gregory Koblentz, *Strategic Stability in the Second Nuclear Age* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, November 2014).

In contrast to the first nuclear age, which was characterized by a superpower arms race and ideological competition, the second nuclear age is defined by the existence of multiple nuclear powers and overlapping levels of cooperation and conflict. This report identifies three major challenges to nuclear stability in this new era.

Andrew Krepinevich Jr., "The Eroding Balance of Terror, the Decline of Deterrence," *Foreign Affairs 98* (January 2019), 62–74.

This essay notes that deterring aggression will become increasingly difficult due to technological and geopolitical developments. It argues that the firebreaks between nuclear and conventional war are slowly disappearing and that there needs to be greater emphasis on understanding how policy makers examine conflict situations.

Vince Mazano and John Warden, "After Nuclear First Use, What?" *Survival* 60 (2018), 133–60.

This exploratory essay is organized around questions such as the following: What are U.S. interests after an adversary's first strike? What variables would shape its response? What are U.S. response options to Russian or North Korean first strikes?

Military Instruments: Small Wars 13



Dateline: Cyber Warfare

Cyber warfare refers to attacks on computers or information networks. Two statements capture the current state of thinking about cyber warfare. The first is from Admiral Mike Rogers, former National Security Agency (NSA) Director and head of the US Cyber Command: "every conflict around the world now has a cyber-dimension." The second is from Michael Hayden, former director of the CIA and the NSA: "rarely has something been so important and so talked about with less clarity and understanding [as cybersecurity]." While both observations may be overstated, evidence suggests that they are right on target.

On the first point, you need look no further than President Trump's decision to authorize cyberattacks on Iran 's missile system after deciding not to employ military force in the June 2019 crisis following Iran's downing of a U.S. drone. For years, Iran had been linked to a series of cyberattacks against Saudi Arabia. Following the tightening of economic sanctions in 2012, Iran began targeting U.S. banks and businesses. Iran reduced its attacks on U.S. targets with the onset of the 2015 nuclear agreement, but a noticeable increase in its cyber activity followed U.S. withdrawal from the agreement.

The U.S. attacks on Iran soon were followed by revelations that the United States had shifted from a defensive posture to an offensive one in using cyber weapons against Russia. Russia had successfully broken into the Pentagon's classified communications system in 2008 and had shut off power to hundreds of thousands of people in Ukraine in 2015 as part of the conflict over Crimea. It was also determined that Russia had made significant inroads into the U.S. energy grid. Since 2012, the United States had been putting reconnaissance probes into the control systems of Russia's electrical grid in order to determine weaknesses and signal that the United States was in a position to cripple the system in a retaliatory strike.

The cyberattacks were not the first time the United States went on the cyber offensive against Iran. In 2010, in cooperation with Israel, the United States launched the Stuxnet virus attack on Iran's nuclear weapons program. Information made public as part of the 2013 NSA leaks revealed that the United States carried out 231 offensive cyber operations in 2011 alone, all of which were on a far smaller scale than the Stuxnet attack. In 2014, cyberattacks on North Korea's nuclear forces were ordered to sabotage its missiles prior to or just after launch. In 2015, Obama approved cyberattacks on North Korea in retaliation for its attack on SONY Pictures over a movie release that included a satirical assassination plot against North Korea's leader. ISIS has also been the target of cyberattacks; in 2016 it was revealed that attacks were being carried out in order to disrupt communications and interrupt electronic transfers of money.

Three separate issues are raised by Hayden's observation in the first paragraph of this section. The first involves launch authority. Obama's Presidential Policy Directive 20 had required high-level discussions among agencies before the Department of Defense could launch aggressive cyberattacks. Reportedly, the State Department often blocked proposed attacks. Under Trump's National Security Presidential Memorandum 13, the Department of Defense can act unilaterally on many types of cyberattacks. Accounts suggest that the military has not briefed Trump in any detail about these operations for fear that he will overrule them or discuss this information with foreign officials in an offhand manner.

The second issue involves evaluating cyberattack effectiveness. Evaluations of Obama's cyberattacks on North Korean missiles were mixed. The success rate of North Korea's missile launches went down, but

it was not clear if this was the result of the cyberattacks or multiple problems existing in the North Korean military establishment. Varying evaluations also have been put forward of the 2010 Stuxnet virus attack. Before the attack, Israeli officials had stated that an Iranian nuclear capability was imminent. Afterward, they said that it would not happen before 2015. Press accounts only two years later spoke of how quickly Iran was recovering from this attack.

Some commentators argue that effectiveness should not focus solely on military consequences. They assert that cyberattacks can also produce significant political consequences for the targeted country in terms of monetary costs, the political standing of leaders, and uncertainty about the security of its secrets.[1] These concerns have arisen in the controversy over Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election; they also ensued following the Stuxnet attack, prompting Iran's Supreme Leader to restart nuclear negotiations with the west.

The third issue is the nature of cyber power and how it should be used[2] Is it a powerful new weapon for which there were no strategic precedents or is it best seen as the most sophisticated version of past weapons, including sabotage, espionage, and subversion?[3] Is it a preemptive weapon that produces cyber–Pearl Harbors or cyber–9/11s, or a weapon of deterrence and retaliation?[4]

Cyber warfare is only one of many varieties of small wars. This chapter examines the range of forms that small wars take (conventional military force, hybrid wars, covert action, counterinsurgency operations, counterterrorism, and cyber warfare) as well as the role of arms control in such conflicts.

Pivoting Out of Small Wars: Afghanistan

With the passing of the Cold War, small wars came to be seen by most observers as the dominant form of future military conflict. The Trump administration's foreign policy strategy has sought to reverse this thinking and reposition threats from powerful states, most notably Russia and China, as the primary focal point of U.S. national security. This has not proven to be easy, as evidenced by the prominent role played by crises in Venezuela, Syria, Niger, the Persian Gulf, and Yemen in Trump administration foreign policy. Many explanations for the difficulty of making this pivot have been given. For organizational and professional reasons, many in the Department of Defense favor continuing to engage in small wars—albeit at a lower level—while simultaneously focusing more on great power competition; this has resulted in defense budget proposals calling for significant expenditures on both forms of warfare.[5] Reinforcing this unwillingness to break away from small wars, many policy makers hold the perception that, while these conflicts cannot be easily won—if at all—stalemates are

politically preferable to losing. Andrew Bacevich argues that this outlook reflects the acceptance of war as a normal condition that can be managed and used for political purposes.[6]

Nowhere is the dilemma of exiting a small war in order to better prepare for big wars more evident than in Afghanistan. Strategically located at the intersection of the Middle East, South Asia, and Central Asia, foreign governments have long sought to conquer and control Afghanistan. These efforts have rarely been successful. Alexander the Great famously remarked that Afghanistan was "easy to march into but difficult to march out of." The United States is the latest country to experience this truth. The war in Afghanistan is the longest-running war in U.S. history. The history of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan is presented in the Historical Lesson.

The Trump administration has struggled to develop a policy toward Afghanistan. Donald Trump had called for leaving Afghanistan as early as 2012, but early in his presidency he said little about it. That began to change in May 2017, when a review of U.S. policy in Afghanistan carried out by the Department of Defense, the State Department, the intelligence community, and others recommended that more troops be sent to Afghanistan. At the time, some 8,500 U.S. troops were stationed there. About 2,000 of them carried out counterterrorism missions. The remainder trained and advised Afghan troops but did not participate in front-line operations.

In late June 2017, with little fanfare and via a vaguely worded press release, Trump announced that he was giving Secretary of Defense James Mattis the authority to send several thousand additional troops to Afghanistan. Mattis did not act immediately, waiting instead for Trump to announce a strategy to guide their presence. Slightly less than one month later, troops had not yet been dispatched; in a visit to the Pentagon, Trump stated that he might hold off doing so since "ISIS is falling fast." A major factor contributing to the delay in formulating a strategy was a split between Trump's advisors. Stephen Bannon, senior advisor to Trump, rejected the idea of sending additional troops. Mattis and National Security Advisor H. R. McMaster, both generals with experience in Afghanistan, supported it.

In August 2017, shortly after Bannon was removed from his position, Trump announced his new strategy, referred to as his South Asia Policy. Under his strategic plan, which did not contain great detail, U.S. forces would be allowed to accompany select Afghan brigades into combat, and would be allowed to call in air power and artillery strikes. Trump also announced that the U.S. might reduce its foreign aid to Pakistan, place economic sanctions on key officials, and perhaps authorize airstrikes against the Taliban (who were operating safely out of the reach of U.S. forces in Pakistan) in an attempt to get Pakistan to push the Taliban to enter into peace negotiations.

Observers in the United States and Afghanistan have judged Trump's military strategy to be similar in most respects to Obama's strategy; a significant exception is that Trump did not establish a deadline for removing U.S. troops as Obama had done. Both were frustrated by the options given to them by the military. Both followed a middle path in selecting a strategic option. The fundamental reality, which Mattis had argued, remained. There was no military solution in Afghanistan; the goal had to be getting the Taliban to negotiate a peace agreement.

Movement in that direction gained speed in 2018 as the United States and the Taliban entered into peace talks. After ten months of negotiations, an agreement in principle was reached. Some 5,000 U.S. troops would leave within 135 days after the agreement was signed. Most of the remaining 9,500 U.S. troops and the 8,600 NATO troops would be withdrawn in phases. In return, the Taliban agreed not to allow ISIS, al-Qaeda, or other terrorist groups to operate in Afghanistan. The Taliban also agreed to begin talks with the Afghan government, which was not part of the peace talks. With an agreement in hand, President Trump sought to bring the Taliban and the Afghan government leaders to Camp David to iron out the final details, after which he would announce the agreement. Continuing Taliban violence in Afghanistan, opposition to the agreement within his administration, and fears on the part of the Afghan government that the agreement did not sufficiently protect its interests created a political climate forcing Trump to cancel the meeting and call the agreement dead. In November 2019, Trump said he was reopening talks with the Taliban and indicated he would draw down 4,000 troops in 2020.

Separating Big Wars from Small Wars

No clear dividing line or formula exists for distinguishing between big wars and small wars. The number of casualties, length of combat, and impact on domestic society are the most frequently cited distinctions. In spite of the implications of the label, small wars have the ability of presenting large challenges to powerful states.

Big wars and small wars tend to have their own language. Large wars have combatants and are fought according to rules of law that are generally accepted (in the West). Small wars have insurgents and often appear to be fought without rules. Different language is also used to discuss the origins and dynamics of big and small wars. The starting points most frequently used to describe big wars are the logic of geopolitics, the influence of geography, and the power considerations of national security policy. **Windows of opportunity**, calculations by leaders that they can win, are contrasted with **windows of fear**, consequences of inaction so dire that leaders feel forced to try to go to war. This language also underlies efforts to stop big wars. Deterrence is intended to convince an opponent that no window of opportunity exists. Arms control seeks to close windows of fear and reduce

the potential for and consequences of accidents. In all cases, it is assumed that a major threat to the national interest is at work.

Small wars often appear to be wars of choice rather than wars of necessity, language implying that other means existed for solving the dispute which gave rise to the conflict. Major sources of small wars involve access to energy supplies, water, and food supplies. Ethnicity is also a cause. In some cases, this takes the form of *separatism*, where one ethnic group seeks to leave a state and form a new one in order to better protect itself. In other cases, it takes the form of *irredentism*, where a state reaches out and tries to bring its kin group into the state by expanding its boundaries. In still other cases, it takes the form of *genocide*, as one group seeks to eliminate another ethnic group from its territory.

Deterrence and arms control become more complex in small wars. For example, some argue that deterrence against terrorism can only be partially successful; for deterrence to work, terrorist networks must be broken down into their component parts and different deterrence strategies employed against each segment.[7] Arms control efforts can easily flounder when the target of concern is viewed by key states as a matter of domestic politics. This has been the case with conventional arms control efforts in the United States amid concerns that they would violate the right to bear arms outlined in the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

Types of Small Wars

From January to March 2015, the CATO Institute think tank estimated that U.S. Special Forces were deployed in over eighty countries. None of these situations is exactly alike, but one thing they tend to share is that they are **asymmetric wars**, military conflicts between forces that have significantly different power resources and strategies. In contrast to conventional warfare, in which victory is achieved by defeating enemy military forces and taking control of land leading to surrender, in asymmetric warfare the path to victory lies in inducing exhaustion that erodes the enemy's will to fight and leads to the collapse of its military and political base.[8] The United States faces three major asymmetric conflict challenges today: **Hybrid warfare**, insurgencies, and terrorism. The distinctions between them are fluid, and elements of each may be present to some degree in any given conflict situation.

Hybrid Warfare

Hybrid warfare is a term with many different meanings. Perhaps the most frequently used definition is that by Frank Hoffman, who defines a hybrid war as one that "incorporate(s) a range of different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics, and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal

disorder."[9] By 2010, the U.S. Army had already begun to alter its training programs to put greater emphasis on hybrid conflicts. Its Hybrid Threat Training Circular presented three hybrid conflict scenarios: offensive operations, defensive operations, and stability operations.[10]

Most observers agree that hybrid warfare is not a new form; instead, it combines different forms of warfare into a coordinated and controlled strategy of war that emphasizes avoiding predictability and engaging in combat in *contested zones* (areas that are highly populated and/or of economic importance). Most accounts of hybrid warfare also recognize the importance of using information resources such as social media and the press to defeat the adversary.[11]

Hybrid warfare may be carried out by both nonstate actors and states. Hezbollah's campaign against Israel is an example of the former and Russia's military operations in Crimea and Ukraine are examples of the latter. By the end of the Ukrainian crisis, Russia had sent in armed forces without uniforms, professional soldiers in uniforms without marking, and agents acting with indigenous separatist groups to seize public buildings. It also relied upon local agitators (a variety of militia groups). Sophisticated military technology such as antiaircraft weapons and surface-to-air missiles were provided to local fighters, who also employed terrorist techniques and engaged in sabotage. Russia sought to control the information about the conflict and engage in deception through such means as Russia Today, a Russian-controlled news network.

The Iran crisis which was highlighted in chapter 9 has taken on many of the characteristics of a hybrid war. Found in it are a combination of traditional military operations in the downing of a U.S. drone, naval operations involving the seizure of British and Iranian commercial ships, cyber retaliatory attacks by the United States against Iranian targets, proxy attack by Houthi rebels who are supported by Iran against Saudi Arabian oil targets, and the dispatch of additional U.S. forces to the region.

Lawrence Freedman urges caution in making overly positive evaluations of the success of Russia's Ukraine hybrid war strategy. He notes that, while Russia achieved key objectives, it had great difficulty controlling developments in Ukraine. The differing objectives of Russia and local forces created problems in military and political coordination, and its deception operations were largely unsuccessful.[12]

Counterinsurgency

The *US Army/US Marine Counterinsurgency Field Manual defines an insurgency as* "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict." **Counterinsurgency (COIN),** the strategy the United States employs to defeat insurgencies, is defined by the 2006 Field Manual (FM3-34) as a protracted conflict that involves a mix of offensive, defensive, and stability

operations. It requires that soldiers be both "nation builders as well as warriors."[13] COIN is a strategy designed to get the support of the people that requires the coordinated use of military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions.

Using a medical analogy, COIN operations are seen as moving through three stages:

1. **Stage 1: Stopping the bleeding by providing the patient with emergency first aid.** The goal at this stage is to protect the population and break the insurgency's momentum.
2. **Stage 2: Inpatient care.** The goal is to restore the patient's health and move him on the way to a successful long-term recovery.
3. **Stage 3: Outpatient care.** The goal of this third stage is to move the patient to self-sufficiency, with more and more of the governing functions being carried out by the patient.

At each stage, attention needs to be given to a wide range of activities, including providing security and essential services, and promoting good governance and economic development.

COIN is primarily associated with U.S. military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. Two major criticisms have emerged. The first has to do with the prerequisites for COIN success, most notably the character of the host government. COIN seeks to partner with the government-in-power to restore or enhance its legitimacy, diminishing the insurgent's military capability and isolating it from the public, who will turn their loyalty to the government. As Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated, not all local partners are in a position to capitalize on the successes of COIN. Rather than see their legitimacy increase, the result is a growing political void that invites a renewed insurgency.

A second question focuses on COIN's internal logic. It has three main strategic goals: force protection, distinction between combatants and noncombatants, and the physical destruction of insurgents. However, according to some analysts, at any one time COIN is only capable of achieving two of its goals.[14] In the case of the U.S. surge in Iraq, COIN's focus on protecting U.S. forces and civilians by distinguishing between them and enemy combatants came at the expense of destroying the insurgents. In Afghanistan, COIN focused on discriminating between civilians and enemy combatants and physically destroying the insurgents at the cost of increasing the risks faced by U.S. troops.

COIN is not without its defenders. Instead of being inherent in the concept of counterinsurgency, they see many of the problems identified by critics as a product of a military culture that was slow to embrace the idea (and then did so with little enthusiasm) and of policy makers who made military decisions on going to war without plans following its conclusion. In the final analysis, some argue that "counterinsurgency is sometime the least bad option available."[15]

Counterterrorism

As you learned in chapter 2, *terrorism* is violence employed for the purpose of political intimidation. Where counterinsurgency strategies focus on winning the collective "hearts and minds" of the public, military-oriented anti-terrorism policies focus on taking out individual leaders and crippling terrorist organizations. The weapon of choice in combatting terrorism is air power. Since mid-2015, air strikes against ISIS economic targets such as oil wells, tanker trucks, oil pipelines, and buildings containing stores of cash have been major targets of U.S. air power. In 2016, it was estimated that its production of oil had fallen by 30 percent, and revenues from its oil sales were down some 50 percent. Moreover, ISIS had lost 47 percent of its territory in Iraq and 20 percent in Syria. Its fighting force fell from 33,000 in 2015 to 18,000–22,000 in mid-2016.

The airpower of greatest importance in fighting terrorism are drones (shorthand for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles or remotely piloted vehicles). The use of drones for military purposes does not represent a revolutionary strategic or tactical military breakthrough. They date back to WW I, when pilotless vehicles were launched by catapults. By the Vietnam War, their role had expanded from serving as reconnaissance aircraft to being employed as combat decoys and missile launchers. Drones next played a major role in U.S. military operations in Bosnia in 1995. After the 9/11 attacks, the mission assigned to drones expanded yet again to include killing suspected terrorists. Under the George W. Bush administration, the use of drones to kill terrorists was limited. Trump has embraced the use of drone even more. Shortly after taking office, parts of Yemen and Somalis were declared to be war zones; doing so removed the need for White House approval and provided the military and the CIA with increased freedom to launch drone strikes. Trump also relaxed the standards use to justify drone strikes outside war zones. There no longer needed to be an "imminent threat" or "near certainty" that civilians would not be killed. He also terminated the annual report on drone strikes outside war zones, which detailed strike numbers and numbers of civilian casualties. Over the course of his presidency, it is estimated that Obama approved 542 drone strikes, an average of one every 5.4 days. Through March 2017, Trump approved thirty-six drone strikes in 45 days, an average of one every 1.25 days.[16]

The attractiveness to policy makers of targeted drone strikes is readily apparent. They greatly reduce the human cost to the U.S. military. Prior to their use, the primary means of targeting terrorist or insurgent leaders was to send U.S. troops into contested territory, a tactic that held high risks for those troops with no guarantee of success. Drone critics raise two questions. First, is the military effectiveness of drone strikes largely restricted to short-term successes rather than long-term goals? Second, does the military success of drone strikes come at the cost of losing popular support? Critics contend that drone strikes may undermine efforts to promote human rights and build democracy.

TABLE 13.1 Number of U.S. Drone Strikes 2011–2019: Somalia, Yemen, and Pakistan

Year	Somalia	Yemen	Pakistan*
2011	1–4	11	75
2012	2	37	50
2013	1	22	27
2014	3	17	25
2015	11	21	13
2016	14	37	3
2017	35	127	5
2018	45	36	1
May, 2019	38	7	0

*Strikes carried out under CIA command

Source: Statista.com/statistics

Small Wars by Other Means

We routinely think about wars as being fought by armies. There are, however, other instances—often referred to as grey zones—in which adversaries engage in hostile actions that fall just below the level of overt military conflict. One example of this is *coercive diplomacy*, which was discussed in chapter 10. Two types of grey zone conflicts not involving the use of military power are covert action and cyber warfare. Because the Dateline section has already discussed cyber warfare, only a few additional observations will be added here. Most of the discussion is devoted to Cold War and post–Cold War covert action.

Cold War Covert Action

As its name implies, **covert action** is conducted in secret. It seeks results by altering the internal balance of power in a foreign state. As is the case with cyber operations, a great deal of confusion exists over its fundamental characteristics. In popular usage, covert action is all but synonymous with secret paramilitary operations. A review of U.S. Cold War covert action shows that at least five different forms have been employed by the United States.[17] No instrument of foreign policy is more controversial or difficult to control. In its report, the Tower Commission, which investigated the Iran-Contra Affair during the Reagan administration, stated, "Covert action places a great strain on the process of decision making in a free society."[18]

The most common form of covert action has been and remains providing clandestine support for individuals and organizations. This support takes many forms (financial, technical, or training) and can be directed at many targets (politicians, labor leaders, journalists, unions, political parties,

church groups, or professional associations). Clandestine support for pro-U.S. political leaders and parties was the major focus of CIA efforts in France, Italy, and West Germany in the immediate post–World War II era.[19] A widely publicized case of CIA clandestine support outside Europe involved efforts to block the election of Salvador Allende in Chile by training Chilean peasants and slum dwellers as anti-communist organizers.[20]

A second category of covert action is propaganda. The CIA has used a number of techniques for dispensing propaganda, including radio broadcasts and placing stories in newspapers. One of the most primitive involved using loaded balloons with an assortment of leaflets, pamphlets, and newspapers in an effort to exploit dissatisfaction and increase internal unrest in China in the early Cold War era.[21]

A third category of covert action involves economic operations. According to one account, comparatively few economic operations have been undertaken by the CIA, and they have not been very successful.[22] Economic operations were an integral part of the CIA's efforts to stop Salvador Allende, with the goal "to make the economy scream." The most persistent target of CIA covert economic operations was Fidel Castro's Cuba. One of the most notorious programs was Operation Mongoose.[23] It succeeded in getting European shippers to turn down Cuban delivery orders and sabotaging British buses destined for Cuba. Other anti-Castro economic covert action programs included an effort at weather modification against Cuba's sugar crop and infecting Cuban pig herds with an African swine flu virus.

The fourth category of covert action involves **paramilitary** undertakings, defined as furnishing covert military assistance and guidance to unconventional and conventional foreign forces and organizations. It is argued to be a highly valuable "third option" that falls between dispatching military troops and doing nothing.[24] Initially, paramilitary operations were targeted against the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellite states.[25] Almost uniformly, they failed. In one effort, to establish an underground apparatus for espionage and revolution in Poland, Polish secret service co-opted the network and used it to acquire gold and capture anti-communist Poles.

More significant CIA paramilitary operations took place in the Third World. In 1953, the United States and Great Britain undertook a joint venture, Operation AJAX, to bring down the government of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddegh and return the shah to power.[26] In 1954, the CIA helped bring down the government of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala.[27] As was the case with Iran, the paramilitary operation itself was relatively small in scale, and it was preceded by a propaganda campaign designed to frighten Arbenz into fleeing the country.

As the 1950s ended, so too did the string of CIA successes. Its greatest embarrassment came in 1961 with the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. A brigade of some 1,500 Cuban exiles was put ashore in Cuba, where they were

to link up with Cuban opposition forces and topple the Castro regime. Everything went wrong. On the first day of the invasion, two of the four supplies and ammunition ships were sunk, and the other two fled. On the second day, the brigade was surrounded by 20,000 loyal, well-armed Cuban soldiers. On the third day, the 1,200 surviving members of the invasion force surrendered. Almost two years later, most were released in exchange for $53 million in food and drugs.

The Bay of Pigs put a temporary dent in Washington's fascination with paramilitary covert action programs, but it did not put an end to it. By the mid-1970s, a controversial covert paramilitary operation was under way in Angola.[28] In January 1975, a transitional coalition government in Angola was formed, intending to unite rival pro-independence groups, one communist and one anti-communist. After this agreement was reached, the CIA secretly paid the pro-U.S., anti-communist group to attack the Soviet-supported, communist group. The CIA claimed that no U.S. personnel were directly involved in the fighting and that it was not directly supplying funds to one side. Discovering that this was not true, Congress passed the Tunney Amendment in 1975 and the Clark Amendment in 1976, which attempted to cut off all government spending in Angola.

The most controversial of the CIA's paramilitary programs in the 1980s was its Nicaraguan operation. The impetus for CIA involvement in Nicaragua was evidence collected in the late 1970s that the Nicaraguan Sandinista government was increasing its shipments of arms to El Salvadoran rebels, and becoming the site of a substantial Cuban-backed military buildup. In 1981, the Reagan administration authorized a $19.5 million covert action program to stop the flow of arms to El Salvador. By November 1981, the program's goals had expanded to include creating an anti-Sandinista force (the Contras).[29] The CIA's paramilitary program in Nicaragua is credited with having slowed down the shipment of arms to El Salvador and with hampering Sandinista offenses, but it also became the object of intense criticism for going too far and trying to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. Congress responded by passing Boland Amendments forbidding the CIA from funding the Contras for the purpose of overthrowing the Nicaraguan government.

The largest Third World covert operation run by the CIA was a Cold War paramilitary program in Afghanistan. In FY 1985, the CIA spent about $250 million (more than 80 percent of its covert action budget) helping Afghan guerrillas evict Soviet forces. The operation was not without long-term costs. After defeating the Russian forces, U.S. weapons remained in Afghanistan and came under the control of the Taliban.

A final form of covert action involves the assassination of foreign leaders. The most thorough investigation into U.S. involvement in an assassination plot was carried out by the Church Committee, which investigated five cases of alleged U.S. involvement.[30] The committee concluded that only the cases of Fidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba (Belgian Congo)

involved plots conceived by the United States to kill foreign leaders. It found concrete evidence of at least eight CIA plots to assassinate Fidel Castro between 1960 and 1965. One former CIA official characterized these efforts as ranging from "the vague to the weird."[31] Proposed assassination devices included arranging an "accident," poison cigars, poison pills, poison pens, placing deadly bacterial powder in Castro's scuba-diving suit, and rigging a seashell to explode while Castro was scuba diving.

In 1972, following the kidnapping and assassination of Chilean General René Schneider, Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms issued a directive banning assassinations.[32] This ban was later included in presidential executive orders. Following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, President George W. Bush asserted that the ban on assassinations did not prohibit the United States from assassinating terrorists or acting in self-defense.

Post–Cold War Covert Action

Covert action programs did not disappear with the end of the Cold War. President-elect Barack Obama received a briefing on nine different types of ongoing covert actions operations in over sixty countries targeting terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, genocide, and drug trafficking. In 2013, Obama authorized a covert program to fund and assist Syrian rebels who sought to remove Bashar al-Assad from power. Training Syrian rebels did not go well. Very few recruits who joined the battle against Assad or ISIS distinguished themselves in combat, and some CIA weapons intended for the rebels were stolen by Jordanian intelligence officers and sold on the black market.

Earlier, the CIA ran a Cold War–style operation against Saddam Hussein between 1992 and 1996. The goal was to remove him from power by encouraging a military coup and reducing his control over Iraq's outlying regions, such as Iraqi Kurdistan. The cost of the program is estimated to have approached $100 million. Little was achieved. In June 1996, Saddam Hussein arrested and executed more than a hundred Iraqi dissidents and military officers associated with the CIA plan.

Historical Lesson

Into Afghanistan

U.S. involvement in Afghanistan began following the 1979 Soviet invasion. Carried out by some 50,000 Soviet troops, the Reagan administration saw the invasion as an attempt to increase Soviet influence in the region. Evidence suggests that the Soviet leadership was motivated more by fears of large-scale domestic unrest on its borders. The Soviets had planned to leave the

bulk of the fighting to the Afghan army, but soon they were forced to increase their military presence to over 110,000 troops. Initially they used a conventional war strategy against the Mujahideen, a loose coalition of Islamic forces, but gradually embraced a search-and-destroy strategy in an attempt to establish control over strategic areas. The strategy failed, and peace talks began in 1982. The talks led to the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 along with pledges by the United States and Soviet Union not to intervene in Afghanistan's internal affairs. One reason for the success of the Mujahideen was covert U.S. military support provided by the CIA that totaled $2.1 billion over the course of the fighting.

The Mujahideen refused to accept the peace agreement and continued fighting for control of the Afghan government. The communist Afghan government fell in 1992, but that did not bring peace; the fighting continued. In the midst of this fighting, the Taliban, an Islamic fundamentalist movement, came into existence in 1994 with the support of neighboring Pakistan, which saw the Taliban as an Afghan force that would protect its security interests in the ongoing civil war. By 1998, the Taliban had succeeded in taking control over most of Afghanistan. Initially, the United States was not opposed to the Taliban because it saw them as capable of returning order to Afghanistan. This soon changed, after the Taliban took control of the government and began trying to enforce a reform agenda designed to create an Islamic state; al-Qaeda's 1998 bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania was another factor.

After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, President George W. Bush demanded that the Taliban expel Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. (The Taliban had given refugee to al-Qaeda and bin Laden since their expulsion from Somalia in 1996.) Founded in 1988, al-Qaeda was no stranger to Afghanistan, having fought against Soviet forces following its 1979 invasion. The Taliban refused Bush's request, and on October 26 the United States began air strikes against terrorist facilities and Afghan military targets.

Ground fighting was largely carried out by local forces known as the Northern Alliance; their efforts were guided and aided by CIA operatives. A small contingent of U.S. Special Operations forces entered Afghanistan shortly after fighting began, and U.S. Marines arrived in November. At a December 10, 2001, news conference, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz stated, "We have accomplished one major objective, which is the defeat of the Taliban government." A few days earlier, a Bonn Conference of Afghan opposition leaders had selected Hamid Karzai to head the new Afghan Interim Authority. The UN announced the creation of an International Security Assistance Force that would be commanded by NATO to aid the new government in providing security.

From the outset, the new Afghan government struggled to assert and build its legitimacy and expand its power. Taliban forces had fled to Pakistan and into rural areas of Afghanistan to evade capture. By the summer of 2003, they had begun to reassert their presence in Afghanistan. By July 2008, the situation in Afghanistan had deteriorated

to the point that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff characterized it as "precarious and urgent"; 36,000 U.S. troops were present at the time. Three options were presented to Obama by the military: (1) 80,000 additional troops for a COIN operation to maximize success; (2) 40,000 troops with a medium likelihood of success; and (3) 20,000 troops to pursue a counterterrorism strategy. Taliban attacks on U.S. forces continued. In February 2009, Obama announced that another 17,000 troops would be sent to Afghanistan. Some in the Obama administration saw the move as unlikely to make an impact unless the Karzai government ended widespread corruption and mismanagement of funds. A December 2009 briefing indicated that Taliban-sponsored incidents were up 300 percent from 2007. That same month, President Barack Obama announced that an additional 30,000 U.S. troops would be sent to Afghanistan as part of a short-term surge operation.

Stating that "the tide of war is receding," in June 2011 Obama announced that 10,000 U.S. troops would be withdrawn from Afghanistan by the end of the year and another 23,000 would leave by summer 2012, leaving 65,000 troops. A 2012 NATO Summit Conference decided to move forward with an exit strategy that would turn over command and control of combat missions to the Afghan army by mid-2013. On May 27, 2014, Obama announced that U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan would end in December, and that all but 9,800 troops tasked with training and counterinsurgency operations would leave at that time. All forces would be gone by the end of his presidency in 2016.

Applying the Lesson

1. How similar were the U.S. and Soviet experiences in going into Afghanistan? How did they differ?
2. How much changed in U.S. military strategy between the initial entry into Afghanistan and the reentry?
3. What other options might the United States (and Soviets) have pursued to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan?

The most controversial post–Cold War covert action program became public on September 6, 2006, when George W. Bush acknowledged the existence of a *rendition program*; suspected terrorists were kidnapped and taken to prisons located outside the United States, where they were subjected to what he referred to as "tough" but "safe and lawful and necessary" interrogation methods. Others condemned the methods as torture. Interrogation techniques included feigned drowning (*waterboarding*), extreme isolation, slapping, sleep deprivation, semi-starvation, and light and sound bombardment.[33] Public reports identified Thailand, Egypt, Indonesia, Poland, Romania, and Libya among the countries to which suspects were taken. In August 2009, Obama announced that his administration would continue the rendition program but would monitor the interrogation methods

more closely by assigning oversight responsibility to the National Security Council.

The Covert War against Osama bin Laden

Osama bin Laden was killed on May 2, 2011, in an attack carried out by U.S. Special Forces on his safe house in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Efforts to capture him predated the terrorist attacks of 9/11.[34] Perhaps the earliest involved kidnapping bin Laden so that he could be taken out of Afghanistan by U.S. Special Forces. The CIA contacted and recruited at least three proxy forces in the region to try and capture or kill bin Laden.

Formal authorization for the CIA to pursue bin Laden had been obtained in 1998; it followed the bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, when Bill Clinton signed the first of a series of findings consistent with the Hughes-Ryan Amendment. The original finding emphasized the goal of capturing bin Laden but permitted the use of lethal force. This was later expanded to include using lethal force against bin Laden even when there was little chance of capturing him, including shooting down private or civilian aircraft.[35] Another expansion permitted the intelligence community to target his top aides.

Cyber Warfare

This section includes two observations about cyber warfare in addition to those included in the earlier Dateline discussion. First, on several occasions the United States has considered engaging in a cyberattack, only to decide against doing so. One was an offensive cyber warfare campaign against Libya in the early period of the uprising against Gaddafi. The plan was rejected for fear that it would set a precedent that might be used by Russia or China to justify a future offensive cyberattack. The use of cyber weapons against the Syrian military and President Bashar-al Assad's communication networks was also proposed. Obama rejected it, in part because Syria was not of sufficient strategic value to the United States to justify the accompanying risks. The Obama administration constructed—but did not implement—a cyberattack plan, Nitro-Zeus, with the mission of disabling Iran's air defenses, communications systems, and crucial parts of its power grid if an arms control agreement was not reached.

Second, cyber threats are not static. Because they evolve and change over time, strategies and tactics to use (and defeat) cyber power must be geared to specific situations and threats. Four common stages in the life cycle of cyber threats have been identified:[36]

1. The discovery of a vulnerability and the development of a cyber tool to exploit it.
2. At the introduction stage, the existence of the cyber tool is not well known. No defense is likely to exist, giving an attacker a major advantage.

3. Knowledge of the cyber tool is still limited in the growth stage, but it is known to exist. At this point the attacker has an incentive to use the cyber tool aggressively, since defenses will soon be developed.
4. In the maturation stage, defenses are in place and the offensive value of the cyber tool steadily diminishes. At the same time, the cyber tool is no longer under tight control. It is now possessed by a large number of states and other actors, which use it for their own purposes on a wide range of targets; many of them are still vulnerable.

Small Wars for Peace

Two other forms of military action, often involving the use of conventional forces short of engaging in traditional interstate wars, have had a recurring presence on the international scene. Even though they are small wars, humanitarian/peacekeeping operations and stability forces hold the potential for involvement of large numbers of military forces.

Humanitarian/Peacekeeping Operations

Operation Restore Hope (Somalia), Operation Provide Comfort (Northern Iraq), Operation Restore Democracy (Haiti), and Operation Odyssey Dawn (Libya) are prominent examples of post–Cold War U.S. military interventions that, at least in part, can be classified as **humanitarian** in nature. The United States is the largest source of money for United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations; the United States provides about one-quarter of UN funds for peacekeeping, but it is among the least active in providing personnel, with only eighty-two military personnel and police officers assigned.

Humanitarian military operations grew out of an earlier generation of efforts referred to as peacekeeping **operations**. Carried out by neutral UN forces, their original purpose was to provide a way to stabilize an international or domestic conflict without involving U.S. or Soviet forces or creating a situation in which one side had "lost," providing a second-best solution for each side. Peacekeeping forces did not arrive until all parties to the conflict were ready to end the fighting. Over time, the scope of these efforts has been expanded to include interventions undertaken outside of the UN system in which fighting continues. In these situations, the word *peacemaking* is often used to describe the challenge facing the intervening military forces.

Opposition to humanitarian and peacekeeping undertakings has been expressed across the political spectrum. Neo-isolationist commentators have questioned whether humanitarian interventions are really in the American national interest. They compare it to bungee jumping: "A risky undertaking for which there is no compelling need."[37] Advocates of humanitarian military interventions reject this argument, contending that definitions of the

American national interest that focus only on the physical security of the United States or the health of its economy are much too narrow.

Stability Operations

Peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions focus on developments in a state and generally occur after a crisis has already begun. Stability operations, in contrast, may focus on internal situations but may also have a broader focus, such as seeking to prevent interstate violence from breaking out or stopping an international conflict from spilling over into neighboring states.

A recent example of international stability operations is Libya. The Libyan case is instructive for understanding the challenges that can be faced using conventional military power to address threats to domestic and regional stability. When asked to identify the biggest mistake of his presidency, Barack Obama pointed to the lack of planning for the post-Gaddafi era that followed the 2011 bombing of Libya.

Protests against the government of Muammar Gaddafi, which grew out of the Arab Spring movement, began in mid-February 2011. Obama's advisors disagreed over whether to use military force to protect Libyan civilians and remove Gaddafi from power. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned against becoming involved in another big land war, asking, "Can I finish two wars before you guys go looking for a third one?" Director of National Intelligence James Clapper suggested that the end result of the crisis would be the emergence of two or three mini-states. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton joined with National Security Council staffer Samantha Powers and United Nations ambassador Susan Rice in supporting military action. Obama approved military action with the caveat that no U.S. troops would be involved and that it would be a limited and finite operation.

Operation Odyssey Dawn began on March 19, 2011, with air attacks on armored Libyan government units near Benghazi and on Libya's air defense system. The U.S. effort was part of a broader UN undertaking to impose a no-fly zone and use "all necessary means" to protect civilians. The operation ended on October 31 when Gaddafi died at the hands of rebel forces. Odyssey Dawn was hailed by many as a model of humanitarian intervention. It was not long before pessimism set in. Libya could not form a national unity government and became a jihadist magnet, attracting as many as 6,500 fighters to ISIS training camps.

President Trump raised the possibility of a domestic stability operation in November 2019 when, following the murder of nine members of an American family in Mexico by a drug gang, he announced plans to designate Mexican drug cartels as foreign terrorist organizations. Mexican officials strongly objected, arguing that this designation would be a violation of Mexican sovereignty. It also voiced fears over the possible use of drones by the United States in Mexico.

Conventional, Cyber, and WMD Arms Control

Nuclear weapons receive most of the attention when arms control is discussed, but they are not the only proliferation problem facing policy makers today. The proliferation of chemical and biological weapons (along with their missile delivery systems) and of conventional weapons has also been the subject of arms control efforts. Collectively, chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons are referred to as **weapons of mass destruction (WMD).**

Chemical and Biological Weapons

Chemical and biological weapons may be constructed to deliver a number of different agents. Among the most significant chemical agents are mustard gas, which causes blistering over the entire body, blindness, and death by respiratory failure; and sarin, which interrupts the flow of oxygen to cells. Significant biological agents and toxins include anthrax, which causes pneumonia and organ failure; ricin, which attacks the circulatory system; and smallpox, which many consider the most deadly biological agent.

The modern historical record documenting the use of chemical and biological weapons dates to World War I, when Germany used chemical weapons. Saddam Hussein employed chemical weapons, principally sarin and mustard gas, against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, as early as 1983. Hussein then used poison gas and possibly anthrax against Kurds in northern Iraq to solidify his hold on power following that war. In late 2013, evidence began to mount that Syria had used chemical weapons against rebel groups seeking to overthrow the government. At the time, Syria had one of the world's largest stockpiles of chemical weapons. It had begun to acquire them in large numbers in the 1970s and 1980s to offset Israel's superior strength in conventional weapons. Commonly discussed means for the delivery of WMDs include dispersal from an aircraft or drone, artillery shells, rockets, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles. Of most concern are ballistic and cruise missiles because of their long-range ability to strike targets.

The military value of chemical and biological weapons is disputed. For example, sarin is most effective against large concentrations of troops but is not very useful for fighting insurgent forces in close-contact situations. There is also the danger that, if winds change direction, government forces and their supporters might be affected. At the same time, it is recognized that the use of chemical weapons could have a devastating psychological impact on rebel forces and might succeed in denying opposition forces access to large areas due to the poisons' long-lasting effects. The use of biological weapons faces similar problems. Microbes used for biological weapons often lose their effectiveness when exposed to sunlight, water, and other natural elements. They are also difficult to use militarily because of the challenges involved in spreading them out over large areas.

International treaties are in place regulating both chemical and biological weapons. The United States has signed and ratified the Chemical

Weapons Convention, which outlaws the production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons; the treaty entered into force in 1997. With over 35,000 tons of declared chemical weapons stockpiled, the United States had the second largest quantity of chemical weapons to destroy. April 2012 was set as the destruction target, but this date was not met. As of January 2012, the United States had destroyed 90 percent of its chemical weapons. A Biological Weapons Convention also exists, but the United States has not signed it. The Obama administration followed the path pursued by the Bush administration to support a more limited global biological weapons monitoring system.

Recovering Loose WMD Material

An additional serious arms control problem in the area of WMD involves preventing vulnerable WMD material from falling into the hands of terrorists, rogue governments, or criminals. The challenge is immense. From 2004 to early 2011, the United States recovered 4,996 discarded chemical weapons in Iraq alone. Not all were lethal in their present condition. Some were found abandoned. Others had been purchased secretly by the CIA in 2005–2006 as part of Operation Avarice. All were manufactured in the 1980s and early 1990s. They were destroyed by open air detonation.

Following a 2009 address in Prague, in which he highlighted the dangers posed by unsecured nuclear material, President Obama organized a series of Nuclear Security Summits to address this problem. The first took place in 2010. The fourth—and last—one took place in 2016. Their focus was on increasing security around vulnerable military and civilian nuclear material, and identifying how to better deal with the potential problem of nuclear terrorism. At that time, it was estimated that twenty-four countries held nearly 2,000 tons of nuclear weapons grade material. Twenty countries had atomic stockpile facilities or nuclear power plants judged to be vulnerable to cyberattacks.[38] The largest amount of nuclear grade material is held in Russia, which declined to attend the meeting due to worsening relations with the United States. In October 2016, as U.S.-Russian relations worsened over Syria, Russia announced that it was suspending its participation in a 2000 agreement to dispose of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. Among the conditions Russia identified for resuming its participation were removal of economic sanctions put in place after its annexation of Crimea, ending the deployment of NATO troops in the Baltics, and repeal of the Magnistsky Act, which targeted Russian officials for violations of human rights.

Cyberspace

While much of the discussion to date has been over questions related to cyber warfare, the political contest to establish rules for the use of cyberspace is also under way.[39] For some, cyberspace is best seen as a region

divided among states around which borders will be built and national legal and political rules will apply. For others, cyberspace is—and should remain—a global commons to which all should have equal access and to which internationally agreed upon rules and norms should apply.

At present, the policy debate between these two perspectives centers on calls for a cyber–security treaty. In 2011, Russia and China jointly proposed a code of conduct among cyber powers. The stated goal was to keep cyberspace from becoming a battleground and heading off a cyber–arms race. The United States objected, citing a provision asserting that states had the right to protect their information space from attacks and sabotage; the reason for the objection was that such a statement provided grounds for legitimizing censorship and curbing free speech. In 2014, the State Department's Office for Cyber Issues joined the discussion by calling for development of a set of confidence-building measures that would promote security in cyberspace and reduce the incentives for using it as a platform for attacks.[40]

The complexity and newness of cyberspace as an arms control issue have led many to call for shifting the focus of negotiations from cyberspace security to curbing cybercrime. Others argue that the Chemical Weapons Convention might serve as a model for a cybersecurity treaty.[41] Each country is responsible for enforcing the treaty's terms within its borders. The agreement also established an international office to provide help during crises.

Conventional Weapons

Several different types of conventional weapons exist. A commonly used classification distinguishes among heavy weapons systems (such as missiles, tanks, attack helicopters, and advanced artillery systems); small weapons (pistols and rifles that can be carried by one person); light weapons (heavy machine guns and antitank and antiaircraft munitions that are carried by two or more people or transported in light vehicles); cluster bombs (air- or ground-launched weapons that release smaller munitions); and land mines (explosive devices that are hidden underground and activated on contact). Each has been subject to arms control efforts, with limited success.[42]

Traditionally, efforts to curb conventional weapons proliferation have focused on restricting the sale or transfer of major weapons systems from one state to another. For a brief period of time, it appeared that conventional arms transfers were becoming less pronounced in world politics. Between 1989 and 1991, worldwide sales fell 53 percent and U.S. sales fell nearly 34 percent. This downward trend has since reversed. The volume of major weapons sold between 2011 and 2015 was 14 percent higher than during the 2006–2010 period. The United States was the largest exporter of weapons, accounting for 33 percent of the total.

The major international initiative in place to curb conventional proliferation is the UN Arms Transfer Register.[43] It identifies seven different

categories of heavy conventional weapons; countries are requested to submit an annual statement of the number of these items it has exported or imported during the previous year. The goal is to bring a heightened degree of transparency to the arms transfer process and thereby reduce the military advantages that arms transfers bring to states. However, some fear that it may have the unintended effect of legitimizing registered arms transfers.

In 2001, a voluntary international agreement was reached that was designed to stop the international trade in small arms. The United States blocked efforts to include regulations on civilian ownership of military weapons and to restrict small arms trade to rebel movements. It continued to oppose such an agreement, even when, after seven years of negotiation, it finally produced a 2013 treaty covering trade in heavy, small, and light conventional weapons. Among the treaty's key features was a prohibition on selling weapons to countries that were engaged in genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. While the United States voted for the treaty at the UN, it raised objections that almost scuttled the talks, insisting that any agreement "not impose any new requirements on the U.S. domestic trade in firearms or on U.S. exporters." In 2019, Trump officially withdrew the U.S. from the agreement without a vote ever having been taken in the Senate.

In 2008, ninety-four countries signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which banned the production, stockpiling, transfer and use of explosive weapons that scatter submunitions over an area. That agreement came into effect in 2010. The United States opposed the agreement, maintaining that a separate treaty on cluster munitions was not needed, and that it should be included in the broader conventional arms trade treaty then under discussion. Moreover, the United States argued that the development of "smart" munitions with automatic self-destruct capabilities had drastically reduced the scope of the problem, and that a treaty banning their use was dangerous to civilians.

Although it did send an observer to the 2009 Review Conference, the Obama administration continued the existing policy of not signing the 1997 Ottawa Treaty banning the use, stockpiling, or transfer of antipersonnel landmines and allowing prosecution of offenders. The U.S. military has long opposed the ban, arguing that landmines are necessary to ensure the protection of U.S. forces abroad. Some one million landmines remain in place along the border between North and South Korea. Along with the United States, China, Russia, India, and Israel are the most prominent countries that have not signed the Ottawa Treaty.

Counterproliferation

One final arms control and disarmament strategy is **counterproliferation**. Unlike the other approaches outlined here, which rely heavily on diplomacy, counterproliferation historically involved the use of military force to

deter countries from acquiring and using WMD against the United States. Today, the use of force can be extended to include cyberattacks.

Proponents of counterproliferation start from the premise that nonproliferation efforts have failed. Not a new strategy, it continues to evolve and is controversial.[44] Its principal targets are smaller states such as Iran and North Korea. Few historical examples of counterproliferation exist.[45] The most frequently cited are Israel's 1981 raid on Iraq's Osiraq nuclear reactor, the bombing of Iraq's unconventional weapons during the first phase of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, and U.S. cruise missile attacks on the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan in 1998. Because the historical evidence is so limited, strategists have turned to war games and simulations to help them judge the potential value of a specific counterproliferation strike. A 2012 Pentagon assessment, based on a two-week war game that assumed Israel would attack four major Iranian nuclear sites, concluded that it would lead to a wide-ranging regional war.

Over the Horizon: Drone Wars

Commentators uniformly agree that the drone genie is out of the bottle, and that the United States no longer sits atop the playing field. In 2018, twelve states and several non-state actors such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and Houthi were using armed drones. At least five other states had drone development programs underway. Accounting for over 60 percent of all sales, Israel is the leading exporter of military drones, followed by the United States and China. Iran and Turkey also export armed drones. Nigeria, Iraq, and Turkey rank among the most active users of armed drones within their own borders. Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates use armed drones in cross-border conflicts. Along with Egypt and Pakistan, the countries listed above are often characterized as the second generation of drone users. Standing ready to join them are Russia, India, South Korea, and several European states.[46]

Armed drones are not seen as having the potential to alter the fundamental nature of international politics in the way that nuclear weapons did, but their impact is potentially significant in several ways. First, a drone arms race is generally expected to develop as countries seek to acquire drones to offset their adversaries' advantages. China has already emerged as a leading provider of cheap reconnaissance drones. Within the United States, manufacturers of drones actively lobby Congress to approve sales of unarmed drones. In 2011, the drone industries' political action committees gave $2.3 million to the House Unmanned Systems Caucus in order to get Congress to lift restrictions on drone sales.

Second, although reconnaissance drones may increase deterrence by providing policy makers with additional information about a conflict situation, they bring an added element of uncertainty. As one observer asked,

"Does sending a drone into a contested area signal commitment, or does it send a [message of a] lack of commitment because a nation wasn't willing to risk sending a person?"

Finally, there are no clear-cut international norms on the use of drones. The agreement currently governing their use is the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Use of the MTCR to establish guidelines on acceptable drone use is hindered by two problems. One is that, under the MTCR, drones are treated as missiles. Today, most observers argue that they are better thought of as a type of aircraft. Second, the MTCR is defined as an "informal political understanding among states." The problem here is that the view of drones appears to be changing, creating problems for application of international norms. At one time, the use of drones was seen as relatively safe, and occupied a low rung on the ladder of international conflict. Shooting down a drone created international tensions, but it fell far short of setting a military crisis in motion. Yet consider what happened when Iran shot down a U.S. reconnaissance drone, as outlined in the Dateline section of chapter 9. President Trump threatened and authorized retaliatory military action against Iran, only to cancel it at the last minute. Was Trump's response a sign of the future for drone warfare? Might it be repeated elsewhere by the United States or other states?

Critical Thinking Questions

1. How can insurgents be best stopped from acquiring weapons?
2. What types of actions are best taken covertly and what actions should never be taken covertly, and why?
3. What is the most likely cause of a U.S. small war in the next five years? In the next ten years? Explain your answers.

Key Terms

asymmetric wars, 333
counterinsurgency (COIN), 334
counterproliferation, 349
covert action, 337
cyber warfare, 328
humanitarian, 344
hybrid warfare, 333
paramilitary, 338
peacekeeping operations, 344
stability operations, 345
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 346
windows of fear, 332
windows of opportunity, 332

Further Reading

Thomas Barnet, *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Berkley Books, 2004).

The author argues that a new set of rules govern warfare today and examines the likely future locations of international conflicts, especially as they relate to the spread of globalization.

Richard Betts, *American Force* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).

Betts believes that policy makers have failed to recognize that, with the end of the Cold War, the strategic importance and military force in American foreign policy has been altered. He calls for greater caution and restraint in its use.

Lawrence Cavaiola, David Gompert, and Martin Libicki., "Cyber House Rules: On War, Retaliation, and Escalation," *Survival* 57 (March 2015), 81–104.

The authors argue that, if cyber war is not kept under control, its advantages are far outweighed by its disadvantages. Asserting that control is unclear, they identify and assess three basic offensive options: minimum deterrence, equivalence, and superiority.

Lawrence Freedman, "Ukraine and the Art of Limited War," *Survival* 25 (November 2014), 7–38.

In this work, one of a series he authored, Freedman examines the intensification of the Ukraine crisis and the strategic lessons that can be drawn from it. Focal points of other works in the series were crisis management and the strategy of exhaustion.

John Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).

The argument of this book, frequently cited by proponents of counterinsurgency warfare, is that the military must foster a spirit of innovation within its organizational culture to succeed.

Michael O'Hanlon, *The Future of Land Warfare* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2015).

The author argues that confidence about the end of the era of land warfare may be overstated. He examines a series of possible scenarios in which land warfare might play a significant role, ranging from deterring Russia and China to civil strife in Central America and Africa to humanitarian disaster relief.

Pavel Podvig, "Blurring the Line Between Nuclear and Nonnuclear Weapons," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 72 (2016), 145–49.

The decreased role of nuclear weapons in world politics has led to efforts to promote the use of strategic systems in conventional conflicts by allowing them to carry nonnuclear warheads. This article argues that this blurring of the line creates an increased risk of accidental nuclear war.

John Watts, et al., *Alternative Cybersecurity Futures* (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2019).

This study by the Scowcroft Center and the Security Cyber Statecraft Initiative and Emergent Futures Lab presents three alternative security scenarios in an effort to move cyber policy away from being reactive toward development of novel responses.

14 Alternative Futures



Dateline: Africa

On October 4, 2017, fifty members of an ISIS affiliate ambushed U.S. military forces in Niger. Four U.S. Special Operations Forces were killed, and two were wounded. This is believed to be the first time that an ISIS-affiliated group in the Sahel region of Africa killed active-duty U.S. military personnel. The forces were tasked with a routine, low-risk patrol. While carrying out this mission, information came in regarding the location of a terrorist leader believed to be behind the kidnapping of an American citizen. An assault team was assembled to attack the terrorist camp. This mission was cancelled at the last minute, and the U.S. Special Operations Unit was sent instead. They did not find any terrorists or key information. On

the way back to their base, they stopped at a village for water. Minutes after they departed, they were ambushed in what some felt was an encounter set up by the village chief, as he had inexplicably delayed their departure. Only after an hour of fighting did the U.S. forces request help. It took another hour for air support to arrive. At first, the Pentagon stated that the soldiers were advising Nigerian soldiers on a routine reconnaissance mission. Weeks later it was acknowledged that they were on a quite different mission deep into contested territory.

At the time of the Niger attack, estimates placed the number of U.S. troops in Africa at between 5,000 and 6,000. These forces were deployed in ten countries and one additional region, accord to the Department of Defense.[1] Press reports also identified a U.S. military presence in Burkina Faso and Nigeria. Prior to the attack, the White House had reported 645 U.S. military personnel in Niger. Following the attack, this number was revised to 800. Compare this to 40,000 in Japan, 35,000 in Germany, 25,000 in South Korea, and 14,000 in Afghanistan.

This was not the first incident in which American military advisors engaged in combat operations. In December 2017, Green Berets accompanying Nigerian forces killed eleven Islamic militants. Nor is it the last time American soldiers were killed in a military encounter. In June 2018, a U.S. Navy Seal accompanying troops from Somalia and Kenya was killed in Somalia. At the time, an estimated 500 U.S. troops were stationed in Somalia, up from 200 in 2016. Six months before this incident, the Department of Defense revealed plans to remain in Somalia for at least two more years.

Rarely has Africa been a high priority foreign policy issue for the U.S. The Africa Command (AFRCIOM), only established in 2007, is headquartered in Germany. During the Cold War, American involvement was spurred by concern for Russian support of pro-communist governments and guerilla movements in Africa. With the end of the Cold War, the U.S. presence in Africa briefly centered on providing humanitarian aid, a foreign policy orientation that abruptly ended with the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu highlighted in the Historical Lesson.

Since 9/11, local Islamic terrorist groups affiliated with ISIS and al-Qaeda have been the key motivating factors for U.S. involvement in Africa. Concern has centered on their impact in Africa as well as their ability to use the continent as a launching pad for attacks on the Middle East. Most recently, this anti-terrorism orientation has been joined by concern about growing Russian and Chinese involvement in Africa. Russian involvement is perhaps most visible in the Central African Republic. It began with an arms deal and has expanded to include military training and exploration of the potential for mineral resource mining. China has built its first overseas military base in Djibouti. It is located only a few miles from one of the U.S.'s largest military bases. China also has 2,400 peacekeepers in Africa and has become an important source of financial and development aid.

Regardless of its motivating force, a consistent feature of U.S. involvement in Africa, reinforced by the Mogadishu experience, is restricting the U.S. military presence by minimizing the number of "boots on the ground" to avoid U.S. casualties, and working indirectly through African partners to strengthen their capacity to guarantee internal and regional stability. According to the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, which defined this strategy as Building Partner Capacity, U.S. forces do not engage in "active and direct combat operations." Instead, their mission is to train, advise, and assist. This mission first began in Niger under George W. Bush in 2002. In 2013, Obama reported to Congress that some one hundred U.S. military personnel were in Niger for purposes of providing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Of those, forty were involved in setting up a drone base. For a decade, Niger has been the top recipient of U.S. security assistance. It has received about $170 million to train and equip its forces for counterterrorism operations. In reporting to Congress, both Obama and Trump cited the War Powers Act (see chapter 6 Historical Lesson) as the basis for this deployment, not the Authorization for Use of Military Force passed after 9/11 (also discussed in chapter 6).

An ongoing critique of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa is that Building Partner Capacity does not provide the basis for a coherent strategy for accomplishing its foreign policy goals. Instead, it leads the United States to approach African conflict situations as a series of separate, distinct separate conflicts on a cost-benefit basis that emphasizes tactical considerations rather than an understanding of their broader objectives and their underlying political and military dynamics. After the Niger attack, AFRICOM's Commanding General Thomas Walhauser acknowledged the extent of the problem in testimony to Congress, stating that he was "not aware of any overall grand strategy [in Africa] at this point."[2]

U.S. foreign policy in Africa highlights the possibility of change, the unpredictability of actions, and the potential consequences of foreign policy choices. This concluding chapter introduces six competing visions of the future direction that American foreign policy might take. It ends with a discussion of a highly visible foreign policy challenge that the United States must address: relations with China.

Foreign Policy Visions

Each of the six competing visions about to be introduced provides a different starting point for making policy choices. Three questions are asked of each alternative future: (1) What is the primary threat to U.S. national security? (2) What responsibility does the United States have to other states? and (3) What responsibility does the United States have to the global community? The answers reflect different views regarding the degree to which the United States should be involved in world politics, how much power it possesses, and the extent to which the future may differ from the past.

The United States as an Ordinary State

For some, the key to the future is realizing that foreign policy can no longer be conducted on the assumption of American uniqueness or the idea that U.S. actions stand between anarchy and order. The American century is over, and the challenge facing policy makers is no longer managing alliances, deterring aggression, or ruling over the international system. It now requires adjustment to a new role orientation in which the United States is an **Ordinary State**.[3] This change in outlook is necessary, because international and domestic trends point to the declining utility of a formula-based response to foreign policy problems—be it rooted in ideology, concepts of power politics, or some vision of regional order. Such a response forces the United States to pursue narrowly defined national interests at the expense of international collaborative and cooperative efforts. In this altered environment, flexibility, autonomy, and impartiality are valued more than one-sided commitments, name calling, and efforts at the diplomatic, military, or economic isolation of states.

As an Ordinary State, the United States would not define its interests so rigidly that their defense would require unilateral American action. If the use of force is necessary, it should be a truly multilateral effort; if others are unwilling to act, there is no need for the United States to assume the full burden of the commitment. Stated as a rule, "The United States should not be prepared, on its own, and supported solely by its own means, to perform tasks that most other states would not undertake."[4] Ordinariness does not, however, mean passivity, withdrawal, or a purely defensive approach to foreign policy problems. The quality of U.S. participation in truly multilateral efforts to solve international problems will be vital, because the core ingredients of the international influence of the future will be found in fields in which the United States is already a leader: economics, diplomacy, and technology. The goal of these collaborative efforts should be to "create and maintain a world in which adversaries will remain in contact with one another and where compromises are still possible."[5] The following summarizes the Ordinary State perspective:

1. The greatest threat to U.S. national security lies in trying to do too much and in having too expansive a definition of its national interest.
2. Responsibility to other states must be proportionate and reciprocal to that of other states to the United States.
3. The United States' responsibility to the global community is to be a good global citizen—nothing more and nothing less.

The imagery advanced by the Ordinary State perspective—with its denial of American uniqueness, its lack of optimism, its focus on restraints rather than opportunities, and its admonition to not try to do too much—runs against the traditional American approach to world politics.[6] A variant of the Ordinary States perspective voiced today is that the United States

must act like a Normal State. The Normal State perspective also taps into a feeling shared by many Americans that, although it should not retreat into isolationism, the United States should not be the first to take risks that others are not willing to run.

Reformed America

According to proponents of the **Reformed America** perspective, U.S. foreign policy has traditionally been torn between pursuing democratic ideals and empire (one power center ruling a hierarchically structured grouping of states).[7] The United States wants peace—but only on its own terms; the United States supports human rights—but only if its definitions are used; the United States wants to promote Third World economic growth—but only if it follows the U.S. model and does not undermine U.S. business interests abroad. Historically, the thrust toward empire (whether called containment or détente) has won out, and democratic ideals have been sacrificed or given only lip service. U.S. policy makers have given highest priority to maintaining the United States' position of dominance in the international system and promoting the economic well-being of U.S. corporations.[8]

The Reformed America outlook argues that the need now exists to reverse this pattern. Democratic ideals must be given primary consideration in the formulation and execution of U.S. foreign policy. Not doing so invites future Vietnams and runs the risk of undermining the very democratic principles for which the United States stands. From this outlook, foreign policy and domestic policy are not seen as two separate categories. They are held to be inextricably linked; actions taken in one sphere have effects on behavior and policies in the other. Bribery of foreign officials leads to bribery of U.S. officials; an unwillingness to challenge human rights violations abroad reinforces the acceptance of discrimination and violations of civil rights at home; and a lack of concern for the growing disparity in economic wealth on a global basis leads to an insensitivity to the problems of poverty in the United States.

The Reformed America perspective demands global activism from the United States. The much-heralded decline in American power is not seen as being so great that it prevents the United States from exercising a predominant global influence. Moreover, the United States is held to have a moral and political responsibility to lead by virtue of its comparative wealth and power. The danger to be avoided is inaction brought on by the fear of failure. The United States cannot be permitted to crawl into a shell of isolationism or to let itself be "Europeanized" into believing that there are limits to its power and accepting the world "as it is." The power needed for success in creating what amounts to a new world order faithful to traditional American democratic values is not the ability to dominate others but to renew the American commitment to justice,

opportunity, and liberty. The following summarizes the Reformed America perspective:

1. The primary threat to U.S. national security is a continued fixation on military problems and an attachment to power-politics thinking.
2. The United States' responsibility to other states is great, provided that they are truly democratic, and the United States must seek to move those that are not democratic in that direction.
3. The United States' responsibility to the global community is also great and centers on the creation of an international system conducive to the realization of traditional American values.

The values underlying this perspective were widely embraced in the early post–Cold War period, as many commentators urged presidents to move more aggressively toward a neo-Wilsonian foreign policy. After 9/11, a split occurred within the Reformed America movement. Some, labeled liberal hawks, advance a foreign policy that embraced the use of military power in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan to advance democracy and reconstruct societies. Others continue to express concern over how much the military has become the foreign policy instrument of choice to advance American foreign policy goals. Along these lines, some commentators argue that the United States is far more secure today than is commonly believed, thus providing an opportunity for rejecting power-politics thinking.[9]

Pragmatic America

The **Pragmatic America** perspective holds that the United States can no longer afford foreign policies on the extreme ends of the political spectrum. Neither crusades nor isolationism serve America well. Some world problems require U.S. attention, but not all do. What is needed in U.S. foreign policy is *selectivity*, a strong dose of moderation in means and ends.[10] To supporters of this view, the end of the Cold War vindicated a policy of moderation.[11]

The United States must recognize that the American national interest is not identical to the global interest, and that not all problems lend themselves to permanent resolution. The most pressing issue on the U.S. agenda is development of a set of criteria for identifying these problems and then acting in moderation to protect American interests.

Pragmatic America emphasizes a utilitarian outlook on world politics and recognizes the lessened ability of military force to solve many foreign policy problems; it also recognizes that the nature of the problems facing the United States has changed. The Cold War dragon represented by the Soviet Union has been slain. The world confronting the United States is now populated by large numbers of poisonous snakes.

One national security practitioner suggests that the ideal practical method for moving forward and dealing with these poisonous snakes is

through the creation of international posses.[12] Just as in the old American West, when security threats present themselves, the United States (the sheriff) should organize and deputize a posse of like-minded states that will end the threat and then disband. The following summarizes the Pragmatic America perspective:

1. The primary threats to U.S. national security continue to be military in nature.
2. The United States has a responsibility to other states on a selective basis, and only to the extent that threats to the political order of those states would lessen American security.
3. The United States' responsibility to the global community is limited. More pressing is a sense of responsibility to key partners, whose cooperation is necessary to manage a threatening international environment.

President George H. W. Bush, in his farewell foreign policy address, argued for a position that is consistent with this view.[13] Warning against becoming isolationist, Bush asserted that the United States can influence the future, but that "it need not respond to every outrage of violence." Bush went on to note that no formula exists telling with precision when and where to intervene. "Each and every case is unique . . . we cannot always decide in advance which interests will require our using military force." When force is used, Bush urged that the mission be clear and achievable, that a realistic plan be in place, and that equally realistic criteria be established for withdrawing U.S. forces.

The Pragmatic America perspective is seen by some as well suited for an international system in a state of flux. Henry Kissinger argues that goals should be consistent over time but the means to achieve them must be based on specific conditions.[14] This measured approach to solving foreign policy problems is also a fundamental weakness. Because pragmatism can be interpreted differently by different people, the policy it produces tends to move forward in a series of disjointed steps. The result is that defenders see it as producing flexibility and adaptability but detractors see in it a foreign policy by lottery, in which the past provides little guidance for friends or enemies as they seek to anticipate America's position.

American Crusader

The **American Crusader** sees the United States as having won the Cold War and now being intent on enjoying the fruits of its victory as the dominant global power.[15] Victory brings with it an opportunity to act on America's historical sense of mission. It builds on an important strain in the American national style that defines security in absolute terms. The objective is "unconditional surrender." "For more than two centuries, the United States has aspired to a condition of perfect safety from foreign threats," both real and imagined.[16] Unlike the Reformed America

perspective, the American Crusader perspective identifies military power as the instrument of choice. It is rooted firmly in that part of the American national style that rejects compromise and seeks permanent, engineered solutions to political problems.

Faint echoes of the American Crusader perspective can be found in post–World War II foreign policy. During the Eisenhower administration, some commentators called for rolling back the Iron Curtain, feeling that containment was too passive and accommodating a strategy. During the Persian Gulf War, there was a moment when defeating Saddam Hussein had the characteristics of a crusade, at least at a rhetorical level. The American Crusader perspective is most associated with neoconservative thinking on foreign policy and burst on the scene with full force following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The following summarizes the American Crusader perspective:

1. The international system holds real and immediate threats to American national security that must be unconditionally defeated.
2. The United States has a responsibility to help other states that are allies in its cause, because their security increases American security.
3. The United States' responsibility to the international community is great, but how that responsibility is defined is a matter for the United States to determine based on its historical traditions.

There are some who share the American Crusader view that the international system contains immediate and serious threats to American national security, but others question its wisdom as the basis for U.S. foreign policy. One concern is that this view overlooks the fact that superpower status does not convey total power to the United States. The challenge of bringing means and ends into balance is an ongoing one, and "superpower fatigue" becomes a real danger.[17] A second concern is that, by acting in this manner, the United States may hasten its own decline. Rather than staying on the American "bandwagon" as an ally, second-order states may decide that—because they too may become the object of an American crusade—it is necessary to build up their own power to balance that held by the United States.

America the Balancer

Out of a conviction that unipolarity is bound to give way to a multipolar distribution of power in the international system, some commentators argue that the prudent course of action today is to adopt the role of balancer. The United States needs to stand apart from others yet be prepared to act in concert with them. It cannot and should not become a rogue superpower, acting on its own impulses and imposing its vision on the world.[18]

The starting point of wisdom from this **America the Balancer** perspective is that not all problems are threatening to the United States or require its involvement. The United States has a considerable amount of

freedom to define its interests. In addition, the United States must recognize that one consequence of putting a global security umbrella in place is that it has discouraged other states and regional organizations from taking responsibility for preserving international stability. This situation must be reversed. Others must be encouraged to act in defense of their own interests. Otherwise, the United States runs the risk of becoming entrapped by commitments to unstable regimes.[19] Finally, the United States must learn to live with uncertainty. Absolute security is an unattainable objective and one that only produces imperial overstretch. The following is a summary of the **America the Balancer** perspective:

1. The primary national security threats to the United States are self-inflicted. They take the form of a proliferation of security commitments designed to protect America's economic interests.
2. The United States has a limited responsibility to other states, because the burden for protecting a state's national interests falls on that state.
3. The United States' responsibility to the global community is limited. American national interests and the maintenance of global order are not identical.

Many advocates of balancing see a return to multipolarity as all but inevitable and believe that trying to reassert or preserve American preeminence and suppress the emergence of new powers is futile.[20] Thus, there is little reason for the United States to become deeply involved in the affairs of other states on a routine basis. What is needed is a **hedging strategy**, one that will allow the United States to realize its security goals without provoking others into uniting against it or accelerating their separate pursuits of power. Blessed by its geopolitical location, the answer for some lies in adopting the position of an offshore balancer.[21] The United States is positioned to allow global and regional power balances to ensure its strategic independence. Only when others prove incapable of acting to block the ascent of a challenging hegemony should the United States step in to affect the balance of power. Given its continued power resources, such an intervention is likely to be decisive.

One issue that must be confronted by advocates of the America the Balancer perspective is how to exercise American military power most effectively. Traditionally, war has been the mechanism for preserving a stable balance of power in the international system. Commentators across the political spectrum have raised the question of whether wars can continue to play this role on a large scale. If they cannot, how is the balancer to enforce its will? One possibility is that, rather than using American power to deter or defeat an adversary, America the Balancer will play a central role in compelling adversaries to change their behavior. The distinction is potentially important. One commentator who has looked at *compellence* (see chapter 10) suggests that it is more of a police task than *deterrence* (see chapter 12), which is a military task.

Disengaged America

The final alternative future calls for the United States to selectively, yet thoroughly, withdraw from the world.[22] It is a perspective most often associated with the libertarian perspective on U.S. foreign policy.[23] The **Disengaged America** perspective sees retrenchment as necessary because the international system is becoming increasingly inhospitable to U.S. values and unresponsive to efforts at management or domination. Increasingly, the choices facing U.S. foreign policy will be selecting what types of losses to avoid. Optimal solutions to foreign policy problems will no longer present themselves to policy makers; even if they do, domestic constraints will prevent policy makers from pursuing such a path. In the Disengaged America perspective, foreign policy must become less of a lance—a tool for spreading values—and more of a shield—a minimum set of conditions behind which the United States can protect its values and political processes.[24] In the words of one commentator writing after 9/11, the purpose of American foreign policy should be security first. Promoting democracy is fine so long as it is pursued by peaceful means and is seen as homegrown.[25]

Historical Lesson

The Path to Mogadishu

On October 3, 1993, a 160-person special assault team consisting of Army Ranger and Delta Force troops, nineteen aircraft, and twelve vehicles targeted the Olympic Hotel in Mogadishu, Somalia to apprehend warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid and two of his top leaders. The raid was expected to be completed in one hour. Instead, it became a seventeen-hour overnight battle in which eighteen U.S. soldiers died and eighty-four were wounded before being rescued by an international military force.

Little went right in the October 3 military raid, although it did reach its intended target. Minutes after beginning their withdrawal from the area of the hotel, U.S. forces were attacked by Somali militia and armed civilians who blocked their path. They pushed back repeated attempts by Somali groups to overrun their positions. Two U.S. Black Hawk helicopters were shot down and its crew members killed, captured, or pinned down by enemy fire. Highly emotional TV images of the Battle of Mogadishu showed the bodies of U.S. servicemen being dragged through the streets. Estimates of Somali deaths ranged from 315 (by Aidid) to 1,000–2,000 (by U.S. diplomatic officials).

The path to Mogadishu began in January 1991, when Somalia's dictator was overthrown by an alliance of tribal warlords. With his removal from power, the alliance collapsed and the warlords began competing for control of the government. By September, fighting had become so widespread and intense that an estimated 4.5 million Somalis were on the verge of starving to death. By the end of the year, an estimated 200,000 people

had been killed or injured. In response, a cease-fire was organized by United Nations (UN), and relief efforts began. In July 1992, a small UN mission was sent to Somalia to oversee the distribution of food. In August, the UN initiated Operation Provide Comfort to further the relief effort. The U.S. provided transportation to move aid workers and relief supplies to Somalia. Its efforts were frustrated and undermined by continuing fighting among the warlords and their seizure of an overwhelming majority of the relief supplies. General Mohamed Farrah Aidid, one of the key players in bringing down the Somali government and its self-proclaimed new head, was now demanding that UN peacekeepers leave and that no new peacekeepers be sent.

The inability of Operation Provide Comfort to alleviate the suffering and stabilize the situation in Somalia led to a proposal to the UN by President George W. Bush that U.S. combat troops be sent in to protect the humanitarian operation, on the condition that they not be placed under a UN command. That offer was accepted, and in December it was announced that some 25,000 troops would be sent to Somalia under the heading Operation Restore Hope. Bush stressed that Operation Restore Hope was not an open-ended military mission but would be concluded by the time Bill Clinton was inaugurated as president in January 1993.

In March 1993, the mission of UN forces in Somalia was officially changed from providing humanitarian aid to nation building and promoting stability throughout the country. Upon taking office, Clinton had expressed a desire to reduce the U.S. military presence in Somalia; with the change in mission, he arranged for reducing the number of U.S. forces and having them replaced by troops from other UN member nations. By June 1993, only 1,200 U.S. troops remained in Somalia.

A principal challenge facing the UN mission was disarming the warlords. On June 5, 1993, the full extent of the challenge became clear when twenty-four Pakistani troops were ambushed and killed and another fifty-seven wounded while they were inspecting a weapons storage facility. Three American soldiers were also wounded. A UN emergency resolution called for international efforts to capture those responsible. Evidence pointed to Aidid.

U.S. and UN troops repeatedly attacked locations in Mogadishu the following week searching for Aidid. He was not found, but several buildings were destroyed and a number of Somalis were killed. In August, four U.S. military police were killed by a remotely detonated land mine. A 400-person U.S. military task force was sent to Somalia in September. That month it carried out six missions in an attempt to apprehend Aidid. Also in September, the Clinton administration rejected requests for armed reinforcements and began secret planning to negotiate with Aidid.

The path out of Mogadishu has not been smooth. Shortly after the attack, President Clinton ordered the remaining U.S. Ranger troops to leave Somalia on the grounds that the mission had changed from a military one to a diplomatic one (seeking a political settlement to the ongoing civil war).

Additional U.S. troops were sent to Somalia in order to prevent greater violence, but they were restricted to defensive operations. March 1994 was set as the withdrawal date for all U.S. forces. All remaining UN forces left in 1995. However, in 2016, fifty U.S. troops returned to Somalia to help fight terrorism.

Applying the Lesson

1. What should be the lesson of Mogadishu for U.S. foreign policy?
2. Can future Mogadishu's be prevented? How?
3. Who holds primary responsibility for dealing with domestic unrest and civil wars in Africa, and why?

Becoming disengaged means that the United States will have to learn to live in a "second-best world," one that is not totally to its liking but one in which it can "get by." Allies will be fewer in number, and those that remain will have to do more to protect their own security and economic well-being. Nonintervention will be the rule for the United States, and self-reliance will be the watchword for others. The United States must be prepared to "let" some states be dominated and to direct its efforts at placing space between the **falling dominoes** rather than trying to define a line of containment. In the realm of economics, while supporting free trade, the objective should be to move toward autarchy and self-sufficiency so that other states cannot manipulate or threaten the United States. If the United States cannot dominate the sources of supply, it must be prepared to "substitute, tide over, [and] ride out" efforts at resource manipulation.[26] World order concerns must also take a backseat in U.S. foreign policy. As George Kennan has said about the food-population problem, "We did not create it and it is beyond our power to solve it."[27] Kennan argues that the United States needs to divest itself of its guilt complex and accept the fact that there is really very little that it can do for the Third World and very little that the Third World can do for the United States. The following summarizes the Disengaged America perspective:

1. The major threat to U.S. national security comes from an overactive foreign policy. Events beyond U.S. borders are not as crucial to U.S. security as is commonly perceived; moreover, the United States has little power to influence their outcome.
2. The United States' responsibility to other states is minimal. The primary responsibility of the United States is to its own economic and military security.
3. The United States' responsibility to the global community is also minimal. The issues on the global agenda, especially as they relate to the Third World, are not the fault of the United States, and the United States can do little to solve them.

From the Disengaged America perspective, traditional principles of defense planning are largely irrelevant.[28] Military power should no

longer be employed to further human rights or economic principles beyond American borders. Rather than pursuing military goals, American foreign policy must concentrate on protecting American lives and property, the territorial integrity of the United States, and the autonomy of its political system. Consistent with these priorities, American military power should only be used for three purposes: (1) to defend the approaches to U.S. territory, (2) to serve as second-chance forces if deterrence fails or unexpected threats arise, and (3) to provide finite essential deterrence against attacks on the United States and its forces overseas.

The Disengaged America perspective has few qualms about the need to defend American interests or take action unilaterally and forcefully in doing so. Preemption as a means for dealing with terrorists is not a repugnant strategy. The primary concern is that the War on Terrorism has as its objective not simply the defeat of the enemy, but its transformation. In the words of Pat Buchanan, an assistant and special consultant to Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Reagan, the purpose of American foreign policy is "America First—and Second, and Third." Some twenty-five years later, Buchanan reiterated this theme, writing, "This is not isolationism. It is putting our country first . . . It used to be called patriotism."[29]

Over the Horizon: The U.S.–China Relationship

China has become the central reference point for discussing the present and future direction of U.S. foreign policy. In 2019, General Mark Milley (who would soon become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) told Congress that China may be the primary threat to the U.S. military for a century.[30] In the Council of Foreign Relations' annual Preventive Priorities Survey, a 2019 poll of five hundred scholars and practitioners ranked thirty challenges to U.S. interests. Five scenarios were identified as being of high impact and moderate likelihood and placed in Tier 1. One involved an armed confrontation in the South China Sea between China and its neighbors. Another, a China-Taiwan conflict, was placed in Tier 2.[31]

Identifying the ways in which China presents a challenge to the U.S. is only the starting point for thinking about U.S.–China relations over the horizon. It is also necessary to anticipate the extent to which cooperation or conflict will dominate that relationship.[32] The two end points of the debate on this question are engagement and confrontation. *Engagement* is a strategy based on the potential for cooperation, promoting democracy, and creating a free market economy in China. It is identified with U.S. foreign policy dating back to 1972, when President Richard Nixon made his surprise visit to China. Advocates of *confrontation* argue that engagement failed. From their perspective, China is a revisionist state and strategic challenger with policies targeted toward significant reduction in U.S. global power.[33] Defenders of engagement argue that it did not fail but was misrepresented, and that, in many ways,

it is just as much of a gamble to rely on a strong U.S. military to end this challenge.[34]

Between these two perspectives are images of U.S.–China relations built around the idea of limited competition. China is seen not as a state interested in remaking the international system but as a competitor seeking to gain influence in and increased benefits from it. Some describe this middle ground as coevolution, benign competition, or a view of China as a junior superpower.[35] Still others see that a triangular strategic partnership among China, Russia, and the United States will become the cornerstone of global stability.[36]

Numerous starting points exist for thinking about which of these pathways will best come to characterize U.S.–China relations in the future. Each of the following four possibilities draws upon themes developed throughout *American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future:*

Organize the development of policy options around the fundamental forces that drive international relations. Possibilities range from casting these relations as a clash of civilizations representing alternative and competing value systems to focusing on economic, political, military, and geographic forces that drive the foreign policies of states.[37] One danger highlighted by this starting point is the Thucydides Trap, named for the ancient Greek historian who studied the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta. He observed that the war was made inevitable by the fear that Athens' rise in power instilled in Sparta.[38]

1. View U.S.–China relations as the coming of a new Cold War. If this is true, the logical starting point for U.S. foreign policy is to replicate the policy of containment practiced during the Cold War. Those who reject this starting point argue that China and the Soviet Union are not alike, the military challenges they present differ, their level of economic interaction is much higher, and the American society supporting containment no longer exists. [39]
2. Focus the development of policy options and challenges on how the United States and China view world politics. An often-cited obstacle to cooperation is the American sense of *exceptionalism* (see chapter 3), according to which the United States sees itself either as the indefensible state or the aggrieved and exploited state. Both versions place other states in a subordinate position. Similarly, many see reestablishing China's leadership role in world affairs as a driving force in its foreign policy.
3. Focus on how the United States and China approach solving foreign policy problems. In the case of the United States, the emphasis is on immediate problem solving, in which a solution is identified and put into place with the expectation that success will soon follow. China, on the other hand, is defined by many observers as having a long-term perspective. Incremental gains and the avoidance of direct conflict are seen as underlying their development of policies.[40]

These starting points for thinking about future U.S.–China relations are not mutually exclusive. More than one may be of importance, but their influences will vary depending on the time, place, and nature of the foreign policy problem. The challenge is to identify how they interact and what policies they support.

Critical Thinking Questions

1. In selecting a foreign policy for the future, which of the three questions we ask is most important, and why?
2. Identify one foreign policy option that is missing and needs to be added to the list. Why is it needed?
3. What power resources are most needed by the United States in facing the future, and why?

Key Terms

America the Balancer, 360
American Crusader, 359
Disengaged America, 362
empire, 357
falling dominoes, 364
hedging strategy, 361
Ordinary State, 356
Pragmatic America, 358
Reformed America, 357

Further Reading

Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "Unraveling America the Great," *The American Interest* 11 (Summer 2016), 7–17.

The authors call for a renewal of the Rooseveltian (FDR) foundations of success and influence in the world. They express deep concern over the growing influence of radical conservative anti-internationalism.

Jacob Helibrunn, "Trump Transformed," *National Interest* 161 (March 2019), 5–9.

This article raises the following question: "Does the Trump presidency mark the end of an era or is it a passing moment?" The author notes that Trump's willingness to change policy is not matched by his ability to do so.

Robert Kagan, "The Allure of Normalcy," *The New Republic* (June 9, 2014), 14–31.

The author calls for the United States to reject a return to the normalcy that guided foreign policy in the post–World War I era. He argues that it must adopt a definition of the national interest which recognizes the need to defend the global liberal international order.

Michael Lind, "The Case for American Nationalism," *The National Interest* 131 (May 2014), 9–20.

The author of this article calls for a foreign policy of primacy rather than one of hegemony. To this end, he favors an offshore balancing or concert balancing strategy and supports the call for the United States to become a normal country in world politics.

Joseph Nye, *Is the American Century Over?* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015).

This book argues that the American century is far from over, because its military, economic, and soft power resources will continue to far exceed those possessed by its closest rivals for several decades.

David Shlapak, "Toward a More Modest American Strategy," *Survival* 57 (April 2015), 59–78.

The author argues that the United States needs to place limits on its global ambitions. He identifies five challenges that should drive force planning, all of which focus on defeating an adversary's attempt to project power and not on internal Pentagon politics.

Fareed Zakaria, "The Self Destruction of American Power," *Foreign Affairs*, 98 (July 2019), 10–16.

Zakaria argues that the United States has squandered the unipolar moment, a problem accentuated by Trump's presidency. He asks if the United States will now witness the decline of the empire of ideas that now dominate international politics.

Glossary

action channels Decision-making linkages between organizations and individuals that determine who participates in bureaucratic politics decision-making games. Important because not everyone "plays" in these games. Players and their power are determined by where they fit in the action channels.

action indispensability Decision-making situations in which action by policy makers is critical to success or failure. The identity of the actor is not essential because the response was standard and expected.

action policy U.S. foreign policy as it is actually carried out with respect to a problem. Refers to what is done rather than what is said. Often contrasts with declaratory policy. Originally used in the context of U.S. nuclear policy.

actor indispensability Decision-making situations in which not only is action by policy makers critical to success or failure but the identity of the actor is seen as being key to the outcome.

alliance A formal agreement among states to provide military assistance to each other. Alliances vary in the types of aid offered and the nature of the commitment.

America the Balancer A possible future foreign policy strategic orientation of U.S. foreign policy that is based on a limited and selective involvement in world affairs.

American Crusader A possible future foreign policy strategic orientation of U.S. foreign policy that is based on the idea that the United States faces real and immediate security threats and has the power and moral responsibility to lead.

"America first" perspective A perspective on foreign policy in which priority is given to the interests of American firms over those of other states. Identified with bureaucracies such as the Commerce and Agriculture Departments.

analogy Central to method of reasoning in which comparisons are made between events and objects as the basis for making judgments about similarities and differences. Foreign policy often involves comparison of present with past events.

arms control Policy designed to bring about restraint in the use of weapons. Generally involves reduction in numbers of weapons but does not have to do this. Often contrasted with disarmament.

arms sale Purchase of weapons by one state from another. The distinguishing feature of arms sales is the quality of the weapons obtained. Unlike in the case of arms transfers, these weapons tend to be among the most preferred in the seller's inventory.

arms transfer Process of providing weapons to another state for free or at greatly reduced prices. Typically, these weapons are characterized as being excess defense articles or emergency allocations.

assured destruction Nuclear strategy under Johnson predicated on U.S. ability to destroy a significant portion of Soviet population and economic capability in retaliation for a Soviet attack on the United States.

bargaining Process by which two or more states reach agreement on a policy through a process of give and take. It can take place in formal settings or informally. A subtype of negotiations.

barnacles Riders or amendments that are attached to foreign policy legislation. Often needed to secure its passage, they can result in features being added that complicate the conduct of U.S. diplomacy. Reporting requirements are an example.

bipartisanship Situation in domestic politics of American foreign policy, where a policy is supported by both political parties. Seen as a sign of national unity and communicates resolve to opponents. It came into use following World War II when foundations of containment policy were put into place.

bipolar Characterizes an international system that is conflict prone and divided into two competing and mutually exclusive blocs each led by a superpower. Often subdivided into loose and tight variants depending on the unity of the blocs and the distance separating them. The Cold War was a bipolar system.

black box Part of rational actor decision-making perspective. Assumes that foreign policy is a response to actions and events in the international system. Therefore, one does not need to examine domestic politics, and events inside the state can be ignored or black boxed.

blowback The negative consequences that result from foreign policy actions. Originally used with reference to CIA covert actions but now applied more generally to foreign policy initiatives.

boycott A refusal to buy or sell goods from a company or country. Alternatively, a refusal to attend a meeting or negotiations.

Bretton Woods system International economic order created after World War II consisting of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs. Formally ended in 1974 when Nixon took the United States off the gold standard.

Bricker Amendment Failed attempt by Congress in the 1950s to limit the president's ability to use executive agreements in place of treaties as instrument of U.S. foreign policy. It would have required Senate advice and consent to executive agreements before they took effect.

bureaucratic politics Decision-making model that emphasizes the influence of bureaucratic factors, most notably, self-interest. Policy is not decided upon so much as bargained into existence.

casus belli The factors or events used to justify going to war.

CEO system Presidential management system introduced by George W. Bush that emphasizes the importance of providing overall direction to policy and selecting qualified individuals and then removing oneself from the day-to-day affairs of governing.

civil-military relations The overarching relationship between professional military officers and civilian policy makers. Involves issues such as who has ultimate authority, the values to be pursued, and political neutrality.

closed belief system A belief system is a set of interrelated mental images about some aspect of reality. A closed belief system is one that does not change in spite of contradictory evidence. Contrasts with an open belief system.

CNN effect Phrase designed to convey increased importance of the media for determining the foreign policy agenda of the United States by its ability to arouse and shape public opinion and to force policy makers to respond quickly to unfolding events.

coalitions Informal alignment of states that come together out of self-interest to deal with a specific problem. Common forms include voting blocs at an international organization and combinations of military forces such as those in the Persian Gulf War and the Iraq War.

coercive diplomacy Use or threatened use of force against another state for political purposes. Typically refers to military force but can include economic force. Purposes can include deterrence and compellence.

cognitive consistency The tendency of individuals to seek out information and stimuli that are supportive of one's beliefs and attitudes.

collegial system Presidential management system that emphasizes cooperation, team work, and problem-solving as primary values for top presidential aides and department heads.

compellence Use or threat of using military force to prompt another state to undertake a desired action. Contrasts with deterrence in which force is used or threatened to prevent an action from taking place.

competitive system Presidential management system that emphasizes playing off aides against one another and assigning the same task to multiple units in order to maximize information flow and freedom of maneuver.

conference diplomacy Category of diplomacy that focuses on large international gatherings that are generally open to all states. Typically, they focus on a single problem or issue and attempt to lay down rules for addressing the problem. Differs from summit diplomacy where only a few states attend.

constructivism A theoretical perspective for studying international relations that emphasizes the subjectivity of actions. Emphasis is placed on understanding how the developments are viewed by the participants by examining ideas, culture, history, and the dynamics of interaction.

containment U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union for much of the Cold War. Predicated on the assumption that the potential for Soviet aggression was constant but could be checked by applying constant counterpressure to thwart it. Over time, this policy was expected to produce a mellowing of Soviet foreign policy.

counterinsurgency The military strategy for fighting an insurgency, which is defined as an armed rebellion against a recognized government. The military strategy counterinsurgency also contains political, economic, and psychological dimensions.

counterproliferation Military strategy designed to prevent the spread of weapons. Most frequently talked about in context of weapons of mass destruction, it can be seen as a preemptive use of force.

country team Comprises the representatives from all U.S. agencies represented in an embassy. Headed by the ambassador. It is meant to signify that a united purpose exists to U.S. foreign policy in the country.

covert action Activities to influence military, economic, and political conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the U.S. government not be apparent.

cyber warfare A variety of attacks on computer and information systems for the purpose of causing damage or destruction through such means as computer viruses or denial of service attacks.

declaratory policy Public statements of U.S. foreign policy with regard to a problem. Refers to what is said rather than what is done. Often contrasted with action policy. Originally used in the context of U.S. nuclear policy.

denuclearizing Process by which a state that has acquired or is pursuing a nuclear weapon reverses course and agrees to forego it.

détente Foreign policy associated with Nixon. Rather than containing the Soviet Union, it sought to establish a working relationship by treating it as a legitimate power and engaging it in a series of mutually beneficial arms control and economic relationships that would reduce its threat to the United States, thus making global conflicts more manageable.

deterrence The use of power to prevent an unwanted action from taking place. Most frequently, it refers to the use of military power and in the context of the Cold War, the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union.

digital diplomacy The use of the Internet and information and communication technologies such as social media and twitter to achieve diplomatic objectives.

disarmament Policy designed to reduce the number of weapons in existence. May be applied to specific weapons or inventories in general. Logical endpoint is zero weapons but need not necessarily reach this point. Often contrasted with arms control.

Disengaged America A possible future foreign policy strategic orientation of U.S. foreign policy that is based on minimal global engagement and learning to live in a second-best world.

economic statecraft The use of economic resources and tools to achieve foreign policy goals.

elite theory Decision-making model that stresses the overwhelming influence of economic class and ideology on policy. Contrasts with pluralism, arguing that there does not exist a system of checks and balances among competing interests.

embargo A prohibition of selling goods or services to another country.

empire A hierarchically structured grouping of states ruled from one power center. It is debated whether or not the U.S. position of dominance in the world qualifies it to be an empire. Similarly, it is debated how long the U.S. empire, if it exists, can survive.

executive agreement Arrangements entered into with other countries by the president that are not subject to a congressional vote. The Supreme Court has ruled executive agreements hold force of law as do treaties.

falling dominoes Term associated with the Cold War, it denotes the possibility that a U.S. foreign policy failure in a given country or military engagement may set off a chain reaction leading to the fall of many states, resulting in a major national security crisis.

fast track Today known as Trade Promotional Authority. Voted on by Congress for set periods of time, it gives the president the authority to enter into international trade negotiations, guarantees a prompt vote by Congress, and limits Congress's ability to modify treaties that come before it.

firewall A blockage or separation that is intended to stop the spread of a dangerous condition. In warfare, it is often used to signify attempts to create a dividing line between conventional and nuclear weapons.

flexible response Nuclear strategy under Kennedy that called for wide range of military responses, including a variety of nuclear options to deal with Soviet challenges.

foreign service officer Professional diplomatic corps of the United States. Has been controversial at times for its values and degree of separation from American society as a whole.

formalistic system Presidential management system that employs strict hierarchical decision-making structure on decision-making processes.

free trade International economic policy based on the principle of the open and nondiscriminatory flow of goods across borders. Achieved through the removal of government-imposed barriers to trade.

gadfly A congressional orientation to foreign policy in which an individual raises concerns about the direction of U.S. foreign policy not out of an interest in short-term electoral gains but with an eye toward affecting the long-term direction of policy.

gatekeeper An individual who determines the types of information and which individuals have access to a policy maker. Gatekeepers are crucial to establishing effective decision-making routines and yet also a liability because they can distort the information on which policy is made.

generational events Those highly visible and psychologically significant events that influence the worldview of a generation of individuals, whether they were experienced directly or not. The Great Depression, Pearl Harbor, and Vietnam are often given as examples.

globalization Refers to the process of the growing pace and density of economic, political, and cultural interactions in international affairs. Viewed by some in a positive light as a force that unites peoples; others see it as a threatening condition that fosters conflict among people and countries.

grand strategy Overarching conceptual framework for integrating and applying all elements of power. Establishes the general direction, purposes, and logic of U.S. foreign policy. Often associated with presidential doctrines.

groupthink Common consequence of small-group decision-making dynamics. Concurrence seeking behavior on the part of group members causes them to reach fundamentally flawed decisions.

guerrilla war Unconventional war strategy that emphasizes hit-and-run tactics and prolonged warfare rather than direct engagement of enemy forces in decisive battles. Ultimate objective is to get government to overreact and lose support of the people.

hard power The power to coerce. Generally associated with military power. It seeks to impose an outcome on an opponent.

hedging strategy A foreign policy strategy in which the United States acts cautiously to ensure that the failure of no single initiative can inflict great harm on U.S. national interests. It requires keeping open lines of communication with all states and not locking the United States into an all-or-nothing situation.

hegemony Domineering and uncontested leadership that is rooted in the political, economic, and military ability to impose one's will on others. Often used to characterize the position of the dominant state in a unipolar system and the U.S. position in the world after the end of the Cold War.

hybrid warfare A form of warfare that employs a combination of conventional and unconventional military strategies along with informational and other nonmilitary resources and societal resources to achieve victory.

imperialism A foreign policy of domination in which one state controls the people, resources, and political activity in other states generally by military force. Critics of U.S. foreign policy have often argued that it has been imperialist in dealings with developing countries.

intermestic Foreign policy problems that contain both domestic and foreign policy dimensions thus complicating efforts to solve them and defy the traditional dichotomy of foreign versus domestic policy.

internationalism An orientation to world affairs that stresses the importance of taking an active role in global decision-making in order to protect and promote national security and economic prosperity. Can be undertaken both in the pursuit of liberal or conservative goals.

Iraq syndrome Much speculated on possible negative public reaction to U.S. involvement in Iraq that will prevent policy makers from using force in the future, just as Vietnam syndrome did in the 1970s.

isolationism An orientation to world affairs that stresses the dangers of global involvement rather than its benefits. Strong defenses and unilateral action are seen as necessary to protect the national interest. A sharp distinction is drawn between the national interest and the global interest.

legalism Part of the American national style. The belief that foreign policy problems can be solved through the application of legal formulas and principles.

legislative veto A situation where Congress repeals presidential action or the decision of a Federal agency by writing legislation so that it can be overridden by a majority of one or both Houses. Contained in the War Powers Resolution.

Lippmann Gap The difference between a country's power resources and the goals it wishes to achieve. Named after political columnist Walter Lippmann, who argued that the larger this gap, the greater the likelihood that U.S. foreign policy would fail.

massive retaliation Nuclear strategy under Eisenhower that sought to deter the Soviet aggression throughout the world by threatening a large-scale retaliatory strike on the Soviet Union.

military after next Phrase used to describe need to think beyond immediate problems and focus on long-term bureaucratic requirements of U.S. foreign policy. Can also be "State Department after next" or "CIA after next."

military-industrial complex A phrase used in Eisenhower's farewell presidential address. Most narrowly used, it speaks to the unchecked influence of industry lobbyists and allies in the military to obtain funds for weapons systems and militarize American foreign policy.

models A simplified depictions of a complex process or structure used to generate insights into their nature. May be mathematical or descriptive.

moral pragmatism Part of the American national style. Brings together the belief that foreign policy ought to be driven by the pursuit of principles and that they can be solved by applying an engineering problem-solving logic.

multipolar Characterizes an international system in which there are at least five major powers. No permanent dividing line separates them into competing blocs; rather, the major states enter into a series of shifting alliances to preserve national interests. Nineteenth-century Europe is seen as a multipolar period.

national interest The fundamental goals and objectives of a state's foreign policy. Used as if it were self-explanatory, it is a contested concept that holds great emotional power in political debates.

national style Refers to deeply engrained patterns of thought and action on how to approach foreign policy problems and their solutions. More generally, it establishes the basis for how a country looks out at the international system and defines its role in world politics.

negotiation Broadly defined as a dialogue to resolve disputes. This result may be achieved through mediation, fact finding, or bargaining. On occasion, negotiations are entered into by states not to solve problems but to gain an advantage through obtaining information or the publicity it generates.

neoconservatism In foreign policy, it refers to an activist and unilateral orientation to involvement in world affairs for the purpose of promoting democracy and free trade that stresses the use of military power to defeat enemies. Seen by many as the dominant viewpoint of the George W. Bush administration following 9/11.

neoliberalism A theoretical perspective for studying international relations that stresses the ability of states to cooperate, solve problems, and defend their interests peacefully. Emphasis is placed on the importance of mutually beneficial economic interactions, the peaceful effects of democracy, and the importance of international laws and organizations.

noise Background clutter of irrelevant or misleading data that complicates the task of policy makers trying to identify important pieces of information or signals that will help them formulate policy.

nontariff barrier A nontax barrier to free trade. Generally takes the form of requirements to ship national vessels, purchase goods in a specific country of origin, or meet safety and health or environmental standards imposed on goods and their production.

opportunity costs In conducting foreign policy, states are faced with the reality of limited time and limited resources. The pursuit of any objective necessarily comes at the expense of pursuing other goals that now must be neglected.

Ordinary State A possible future foreign policy strategic orientation of U.S. foreign policy that is based on the presumption that the United States has no greater responsibility for maintaining global order than does any other state.

outsource To rely on nongovernmental or private sector agencies to carry out assigned tasks. Found throughout foreign policy area. Became controversial with large-scale use of private contractors during the Iraq War.

oversight Congressional regulatory supervision of the Federal bureaucracy. The stated objective is not day-to-day managerial control but ensuring accountability of decisions made and improving performance.

paramilitary Operations carried out by forces or groups distinct from the professional military for which no broad conventional military capability exists. They are often carried in hostile, politically sensitive, or denied areas.

peacekeeping Operations conducted in postconflict areas to observe the peace process and implement peace agreements. Although not exclusively military in nature, peacekeeping operations generally build upon a significant military presence in the country affected.

pledge system Form of international cooperation in which countries promise voluntarily to support an agreement. No enforcement mechanism is created.

pluralism Decision-making model that sees policy as the result of competing interest groups. The government is often pictured as a neutral umpire making policy to reflect position of strongest groups.

policy entrepreneur A congressional orientation to foreign policy, whereby the individual takes positions on foreign policy legislation, primarily with an eye toward the electoral advantage it might bestow rather than a long-range concern for the issue itself.

poliheuristic decision-making A model of decision-making that emphasizes the presence of a two-stage decision-making process only the second of which involves engaging in an analysis of options.

political creep The tendency for political criteria and considerations to replace professional ones in assignment of personnel to positions within foreign policy bureaucracy. Once identified with appointment of political fund-raisers to ambassadorships, it is now also an issue at lower levels of bureaucracies.

politicizing intelligence Situation where professional expertise and objectivity of intelligence reports is replaced by partisan political considerations. Associated with phrases such as intelligence-to-please and cherry-picking.

positional issues Refers to foreign policy issues in elections that find candidates taking opposite sides. The dominant logic of primary campaigns. A frequent result is to oversimplify issues.

post-American world An international system, some say, may come into existence in the near future. It is characterized by the rise in the power of competing states to create an international system in which the United States has reduced influence.

Pragmatic America A possible future foreign policy strategic orientation of U.S. foreign policy that is based on the view that the rapid changes in world politics make it inadvisable for U.S. foreign policy to be guided by a broad set of principles. Instead, it should focus on the particulars of each situation as they arise.

preemption Striking first in self-defense. In classical usage, a distinction is drawn between preemption, which occurs when the threat is immediate, and prevention, when it is more long term or generic.

presidential finding Mandated by the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, it requires that except under exceptional circumstances, presidents inform key members of Congress in advance of the scope of CIA operations.

presidential personality Refers to those traits of the president that are important for understanding how he defines problems and solutions as well as his outlook on the use of presidential power.

proliferation Spread of weapons. Two different versions exist. Horizontal, in which weapons spread to additional countries, and vertical, in which case, the inventories of states already possessing the weapon grow larger.

prospect theory Decision-making model that sees policy makers far more willing to take risks to defend what they have than to pursue new goals and objectives.

proxy war War fought on behalf of another state that does not actively participate in the war itself. Typically associated with a smaller or regional ally fighting on behalf of a major power.

public diplomacy Diplomatic activity that is directed at the public at large

in a target state. Contrasts with classical diplomacy, which is conducted in secret and involves government-to-government relations. Based on the belief that the public can influence the foreign policy decisions of adversaries.

public goods Policy benefits that are not the object of competition among state and cannot be possessed by a state or group of states and denied to all others. Often characterized as goals that are in the global interest such as a clean environment, absence of disease, or an international stable economic order.

Quadrennial Defense Review Congressionally mandated four years of U.S. defense strategy. Used to identify scenarios that might confront the United States and forces that might be needed to meet that threat. In practice, has often been largely a symbolic exercise.

quota Quantitative restriction placed on the amount of goods allowed to enter a country from another country.

rally-around-the-flag effect Tendency for public opinion to coalesce and support the president's foreign policy position in times of crisis. Reflects both the power of the presidency and media to shape public opinion as well as the lack of in-depth knowledge that many Americans have on foreign policy matters.

ratify To give approval. Treaties in the United States are ratified by the president after the Senate has given its advice and consent by a two-thirds majority.

rational actor Decision-making model that stresses foreign policy; it should be viewed as a deliberate and calculated response to external events and actions. Values are identified, options are listed, and a choice is made that best ensures that the most important values will be realized.

realism A theoretical perspective for studying international relations that emphasizes the struggle for power carried out under conditions of anarchy. Conflict and competition are seen as permanent features of world politics. Security, not peace, is the central objective of foreign policy.

Reformed America A possible future foreign policy strategic orientation of U.S. foreign policy that is based on the belief that the time is appropriate to give preference to traditional American values over narrowly defined security interests in dealing with global problems.

reporting requirement A statement added on to legislation, requiring periodic reports by implementing agencies or the president on the status of a situation. They have been used by Congress as a means of keeping up the pressure on presidents to carry out foreign policy according to its wishes. Generally, escape hatches are included to give presidents freedom to act.

Revolution in Military Affairs Term used to capture the transformational power that modern information and communication technology were expected to have in conduct of military campaigns. Widely used in U.S. defense planning and weapons procurement decisions after Persian Gulf War. Now challenged by new emphasis on counterinsurgency warfare.

sanctions Penalties or other means of enforcement used to create incentives for countries to act in accordance with policy edicts of the sanctioning state. Typically involves the use of economic instruments of foreign policy.

shock and awe Massive bombing campaign used by United States in opening of Iraq War. Designed as much to psychologically intimidate enemy as to defeat it on the battlefield. Associated with military logic of Revolution in Military Affairs.

shuttle diplomacy negotiations or talks mediated by a third party who travels frequently between the counties who are involved in the dispute.

signal Piece of information that will help policy makers formulate policy. Often difficult to identify because of the presence of noise that masks their presence and significance.

signing statement Comments made by the president when signing legislation into law and used to identify which parts of the legislation he objects to and will not enforce. Effectively allows the president to veto certain parts of a bill without having to veto the entire bill.

smart sanctions Penalties or other measures that are targeted on specific groups or individuals in a target state. Adopted out of a concern that sanctions, particularly economic sanctions, unfairly punish all individuals in a society rather than just those engaging in the disputed behaviors.

soft power The power to influence and persuade. It attracts others to one side rather than forcing them to support your cause as is the case with hard power. Often associated with diplomacy, positive economic incentives, and, more generally, the attraction of American culture, ideas, and values.

sovereignty The principle that no power exists above the state. The state alone decides what goals to pursue and how to pursue them. Its relevance as an absolute standard is questioned by many in today's world of globalization, terrorism, and large-scale power inequalities among states.

spiral of silence Tendency for those holding minority views to remain silent when they fail to see the media report stories that support their position. Results in an exaggerated sense of national unity.

stability operations Military operations undertaken to restore and maintain order and stability in regions or states where a competent civil authority no longer functions.

standard operating procedures Central part of bureaucratic politics model. States that policy is implemented not with an eye to the particulars of a situation or a problem but in a routine and predictable fashion, with the result that policies often fail to achieve their intended purpose.

sufficiency Nuclear strategy under Nixon that emphasized strategic equality with the Soviet Union and the possession of a minimum retaliatory threat.

summit conference Category of diplomacy that involves meetings of the heads of government of a small number of states. Popularized during World War II and the Cold War. They are now less negotiating sessions and more occasions to sign agreements reached in other settings.

tariff Tax on foreign products coming into a country. May be put in place to raise revenue, protect domestic industries from foreign competition, or punish another state.

terrorism Violence employed for purposes of political intimidation. It may be employed in the support of any set of goals and carried out by nonstate actors or state agencies. It may exist as a strategy in its own right or as the first stage in a larger guerrilla war conflict.

think tanks Generic phrase used to describe organizations that engage in policy analysis and advocacy. They may be nonprofits, represent corporate interests, or funded by governments.

tipping point Term used to describe foreign policy issues in which elite and public opinion are sufficiently divided that a shift in public opinion holds the

potential for changing the direction of policy.

trade promotional authority Once known as fast-track authority. Voted on by Congress for set periods of time, it gives the president the authority to enter into international trade negotiations, guarantees a prompt vote by Congress, and limits Congress's ability to modify treaties that come before it.

unilateral president View of presidential power that emphasizes strength rather than weakness. By acting unilaterally to make policy statements, create organizations, appoint individuals to key positions, and take action, the president is seen as able to dominate the political agenda and outmaneuver Congress and the Courts, placing them in a reactive position.

unilateralism Part of the American national style. It is an orientation to action that emphasizes the value of going it alone. When cooperation with others is needed, it must be carried out on one's own terms and with a minimal level of commitment to joint action.

unipolar Characterizes an international system in which one power dominates over all others. No balancing or competing bloc exists. Rare at the international level, it has been more common at the regional level such as in Latin America and East Europe. Some see the contemporary international system as unipolar.

valence issues Refers to electoral foreign policy issues, which find all candidates taking the same side. Common in general elections. For voters, the choice becomes not what position to endorse but who they think is best capable of achieving the agreed-upon outcome.

Vietnam syndrome Refers to what many interpreted as the primary lesson of Vietnam. The perception that the American public will not again support long-term military engagements that result in the substantial loss of American lives. Consequently, any military action must be quick and decisive.

War Powers Resolution The major Cold War attempt by Congress to limit a president's ability to use military force without its approval. Its constitutionality has never been tested. No president has officially recognized its binding nature on their decision-making power.

weapons of mass destruction Overarching term used to describe nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Radiological weapons and delivery systems are also often included in the definition. During the Cold War, the term related almost exclusively to nuclear weapons.

Wilsonianism A set of foreign policy ideas associated with Woodrow Wilson. The core essence of these ideas is contested. Generally seen as foundational is the notion that the United States has a moral and national security obligation to spread democracy and create a liberal international order.

window of fear The onset of a set of short-term conditions that lead policy makers rationally to conclude that military action needs to be taken, regardless of how small the prospects of victory are, because conditions will only get worse in the future.

window of opportunity The onset of short-term conditions that lead policy makers rationally to conclude that military actions needs to be undertaken because they possess a clear and distinct military advantage over the enemy.

yellow journalism Phrase used to characterize media coverage of foreign policy that stresses a provocative, overly dramatic, and sensationalistic treatment of events over measured reporting and a concern for factual accuracy.

Notes

Chapter 1: Defining American Foreign Policy Problems

[1] Office of Director of National Intelligence, World Threat Assessment (Washington, DC: U.S. government Printing Office, 2019).
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Index

A

Abe, Shinzo, 163
Abu Ghraib prison, 68
Acheson, Dean, 7, 24, 59, 165, 309
Acheson-Lilienthal Committee, 309
action channels, 224
action indispensability, 172
action policy, 6–7, 305
actor indispensability, 172
actor proliferation, 37–38
Adams, Abigail, 185
Adams, John, 69, 185
administrative powers, 169
adversaries, 250–51
Aerospace Industries Association, 118
Afghanistan: al Qaeda in, 2; budgetary powers and, 148; Bush Doctrine and, 18; Carter Doctrine and, 16; choices in foreign policy in, 4; covert action in, 340–42; foreign aid to, 148; incentives and, 249; inheriting foreign policy problems in, 4; loss of intelligence in, 248; Mujahedin, 17, 341; paramilitary action in, 339; People's Democratic Party, 16; Reagan Doctrine and, 17; reconstruction in, 100; Soviet invasion of, 41, 67, 81, 96–97, 108, 340–41; Taliban, 17–18, 181, 316, 331–32, 341–42; US involvement in, 340–42
Afghanistan War: Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), 160; costs of, 6–7; counterinsurgency (COIN) in, 335; large-scale conventional military force and, 316; NATO and, 332; Operation Enduring Freedom, 6–7; pivoting out of, 330–32; public opinion on, 56, 111–12; US deaths in, 6–7
AFL-CIO, 116
Africa, US military presence in, 353–55
Africa Command (AFRICOM), 354
African Development Bank, 291
Agriculture Department, 212
Aidid, Mohamed Farrah, 362–63
Air-Sea Battle strategy, 316–17
al-Assad, Bashar, 110, 313, 340, 343
Albright, Madeline, 55
Alexander, Keith, 130
Alexander the Great, 331
Allawi, Iyad, 95
Allende, Salvador, 60, 151, 338
Alliance for Progress, 164–65
alliances, 247
allies, 250–51
Allison, Graham, 224
al-Maliki, Nouri, 95
al Qaeda, 2, 41–42, 96, 107, 160, 183, 341, 354
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), 134
America First Committee, 10–11
"America First" perspective, 212. *See also* Trump, Donald
American Cities Climate Challenge, 269
American Crusader perspective, 359–60
American Enterprise Institute (AEI), 122
American hegemony, 44–45
American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), 118–19
American national style: consequences of, 64–65, 67–69; future trends, 72–73; historical sources of, 57–59; ideas, importance of, 54–55; patterns of, 59–64
Americans with Disabilities Act, 136
America the Balancer perspective, 360–61
Amnesty International, 68, 116
analogies, 78
Angell, Norman, 232
Angola, paramilitary action in, 339
anti-access (A2) challenges, 317
Anti-Apartheid Act, 151
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, 138, 319, 321, 324
apartheid, 107, 231
apathetic internationalism, 124
Apple, 130
appointment powers, 139
Arab American Institute, 119
Arab-Israeli War, 319
Arab Spring, 135, 345
Arbenz, Jacobo, 60, 338
area denial (AD) challenges, 317
Argentina, trade agreements with, 279
Arizona, illegal immigrants and, 128
Armitage, Richard, 100
arms control: Cold War, 318–20; hotline, 319; overview, 317–18; post-Cold War, 320–22
Arms Export Control Act, 147, 265
arms transfers, 265–68, *266*
Army Reorganization Act, 200
Asian Development Bank, 45
Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement, 167
Aspin, Les, 168
assassination, 339–40

assessment of foreign policy results: consistency of application, 23–24; domestic politics, influence of, 22–23; intellectual coherence, 22
assured destruction, 308
asymmetric wars, 333
AT&T, 130
Atlantic Council, 122
Atomic Development Authority, 309
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 205
Atoms for Peace plan, 318
Australia: arms sales to, 266; trade agreements with, 279
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), 143–45, 157, 159–60

B

Bacevich, Andrew, 96–97, 331
Bahrain, shuttle diplomacy and, 251
Ball, George, 90
Ballistic Missile Review Report, 324
Bannon, Steven, 23, 176, 180–81, 209, 245, 331
Barber, James David, 173–75
bargaining, 246
barnacles, 147
Baruch, Bernard, 309–10
Baruch Plan, 308–10, 318
Battista y Zaldivar, Fulgencio, 83
Bay of Pigs, 60, 83, 157, 165, 238, 338–39
Begin, Menachem, 16
Benghazi attack, 149, 152–53, 192
Benton, William, 10
Berlin Wall, 313
Biden, Joe, 159, 182
big wars: arms control and, 317–23; assured destruction, 308; Baruch Plan, 308–10; Cold War nuclear strategy, 306–8; Cold War nuclear thinking, 305–10; Cold War strategic arsenal, 305–6; defense, 323–25; deterrence, 306–7, 312–14; disarmament and, 317–23; flexible response, 307–8; future trends, 325; large-scale conventional military force, 315–17; massive retaliation, 306–7; national missile defense systems, 324–25; New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and, 325; nuclear-conventional divide, 312–15; post-Cold War nuclear strategy, 311–12; post-Cold War nuclear thinking, 310–12; post-Cold War strategic arsenal, 310–11; preemption, 307, 314–15; small wars versus, 332–33; Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars) and, 323; sufficiency, 308
bilateral development assistance, 291
bilateralism, 247
bilateral trade agreements, 278–79
Billington, James, 103
bin Laden, Osama, 18, 67, 113, 316, 341, 343
biological weapons, 346–47
Biological Weapons Convention (1975), 347
bipartisanship, 7–8, 157
bipolar stratification, 34
black box, 223
black knights, 283
Blair, Dennis, 180
Blair, Tony, 93
Bloomberg, Michael, 269
blowback, 7
Boehner, John, 104, 158
Boeing, 117, 155
Boeing 737 Max 8 planes, 37
Bohlen, Charles, 214
Boko Haram, 38
Bolton, John, 21, 24, 181, 220–21, 325
Booz Allen Hamilton, 130
Border Patrol, 52
Bosnia: drones in, 336; humanitarian intervention in, 112, 125
bottom-up negotiations, 302
Bowles, Chester, 10
boycotts, 275
Bracero program, 65–67
Brazil, trade agreements with, 279
Bremer, Paul, 94–95
Bremmer, Ian, 43
Brennan, John, 206
Brenner, Jerry, 166
Bretton Woods monetary system, 43, 137, 277, 281
Bricker Amendment, 167
Brookings Institution, 154
Brooks, Stephen, 45
Brown, Harold, 208
Brown, Jerry, 269
Bryan, William Jennings, 170
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 175
Buchanan, Pat, 365
budgetary powers, 147–49
budget hawks, 154
Bundy, McGeorge, 90, 178
Bundy, William, 179
bureaucracy: future trends, 214–15; policy maker responses, 214; Presidents and, 192. *See also specific entity*
bureaucratic politics model, 224–25, 238–40
Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), 205
Burkina Faso, US military presence in, 354
Bush, George H.W.: arms control and disarmament and, 320–21; China and, 114; Earth Summit and, 259; Haiti and, 53; Iraq and, 64; large-scale conventional military force and, 315; managerial style of, 175–76; media and, 125; NAFTA and, 293–94; national missile defense systems and, 324; National Security Council (NSC) and, 180; Persian Gulf War and, 82, 127; personality of, 173; Pragmatic America perspective and, 359; Somalia and, 363; Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars) and, 323; war powers and, 171

Bush, George W.: action indispensability and, 172; Afghanistan War and, 111, 341; Africa, US involvement in, 355; al Qaeda and, 2; approval rating, 113; assassination and, 339–40; Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) and, 157; biological weapons and, 347; bipartisanship and, 8; budgetary powers and, 148–49; Bush Doctrine, 13–14, 18, 54; choices in foreign policy and, 4; Congress and, 157–58; diplomacy and, 250; domestic politics, influence of, 22; double standards and, 68; drones and, 336; elite theory and, 230; executive agreements and, 167; fast-track authority and, 146; first 100 days, 164; foreign aid and, 295; Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) under, 195; Global War on Terrorism and, 96; human rights conferences and, 260; immigration and, 147; inheriting foreign policy problems and, 4; Iraq War and, 82, 93, 95, 97–99, 124, 127, 166; Kyoto Protocol and, 257; Libya and, 21; managerial style of, 175–76; Mexican migrants and, 67; Mexico and, 52; National Security Council (NSC) and, 180; North Korea and, 302–4; nuclear weapons and, 311; personality of, 174–75; preemption and, 313–15; public diplomacy and, 262; rendition and, 342; signing statements and, 168; spending and administrative powers and, 169; trade agreements and, 279–80; transition planning and, 186; treaties and, 136, 138; unilateralism and, 61; Venezuela and, 76; Vietnam War and, 97; war-peace dichotomy and, 67; as Wilsonian, 70
Bush, Laura, 185
business groups, 116–18
Buy American Act, 274
Byrnes, James, 309

C

California, sanctuary movement in, 128
Cambodia: bombing of, 105; Geneva Peace Accords and, 87; Nixon Doctrine and, 15; reconstruction in, 100; sanctions against, 282; US invasion of, 89, 141, 180
Camp David Accords, 16, 267, 290
Canada: NAFTA and (*See* North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)); quotas and, 275; U.S.-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement and, 146, 167, 273; in Western system, 38
Card, Andrew, 184
Carter, Ashton, 200
Carter, Jimmy: appointment powers and, 139; arms control and disarmament and, 319; arms sales and, 267; Carter Doctrine, 13, 16, 22–23; Congress and, 157; domestic politics, influence of, 22; elite theory and, 230; first 100 days, 164; Hispanic support for, 119; human rights and, 36; inconsistency in foreign policy, 23; informal ambassadors and, 170; managerial style of, 176; Middle East and, 96–97; National Security Council (NSC) and, 179–80; Panama Canal Treaties and, 157, 173; personality of, 173; Rosalynn and, 185; small-group decision-making model and, 226; treaties and, 136, 139; war powers and, 171
Carter, Rosalynn, 185
Casey, George, 24
Casey, William, 152, 179, 209
Case-Zablocki Act, 157, 167–68
Castro, Fidel, 35, 53, 83, 165, 237–38, 285, 338–40
Catholic Church, 123
Cato Institute, 122, 154, 333
Center for a New American Century, 130
Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 258
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 122
Central African Republic, Russian involvement in, 354
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 205–11; Afghanistan and, 341; bin Laden and, 343; blowback and, 7; Congressional control of, 151; Contras and, 17; Counterterrorism Center, 206; covert action and, 338, 341; Directorate of Digital Innovation, 206; Directorate of Intelligence, 206; Directorate of Operations, 206; Director of Central Intelligence, 208–9; growth of, 205–8; Guatemala, intervention in, 60; Homeland Security Department and, 213; impact on foreign policy, 210–11; intelligence professionals, 210; Iraq War and, 93; National Clandestine Service, 206; paramilitary action and, 338–39; politicization of intelligence, 209; public diplomacy and, 262; structure of, 205–8; value system, 208–10

Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), 15
Chao, Elaine, 121
Chavez, Hugo, 76–77, 122–23
chemical weapons, 346–47
Chemical Weapons Convention (1997), 138, 346–47
Cheney, Dick, 129, 180, 182–83
Chertoff, Michael, 53
Chiang Kai Shek, 89
Chicago, sanctuary movement in, 128
Chicago Council of Global Affairs, 109–10
Chile: trade agreements with, 279; US intervention in, 60
China: Africa, involvement in, 354; Air-Sea Battle strategy and, 316–17; American hegemony and, 45; arms control and disarmament and, 322; Belt and Road Initiative, 299; coercive diplomacy with, 264; confrontation and, 365–66; covert action in, 338; cyberspace and, 348; cyber warfare and, 343; détente and, 15; drones and, 350; in East-West system, 39; embargoes against, 275; engagement and, 365–66; future trends regarding, 48; "Great Wall of Sand," 28–29; Japan and, 30–31; "loss" of, 89–90, 114; military power of, 45–46; monetary policy and, 277; New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and, 325; Nixon Doctrine and, 22; Open Door Notes and, 63; People's Liberation Army (PLA), 45–46; public opinion on, 47; relations with US, 114, 365–67; sanctions and, 266; South China Sea and, 27–29, 39, 317, 365; strategic trade and, 276; Taiwan and, 365; tariffs and, 123, 155, 174; Tiananmen Square protests, 114; trade war with, 287–88, 299; Venezuela and, 76
Christian Broadcasting Network, 122
Christian Coalition of America, 116
Church Committee, 339
Churchill, Winston, 182
CIA. *See* Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
cities, foreign policy and, 128
Citizens for a Nuclear Free Iran, 119
civil-military relations, 203
Clapper, James, 130, 345
Clay, Lucius, 99
Clean Water Act, 53
Cleveland, Grover, 171
Climate Action Now Act, 269
Clinton, Bill: action indispensability and, 172; appointment powers and, 139; bin Laden and, 343; Earth Summit and, 259; fast-track authority and, 146; first 100 days, 164; foreign aid and, 295; Haiti and, 53–54, 64; Kosovo and, 78; Kyoto Protocol and, 257; managerial style of, 175–76; media and, 125; Mexico and, 52; NAFTA and, 293–94; National Security Council (NSC) and, 180; North Korea and, 302–4; nuclear weapons and, 311; personality of, 173; public diplomacy and, 262; quotas and, 275; Somalia and, 363; spending and administrative powers and, 169; treaties and, 138
Clinton, Hillary, 121, 127, 153, 185, 192–93, 260, 294, 345
closed belief systems, 79
cluster munitions, 349
CNN, 125, 127
CNN effect, 126
coalitions, 247
Coast Guard, 213
Coats, Daniel, 130, 209–10, 254
coercive diplomacy, 263–64, 337
cognitive consistency, 79
Cohen-Nunn Act, 197
Cold War: foreign aid during, 292; Iraq War, analogy with, 96–97; nuclear strategy, 306–8; nuclear thinking, 305–10; remnants of, 39; strategic arsenal, 305–6; Truman Doctrine and, 14–15
collegial system, 176
Colombia: civil war, 198; Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), 76; trade agreements with, 279
Commerce Department, 121–22, 212
commerce powers, 145–46
Commission on Wartime Contracting, 156
Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, 215
Committee Against Jim Crow in Military Service and Training, 199
Committee of 100 for Tibet, 116
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR), 235
Committee on the Present Danger, 230
compellence, 265, 361
competitive system, 175
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), 281
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act, 284
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 157, 169

concurrent resolutions, 146–47
conference diplomacy, 255–60
confrontation, 365–66
Congress, foreign policy and: absence of single voice, 152; appointment powers, 139; barnacles, 147; blunt foreign policy tools, 146–52; budgetary powers, 147–49; commerce powers, 145–46; commissions, 156; competitive Congress, 156–59; concurrent resolutions, 146–47; disengaged Congress, 156–58; earmarking, 147; future trends, 159–60; gadflies, 153; general legislative powers, 146–47; joint resolutions, 146–47; legislative bills, 146–47; outsourcing of foreign policy, 155–56; oversight, 149; party, influence of, 154–55; policy entrepreneurship and, 152–53; President, relationship with, 156–59; region, influence of, 154–55; reporting requirements, 150–51; simple resolutions, 146–47; staff aides and, 153–54; strategic Congress, 157; supportive Congress, 157; treaty-making powers, 136–39; war powers, 139–40, 142–43
Congressional Budget Office, 153
Congressional Research Service, 153, 290
consensus building, 7–8
Constitution, foreign policy and: administrative powers, 169; appointment powers, 139; commerce powers, 145–46; executive agreements, 167–68; executive orders, 168–69; informal ambassadors, 170; signing statements, 168; spending powers, 169; treaty-making powers, 136–39; undeclared wars, 170–71; war powers, 139–40, 142–43
constructivism: decentralization and, 33; overview, 32; self-help principle and, 34; stratification and, 35
containment, 14–15, 54
contested zones, 334
Contras, 17, 62, 339. *See also* Iran-Contra Affair
Conventional Arms Transfer Policy (CAT), 268
conventional weapons, 348–49
Convention on Cluster Munitions (2010), 349
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, 320
Copenhagen Accord (2009), 246, 257–58
Corker, Bob, 158
costs of foreign policy, 6–7
Coughlin, Charles, 11
Council of Foreign Relations, 365
Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, 267, 287
counterinsurgency (COIN), 95, 98–99, 334–35
counterproliferation, 349–50
counterterrorism, 336
country teams, 193
covert action, 337–38
Cox, Archibald, 141
Cuba: Bay of Pigs, 60, 83, 157, 165, 238, 338–39; diplomacy with, 250; embargoes against, 275; incentives and, 249; Mariel boatlift, 53; migration from, 119–20; Reagan Doctrine and, 17; reconstruction in, 100; relations with US, 82–84; sanctions against, 35, 282–83, 285–86; Soviet Union and, 84; Truman Doctrine and, 15
Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), 120
Cuban Democracy Act, 120, 285
Cuban Missile Crisis, 234–41; arms control and disarmament and, 318–19; bureaucratic politics model and, 238–40; legalism and, 64; lessons learned from, 83–84; media and, 125; overview, 234–37; rational actor model and, 237–38; small-group decision-making model and, 226, 240–41; unilateralism and, 60
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 53
Customs Service, 213
Cyber Command, 207
cyberspace, 347–48
cyber warfare, 328–30, 343–44
Czechoslovakia, Soviet invasion of, 67, 81

D

Darroch, Kim, 214
Davidson, Philip, 29
debt relief, 290–91
decentralization, 33
declaratory policy, 6, 305
deductive analysis, 223
defense, 323–25
Defense Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission, 156
defense contractors, 117–18
Defense Department, 196–204; civil-military relations, 203; functionalists, 202; fusionist view in, 203; generalists, 202; growth of, 197–98, 200–202; impact on foreign policy, 204; integration of military, 198–202; on ISIS, 41; National Security Council (NSC) and, 180; outsourcing, 198; professional military, 203–4; Revolution in Military Affairs, 204; Secretary of Defense, 202–3; structure of, 197–98,

200–202; traditional view in, 203; value system, 202–4
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 205
deliberative decision-making, 242
Denver, sanctuary movement in, 128
détente, 15, 22, 27–29, 55, 88, 157
deterrence, 14–15, 54, 306–7, 312–14, 361
Deutch, John, 311
DHS. *See* Homeland Security Department (DHS)
Diem, Ngo Dinh, 87, 91–92
diffusion of power, 35–36
digital diplomacy, 262–63
diplomacy: adversaries, 250–51; allies, 250–51; ambivalence toward, 68; arms transfers, 265–68, *266*; bargaining, 246; bilateralism versus multilateralism, 247; climate change and, 244–46, 268–69; coercive diplomacy, 263–64, 337; conference diplomacy, 255–60; digital diplomacy, 262–63; East-West superpower summits, 253; economic summits, 253–54; environmental conferences, 259; friends, 250–51; future trends, 268–69; human rights conferences, 259–60; incentives versus sanctions, 248–49; negotiation, 246; nuclear diplomacy, 264–65; process versus product, 247–48; public diplomacy, 261–62; shuttle diplomacy, 251–52; summit diplomacy, 252–55; tool kit, 246–47; United Nations and, 260–61
direct deterrence, 312
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), 205, 208–9
Director of National Intelligence (DNI), 209–10
disarmament: Cold War, 318–20; hotline, 319; overview, 317–18; post-Cold War, 320–22
Disengaged America perspective, 362, 364–65
Djibouti, Chinese involvement in, 354
Dobrynin, Anatoly, 237
domestic politics, influence of, 22–23
domestic surveillance, 103–5, 129–30, 153–54
Dominican Republic: reconstruction in, 100; US intervention in, 60, 67, 315
Donilon, Thomas, 184
donut strategy, 128
double standards, 67–68
Drezner, Daniel, 25
drones, 218–21, 336, *337*, 350–51
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), 212–13
Dulles, Allen, 208
Dulles, John Foster, 59, 79, 85–86
Dunford, Joseph Jr., 220–21
Durban Review Conference (2009), 260

E

Eagleton, Thomas, 142
earmarking, 147
Earth Summit (1992), 259
East-West superpower summits, 253
East-West system, 39
economic aid, 290
economic statecraft, 273–74
economic summits, 253–54
Egypt: arms sales to, 267; drones and, 350; executive agreements and, 168; foreign aid to, 289–90, 292; rendition in, 342; shuttle diplomacy and, 251
Eisenhower, Dwight: arms control and disarmament and, 318; Cuba and, 83, 90, 165; deterrence and, 313; integration of military and, 200; Korean War and, 164; managerial style of, 176; on military-industrial complex, 117, 129; National Security Council (NSC) and, 178; nuclear diplomacy and, 265; nuclear weapons and, 307, 313; personality of, 174; Vietnam War and, 85–86, 98
elections, 113–16; foreign policy and, 113–14; impact of, 114–16; positional issues, 114; Russian interference in, 127, 149–50, 174, 209, 254–55; valence issues, 114; Vietnam War and, 113
elite theory, 229–30
Ellender, Allen, 151
Ellsberg, Daniel, 70, 106
El Salvador: foreign aid to, 298; Reagan Doctrine and, 17
embargoes, 275
embassies, 193
Emmanuel, Rahm, 128
empires, 44
Endangered Species Act, 53
Energy Department, 205, 213
engagement, 365–66
engineering approach, 62
environmental conferences, 259
Environmental Protection Agency, 152, 158
Erdogan, Recep, 21
Esper, Mark, 220–21
Espionage Act of 1917, 70, 106
ethnic groups, 118–20
Ettinger, Aaron, 22
evangelicalism, 59
evolutionary trends in international system: actor proliferation, 37–38; diffusion of power, 35–36; issue proliferation, 36–37; regional diversity, 38–39

exceptionalism, 55, 366
ExCom, 235–37, 239–41
executive agreements, 167–68
Executive Order 1379, 163
executive orders, 168–69
Export Control Act of 1949, 275
extended deterrence, 312
extraterritoriality, 30
Exxon, 116

F

Facebook, 127, 262
Fall, Bernard, 99
falling dominoes, 364
fast-track authority, 145–46, 279
Federal Aviation Administration, 37, 299
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 41, 130, 205, 213
Federal Election Commission, 118
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 213
Feinstein, Dianne, 154
Ferdinand (Austria-Hungary), 231
Ferguson, Niall, 43, 233
Fillmore, Millard, 30
firefighting oversight, 149
firewall, 312
First Lady, 185
flexible response, 307–8
Flynn, Michael, 23, 163–64, 180, 204
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 37, 213
Food for Peace program, 212, 292
Ford, Gerald: arms control and disarmament and, 192, 319; managerial style of, 176; Mayaguez incident and, 142; Vietnam War and, 89
Ford, Henry, 11
Foreign Agriculture Service, 212
foreign aid: bilateral development assistance, 291; during Cold War, 292; contemporary foreign aid, 298–99; debt relief, 290–91; economic aid, 290; humanitarian economic assistance, 291; military assistance, 291; multilateral development assistance, 291; nonemergency food aid, 292; nontraditional foreign aid, 290; post-Cold War, 292–93, 295; post-9/11 foreign aid, 295–96; recipients of, *289*; remittances, 290; traditional foreign aid, 290; types of, 290–92
Foreign Assistance Act, 151
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), 104, 150
foreign lobbyists, 120–22
foreign policy visions: American Crusader perspective, 359–60; America the Balancer perspective, 360–61; Disengaged America perspective, 362, 364–65; falling dominoes and, 364; hedging strategy and, 361; Ordinary State perspective, 356–57; Pragmatic America perspective, 358–59; Reformed America perspective, 357–58; selectivity and, 358
Foreign Service Officers (FSOs), 191, 193–96
formalistic system, 175–76
Forrestal, James, 202
Fourteen Points, 70
Fourth Amendment, 104, 154
Fourth United Nations Conference on Women (1995), 185
Fox News, 127
France: covert action in, 338; Vietnam War and, 85–87, 90; World War I and, 231–33
Freedman, Lawrence, 334
Freeh, Louis, 121
free rider problem, 9–10
free trade, 273, 275–76
friends, 250–51
Fromkin, David, 70
Fulbright, William, 106
fundamentalism, 59

G

Gaddafi, Muammar, 38, 67, 110, 171, 314, 343, 345
gadflies, 153
gatekeepers, 184
Gates, Robert, 9, 98, 116, 184, 209, 345
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 43, 137, 255–56, 281–82
generational events, 79
Geneva Peace Accords (1954), 87
genocide, 333
Gephardt, Richard, 116
Germany: covert action in, 338; de-Nazification in, 99; reconstruction in, 99–100; World War I and, 231–33
Gibson, Chris, 159
Gilpin, Robert, 35
Gingrich, Newt, 121
Giuliani, Rudolph, 120, 128
Global Development Alliance, 290
globalization, 42–43
Global Leaders' Meeting on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment, 260
global trade agreements, 281–82
Global War on Terrorism, 18, 96, 168, 262, 268, 295
Golan Heights, 20
Goldwater, Barry, 113
Goldwater-Nichols Act, 197
Gorbachev, Mikhail, 18, 61, 253, 320
Gordon, Susan, 210
Gore, Al, 182
Goss, Porter, 121
Government Accountability Office, 153
grand strategy, 12, 24–25
Gravel, Mike, 105

"Great Wall of Sand," 28–29
Greece, Truman Doctrine and, 14
Grenada: reconstruction in, 100; US intervention in, 60, 64, 67, 171, 197, 315
Group of 6 (G6), 253
Group of 7 (G7), 253–54
Group of 8 (G8), 39
Group of 20 (G20), 253–54
groupthink, 227, *228*, 229
Guaido, Juan, 75–77
Guantanamo Bay, 68, 147, 239–40
Guatemala: foreign aid to, 298; paramilitary action in, 338; remittances to, 290; Truman Doctrine and, 15; US intervention in, 60
guerrilla wars, 87
Gulf of Tonkin incident, 88
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 88, 141, 157
Gulf War. *See* Persian Gulf War

H

Hadi, Abdu Abdullah Mansour, 134
Hadley, Stephen, 95, 116
Haiti: humanitarian intervention in, 112, 125, 344; migration from, 53–54
Halberstam, David, 241
Haldeman, H.R., 265
Haley, Nikki, 287, 298
Hamas, 350
Hamilton, Alexander, 69–71, 140
Hanoi Summit, 304
hard power, 9
Haspel, Gina, 209, 220–21
Hawaii, annexation of, 30
Hayden, Michael, 328–29
Hearst newspaper chain, 125
hedging strategy, 361
hegemony, 44–45
Helms, Richard, 208, 340
Helms-Burton Act, 84, 285
Helsinki Human Rights Agreement (1975), 56, 168
Heritage Foundation, 122, 154
Hezbollah, 334, 350
Hitler, Adolf, 90
Ho Chi Minh, 85, 87, 90
Hoffman, Frank, 333
Holsti, Ole, 92
Homeland Security Council, 181, 184
Homeland Security Department (DHS), 41, 52, 130, 163, 205, 213
Honduras: foreign aid to, 298; remittances to, 290
Hopkins, Harry, 170
hotline, 319
House, Colonel, 170
Huawei, 279
Hughes-Ryan Amendment, 151, 343
Hull, Cordell, 170
humanitarian economic assistance, 291
humanitarian operations, 344–45
human rights, 36
human rights conferences, 259–60
Human Rights Watch, 345
Humphrey, Hubert, 80
Hussein, Saddam, 18, 82, 95, 110, 113, 313, 340, 346, 360
Hybrid Threat Training Circular, 334
hybrid warfare, 333–34

I

ideological public interest groups, 122–23
Illinois, sanctuary movement in, 128
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 213
impatience, 68
imperialism and domination, 273
impulsive decision-making, 242
incentives, 248–49
indexing, 126
India: drones and, 350; nuclear weapons in, 322; transfer of nuclear material to, 142–43
individual-centered models, 241–42
Indonesia: Nixon Doctrine and, 15; rendition in, 342; Truman Doctrine and, 15
inductive analysis, 223
informal ambassadors, 170
intelligence community. *See specific entity*
intelligence-industrial complex, 129–31
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), 260
interest groups: business groups, 116–18; ethnic groups, 118–20; foreign lobbyists, 120–22; ideological public interest groups, 122–23; impact of, 123
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), 37
Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, 138, 320–22
intermestic issues, 36–37, 184
International Atomic Energy Agency, 318
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. *See* World Bank
International Court of Justice, 29
International Criminal Court (ICC), 129, 169, 295
International Disability Treaty (2007), 136
internationalism, 56–57, 108
International Labor Organization, 137
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 43, 168, 277
international trade, *117*
International Trade Organization (ITO), 137, 256
Internet, 125–26
interventionism, 57
intuitive decision-making, 242
Iran: choices in foreign policy in, 4; coercive diplomacy with, 264; counterproliferation and, 350; cyber warfare

and, 329–30; diplomacy with, 250; downing of US drone by, 218–21, 334; drones and, 350; executive orders and, 169; hostage crisis, 96, 226; hostage rescue mission, 171, 197; Iraq War and, 100; Islamic Revolutionary National Guard Corps, 220–21; Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (MEK), 120–21; Muslim ban and, 163; Nixon Doctrine and, 15; nuclear agreement with, 6, 68, 100, 284–85, 322; nuclear weapons and, 322; ouster of Shah, 41, 79–82; paramilitary action in, 338; revolution in, 108; sanctions against, 282–85; State Department reports on, 151; Syria, influence in, 2; Truman Doctrine and, 15; Venezuela and, 76
Iran-Contra Affair: consequences of, 67–68; covert action and, 337, 339; groupthink and, 227, *228*; inconsistency in foreign policy and, 23; informal ambassadors and, 170; moral pragmatism and, 62–63; National Security Council (NSC) and, 179; Reagan Doctrine and, 17
Iran-Iraq War, 346
Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, 284
Iran-Libya Sanctions Extension Act of 2001, 283
Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, 284
Iran Threat Reduction Act, 284
Iraq: al Qaeda and, 2, 183; Anbar Awakening, 95; budgetary powers and, 148–49; Bush Doctrine and, 18; chemical weapons in, 346–47; Coalition Provisions Authority (CPA), 94–95; counterproliferation and, 350; covert action in, 340; de-Ba'athification in, 7, 94–95, 99; diplomacy with, 250; humanitarian intervention in, 344; inheriting foreign policy problems in, 4; ISIS in, 1–3, 336; Kuwait, invasion of, 97, 107, 110, 298, 315; Muslim ban and, 163; nuclear weapons and, 322; Osiraq nuclear power plant, 350; reconstruction in, 99–100
Iraq Study Group, 95
Iraq syndrome, 84
Iraq War, 92–100; Abu Ghraib prison, 68; Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), 143–45, 157, 160; bipartisanship and, 8; chronology of, 93–96, *94*; Cold War, analogy with, 96–97; costs of, 7, 110; counterinsurgency (COIN) in, 95, 98–99, 335; ideological public interest groups and, 123; intelligence community and, 205; Iran and, 100; Korean War, analogy with, 98, 100; large-scale conventional military force and, 315–16; lessons from past and, 82; new media and, 126; Operation Iraqi Freedom, 7, 315; overview, 92–93; political protest and, 124; preemption and, 315; public awareness of foreign policy issues and, 107; public opinion on, 56, 110; reconstruction and, 99–100; "shock and awe," 93, 315; US deaths in, 7; Vietnam War, analogy with, 97–98; war-peace dichotomy and, 67
Irish Republican Army, 41
irredentism, 333
Islamic caliphate, 2
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 1–3, 39, 41–42, 96, 329, 336, 340, 354
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), 39, 96
isolationism, 56–57, 108–9
Israel: arms sales to, 267; drones and, 350; executive agreements and, 168; Golan Heights and, 20; Hezbollah and, 334; Iran-Contra Affair and, 17; nuclear weapons in, 322; Palestinians and, 118–19; shuttle diplomacy and, 251
issue proliferation, 36–37
Italy, covert action in, 338

J

Jackson, Andrew, 69, 71–72
Jackson, Henry "Scoop," 155
Jackson, Jesse, 119
Jackson-Vanik Amendment, 157
Janis, Irving, 227, 240
Japan: China and, 30–31; diffusion of power and, 35–36; lobbying by, 121; Meiji Restoration, 30; nuclear weapons, use in, 305; opening of, 27–29; Pearl Harbor, attack on, 78–82; reconstruction in, 99–100; sanctions against, 282; signing statements and, 168; strategic trade and, 276; tariffs on, 279; Truman Doctrine and, 15; in Western system, 38
Javits, Jacob, 142
jawboning, 130
Jefferson, Thomas, 69, 71, 82
Jentleson, Bruce, 110
Johnson, Lyndon: boycotts and, 275; election of, 113; managerial style of, 175–76; military planning, participation in, 140; National Security Council (NSC) and, 178–79; personality of, 173; preemption and, 315; Vietnam War and, 87–92, 106, 141

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 87–88, 196
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), 284–85, 322
Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons, 317
joint resolutions, 146–47
Jolly, Stuart, 121
Jordan, Hamilton, 170, 184
Justice Department, 41, 149–50, 169

K

kaffeeklatsch approach, 175
Kaine, Tim, 159
Karzai, Hamid, 341–42
Kellogg–Briand Pact (1928), 63–64
Kelly, John, 170, 176–77, 181, 184–85, 204, 213
Kennan, George, 22, 61, 364
Kennedy, Edward, 97
Kennedy, John F.: arms control and disarmament and, 319; arms sales and, 267; Cuba and, 83; Cuban Missile Crisis and, 234–41; executive agreements and, 167–68; first 100 days, 164–65; foreign aid and, 292; Iran and, 80; managerial style of, 176; National Security Council (NSC) and, 178; nuclear weapons and, 307–8; personality of, 173; small-group decision-making model and, 226; State Department and, 214; summit diplomacy and, 252; Vietnam War and, 85, 87, 89–91, 97–98
Kennedy, Robert, 237, 240–41
Kenya, attack on US embassy in, 41, 341, 343
Kerrey, Bob, 97
Kerry, John, 97, 148, 170, 251
Khashoggi, Jamal, 20–21, 118, 135, 170, 251
Khrushchev, Nikita, 164, 236–40, 252, 319
Kilcullen, David, 99
Kim Jong-un, 21, 114, 176, 252, 254, 303–4
Kissinger, Henry, 22, 80, 89, 106, 168, 180, 192, 251
Korean War: deterrence and, 313; efforts to end, 164; embargoes and, 275; Iraq War, analogy with, 98, 100; legalism and, 64; lessons learned from, 90–91; loss of intelligence and, 248; nuclear diplomacy and, 265; public opinion on, 110; small-group decision-making model and, 226; unilateralism and, 60
Kosovo, humanitarian intervention in, 78, 112
Kurds, lobbying by, 121–22
Kushner, Jared, 170, 176, 209
Kuwait: Iraqi invasion of, 97, 107, 110, 298, 315; shuttle diplomacy and, 252; State Department reports on, 151
Kyoto Protocol, 152, 164, 246, 257–58

L

La Follette, Phillip, 10
Laird, Melvin, 97, 265
landmines, 260, 349
Lansing, William, 170
Laos: bombing of, 105; Geneva Peace Accords and, 87; Nixon Doctrine and, 15
large-scale conventional military force, 315–17
League of Nations, 56, 60, 63, 70, 173, 185, 232
Lebanon: attack on US Marines in, 23, 41, 68, 98, 197; US hostages in, 17, 62
legalism, 63–64
legislative bills, 146–47
legislative vetoes, 142
Lend-Lease, 11, 273
lessons from past: avoiding failure, 82; continuity, 81–82; events learned from, 79–80; Iraq War, 92–100; methods of learning, 78–79; "more of the same," 81; repeating success, 82; types of calculations, 80–81; Vietnam War, 84–92
liberal anti-Americanism, 47
Liberal Christianity, 59
Libya: Benghazi attack, 149, 152–53, 192; cyber warfare and, 343; humanitarian intervention in, 344; Muslim ban and, 163; NATO intervention in, 38; nuclear weapons and, 21, 322; public opinion on, 110; rendition in, 342; Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and, 101, 264; stability operations in, 345; State Department reports on, 151; war-peace dichotomy and, 67
Lighthizer, Robert, 183
Lilienthal, David, 309
Limited Test Ban Treaty, 318
Lindbergh, Charles, 10–11
Lippmann, Walter, 7, 103
Lippmann Gap, 7
Locke, John, 58
Lockheed Martin, 117–18
Lodge, Henry Cabot, 185
loose WMD material, recovery of, 347
Los Angeles, sanctuary movement in, 128
Lott, Trent, 116, 156
Louisiana Purchase, 273
Lugar, Richard, 258
Lumumba, Patrice, 339

M

MacArthur, Douglas, 200
Maduro, Nicolas, 75–78, 120
Magnitsky Act, 347
Magsaysay, Ramon, 91
Malaysia, insurgents in, 91
Manhattan Project, 309
Manifest Destiny, 12
Mao Tse Tung, 89
Mariel boatlift, 53
Marshall, Thurgood, 200
Marshall Plan, 56, 100, 196, 273, 292

Massachusetts, sanctuary movement in, 128
massive retaliation, 306–7
Mattis, James, 2, 169, 181, 190, 201, 203–4, 242, 331–32
Mayaguez incident, 142
McCain, John, 97, 153–54, 159, 186, 258, 294
McCarren-Walter Act, 147
McCarthy, Kevin, 153, 155
McCarthy hearings, 61, 157, 195
McCarthyism, 90
McChrystal, Stanley, 203
McClellan, Scott, 126
McCone, John, 208, 235, 239
McConnell, Mike, 130
McConnell, Mitch, 150, 160, 221
McFaul, Mike, 255
McGovern, George, 106, 164
McKeon, Robert, 121
McKeon Group, 121
McMaster, H.R., 176–77, 180–81, 204, 331
McNamara, Robert, 105, 125, 200, 202, 236, 239–40, 308
Mead, Walter, 69
media, foreign policy and: new media, 125–26; newspapers, 125; shaping public view, 126–27; television, 125
Medvedev, Dmitri, 321
Mexican Contract Labor Program, 65–67
Mexican War, 140
Mexico: asylum seekers entering US from, 7; border wall and, 51–54, 114, 147, 163, 169, 174; Bracero program and, 65–67; Constitution of 1917, 66; debt relief and, 290–91; migration from, 119; NAFTA and (*See* North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)); US intervention in, 315; U.S.-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement and, 146, 167, 273; Venezuela and, 76
Microsoft, 130
Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) program, 201–2
military after next, 214–15
military assistance, 291
military-industrial complex, 117, 129
Millennials, 72–73
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), 295–96, *296–98*
Milley, Mark, 365
"missile gap," 306
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), 351
Mohammed bin Salman, 134–35, 170
Moltz, James, 215
monetary strategies, 277
Monroe Doctrine, 12, 56, 59–60, 64
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987), 259
Moon Jae-in, 303
moral pragmatism, 61–63
Morgenthau, Hans, 31
Mosaddegh, Mohammed, 338
Moynihan, Daniel Patrick, 208
Mueller, Robert, 150, 254
multilateral action, 9–10
multilateral development assistance, 291
multilateralism, 247
multipolar stratification, 34
Mulvaney, Mick, 184–85
Mundt, Karl, 10
Munich Conference (1938), 90
Muslim ban, 163, 169, 213–14
Muslim Peace Fellowship, 123

N

NAFTA. *See* North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), 200
National Association of Arab Americans (NAAA), 119
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (9/11 Commission), 156
National Counterterrorism Center, 41
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, 151, 160
National Historic Preservation Act, 53
National Intelligence Council (NIC), 48–49
national interest, 5–6
national missile defense systems, 324–25
National Security Act, 177, 206
National Security Agency (NSA), 71, 103–5, 129–30, 153–54, 205–7, 250
National Security Council Document #68, 22
National Security Council (NSC), 151–52, 169–70, 177–81, 226
National Security Presidential Memorandum 13, 329
National Strategy Target List (NSTL), 307
National War Powers Commission, 159
NATO. *See* North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
negotiation, 246
neoconservatism, 54, 230
neoliberalism: decentralization and, 33; overview, 32; self-help principle and, 34; stratification and, 34–35
Netanyahu, Benjamin, 153, 158
Neutrality Act, 11
neutrality principle, 62
New America, 122
New Deal, 164
New Jersey, sanctuary movement in, 128
New Left, 40–41
new media, 125–26

New Orleans, sanctuary movement in, 128
newspapers, 125
New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), 64, 115, 136, 312, 325
Nicaragua: paramilitary action in, 339; Reagan Doctrine and, 17; Sandinistas, 17, 339. *See also* Iran-Contra Affair
Nicholson, John, 332
Nielsen, Kirstjen, 213
Niger: ambush of US troops in, 42, 143, 149, 353–55; US military presence in, 353–55
Nigeria: Boko Haram, 38; US military presence in, 354
9/11 attacks, 157, 172, 186, 268, 323
9/11 Commission, 156
Nixon, Richard: arms sales and, 267; budgetary powers and, 148; Congress and, 157; Cuba and, 165; détente and, 22, 55, 157; executive agreements and, 168; first 100 days, 164; gold standard and, 277; managerial style of, 176; National Security Council (NSC) and, 179; Nixon Doctrine, 12–13, 15, 54; nuclear diplomacy and, 265; nuclear weapons and, 308; personality of, 173; two-war capability and, 316; Vietnam War and, 88–90, 98, 106; War Powers Act and, 140–42
nonemergency food aid, 292
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 37
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (1970), 303, 318, 322
nontariff barriers (NTBs), 274
nontraditional foreign aid, 290
North, Oliver, 62
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 157, 183, 248, 271–73, 280, 293–95
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): Afghanistan War and, 332; as alliance, 247; containment and, 15; deterrence and, 314; internationalism and, 56; Libya and, 38; State Department and, 196; Trump and, 163; unilateralism and, 60
North Korea: choices in foreign policy in, 4; counterproliferation and, 350; cyber warfare and, 329–30; denuclearization and, 302–5, 322; diplomacy with, 249–50; embargoes against, 275; incentives and, 249; nuclear weapons in, 322; sanctions on, 261; summit diplomacy and, 252; Three-Party Talks, 303
Northrop Grumman, 117
North-South system, 38
North Vietnam: bombing of, 105; embargoes against, 275; executive agreements and, 168; Nixon Doctrine and, 15. *See also* Vietnam War
NSA. *See* National Security Agency (NSA)
NSC. *See* National Security Council (NSC)
nuclear-conventional divide, 312–15
nuclear diplomacy, 264–65
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), 311–21
nuclear weapons, 80, 305
Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (NUWEP), 308
Nunes, Devin, 149
Nunn-Lugar Threat Reduction Program, 293, 320
Nye Committee, 61

O

Obama, Barack: Afghanistan War and, 67, 332, 342; Africa, US involvement in, 355; appointment powers and, 139; approval rating, 113; arms control and disarmament and, 321; arms sales and, 268; biological weapons and, 347; on bureaucracy, 192; choices in foreign policy and, 4; coercive diplomacy and, 264; Congress and, 158–59; Copenhagen Accord and, 258; covert action and, 340; Cuba and, 120, 170, 285–86; cyber warfare and, 329–30; Defense Department and, 197, 203; diplomacy and, 250; domestic surveillance and, 104; drones and, 336; election cycle and, 115; executive agreements and, 167; executive orders and, 168–69; fast-track authority and, 146; first 100 days, 162–64; foreign aid and, 289–91, 295, 299; Group of 7 (G7) and, 254; Hispanic support for, 120; immigration and, 166; incentives and, 249; informal ambassadors and, 170; inheriting foreign policy problems and, 4; Iran and, 119, 284–85, 322; Iraq War and, 95, 316; ISIS and, 2; joint resolutions and, 147; Kyoto Protocol and, 258; "leading from behind," 54; Libya and, 64, 67, 142, 345; loose WMD material and, 347; managerial style of, 176–77; Mexico and, 52; NAFTA and, 294; national missile defense systems and, 324; National Security

Council (NSC) and, 180; new media and, 126; nuclear weapons and, 311–21; Obama Doctrines, 24; Paris Climate Agreement and, 245; personality of, 173; "pivot" to Asia, 28–29, 32; public diplomacy and, 262; rendition and, 342–43; Russia and, 286; signing statements and, 168; spending and administrative powers and, 169; Syria and, 6, 112, 154, 264; trade agreements and, 279–80; transition planning and, 186; treaties and, 136; Trump foreign policy compared, 19–20, 54, 162–64; United Nations and, 261; Venezuela and, 76–77; Vietnam syndrome and, 100; war-peace dichotomy and, 67; war powers and, 171; Yemen and, 134, 163
Obama, Michelle, 185
O'Brien, Robert, 181
Office of eDiplomacy, 262
Office of International Climate and Technology, 213
Office of Legal Counsel, 169
Office of Management and Budget, 169
Office of Special Plans (OSP), 205
Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 206
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), 205, 207–8
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 183, 212, 276
Omar, Ilhan, 153
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, 276
one plus strategy, 316
Open Door, 12
Open Door Notes, 63
Open Skies proposal, 318
Operation AJAX, 338
Operation Avarice, 347
Operation Desert Shield, 110
Operation Desert Storm, 110, 143, 350
Operation Enduring Freedom, 6–7
Operation Gatekeeper, 52
Operation Iraqi Freedom, 7, 315
Operation Mongoose, 83–84, 338
Operation Odyssey Dawn, 344–45
Operation Provide Comfort, 344, 363
Operation Restore Democracy, 344
Operation Restore Hope, 344, 363
Operation Rolling Thunder, 88
Operations Plan (OPLAN) 8010, 311
opinion cascade, 127
opinion holders, 106
opportunity cost, 7
ordered anarchy, 33
Ordinary State perspective, 356–57
Organization of American States (OAS), 64, 76
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, 64
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 36
Osgood, Robert, 65
Ottawa Treaty, 260, 349
Overseas Contingency Account (OCO), 148
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), 299
oversight, 149

P

Pakistan: budgetary powers and, 148; drones and, 350; foreign aid to, 289, 331; Nixon Doctrine and, 15; nuclear weapons in, 322; public opinion regarding US, 47; Taliban and, 331; US drone strikes in, *337*
Palestine Liberation Organization, 41
Panama: reconstruction in, 100; trade agreements with, 279; US intervention in, 60, 67
Panama Canal Treaties (1977), 16, 137–39, 157, 173
Panetta, Leon, 129, 184
paramilitary action, 338
Parcel Islands, 28
Paris Climate Agreement (2015), 37, 64, 158, 167, 244–46, 269
Paris Peace Talks, 89, 180
Partnership for Public Service, 186
Patriot Act, 154
Patriot missiles, 267, 323
patron's dilemma, 10
Paul, Rand, 71, 154, 159–60
Paul, Ron, 153
Peace Corps, 291
peacekeeping operations, 344–45
Pearl Harbor, 78–82
Peloponnesian War, 366
Pelosi, Nancy, 221
Pence, Mike, 77, 163, 182, 221, 303
Pentagon Papers, 105–6
Perot, Ross, 294
Perry, Matthew, 29–31
Perry, Rick, 245
Persian Gulf War: American Crusader perspective and, 360; Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), 143; budgetary powers and, 148; counterproliferation and, 350; large-scale conventional military force and, 315; lessons learned from, 82; media and, 125; public opinion on, 107, 110; rally-around-the-flag effect and, 127; Revolution in Military Affairs and, 204; as undeclared war, 171
Petraeus, David, 95
Pew Research Center, 108–9
phases of military activity, 93–94, *94*

Philadelphia, sanctuary movement in, 128
Philippines: budgetary powers and, 148; Huk guerrillas, 91; Nixon Doctrine and, 15; public opinion regarding US, 47; Truman Doctrine and, 15
Pillar, Paul, 61–62, 211
Plan Colombia, 295
Platt Amendment, 83
pledge system, 63
pluralism, 230–31
Point Four Program, 292
Poland: NATO and, 314; paramilitary action in, 338; rendition in, 342; Soviet Union and, 81
policy entrepreneurship, 152–53
policy-making models: bureaucratic politics model, 224–25, 238–40; critique of, 241; elite theory, 229–30; future trends, 241–42; individual-centered models, 241–42; integration of, 233–34; overview, 222; pluralism, 230–31; poliheuristic decision-making, 234; rational actor model, 223–24, 237–38; small-group decision-making model, 225–29, 240–41
poliheuristic decision-making, 234
political action committees (PACs), 118–20
political creep, 195
political protest, 123–24
politicization of intelligence, 209
Pollack, Kenneth, 135
Pompeo, Mike, 77, 130, 181, 191, 195, 208–9, 220–21, 304
Porch, Douglas, 99
positional issues, 114
post-Cold War nuclear thinking: nuclear strategy, 311–12; strategic arsenal, 310–11
Powell, Colin, 179, 183, 194
Powers, Samantha, 345
Pragmatic America perspective, 358–59
preemption, 54, 307, 314–15
Preibus, Reince, 176, 184
President, foreign policy and: action indispensability, 172; active-negative president, 173–74; active-positive president, 173; actor indispensability, 172; administrative powers, 169; bureaucracy and, 192; character, 173; chief executive officer (CEO) system, 176; collegial system, 176; competitive system, 175; Congress, relationship with, 156–59; Constitution and, 166–71; executive agreements, 167–68; executive orders, 168–69; formalistic system, 175–76; future trends, 186–87; informal ambassadors, 170; managerial style, 175–77; movers versus players, 171–72; passive-negative president, 174; passive-positive president, 174; personality, 172–75; signing statements, 168; spending powers, 169; style, 173; transitions, 186–87; undeclared wars, 170–71; unilateral president, 166; weak versus strong president, 166; worldview, 173
Presidential Committee on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, 201
Presidential Decision Directive 60 (PDD-60), 311
Presidential findings, 151–52
President's Commission on Migratory Labor, 66
preventive strike, 314
principled realism, 19
proliferation, 309, 318
prospect theory, 223–24
Protestantism, 59
proxy wars, 86
public awareness of foreign policy issues, 106–7
public diplomacy, 261–62
public goods, 6
public opinion: on Afghanistan War, 56, 111–12; on China, 47; on foreign policy, 4–5; gender-based differences, 110–11, *111*; impact of, 112; internationalism and, 108; on Iraq War, 56, 110; isolationism and, 108–9; on Korean War, 110; on Libya, 110; on Persian Gulf War, 107, 110; policy maker responses, 128–29; on Russia, 47; on Syria, 110–12; tipping points, 112; trends and content, 107–9; on US, 47–48; on use of force, 109–12; on Vietnam War, 108, 112; on World War II, 107–8, 112
Pulitzer newspaper chain, 125
Putin, Vladimir, 21, 68, 158, 174, 209, 254–55, 286, 321

Q

Qatar, shuttle diplomacy and, 251–52
Quayle, Dan, 182
quotas, 275

R

radical anti-Americanism, 48
Radio Free Europe, 262
Radio Liberty, 262
Radio Marti, 262
rally-around-the-flag effect, 127
Randolph, A. Philip, 199
Ratcliffe, John, 210
ratification, 136
rational actor model, 223–24, 237–38
Raytheon, 117
Reagan, Ronald: Afghanistan and, 340; appointment powers and, 139; arms control and disarmament and, 319–20; arms sales and, 267–68; covert

action and, 337; on defense, 323; East-West superpower summits and, 253; elite theory and, 230; foreign aid and, 292, 295; Hispanic support for, 120; human rights and, 36; immigration and, 147; inconsistency in foreign policy, 23; informal ambassadors and, 170; Iran-Contra Affair and, 62; managerial style of, 176–77; Mariel boatlift and, 53; Mexican migrants and, 67; Middle East and, 97; NAFTA and, 293; National Security Council (NSC) and, 179–80; personality of, 174; preemption and, 315; public diplomacy and, 262; Reagan Doctrine, 13, 16–18, 23, 70; Saudi Arabia and, 119; Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars) and, 323; treaties and, 138; two-war capability and, 316; Vietnam War and, 85; war powers and, 171
realism: decentralization and, 33; overview, 31
reconstruction, 99–100
Reformed America perspective, 357–58
regional diversity, 38–39
regional trade agreements, 279–81
Reliable Replacement Warhead program, 311
religion: foreign policy and, 58–59; ideological public interest groups, 123
Religious Society of Friends (Quakers), 123
remittances, 290
rendition, 342
reporting requirements, 150–51
Responsibility to Protect (R2P), 100–101, 264
Revolution in Military Affairs, 204
Reykjavik Summit (1986), 61, 253
Rhodesia, boycott of, 275
Rice, Condoleezza, 3, 8, 24, 116, 194
Rice, Susan, 345
RiceHadleyGatesLLC, 116
Robertson, Pat, 122–23
Rogers, Mike, 328
Rogers, William, 180
Rogers Act, 195
Rohrabacher, Dana, 153
Romania, rendition in, 342
Roosevelt, Eleanor, 185
Roosevelt, Franklin: America First Committee and, 11; Eleanor and, 185; first 100 days, 164; informal ambassadors and, 170; lessons from past and, 78–79; managerial style of, 175–76; military planning, participation in, 140; public opinion and, 112; Truman and, 182; Vietnam War and, 85
Roosevelt, Theodore, 30, 60, 69
Roosevelt Corollary, 60
Root-Takahira Agreement (1908), 30–31
Rosenau, James, 92
Rosenberg, Ethel, 70
Rosenberg, Julius, 70
Rostow, Walt, 87, 91, 178
Rovner, Joshua, 84
Rubio, Marco, 120
Rumsfeld, Donald, 166, 180, 202–3
Rusk, Dean, 90, 192, 235, 239
Russia: Africa, involvement in, 354; American hegemony and, 45; arms control and disarmament and, 320–22; arms sales by, 266; Crimea, annexation of, 39, 286, 314, 334; cyberspace and, 348; cyber warfare and, 329, 343; drones and, 350; in East-West system, 39; foreign aid to, 292–93; future trends regarding, 48; loose WMD material and, 347; NATO and, 314; New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and, 64, 325; nuclear accidents in, 318; public opinion on, 47; sanctions against, 158, 163–64, 286–87; Saudi Arabia and, 251; State Department reports on, 151; strategic trade and, 276; Syria, influence in, 2; terrorism in, 40; Ukraine, intervention in, 31, 39, 286, 334; US elections, interference in, 127, 149–50, 174, 209, 254–55; Venezuela and, 76–77; World War I and, 231–33. *See also* Soviet Union
Russia Today (RT), 127, 334
Russo-Japanese War, 30
Ryan, Paul, 135

S

Sadat, Anwar, 16
Saleh, Ali Abdullah, 134
SALT. *See* Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT)
sanctions: black knights, 283; diplomatic sanctions, 248–49, 261; economic sanctions, 282–87; smart sanctions, 283; snap-back, 322. *See also specific country*
sanctuary movement, 128
San Francisco, sanctuary movement in, 128
Saudi Arabia: as ally, 250–51; arms sales to, 143, 147, 266–68; drones and, 350; executive agreements and, 167–68; Khashoggi murder and, 20–21, 118, 135, 170, 251; lobbying by, 121; Nixon Doctrine and, 15; Russia and, 251; shuttle diplomacy and, 251–52; Yemen, military operations in, 121, 134–35
Schake, Kori, 129
Schlesinger, James, 61, 208
Schlieffen Plan, 231
Schneider, René, 340
Scowcroft, Brent, 184

Second Amendment, 333
Secretary of Defense, 202–3
Secretary of State, 194–95
Secret Service, 213
Secure Fence Act, 52
selection of policy instruments: hard power, 9; multilateral action, 9–10; soft power, 9; unilateral action, 9–10
selectivity, 358
self-help system, 33–34
separatism, 333
Shadow Brokers, 207
Shalom Center, 123
Shanahan, Patrick, 220–21
Sheehan, Cindy, 124
Shelton, Hugh, 121
"shock and awe," 93, 315
Shultz, George, 3
shuttle diplomacy, 251–52
signing statements, 168
simple resolutions, 146–47
Singapore, trade agreements with, 279
Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), 307–8
Sino-Japanese War, 30
small-group decision-making model, 225–29, 240–41
small wars: asymmetric wars, 333; big wars versus, 332; biological weapons, 346–47; chemical weapons, 346–47; Cold War covert action, 337–40; conventional weapons, 348–49; counterinsurgency (COIN), 334–35; counterproliferation, 349–50; counterterrorism, 336; cyberspace and, 347–48; cyber warfare, 328–30, 343–44; drones, 350–51; future trends, 350–51; humanitarian operations, 344–45; hybrid warfare, 333–34; loose WMD material, recovery of, 347; peacekeeping operations, 344–45; post-Cold War covert action, 340, 342–43; stability operations, 345
smart sanctions, 283
Smoot-Hawley Tariff, 274
Snowden, Edward, 70, 103–4, 257
social anti-Americanism, 47
soft power, 9
Somalia: humanitarian intervention in, 112, 125, 344, 362–64; Mogadishu, ambush of US troops in, 354–55, 362–64; Muslim ban and, 163; US drone strikes in, 336, *337*; US military presence in, 354–55
Sonoran Policy Group, 121
Sorensen, Theodore, 241
South Africa: apartheid in, 107, 231; nuclear weapons and, 322; public awareness of foreign policy issues and, 107
South China Sea, 27–29, 39, 317, 365
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 15, 60, 87
South Korea: drones and, 350; Nixon Doctrine and, 15; signing statements and, 168; trade agreements with, 279; Truman Doctrine and, 15
South Vietnam: Nixon Doctrine and, 15; reconstruction in, 100. *See also* Vietnam War
sovereign anti-Americanism, 48
sovereignty, 34
Soviet Union: Afghanistan, invasion of, 41, 67, 81, 96–97, 108, 340–41; arms control and disarmament and, 319; Carter Doctrine and, 16, 22; Cuba and, 84; Cuban Missile Crisis and, 234–41; Czechoslovakia, invasion of, 67, 81; détente and, 15, 55; Nixon Doctrine and, 22; nuclear accidents in, 318; nuclear weapons and, 305–6; Poland and, 81; Reagan Doctrine and, 16–18; summit diplomacy and, 252; Truman Doctrine and, 14–15, 22. *See also* Russia
Space Command, 214–15
Space Policy Directive (SPD) 4, 215
Spanier, John, 68
Spanish-American War, 82, 125, 140
Special Operations Forces, 343, 353–54
spending powers, 169
spiral of silence, 127
Spratly Islands, 28
squeaky wheels, 124
stability operations, 345
Stalin, Josef, 182
standard operating procedures, 225
State Department, 192–96; budgetary powers and, 148; Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), 205; on China, 28; country teams, 193; cyber warfare and, 329; embassies, 193; foreign aid and, 182; Foreign Service Officers (FSOs), 191, 193–96; growth of, 192–94; impact on foreign policy, 196; Iraq War and, 93; McCarthy hearings and, 61; National Security Council (NSC) and, 180; political creep, 195; reforming, 189–91; reporting requirements, 150–51; Secretary of State, 194–95; structure of, 192–94; value system, 194–95
states, foreign policy and, 128
Stevenson, Adlai, 240
Stimson, Henry, 308–9
Stoessinger, John, 171
Stoltenberg, Jens, 163
Strategic Air Command, 265
Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT), 15–16, 64, 136–37, 173, 253, 274, 319

Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), 320
Strategic Command, 215
Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars), 17, 138, 323
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), 321
strategic trade, 276
stratification, 34–35
structural constraints on international system: decentralization, 33; self-help principle and, 33–34; stratification, 34–35
Stuxnet virus, 329–30
subnational actors, 37
Sudan: Al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant, 350; Muslim ban and, 163
sufficiency, 308
summit diplomacy, 252–55
"Super 301," 276
Syria: chemical weapons in, 346; costs of US involvement in, 7; covert action in, 340; cyber warfare and, 343; inheriting foreign policy problems in, 4; Iranian influence in, 2; ISIS in, 1–3, 336; Muslim ban and, 163; new media and, 126; public opinion on, 110–12; rebel groups in, 38; "red line" in, 6; Russian influence in, 2; sanctions against, 261, 282–83; US air strikes in, 163

T

Taft, William Howard, 65
Taft-Katsura Agreement (1905), 30
Taiwan: arms sales to, 266; China and, 365
Tanzania, attack on US embassy in, 41, 341, 343
tariffs, 123, 155, 174, 274
Taylor, Charles, 122
Taylor, Maxwell, 87, 91
Taylor-Rostow Report, 87, 90
Tea Party, 72, 154
television, 125
Tenet, George, 209
terrorism: current state of, 41–42; defined, 39, 336; historical background, 40–41; Islamic extremism, 41; trends in, 40. *See also specific group or individual*
Thailand, rendition in, 342
thinking about foreign policy, 3–4
think tanks, 122
Thucydides Trap, 366
Tillerson, Rex, 134, 170, 190–91, 194–95, 245, 252, 255, 303
tipping points, 112
Tlaib, Rashida, 153
top-down negotiations, 302
Tower Commission, 227, *228*, 337
trade agreements: bilateral trade agreements, 278–79; global trade agreements, 281–82; regional trade agreements, 279–81
Trade Agreements Act, 145, 274
Trade Expansion Act, 183
trade promotional authority, 145–46
Trade Reform Act of 1974, 145
trade wars, 287–88, 299
Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 275
traditional foreign aid, 290
traffic rules, 317
TransAfrica, 119
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), 280–81
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 146, 163, 271, 280
Transportation Security Administration, 213
Treasury Department, 205, 211–12
treaty-making powers: House, role of, 138–39; ratification, 136; rejected treaties, *137*; Senate, advice and consent, 136–38
Treaty of Kanagawa (1854), 30
Treaty of Paris (1898), 82
Treaty of Versailles (1919), 136
Treaty of Westphalia (1648), 34
Trilateral Commission, 230
Trudeau, Justin, 263
Truman, Harry S: China and, 114; executive agreements and, 167–68; foreign aid and, 292; inconsistency in foreign policy, 22; integration of military and, 198–200; intelligence community and, 206; International Trade Organization (ITO) and, 256; managerial style of, 176; National Security Council (NSC) and, 177–78; nuclear weapons and, 305, 309–10; personality of, 173; simple resolutions and, 147; trade agreements and, 279; treaties and, 137; Truman Doctrine, 12, 14–15, 22; as Vice President, 182; Vietnam War and, 85
Trump, Donald: Afghanistan War and, 331–32; Africa, US involvement in, 355; "America First" strategy, 2, 10, 19, 22, 24, 55, 123, 167, 177, 189–90; approval rating, 114; arms control and disarmament and, 321–22; arms sales and, 267–68; Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) and, 143; bipartisanship and, 8; border wall and, 51–54, 114, 147, 163, 169, 174; budgetary powers and, 147; China and, 8, 29, 155, 163; choices in foreign policy and, 4; coercive diplomacy and, 264; commissions and, 156; Congress and, 158–59; crises and, 330;

Cuba and, 286; cyber warfare and, 329; Defense Department and, 197, 203–4; diplomacy and, 249; domestic politics, influence of, 23; domestic surveillance and, 104–5; drones and, 336, 351; election cycle and, 115–16; Energy Department and, 213; executive agreements and, 167; executive orders and, 169; fast-track authority and, 146; first 100 days, 162–64; foreign aid and, 295, 298–99; Group of 7 (G7) and, 254; Hispanic support for, 120; human rights and, 36; human rights conferences and, 260; immigrants in military and, 201–2; incentives and, 249; inconsistency in foreign policy, 23–24; informal ambassadors and, 170; inheriting foreign policy problems and, 4; intelligence community and, 208–10; Iran and, 2, 6, 68, 100, 160, 169, 220–21, 285, 322, 351; Iraq War and, 316; ISIS and, 1–3, 41; Israel and, 20, 153; as Jacksonian, 72; Japan and, 114; joint resolutions and, 147; legalism and, 64; managerial style of, 176–77; McCain and, 153; media and, 127; Mexico and, 7, 51–52; moral pragmatism and, 61; Muslim ban, 163, 169, 213–14; NAFTA and, 271–73; national missile defense systems and, 324; National Security Council (NSC) and, 180–81; NATO and, 314; new media and, 126; New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and, 325; North Korea and, 8, 21, 163, 249, 302–5; nuclear weapons and, 311–21; Obama foreign policy compared, 19–20, 54, 162–64; Pakistan and, 331; Paris Climate Agreement and, 245–46, 269; personality of, 174; policy-making models and, 241–42; public diplomacy and, 262–63; public opinion on, 47; Putin and, 21, 68, 158, 174, 254–55, 286; Russia and, 286–87; Russian interference in elections and, 149–50, 209, 254–55; sanctions and, 248; sanctuary movement and, 128; Saudi Arabia and, 20–21, 118, 121, 134–35; "say-do gap," 6; signing statements and, 168; South Korea and, 114, 249; Space Command and, 214–15; spending and administrative powers and, 169; State Department and, 189–91; summit diplomacy and, 252; Syria and, 2–3, 163, 316; Taliban and, 332; tariffs and, 123, 155, 174; trade agreements and, 280; trade strategy, 278; trade war with China, 287–88; transgender individuals in military and, 201; transition planning and, 186–87; Trump Doctrine, search for, 18–21; Turkey and, 21; Ukraine whistleblower and, 158–59; United Nations and, 261; Venezuela and, 75–78, 101, 120, 169; war powers and, 171; Yemen and, 158, 163
Trump, Ivanka, 170
Trump, Melania, 185
Tunney Amendment, 339
Turkey: arms sales and, 267; Cuban Missile Crisis and, 240; Truman Doctrine and, 14
Turner, Stansfield, 208
Twitter, 126–27, 262
two-war capability, 316

U

Udall, Mark, 154
Ukraine: arms sales to, 148; NATO and, 314; Russian intervention in, 31, 39, 286, 334; whistleblower and, 158–59
undeclared wars, 170–71
unilateral action, 9–10
unilateralism, 59–61
unipolar stratification, 34
United Arab Emirates: arms sales to, 147, 268; drones and, 350; shuttle diplomacy and, 251
United Kingdom: as ally, 250; free trade in, 275; Malaysia and, 91; Monroe Doctrine and, 59–60; World War I and, 231–33
United Nations: American hegemony and, 45; Arms Transfer Register, 348–49; Atomic Energy Commission, 309–10; Climate Change Conference, 244; Conference on Environment and Development (1992), 259; Conference on the Law of the Sea, 37; diplomacy and, 260–61; Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 246, 257; Human Rights Council, 261; internationalism and, 56; Iraq War and, 93; legalism and, 63–64; peacekeeping operations, 344; Relief and Works Agency, 261; UNICEF, 291; unilateralism and, 60–61
United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, 151
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), 259
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 182, 190, 290–91, 295–96
U.S. Information Agency (USIA), 262

USA Freedom Act, 104
U.S.-China Business Council, 116
use of force, public opinion on, 109–12
U.S.-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement, 146, 167, 273, 280
USS *C. Turner Joy,* 88
USS *Carl Vinson,* 163
USS *Cole,* 41
USS *Maddox,* 88
USS *Maine,* 125

V

valence issues, 114
Vance, Cyrus, 194
Venezuela: China and, 76; choices in foreign policy in, 4; coercive diplomacy with, 264; executive orders and, 169; Iran and, 76; Mexico and, 76; Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and, 101; Russia and, 76–77; State Department reports on, 151; strategic trade and, 276; unrest in, 75–78, 101
Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act, 76
Verizon Business Network Services, 104
Vice President, 182–83
Vietcong, 88
Vietnam, trade agreements with, 279
Vietnamization, 15, 88–89
Vietnam syndrome, 84, 100, 109–10
Vietnam War, 84–92; bombing in, 89; chronology of, 85–89, *86*; costs of, 110; counterinsurgency (COIN) in, 98–99; détente and, 88; Dien Bien Phu, 86; diffusion of power and, 35; drones in, 336; elections and, 113; France and, 85–87, 90; intelligence community and, 205; Iraq War, analogy with, 97–98; lessons learned from, 92; lessons used by policy makers, 89–92; Nixon Doctrine and, 15; nuclear diplomacy and, 265; Operation Rolling Thunder, 88; overview, 84–85; presidential participation in, 140; presidential personality and, 173; primacy of US in, 60; public opinion on, 108, 112; self-help system and, 34; terrorism and, 40–41; Tet Offensive, 88
virtual protest marches, 124
Vladivostok Accords, 319
Voice of America (VOA), 262
Votel, Joseph, 41

W

Walhauser, Thomas, 355
War of 1812, 140
war-peace dichotomy, 64–65, 67
war powers, 139–40, 142–43
War Powers Consultation Act, 159
War Powers Resolution, 71, 135, 140–43, 157, 159, 170–71, 355
Washington, George, 12, 56
Washington Naval Disarmament Conference (1922), 63–64
waterboarding, 342
Watergate scandal, 141, 173
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 346
Weather Underground, 41
Weinberger, Caspar, 179
Western system, 38
Western Union, 130
Westmoreland, William, 91
Whalen, Charles, 114
Wheeler, Burton, 10
White House Chief of Staff, 183–85
WikiLeaks, 126
Wilson, Edith, 185
Wilson, Woodrow, 32, 60, 69–70, 170, 173, 185, 315
Wilsonianism, 70
windows of fear, 332
windows of opportunity, 332
Wohlforth, William, 45
Women's Armed Forces Integration Act, 200
Wood, Robert, 10
Woodward, Bob, 175, 204, 241
Woolsey, James, 121
World Bank, 43, 168, 277, 291
World Council of Churches, 123
World Trade Center bombing (1993), 41
World Trade Organization (WTO), 39, 124, 146, 183, 247, 255–56, 281–82
World War I, 140, 231–33
World War II: America First Committee and, 10–11; Pearl Harbor, attack on, 78–82; presidential participation in, 140; public opinion on, 107–8, 112
Wright, Thomas, 22
Wriston, Harry, 195
WTO. *See* World Trade Organization (WTO)
Wyden, Ron, 104–5, 154

X

Xi Jinping, 163, 254, 269, 288

Y

yellow journalism, 125
Yemen: budgetary powers and, 148; Congressional actions regarding, 134–35, 171; foreign aid to, 298; Houthis, 134, 221, 264, 334, 350; inheriting foreign policy problems in, 4; Muslim ban and, 163; Saudi military operations in, 121, 134–35; US drone strikes in, 336, *337*
Yom Kippur War, 180, 251
YouTube, 127

Z

zero option, 319–20
Zoellick, Robert, 183
ZTE, 288